THE  LIBRARY 
OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


METHODS   OF  KNOWLEDGE 


AN  ESSAY  IN  EPISTEMOLOGY 


BY 

WALTER  SMITH,  PH.D. 

PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY  IN  LAKE  FOREST  UNIVERSITY 


fforfe 
THE  MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

LONDON :  MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  LTD. 
1899 

All  rights  reserved 


COPTBIOHT,  1899, 

BY  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Nortooofc 

J.  8.  Cuihing  &  Co.  -  Berwick  ft  Smtth 
Norwood  MML  U.S.A, 


PREFACE 

SOME  parts  of  this  work  have  already  been  pub- 
lished in  articles  in  the  philosophical  journals.  The 
germ  of  it  is  in  an  article  that  appeared  in  Mind 
for  October,  1895 ;  and  a  few  of  the  discussions 
have  been  presented  in  The  Philosophical  Review, 
Education,  and  The  International  Journal  of  Ethics. 
I  wish  to  thank  the  editors  of  these  journals  for 
the  courtesy  by  which  I  have  been  allowed  to  make 
use  of  this  material.  The  portions  of  it  which 
have  been  selected  have  been  in  most  cases  con- 
siderably changed. 

I  wish  to  express  my  indebtedness  to  my  brother, 
Professor  William  G.  Smith,  of  Smith  College,  for 
criticisms  and  suggestions. 

WALTER  SMITH. 

LAKE  FOREST  UNIVERSITY, 
July,  1899. 


CONTENTS 


INTRODUCTION 

MM 

1.  The  love  of  knowledge 1 

2.  Progress  of  modern  science .2 

3.  The  benefits  of  science 2 

4.  The  conflict  of  science  with  morality,  art,  religion  .        .        3 
6.  The  widespread  influence  of  science          ....        6 

6.  The  need  for  a  critical  examination  of  knowledge    .        .        6 

7.  Has  philosophy  already  made  this  criticism  ?  .        .         .        7 

8.  The  assumption  of  science  and  philosophy  that  know- 

ledge consists  in  concepts    ......        8 

9.  The  need  to  examine  this  assumption       ....        8 

10.  Psychology  indispensable  in  this  criticism        ...        9 

11.  Result  of  this  criticism  anticipated 10 

12.  Misapprehension  to  be  avoided         .        .        .        .        .11 

13.  Plan  of  this  investigation 12 

CHAPTER  I 
DEFINITION  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

1.  A  survey  of  epistemological  theories  necessary        .        .      14 

2.  Empedocles.     "Like  is  known  by  like."     This  view  of 

knowledge  characteristic  of  the  Greek  mind        .         .       14 

3.  Plato.    Metaphysical  theory.    The  vision  of  ideas.    Unity 

with  the  ideas 17 

4.  Aristotle's  metaphysical  theory.      Definition  of  truth. 

Knowledge   by  sense  and  by  reason.      Identity  of 

thought  with  its  object 19 

6.   The  mysticism  of  Plotinus.     Mysticism  as  a  form  of 

knowledge-theory 21 

vii 


viii  CONTENTS 


6.  Transition  to  modern  philosophy.     Contrast  of  spirit 

and  nature  .........      23 

7.  Modern  agnosticism 24 

8.  Locke 24 

9.  Hume.     Unknown  cause  of  impressions.     Philosophical 

ideas  of  relation 24 

10.  Kant.    Things  in  themselves  unknown.    The  categories 

are  not  knowledge  of  things  in  themselves.     Hints 
toward  another  theory  of  knowledge  ...      26 

11.  Later  agnosticism 28 

12.  The  agnostic  view  of  knowledge 28 

13.  Absolute  idealism.     Hegel.     T.  H.  Green        ...      28 

14.  The  element  of  truth  in  this  view.     Its  neglect  of  the 

problem,  how    individual    persons    and    things   are 
known.     Its  treatment  of  matter         ....      30 

15.  Theory  of  truth  as  consistency.     Its  inadequacy      .        .      33 

16.  Summary.     Theories  fall  into  two  groups:  one  regards 

knowledge  of  the  not-self  ;  the  other  self-knowledge  .      34 

17.  Definition  of  knowledge 36 

CHAPTER  H 
SENSATION,  FEELING,  AND  VOLITION  AS  COGNITIVE  FACTORS 

1.  The  unreflecting  view  of  the  cognitive  value  of  sensation  37 

2.  Distrust  of  the  senses 38 

3.  The  transcendental  and  scientific  grounds  of  this  distrust  38 

4.  The  extent  to  which  the  criticisms  of  sensation  are  valid  40 

5.  Sensation  is  cognitive  of  sensation.     Sensations  are  facts  ; 

not  mere  utilities  or  instruments  of  reason.     Know- 
ledge of  them  by  what  is  like  them      ....      41 

6.  Importance  of  sensations  as  being  facts  of  consciousness 

and  as  largely  constituting  experience         ...  44 

7.  The  connection  of  sensation  with  self-knowledge     .        .  46 

8.  Feeling  and  volition  as  cognitive       .....  47 

9.  Connection  of  the  three  factors  to  be  studied  ...  48 
10.   Relation  of  feeling  to  sensation.     Study  of  mental  growth 

necessary.    The  emotions 48 


CONTENTS  ix 

PACK 

11.  Relation  of  volition  to  sensation.    Attempts  to  identify 

the  two 61 

12.  Testimony  of  physiology  to  psychical  continuity      .        .  62 

13.  Evolution  of  mind 63 

14.  Meaning  of  psychical  continuity 63 

15.  Evidence  from  this  discussion  that  the  mental  elements 

are  intelligible  and  cognitive.     Introduction  to  the 
study  of  concepts 64 

CHAPTER  III 
THE  CONCEPTUAL  VIEW  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

1.  The  history  of  this  view  to  be  presented  ....       67 

2.  Socrates.     The  concept  used  by  earlier  thinkers.     Soc- 

rates used  it  as  the  explanation  of  things    ...       67 

3.  Plato's  idea.      His  treatment  of  sensation.     His  system 

of  ideas 58 

4.  Aristotle.     His  account  of  the  relation  between  the  indi- 

vidual and  the  universal.     His  system  of  concepts. 
The  place  assigned  to  sensation 60 

5.  Later  thinkers 61 

6.  The  testimony  of  logic  as  the  ethics  of  thought  to  be  con- 

sidered           62 

7.  The  account  of  the  concept  given  by  logic        ...  64 

8.  The  relation  of  the  judgment  to  the  concept    ...  65 

9.  The  relation  of  the  syllogism  to  the  concept    ...  66 

10.  Induction  and  the  concept.     The  induction  of  Aristotle. 

Modern  induction.     The  ideas  of  energy  and  law        .      67 

11.  The  emphasis  in  modern  logic  on  the  judgment       .        .       70 

12.  Summary          .........       71 

CHAPTER  IV 
THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS 

1.  The  evolution  of  the  concept  to  be  studied.     Order  of 

investigation        ........       72 

2.  Concept  may  be  any  sense-quality,  or  idea      .  73 

3.  Complex  concept 74 


X  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

4.   Concept  of  individual 74 

6.  The  concept  that  is  unlike  any  particular  reality  ;  being 
a  first  vague  image  that  has  survived  ;  or  a  composite 
image 75 

6.  The  relation  of  the  general  concept  to  individuals :  the 

concept  is  the  essence.  Is  it  numerically  repeated  ? 
Unreflective  thinking.  The  doctrine  of  the  one  in  the 

many 77 

7.  Other  changes  in  the  concept 80 

8.  Substitution  of  words  for  other  ideas        ....  80 

9.  Conclusion :  concepts  are  sensory  in  their  origin     .        .  81 

10.  The  "  categories  "  to  be  studied 81 

11.  The  doctrine  that  categories  are  not  sense-derivatives. 

Its  basis.     Its  incorrectness 82 

12.  Particular  categories  to  be  considered      ....      83 

13.  Space.     All  contents  of  consciousness  are  spatial :  illus- 

trated by  time.  Extensity  may  not  be  necessary  to 
all  experience,  but  belongs  to  human  experience.  The 
qualitative  manifold.  Quantity  derived  from  quality. 
The  study  of  touch,  etc.,  omitted.  Concept  of  space 
as  indicating  its  own  origin.  Its  universality.  In 
what  sense  it  is  conceptual.  Conclusion  reached  .  83 

14.  Time 89 

15.  Being  derived  from  touch.     Why  touch  is  the  reality- 

sense.  The  category  is  a  composite  image.  Its 
universality 90 

16.  Transition  to  higher  categories.   Ejection  of  inner  feelings      92 

17.  Essence.     Feeling  of  the  strain  of  holding  by  anything  .       94 

18.  Similarity.     Not  a  part  of  the  ideas  of  objects,  but  an 

idea  distinct  from  them.     Probably  a  visceral  feeling      96 

19.  Substance.     The  self-feeling  or  the  "  somatic  conscious- 

ness."    The  unknowable  substrate  of  phenomena      .  97 

20.  Causality.     Feelings  of  effort 101 

21.  Energy  and  force  the  modern  substitutes  for  causality     .  103 

22.  Categories  derived  from  observation  of  mind  and  will     .  104 

23.  Teleology  due  to  observation  of  a  special  sequence  of 

phenomena.     Immanent  teleology       ....     104 

24.  The  categories  of  self,  reason,  will .....     106 


CONTENTS  xi 


25.  The  categories  are  the  products  of  experience.     Univer- 

sality of  categories  explained 106 

26.  Are  the  categories  implicit  in  all  experience  ?    Meaning 

of  "implicit."  How  can  categories  absent  from  con- 
sciousness act  upon  it  ?  The  sensuous  content  of  the 
categories  .........  107 

27.  Kant's  view  of  the  origin  of  the  categories  considered. 

The  newness  of  each  part  of  experience      .        .        .     109 

28.  Kant's  view  that  principles  of  synthesis  are  requisite  for 

experience.  Sense-experience  is  not  made  of  discrete 
units,  and  the  act  of  the  mind  is  not  synthesis  .  .110 


CHAPTER  V 
COGNITIVE  VALUE  OF  CONCEPTS 

1.  The  problem  stated 112 

2.  The  composite  image  is  unlike  individuals        .        .        .     112 

3.  The  concept  as  an  abstraction  is  unlike  individuals          .     113 

4.  The  one  in  the  many.     The  relation  not  found  in  spatial 

forms,  or  in  conscious  experiences.  The  universal  if 
not  separate  from  the  individuals  ceases  to  be  cogni- 
tive of  any  one  of  them  ......  115 

5.  Knowledge  of  the  universal  is  outside  the  knowledge  of 

the  concrete         ........     118 

6.  Is  the  individual  to  be  known  as  a  plexus  of  universals  ?     118 

7.  The  universal  as  synthetic  is  not  cognitive       .        .         .119 

8.  Reason  and  the  validity  of  the  doctrine  of  the  one  in  the 

many  .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .119 

9.  Requisites  of  knowledge  .......     120 

10.  Categories  to  be  considered 121 

11.  Space.    Its  claim  to  universality.     It  does  not  resemble 

the  sense-data  from  which  it  is  derived.  Intensity  of 
psychical  states  not  truly  given  in  quantitative  terms. 
Is  space  objective  ?  Yes ;  in  other  finite  minds.  Is 
it  independent  of  the  mind  ?  It  is  an  idea.  If  objec- 
tive, it  is  not  made  known  by  mathematics  .  .  121 

12.  Time  125 


xii  CONTENTS 


13.  Being.     Not  the  truth  of  touch-sensations.     Its  universal 

application  unwarranted  :  not  applicable  to  other  sen- 
sations ;  or  to  nature  .......  125 

14.  Essence.     Its  claim  to  objectivity  examined    .        .        .     127 

15.  Similarity  is  a  relation  that  is  purely  mental   .        .        .     128 

16.  Substance.     Not  the  truth  of  the  soul.     Its  application 

to  matter.  Spinoza's  use  of  the  category.  The  scien- 
tific use  of  it 128 

17.  Causality.     Its  claims  do  not  find  support  in  conscious 

experiences  ;  or  in  physical  phenomena  .        .        .     130 

18.  Energy.      Transformations  of  energy  ;  the  doctrine  of 

the  one  in  the  many  ;  the  problem  of  transformation ; 
correlation  of  forces.  Conservation  of  energy :  a 
quantitative  account  of  what  is  qualitative.  Value  of 
these  principles  for  science 133 

19.  The  will  in  modern  metaphysics       .....     136 

20.  Teleology.     No  special  efficiency  in  the  idea  of  the  end. 

Immanent  teleology  not  given  in  any  experience.    The 

use  of  the  category  in  recent  philosophy     .        .        .     137 

21.  Reason 139 

22.  The  self 140 

23.  Concepts  found  to  be  wanting.     The  faith  in  them  to  be 

put  aside      .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .     140 

24.  Even  if  a  priori  in  their  origin,  they  are  not  cognitive     .     141 
26.   Other  criticisms  of  the  concept 142 

26.  Necessities  of  thought.     Laws  of  thought.     Meaning  of 

necessity 143 

27.  Utility  of  concepts 146 

CHAPTER  VI 
EMPIRICISM 

1.  Reason  for  estimating  empiricism 147 

2.  The  doctrine  of  empiricism.     Natural  history  of  mind. 

Influence  of  evolution-theory.     Recent  psychology     .     147 

3.  Its  failure  to  deal  rightly  with  the  problem  of  episte- 

mology.     Agnosticism 149 

4.  Yet  empiricism  is  not  necessarily  agnostic       .        .        .     151 


CONTENTS  xiii 

PAGE 

6.   It  makes  contributions  to  epistemology  in  its  emphasis 

on  sensation  and  the  historical  method       .        .        .    161 

6.  The  empirical  account  of  universals.    Locke.    Berkeley. 

The  denial  of  universals  by  Hume  and  the  later  em- 
piricists. Recent  modifications  of  empiricism  .  .  162 

7.  Even  when  universals  are  denied  the  method  of  empiri- 

cism is  that  of  universals  in  disguise   .         .         .        .166 

8.  Association  of  ideas.     Fact  of  association  to  be  distin- 

guished from  the  recognition  of  association.  The 
recognition  is  the  scientific  ideal  of  empiricism  .  167 

9.  This  recognition  means  a  return  to  the  doctrine  of  cate- 

gories.    Coexistence.     Succession.     Similarity  .     159 

10.  The  principles  of  association  are  not  cognitive         .        .     160 

11.  If  emphasis  be  put  on  the  particular  ideas  that  are  asso- 

ciated together,  there  is  offered,  instead  of  knowledge, 
continual  reference  from  one  thing  to  another  .  .160 

12.  Empiricism  fails  more  fatally  than   transcendentalism 

to  reach  the  method  of  knowledge       .        .        .        .162 

13.  Microscopic  research 163 

14.  Utility  of  association 163 

16.   Examination  of  the  claim  that  science  seeks  laws  for  the 

sake  of  facts,  not  facts  for  the  sake  of  laws        .        .    163 

CHAPTER  VH 
KNOWLEDGE  BY  SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION 

1.  Thesis :  Knowledge  of  the  not-self  is  possible  through 

sympathetic  imitation          ......     167 

2.  Illustrations  of  imitation  in  the  lower  animals  and  man  .     168 

3.  Imitation  is  association 170 

4.  It  depends  on  past  experience          .        .        .        .        .171 
6.   Yet  habits  are  modified  by  the  imagination      .        .         .171 

6.  Imitation  defined  as  a  mode  of  perception        .         .         .172 

7.  The  place  of  the  external  movement  in  imitation.     The 

thought  of  an  action  is  incipient  action.  In  the  child 
it  often  becomes  overt  action.  In  observing  an  action 
the  child  thinks  it  so  as  to  act  it.  Hence  the  extent 
of  its  imitation  .  ...  173 


XIV  CONTENTS 

FAN 

8.  Is  imitation  an  act  of  will  ? 177 

9.  Reasons  for  referring  to  the  child's  imitations         .        .     177 

10.  Results  stated .178 

11.  Imitations  in  which  muscular  movement  is  absent  or 

imperceptible.  They  may  have  various  physiological 
consequences,  but  are  not  images  of  motor  ideas  .  178 

12.  This  method  of  knowledge  designated  the  method  of 

sympathetic  imitation          ......     180 

13.  Comparison  of  the  knowledge  it  offers  with  that  offered 

by  science  and  philosophy    ......  182 

14.  Summary 184 

15.  The  relation  of  imitation  to  utility  to  be  considered        .  184 

16.  Actions  useful  and  useless :  the  actions  of  the  organism 

are  not  necessarily  utilitarian      .....     186 

17.  Imitation  is  not  necessarily  utilitarian.     It  is  determined 

by  the  object.  It  has  now  this  objective  character, 
even  if  it  was  originally  utilitarian.  Spencer's  deri- 
vation of  imitation 187 

18.  Imitation  not  due  to  the  desire  for  pleasure     .        .        .     190 

19.  Imitation  due  to  growth  of  perceptive  power.     It  is  a 

form  of  play         ........     191 

20.  The  new  departure  in  psychical  development  .         .        .     192 

21.  The  cognitive  faculty  is  always  imitative.      Animism. 

Philosophy.  The  true  principles  of  imitation  not 
observed 193 

CHAPTER  Vin 

SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION  IN  ART 

1.  Imitation  cultivated  by  art 190 

2.  Widespread  interest  in  art.     It  flourishes  beside  science  196 

3.  Art,  in  contrast  with  science,  deals  with  the  concrete      .  197 

4.  Its  treatment  of  the  concrete  :  sensuous  and  sympathetic 

art 198 

5.  Why  sensuous  art  is  here  considered        ....     199 

6.  Its  function  is  to  minister  pleasure,  but  not  merely  to  do 

this •       .        .        .        .199 

7.  Sensuous  art  probably  the  earliest 200 


CONTENTS  3tV 

PAGE 

8.  Illustrations  of  sensuous  art :  colour ;  sound  ;  muscular 

sensations,  etc.  .......     200 

9.  Art,  to  reach  the  concrete,  must  also  be  sympathetic       .     201 

10.  Transition  from  sensuous  to  sympathetic  art    .        .        .     202 

11.  Even  the  immediate  sense-experience  may  be  objectified 

by  the  artist.     Meaning  of  the  sympathetic  imitation 

it  seems  to  involve       .......    202 

12.  Treatment  of  inorganic  nature  by  sympathetic  art  .         .     204 

13.  Architecture.     Schopenhauer's  theory  of   burden  and 

support.  The  character  of  the  knowledge  of  this 
principle 204 

14.  How  far  the  painter  and  sculptor  appreciate  the  beauty 

of  a  living  creature  by  sympathetic  imitation.  Their 
presentation  of  the  inner  life  is  sympathetic  .  .  206 

15.  Possible  objections  to  this  interpretation  of  these  works 

of  art.  Yet  sympathy  is  unmistakably  present  in 
music  and  poetry 208 

16.  Music  is  in  part  sensuous ;  yet  sometimes,  at  least,  it 

evokes  sympathy 208 

17.  Poetry  uses  symbols  which  suggest  conscious  experiences 

associated  with  them.  The  lyric  expresses  the  poet's 
subjective  experience :  it  evokes  sympathy  with  the 
poet.  In  the  epic  the  poet  sympathizes  with  others. 
The  novel.  Limits  of  sympathy  in  epic  and  novel. 
Complete  objectivity  reached  in  the  drama  .  .  209 

18.  Summary  of  results 214 

19.  The  theory,  that  art  is  meant  to  give  pleasure,  shown  to 

be  incorrect.  Art  is  objective,  and  may  even  give 
pain.  The  theory  of  Mr.  H.  K.  Marshall  .  .  .216 

20.  The  idealistic  theory.    Hegel.    The  idea  cannot  be  known 

to  sense.  Unity  in  diversity  not  the  distinctively 
aesthetic  factor 217 

21.  Art  truer  than  history,  for  history  adopts  the  methods  of 

science.     Truer  than  other  sciences    ....     218 

22.  Yet  it  cannot  take  the  place  of  science,  for  it  idealizes, 

and  fails  to  give  knowledge  of  what  is  actual      .        .219 


xvi  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  IX 

SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION  IN  MORALITY 

PA.GK 

1.  Sympathy  as  the  ideal  of  man's  social  relations       .        .    222 

2.  The  Christian  view  of  social  duty 222 

3.  There  is  a  form  of  love  which  is  the  pleasure  of  the  lover. 

Its  legitimacy.     It  is  not  the  only  love.     Benevolence 
exists  even  if  love  was  originally  selfish      .        .        .    223 

4.  But  sympathy  does  not  seem  indispensable  to  benevo- 

lence.    And  it  is  not  inculcated  by  moralists  as  if  it 

were  of  supreme  moment 224 

6.  Yet  it  is  part  of  the  Christian  ideal  .....  223 

6.  Its  relation  to  self-regarding  love 226 

7.  The  relation  of  love  to  knowledge 226 

8.  Criticism  of  the  Kantian  doctrine  of  knowledge  through 

morality 227 

9.  Limitations  of  morality  :  it  is  utilitarian  ;  does  not  regard 

the  whole  of  the  universe ;  does  not  contemplate  the 

past 228 

10.  Morality  and  art  compared 229 

11.  The  doctrine  that  knowledge  is  a  virtue  ....  229 

12.  Result  reached 230 

13.  Sympathy  in  religion 230 

CHAPTER  X 
SYNTHESIS  OF  THE  METHODS 

1.  Need  to  combine  the  methods  of  science  and  art     .        .    232 

2.  Sense-data  or  phenomena  to  be  observed         .        .        .    233 

3.  Coexistences  and  sequences  of  sense-data.     The  true 

rendering  of  the  concept       ......     234 

4.  Space  and  time  not  to  be  taken  as  metaphysical  entities, 

but  as  the  empirical  forms  of  experience     .        .        .  236 

6.   Space  and  time  described  as  symbols       ....  236 

6.  Other  categories  have  a  symbolic  value    ....  238 

7.  Reality  is  that  which  is  matter  for  knowledge.     F.  H. 

Bradley's  definition  of  the  judgment  ....    238 

8.  Substance  indicates  a  certain  coexistence         .        .        .    240 


CONTENTS  xvii 

PAGE 

9.  Causality  indicates  the  order  of  phenomena    .        .        .241 

10.  The  laws  of  energy  refer  to  the  order  of  phenomena        .    241 

11.  Essence  ;  similarity  ;  teleology 241 

12.  Summary  of  the  conclusions  in  regard  to  concepts  as 

symbols 242 

13.  The  meaning  of  the  universality  of  laws  .        .        .     242 

14.  Restatement  of  need  for  synthesis  of  science  with  method 

of  sympathetic  imitation      ......     243 

16.  Kant's  theory  of  knowledge.  Space  and  time  are  forms 
of  sense.  The  function  of  thought  is  to  unite  or  syn- 
thetize  this  material 244 

16.  The  value  of  this  account  of  science         ....     245 

17.  Yet  thought  is  not  merely  synthesis.     Kant's  treatment 

of  the  analogies  ........     245 

18.  Kant's  "intuitive  understanding."     Its  function  is  dis- 

charged by  sympathy  .......     247 

19.  The  validity  of  the  distinction  between  phenomena  and 

things  in  themselves    .......     249 

20.  The  synthesis  of  the  methods  in  the  light  of  the  develop- 

ment of  intellect 251 

21.  The  synthesis  as  applied  to  the  relations  of  mind  and 

brain 252 

22.  Correlation  of  physical  and  psychical  states.     Doctrine 

of  parallelism 253 

23.  Meaning  of  the  parallelism :  both  series  of  facts  are 

conscious  facts 254 

24.  The  place  to  be  assigned  to  matter.     "Double-aspect" 

metaphysical  theory     .......     255 

26.  How  is  knowledge  of  the  person  observed  to  be  gained  ? 
It  is  ideally  complete  in  scientific  observation  of  his 
brain  and  sympathetic  imitation  of  the  associated 
conscious  states 257 

26.  Is  there  not  a  science  of  these  conscious  states  ?    Falsity 

of  psychology 257 

27.  Apparent  inconsistency  of    discrediting  the  categories 

and  at  the  same  time  representing  them  as  essential 
to  knowledge.  The  categories  are  used  as  symbols, 
but  into  the  truth  gained  by  sympathy  they  do  not, 


xviii  CONTENTS 

PA6X 

as  universals,  directly  enter.    Further,  they  may  be 
used  for  the  overthrow  of  their  own  claim  to  be  the 

absolute  truth 2f>9 

28.  Categories  are  necessary  because  of  human  fiiiitude        .    261 


CHAPTER  XI 
THE  LIMITS  OP  KNOWLEDGE 

1.  Is  this  method  of  knowledge  practicable  ?  262 

2.  Idealistic  claim  to  absolute  knowledge.     Its  rejection      .  262 

3.  Agnosticism.    Its  general  principle  ....  263 

4.  Kant's  agnosticism.     Its  connection  with  his  view  of  the 

function  of  thought.  Its  derivation  from  the  idea  of 
substance.  The  contradiction  involved  in  it  .  263 

6.   Spencer's  arguments  :  the  absolute  exists  out  of  relation  ; 

and  cannot  be  classed 265 

6.  The  agnosticism  of  positivism 267 

7.  Dogmatic  agnosticism  being  unjustifiable,  the  practical 

difficulties  in  the  way  of  knowledge  must  be  considered    268 

8.  How  far  the  knowledge  of  a  thing  is  changed  by  a  know- 

ledge of  the  whole  of  which  the  thing  is  a  part  .        .     269 

9.  The   knower  cannot  in   knowledge   pass    beyond   his 

conscious  states.  Yet  these  may  be  a  copy  of  the 
not-self 271 

10.  Infinite  minuteness  needed  in  the  knowledge  of   any 

phenomenon.  Knowledge  of  the  brain.  Memory. 
Element  of  uncertainty  in  the  problem  ;  Weber's 
law.  The  difficulties  are  practically  those  which 
science  has  to  face  in  its  effort  to  know  a  concrete 
fact 272 

11.  Distinction  between  method  and   its  application.     By 

aiming  at  sympathetic  imitation  we  move  toward 
truth 276 

12.  Application  to  the  various  orders  of  being.     Extent  of 

sympathy  with  other  men  ;  with  animals    .        .        .     276 

13.  Knowledge  of  our  own  bodies 278 


CONTENTS  xix 


PAGE 


14.  Sympathy  with  inorganic  nature.     Doctrine  that  matter 

is  sentient.     Poetical  view 279 

15.  Possible  extension  of  sympathy  in  the  future  .        .        .    281 


CHAPTER  XII 

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 

1.  The  method  of  sympathetic  imitation  may  apply  to  a 

man's  knowledge  of  his  past,  but  not  to  present  self- 
consciousness      282 

2.  Need  to  examine  the  doctrine  of  self-consciousness  which 

implies  that  there  is  a  distinct  idea  of  the  self  as  a 
separate  entity 282 

3.  This  distinction  not  louud  at  the  beginning  of  the  con- 

scious life 283 

4.  Its  development.    Its  prominence  in  the  life  of  practical 

activity 283 

6.   It  may  be  absent  in  intellectual  activity  ....     284 

6.  It  is  a  particular  idea,  and  may  be  excluded  by  other 

ideas.     There  is  a  sense  in  which  it  is   specially 
persistent 286 

7.  It  is  not  necessarily  present  in  its  complete  form  as  the 

centre  to  which  experience  is  referred         .        .        .     286 

8.  Even  when  it  is  present,  it  does  not  give  knowledge  of 

the  self 287 

9.  The  transcendental  doctrine  of  the  self  as  a  universal 

given  in  its  particular  experiences       ....     288 

10.  Self-consciousness  not  a  cognition  that  imitates  the  de- 

tails of  experience 288 

11.  Self -consciousness  explaiued:  conscious  states  are  self- 

conscious      289 

12.  Confirmation  of  this  view  by  reference  to  sympathetic 

imitation 290 

13.  Knowledge  of  the  self  not  in   psychological    concepts 

more  than  in  any  conscious  state.     Kant's  "intuitive 
understanding" 290 

14.  How  far  subjective  idealism  is  justified     ....    292 


XX  CONTENTS 

MUH 

16.   The  absoluteness  of  self-knowledge 292 

16.  All  knowledge  is  in  a  sense  self-knowledge.     How  the 

self  is  transcended.  Individuality  preserved,  yet 
unity  with  others.  Lotze's  view  of  the  relation 
between  knowledge  and  its  object  ....  292 

17.  The  tendency  in  human  life  to  individuality,  and  the 

tendency  to  sympathy       • 29C 

18.  Definition  of  knowledge  recalled 297 


CHAPTER  XIII 
THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  PROBLEM 

1.  Epistemology  is  part  of  philosophy 298 

2.  It  is  the  foundation  of  philosophy.      Some  theory  of 

knowledge  is  always  adopted  by  philosophy.  Influ- 
ence of  epistemology  illustrated  by  reference  to  the 
history  of  philosophy.  The  present  doctrine  of 
knowledge  may  bear  on  the  philosophical  problem  .  298 

3.  The  function  which  has  historically  been  assigned  to 

philosophy  must  be  studied,  and  its  true  function 
discovered  .........  300 

4.  Philosophy  ceased  early  to  be  merely  practical        .        .     301 
6.  The  claim  of  philosophy  in  relation  to  the  special  sci- 
ences.    The  science  of  the  sciences     .        .        .        .301 

6.  Materialism.     Its  prevalence    ......    303 

7.  Materialism  and  physical  science.      The  achievements 

and  hopes  of  science 304 

8.  The  successful  explanation  of  the  physical  world.     Me- 

chanical energy   ........     305 

9.  Materialism  and  the  organic  world 305 

10.  Materialism  and  human  consciousness      ....     300 

11.  Summary  of  materialistic  claims       .....     307 

12.  Criticism  of  materialism,  as  offering  a  system  of  concepts  ; 

and  as    being    self-contradictory  in  its  account   of 

knowledge 307 

13.  Dualism.   Partly  materialism.   Partly  an  implicit  idealism  308 

14.  Idealism.     Its  criticism  of  conception  of  matter      .        .  309 


CONTENTS  xxi 

PAGE 

15.  Undeveloped  forms  of  idealism 310 

16.  Developed  systems  of  idealism.     Hegel.    The  Absolute 

is  self-consciousness.  The  process  of  thought  is  nec- 
essary. Relation  of  the  Absolute  to  human  experi- 
ence. The  place  of  science.  Philosophy  as  science 

of  the  sciences 310 

17.  How  far  idealism  is  justified  by  epistemology           .        .  313 

18.  Idealism  has  sought  knowledge  in  categories    .         .        .  314 

19.  Claim  of  Hegel  that  he  presents  the  concrete    .        .         .  314 

20.  Empirical  origin  of  the  categories  recalled.     No  necessary 

connection  among  them 315 

21.  The  failure  of  philosophy  illustrated  by  Hegel          .        .  316 

22.  True  function  of  philosophy.     It  is  not  a  system  of  the 

universe 317 

23.  Philosophy  is  not  an  explanation  of  things       .        .         .  317 

24.  It  gives  the  ideal  of  thought 318 

25.  It  gives  the  method  of  knowledge 319 

26.  Can  truth  be  exhausted  ?                                           .  320 


CHAPTER  XIV 
PRACTICAL  APPLICATIONS 

1.  The  practical  questions  to  be  considered  .         .        .     322 

2.  The  effect  on  scientific  work.     Science  may  be  merely 

utilitarian 322 

3.  As  truth-seeking  it  is  imperfect  by  itself.     Need  for  a 

poetical  science 323 

4.  Lesson  for  art.     Rhyming  philosophy  not  needed.     The 

place  that  abstractions  may  have  in  poetry         .        .  324 

5.  Is  a  scientific  treatise  a  poem  ?         .....  325 

6.  Influences  that  affect  poetry  and  pervert  it       ...  327 

7.  The  dependence  of  poetry  on  sympathetic  imitation         .  328 

8.  The  sensuous  function  of  art.     The  revelation  of  the  self  328 

9.  Education.     Its  aims 330 

10.  Place  of  utility 330 

11.  Utility  in  its  relation  to  truth.     Its  ministry  to  self- 

consciousness  .  .     331 


xxii  CONTENTS 


12.  Education  in  the  truth  of  other  things     ....  332 

13.  Science  and  truth.    Emerson's  view        ....  332 

14.  The  educational  curriculum.     Classics  versus  science       .  333 
16.  The  "humanities"  deal  with  the  subjects  most  accessi- 
ble to  human  knowledge      ......  335 

16.  Literature  often  a  pretext  for  scientific  study  .        .  335 

17.  Absence  of  truth-giving  literature     .....  336 

18.  Cultivation  of  the  faculty  of  sympathetic  imitation  .  336 

19.  The  moral  life.     The  inspiration  of  examples  .        .        .  337 

20.  Is  knowledge  always  desirable  ? 339 

21.  Is  knowledge  of  other  things  an  end  in  itself  ?         .        .  339 


METHODS   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


INTRODUCTION 

1.  "Who  loves  not  knowledge?"  "The  desire 
to  know,"  says  Aristotle,  the  master  of  them  that 
know,  "  is  natural  with  all  men,  and  an  evidence  of 
this  is  the  love  we  bear  our  senses,  they  being  loved 
for  themselves  alone  even  apart  from  their  practical 
use  ;  "  and  he  further  finds  that  man  has  his  per- 
fect happiness  in  the  exercise  of  his  rational  faculty. 
Aristotle  in  ascribing  supreme  value  to  truth  is  only 
expressing  the  conviction  of  very  many  of  the  sages 
of  antiquity. 

Knowledge  is  desired  not  less  earnestly  in  modern 
times.  The  zeal  shown  in  its  pursuit  is  one  of  the 
remarkable  characteristics  of  the  present  age.  It 
would  be  too  much  to  say  that  the  love  for  science 
and  philosophy  is  greater  now  than  in  ancient  times. 
It  would  be  difficult  to  match  the  enthusiasm  of 
Plato  or  Aristotle.  There  was,  similarly,  an  ardour 
in  the  love  of  the  early  Christians,  which  in  the 
present  day  is  seldom,  if  ever,  reproduced.  There 


2  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

is  generally  a  glow  in  the  zeal  of  pioneers  which 
their  successors  do  not  exhibit.  Yet  the  work  of 
the  pioneers,  if  it  prove  of  value,  can  still  call  for 
devotion  and  sacrifice.  Christianity  is  probably 
more  fruitful  now  than  at  any  period  in  its  history. 
And,  likewise,  the  devotion  of  modern  workers  for 
knowledge,  if  less  rapturous  than  that  of  its  first 
great  apostles,  is  not  less  capable  of  disinterested- 
ness. Some  may  say  with  Spinoza  and  Hegel  that 
knowledge  is  the  highest  ideal  of  life  ;  and  many, 
who  hesitate  to  go  so  far  in  words,  show  that  they 
are  offering  their  lives  on  the  altar  of  science. 

2.  Not  less  remarkable  is  the  modern  advance  of 
knowledge.     Many  questions  which  baffled  the  an- 
cients have  been  answered.     Many  illusions  which 
dazzled  them  have  passed  away.     Moreover,  many 
problems  in  mental  and  physical  science  of  which 
they  did  not  dream  have  presented  themselves  and 
have   received   their    solution.      The    conquests   of 
science   are   among    the    greatest   achievements  of 
modern  times. 

3.  The  knowledge  thus  gained  is  gradually  work- 
ing a  revolution  in  the  world.     The  advantages  at- 
tending the  revolution  are  apparent.     By  means  of 
science  man  is  able  to  control  nature  and  to  increase 
the  comfort  of  life.     The  discoveries  of  physics  are 
followed  by  mechanical  inventions  ;    the  researches 


INTRODUCTION  3 

of  the  physiologist  and  pathologist  are  made  tribu- 
tary to  the  medical  art ;  psychology  teaches  how 
the  mind  should  be  trained.  In  every  sphere  of 
life  it  is  being  found  that  science  is  giving  men 
new  and  better  methods  of  living.  Even  in  the 
redemption  of  those  who  are  evil  the  procedure  is 
becoming  more  scientific.  The  crimes  of  men  are 
not  regarded  as  the  expression  of  an  inexplicable 
freedom,  as  if  a  thunderbolt  had  fallen  from  a  clear 
sky,  but  are  traced  back  to  physical  and  mental 
antecedents  ;  and  this  knowledge  of  their  relations 
is  turned  to  account  in  the  work  of  reformation  and 
prevention.  Moreover,  science  is  inducing  a  certain 
habit  of  mind  in  the  contemplation  of  the  universe. 
The  world  is  no  longer  thought  of  as  full  of  capri- 
cious and  malevolent  powers.  Everywhere  there  is 
felt  to  be  order  and  unchanging  law.  Light  has 
come  into  the  world,  and  superstition  and  other 
creatures  of  the  night  have  vanished.  And  many 
other  benefits  might  be  credited  to  science.  If 
these  are  the  works  of  knowledge,  who  would  not 
love  her.  "  Let  her  mix  with  men  and  prosper." 
4.  This  revolution,  however,  has  phases  of  a  more 
doubtful  kind.  The  knowledge  which  is  most 
eagerly  sought  is  of  the  kind  yielded  by  the  positive 
sciences.  These  sciences  profess  to  offer  nothing 
but  facts  and  the  principles  or  laws  on  which  these 


4  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

facts  may  be  strung.  A  system  of  Positive  Philos- 
ophy is  thought  to  present  the  sum  of  knowledge. 
There  has  consequently  come  into  view  a  certain 
want  of  harmony  between  science  and  other  im- 
portant human  interests. 

Thus  it  seems  to  come  into  conflict  with  the  moral 
consciousness.  It  represents  man  as  simply  part  of 
the  world  of  phenomena,  woven  like  everything  else 
into  the  network  of  causes  and  effects,  or  sequences 
and  coexistences.  It  considers  him  only  in  these 
relations,  and  finds  in  him  no  other  value.  Further, 
science  shows  its  opposition  to  morality  in  its 
neglect  of  human  emotions.  Even  when  these  are 
considered  by  the  science  of  psychology,  they  are 
studied  in  that  dry  light  which  Bacon  commended  ; 
they  are  viewed  simply  in  their  casual  connection 
with  other  facts.  It  is  charged  against  the  scientific 
man  that  he  can  "peep  and  botanize  upon  his 
mother's  grave." 

There  is  a  similar  opposition  between  science  and 
art.  There  is,  indeed,  a  sense  in  which  science 
helps  art,  even  as  it  helps  morality.  When  science 
cultivates  close  attention  to  the  details  of  objects, 
the  art  which  aims  at  the  faithful  reproduction  of 
the  appearance  which  things  present  to  the  senses 
is  promoted.  But  when  art  claims  to  find  pleasure 
in  the  colours  and  sounds  of  the  world,  science  is 


INTRODUCTION  5 

indifferent ;  and  if  the  artist  claims,  further,  that  he 
feels,  as  he  moves  among  the  objects  about  him,  the 
throb  of  their  inner  life,  his  pretensions  are  met 
with  scepticism.  Even  aesthetics  has  a  certain 
alienation  from  the  sentiments  it  investigates. 

Again,  science  wears  a  look  of  indifference  or 
hostility  toward  religion.  The  scientific  way  of 
looking  at  the  world  is  not  the  religious  way. 
Science  is  interested  only  in  facts  and  their  con- 
nections ;  religion  regards  the  world  as  derived 
from  and  guided  by  a  living  Being.  It  is  inter- 
esting to  observe  that  Spencer  assigns  to  science, 
as  its  province,  the  knowable  ;  to  religion,  the  un- 
knowable. True,  science  also  ultimately  admits 
that  there  is  an  unknowable,  but  it  is  the  business 
of  science  to  follow  out  the  knowable,  as  it  is 
that  of  religion  to  recognize  the  unknowable. 
This  theory  points,  at  least,  to  the  conviction  that 
science,  in  prosecuting  its  task  of  investigating 
facts,  does  not  find  any  object  of  worship.  Since 
there  is  this  conflict,  and  since  science  absorbs 
attention  in  an  increasing  degree,  religion,  which 
was  wont  to  be  the  supreme  interest,  must  have 
its  territory  correspondingly  reduced.  The  revolu- 
tion is  great  and  is  of  momentous  import.  It 
should  be  added  that  even  the  science  of  theology 
has  often  a  blighting  effect  upon  piety. 


6  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

5.  The    revolution   wrought    by   science   is   not 
confined  to  a  small  academic  circle.     The  diffusion 
of  science  in  the  present    age  is   wide    and    rapid. 
The  democracy  is  claiming  equality   in   knowledge 
as  well  as  in  political  rights.     Many  truths  which 
were    formerly    the    rare    treasures    of    intellectual 
aristocrats  are  now  the  common  possessions  of  our 
school  children.      In  fact,  science  has   become   the 
great  instrument  of  mental  training,  and   there    is 
given  up  to  it  an  increasing  portion    of   the    time 
devoted  to   education.       Even    literature   is    often 
studied  according  to  the  methods    of    science,  and 
the  culture  which  in  such   cases  it   gives    is    little 
different  from  that  given  by  chemical  and  physio- 
logical researches.     It  is  not  to  be  understood  that 
those  who  advocate    science    as    yielding    the   best 
education  always  mean  that  it  is  an  end  in  itself  ; 
they  may  say  that  the  end  is  mental  discipline,  or 
even  moral  culture.     The  significant    fact   for    the 
pupil  remains  that  science  has  for  so  long  a  period 
occupied    the    attention,    and    that    the    mind    has 
learned  the  scientific  way  of  looking  at  the  world. 

6.  In  view  of  the  claims  and  influence  of  science, 
it  is  of  the  first  importance  to  ask,  what   it   is   to 
know.      The    inquiry    is    not,    indeed,    of    merely 
present  interest.       It  is  not  one  belonging    to   the 
exigences  of   a  particular  intellectual    crisis  ;  it   is 


INTRODUCTION  J 

of  importance  whenever  there  are  seekers  after 
truth.  But  now  the  need  for  it  is  more  pressing 
than  ever,  and  it  is  a  question  for  every  one. 
We  have  to  ask  whether  that  which  is  now  offered 
to  the  world  as  knowledge  is  entitled  to  be  so 
regarded,  and,  if  the  present  methods  of  know- 
ledge are  wrong,  what  is  to  be  substituted  for 
them. 

7.  The  protest  may  at  once  be  made  that  in 
the  above  account  of  knowledge  and  the  problems 
which  it  raises  the  achievement  of  philosophy  is 
neglected.  Knowledge,  it  will  be  said,  is  not  to 
be  identified  with  science.  Science  is  abstract ; 
the  categories  of  science  are  finite  ;  philosophy 
finds  fault  with  science  as  giving  at  best  only 
half-truths.  Philosophy,  on  the  other  hand,  has 
the  full-orbed  vision  ;  it  claims  that  it  avoids  ab- 
stractness,  and  that  its  categories  are  infinite.  It, 
therefore,  denies  that  there  are  elements  in  life 
which  it  has  failed  to  recognize,  and  it  asserts  that 
it  has  found  the  method  of  absolute  knowledge. 

The  claims  thus  made  by  philosophy  must  re- 
ceive later  careful  consideration.  At  present  a 
complete  estimate  of  them  cannot  be  given.  It 
must,  however,  here  be  pointed  out  that  science 
and  philosophy  are  alike  in  this  respect,  —  that 
both  seek  knowledge  in  conceptions  or  universals. 


8  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

8.  For  it  is  here  that  we  come  on  the  assump- 
tion  made    by   all   theories    of    knowledge    alike. 
While   much    labour    has   been    devoted    to   these 
epistemological   problems,   while    Locke  and   Kant, 
Hegel  and  Spencer,  have  all    grappled  with    them, 
the  conclusions  reached  have  all  been    vitiated   by 
the    assumption    made    as    to    the    constitution    of 
knowledge.       It  has    been   taken  for    granted,  for 
the  most    part,  that    the    method    of    science    and 
philosophy   is  the  right   method  in  so  far  as  uni- 
versals  or  laws  are  sought.     There  have  been  dis- 
putes as  to  the  proper  procedure  in  induction,  but 
not  as  to  the   character   of    the    knowledge    which 
induction    yields.       That    has    been    regarded    as 
something   fixed,   like   a   fact,   or    event,   which   is 
something   to  be   investigated,   but    which    is   not 
to   be    annulled  by   any   process  of    investigation. 
Even  the  empiricist,  as  we  shall  see,  does  not  dis- 
card universals  ;    he  only    gives  another  version  of 
them  ;  like  the  transcendentalist,  he  tries  to  ana- 
lyze the  content  of  science,  but  does    not   contend 
that  that  content  should  be  different. 

9.  But  this    view    of   knowledge    must   be   sub- 
jected to  criticism.     It  must  be  asked  whether  this 
mode  of  knowing  is  the  only    mode,  and   whether 
it   gives    knowledge,    in    the    true    sense,    at    all. 
When  men  were  discussing  the  power  inherent  in 


INTRODUCTION  t  9 

matter,  Berkeley  asked  the  prior  question,  What 
is  matter  ?  So  it  is  necessary  in  discussions  re- 
garding knowledge  that  there  should  be  a  criti- 
cism of  the  factors  thought  to  constitute  knowledge. 
10.  The  questions  before  us  are  not  primarily 
psychological.  Knowledge  is  a  thought  which  is 
somehow  related  to  an  object,  and  the  aim  of  the 
present  work  is  to  consider  what  that  relation  is, 
or  what  it  may  be  made.  Psychology,  on  the 
other  hand,  studies  the  processes  of  the  mind  with- 
out considering  their  cognitive  value.  It  asks 
whence  our  thoughts  come,  and  what  elements 
their  analysis  yields,  but  does  not  inquire  into  their 
fitness  to  represent  other  things.  The  present  in- 
quiry, therefore,  belongs  to  the  epistemological 
department  of  philosophy.  At  the  same  time, 
psychology  is  indispensable  to  the  success  of  such 
an  inquiry.  For,  if  we  would  rightly  estimate  the 
value  for  knowledge  of  conceptions  or  other  mental 
factors,  we  must  determine  what  the  materials  are 
which  have  gone  to  their  making,  the  images,  emo- 
tions, abstractions,  of  which  they  are  the  resultant 
blend.  The  work  at  which  Kant  laboured  was  a 
criticism  of  conceptions,  and  Kant's  results  are 
marred  because  of  the  imperfections  of  his  psy- 
chology :  he  does  not  know  the  history  of  the 
conceptions,  and  so  fails  to  appreciate  rightly  their 


10  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

function.  The  cry  has  often  been  heard,  "  Back 
to  Kant."  And  it  is  a  summons  to  be  heeded. 
But  comparatively  little  result  has  followed  from 
the  renewed  study  of  the  great  master,  because  the 
examination  of  his  results  has  not  been  carried  on 
in  the  light  of  a  true  psychology.  It  is  not  too 
much  to  believe  that,  when  Kant  is  studied  under 
the  illumination  of  this  new  science,  the  result  of 
the  return  to  him  will  be  in  a  true  sense  an  ad- 
vance upon  him. 

11.  The  work  of  Locke  and  Kant  is  not  yet  ac- 
complished. The  theory  of  knowledge  must  benefit 
by  the  more  thorough  analysis  of  modern  research. 
And  the  result  of  this  investigation  is  to  show 
that  the  method  of  science  and  philosophy  must 
be  discarded.  Science  has  been  called  a  "mush- 
room growth,"  and  even  philosophy  is  not  old. 
And  though  it  were  much  older,  the  present  con- 
ception of  knowledge  has  no  inalienable  right  to 
the  place  it  occupies.  Its  sway  may  be  only  an 
episode  in  the  history  of  thought.  I  think  that  it 
can  be  traced  to  its  origin  in  a  certain  definite 
philosophical  theory,  and  that  the  theory  can  be 
proved  to  be  a  mistake.  It  is,  therefore,  one  of 
the  objects  of  the  present  work  to  show  that  what 
is  now  offered  as  science  is  not  truth  :  that  science, 
physical,  mental,  moral,  philosophical,  is  not  truth  ; 


INTRODUCTION  1 1 

that  no  science  singly  can  give  it,  and  that  all  to- 
gether fail.  It  is  then  to  be  shown  that  for  the 
attainment  of  truth  a  new  method  must  be  de- 
veloped. 

12.  It  is  necessary  at  the  outset  to  guard  against 
a  misapprehension.  It  may  be  said  at  once  that 
such  a  view  as  that  indicated  must  be  fantastical, 
and  that  to  bring  an  indictment  against  science  is 
to  repeat  the  folly  of  ordering  the  ocean  to  retire. 
It  is,  however,  to  be  observed  that  science  is  not 
said  to  be  useless.  It  is  profitable  for  many  things. 
It  would  scarcely  have  reached  the  place  it  occu- 
pies had  it  not  served  some  of  the  great  ends  of 
living.  It  is,  too,  indispensable  in  the  search  for 
knowledge.  It  is  not,  indeed,  knowledge.  Though 
it  has  usurped  the  place  of  knowledge,  it  is  not 
the  heir  to  that  throne.  Yet,  though  not  the  heir, 
it  should  be  one  of  the  chief  ministers  of  know- 
ledge, and  its  work  can  be  used  for  knowledge. 
Especially  is  it  to  be  noted  that  there  is  no  quar- 
rel with  the  spirit  of  science.  The  devotees  of 
science  have  had  truth  as  their  ideal,  though  they 
have  not  shown  discernment  in  their  efforts  to 
reach  it.  They  are  like  that  ancient  religious 
people  who  needed  that  the  God  they  worshipped 
should  be  declared  unto  them.  The  impulse  to 
know,  though  approving  itself  one  of  the  fruits 


12  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

of  human  evolution  most  worthy  of  admiration, 
needs  to  be  guided  by  a  criticism  that  is  ever  more 
careful  and  comprehensive.  And  since  science  has 
this  ideal  and  this  enthusiasm,  he  may  be  its  most 
faithful  friend  who  seems  to  be  dealing  it  wounds. 
He  is  not  necessarily  an  enemy  of  the  democracy 
who  does  not  look  on  the  republican  form  of  gov- 
ernment as  the  ultimate  political  constitution.  He 
may  have  most  of  the  spirit  of  science  who  re- 
fuses to  regard  its  methods  as  above  criticism. 

13.  It  is  the  plan  of  this  investigation  to  give 
first  a  definition  of  knowledge.  The  methods  will 
then  be  considered  by  which  men  have  thought  it 
possible  to  attain  knowledge  of  the  self  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  not-self  on  the  other.  Those  who 
have  not  begun  to  reflect  believe  that  they  get 
truth  in  the  data  of  the  senses.  This  view  will 
be  criticised,  and  at  the  same  time  an  estimate 
will  be  made  of  the  contribution  which  sensation 
offers  to  truth.  The  common  view  of  philosophers 
and  scientists,  that  truth  is  given  in  general  con- 
cepts, or  universals,  or  categories,  will  next  be 
taken  up.  The  special  form  of  the  doctrine  given 
in  empiricism  will  also  be  considered.  It  is  a 
doctrine  that  is  found  wanting  in  all  its  forms. 
At  the  same  time  it  will  be  pointed  out  that  the 
concept  has  its  uses  in  the  mental  economy.  The 


INTROD  UCTION  1 3 

true  method  of  knowledge  will  then  be  expounded. 
The  method  of  knowing  the  not-self  will  be  first 
investigated ;  and  it  will  be  shown  that  this  know- 
ledge is  gained  by  sympathetic  imitation.  But 
as  this  method  involves  the  use,  to  a  greater  or  less 
extent,  of  the  other  methods,  emphasis  will  be 
laid  on  what  is  called  the  "synthesis  of  the 
methods."  After  this  discussion  of  the  conditions 
under  which  knowledge  of  other  things  is  possible, 
it  will  be  a  relatively  short  task  to  determine 
wherein  self-knowledge  consists.  In  conclusion, 
the  bearing  of  this  theory  on  the  philosophical 
problem,  and  also  on  certain  practical  questions, 
will  be  indicated. 


CHAPTER   I 

DEFINITION  OF   KNOWLEDGE 

1.  In  order  to  determine  the  function  of  know- 
ledge, it  is  necessary  to  take  a  brief  survey  of  the 
great  philosophical  theories.     Such  a  survey  is,  in 
one    sense,    disappointing,    for   the   question,  What 
is  knowledge?   is  one  that  has  received  too   little 
attention  from  philosophers  ;  even  in  modern  times, 
when   epistemology  has   often  been    the    exclusive 
topic   of    philosophy,   a   definition   of    the   relation 
which  subject  and  object  sustain  in  knowledge  has 
been  too   little    attempted.      Yet    theories    of    the 
universe  have  certain  views  of   knowledge  as  their 
presupposition,  even  when  these  are  not  adequately 
discussed,  and  the  consideration  of  such  will  be  the 
proper   preparation   of   the   way  to   a  definition  of 
knowledge. 

2.  The  theory  was  maintained  by  some   of  the 
early  Greek  philosophers  that  like  is  known  by  like. 
The  doctrine  may  be  best  appreciated  by  reference 
to   the   system  of   Empedocles,  who   explained  the 
sense  in  which  he  understood  it.     He  taught  that 

14 


DEFINITION  OF  KNOWLEDGE  15 

there  are  four  elements  in  the  universe,  —  fire,  air, 
earth,  and  water.  There  are  besides  two  forces 
which  act  on  these  elements, —  love  and  hatred. 
While  hatred  destroys  their  unity  and  scatters  them, 
love  or  friendship  joins  them  together.  By  this 
process  of  joining  together,  the  cosmos  is  produced ; 
earth  and  stars  and  human  beings  are  formed.  The 
knowledge  which  the  intelligence  of  man  has  of 
the  world  of  things  outside  him  is  rendered  possible 
by  the  fact  that  he  is  composed  of  the  same  ele- 
ments as  those  that  are  found  in  things ;  and  each 
of  the  elements  in  him  recognizes  the  element  out- 
side him  to  which  it  is  akin.  The  air  is  known  by 
the  air  in  him ;  the  fire  by  the  fire ;  the  earth  by 
the  earth ;  and  the  water  by  the  water. 

The  theory  as  thus  stated  seems  crude  as  a 
picture  painted  by  a  child.  Yet  it  is  to  be  appre- 
ciated properly  only  if  its  presuppositions  are  under- 
stood. It  was  the  product  of  an  age  when  the 
world  was  interpreted  in  terms  of  a  simple  animism. 
Fire  and  air  were  not  dead  things ;  they  were  living, 
like  human  beings ;  the  principles  that  joined  them 
together  were  not  mechanical,  they  were  love  and 
hatred.  These  living  elements  blend  in  the  human 
soul,  and  they  reflect  the  life  corresponding  to  them. 
The  living,  conscious  fire  and  air  in  man  are  like 
the  living,  conscious  fire  and  air  in  other  things. 


1 6  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

The  doctrine  of  Empedocles  thus  loses  the  crudity 
of  its  first  appearance  and  becomes  a  suggestion 
toward  a  profoundly  spiritual  theory. 

After  all  that  may  be  said  for  the  theory,  it 
must  be  admitted  that  it  fails  to  offer  a  complete 
account  of  knowledge.  The  material  and  spiritual 
are  so  mixed  that  we  cannot  look  for  a  clear  state- 
ment of  the  relations  subsisting  between  conscious 
elements  and  their  objective  counterpart.  More- 
over, the  self-knowledge  of  the  elements,  exhibited 
in  the  case  of  man,  is  not  yet  explained.  Yet  the 
statement  that  like  is  known  by  like  formulates  a 
view  of  knowledge  that  is  of  extreme  importance, 
and  one  that  was  a  natural  product  of  the  Greek 
mind.  The  unity  of  spirit  and  nature  has  often 
been  referred  to  as  characteristic  of  Greek  ideas. 
The  Greek  did  not  think  of  nature  as  something 
alien  from  man  and  lower.  It  is  also  true  that  he 
did  not  think  of  the  gods  as  inaccessible  to  man: 
they  are  human.  Man  is  thus  one  among  many 
objects  of  like  quality.  This  attitude  toward  the 
world  found  its  parallel  in  the  assumption  regard- 
ing knowledge.  It  was  taken  for  granted  that 
thought  can  measure  reality,  and  that  there  is 
nothing  to  shut  out  the  spirit  of  man  from  the 
objects  about  him.  Philosophers,  therefore,  laboured 
to  define  the  reality  which  seemed  so  certainly 


DEFINITION  OF  KNOWLEDGE  I/ 

within  their  mental  reach.  Their  reflection  on  this 
function  of  knowledge  was  expressed  in  the  maxim 
of  Empedocles. 

3.  The  next  important  contribution  toward  the 
definition  of  knowledge  is  to  be  found  in  the  ideal- 
istic system  of  Plato.  For  it  is  to  him  rather 
than  to  Socrates  that  we  need  here  to  turn.  Soc- 
rates, though  the  author  of  the  philosophic  faith 
of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  has  not  developed  his  sys- 
tem sufficiently  to  raise  the  special  problem  of 
the  relation  which  in  cognition  subject  bears  to 
object. 

Plato  teaches  that  there  is  a  world  of  ideas  ex- 
isting independently  of  the  mind.  The  idea  is  the 
universal,  the  common  concept,  or  notion.  It  is 
that  which  abides  while  individual  things  change 
and  pass  away.  Thus,  there  is  a  multiplicity  of 
beautiful  objects,  but  beauty  in  itself  is  other  than 
they.  They  are  beautiful  because  they  share  in  it ; 
they  are  imperfect  because  they  are  only  broken 
lights  of  it.  It  is  eternal  and  perfect.  Moreover, 
the  idea  is  the  real;  to  it  individual  things  owe 
such  reality  as  they  have. 

Knowledge  is  the  contemplation  of  these  ideas. 
The  soul  sees  them.  It  looked  upon  them  before 
it  was  imprisoned  in  the  body,  and  even  in  this 
world  it  can  so  purify  itself  as  to  enjoy  the  vision 


1 8  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

of  them.  The  bliss  of  the  future  life  will  consist 
in  the  beholding  of  them. 

Thus  Plato  seems  to  regard  knowledge  as  some- 
thing visual.1  The  object  is  something  to  which 
the  eye  of  the  soul  is  directed.  This  is  the  natu- 
ral, naive  view  of  knowledge ;  to  look  at  a  thing 
and  to  know  it  are  the  same.  And  so  far,  the 
Platonic  contribution  to  epistemology  seems  of 
little  value. 

Yet,  though  Plato  so  often  speaks  of  knowledge 
in  terms  of  sight,  he  has  also  given  evidence  that 
he  has  another  conception  of  the  relation  between 
subject  and  object.  Thus,  he  says  the  "true  lover 
of  knowledge  will  go  on  until  he  have  attained 
the  knowledge  of  the  true  nature  of  every  essence 
by  a  kindred  power  in  the  soul,  and  by  that 
power  drawing  near  and  mingling  and  becoming 
incorporate  with  very  being,  ...  he  will  know 
and  live  and  grow  truly."2  It  is  by  a  "kindred 
power  in  the  soul"  that  the  subject  knows  the 
object :  Plato  finds  in  knowledge  the  similarity 
of  subject  and  object,  if  not  a  closer  relation.  His 
teaching  is  similar  when  he  declares  that  the  re- 
alities of  the  universe  are  rational;  and  also  that 
the  good  is  the  source  alike  of  knowing  and  being. 

1  Cf.  Windelband,  Geschichte  der  Philosophic,  p.  92. 
a  Republic,  490  (Jowett's  Translation). 


DEFINITION  OF  KNOWLEDGE  19 

\ 

4.  It  was  the  task  of  Aristotle  to  modify  and 
develop  the  doctrine  of  Plato.  The  form  of  Aris- 
totle takes  the  place  of  the  idea  of  Plato,  yet  the 
form  is  not  like  the  idea,  something  apart  from 
things ;  it  exists  only  in  things.  Further,  the 
relation  of  the  supreme  form  to .  the  subordinate 
forms  is  stated.  The  supreme  form  is  the  ground 
or  "principle"  of  the  other  forms;  they  are  also 
moved  by  it:  it  moves  them,  for  they  are  moved 
by  love  to  it.  This  highest  form  is  interpreted 
according  to  the  purest  idealism :  God  is  self- 
consciousness,  the  thought  of  thought.  It  must 
be  remembered,  at  the  same  time,  that  Aristotle 
does  not  elaborate  these  propositions  into  the  con- 
sistent system  of  idealism  which  they  so  strik- 
ingly suggest. 

Aristotle's  doctrine  of  knowledge  is  in  harmony 
with  these  metaphysical  principles.  His  defini- 
tion of  truth,  as  the  agreement  of  thought  with 
reality,  indicates  its  fundamental  principle.  In 
cognition  he  distinguishes  between  that  which  is 
by  sense  and  that  which  is  by  reason.  By  the 
former  we  know  the  sense-qualities ;  by  the  latter, 
the  rational  form.  In  both  cases  the  knowledge 
consists  in  the  presence  in  the  mind  of  a  form 
which  corresponds  to  the  form  in  things.  "  Sense- 
perception  is  that  which  is  receptive  of  the  forms 


20  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

of  things  sensible  without  their  matter,  just  in  the 
same  way  as  wax  receives  the  impress  of  the  seal 
without  the  iron  or  gold  of  which  it  is  com- 
posed.""1 It  is  to  be  remembered  that  sense- 
perception  relates  to  the  individual,  not  to  the 
universal,  and,  therefore,  cannot  give  us  science. 
It  is  the  reason  that  gives  this  supreme  form  of 
knowledge.  Yet  in  the  two  kinds  of  knowledge 
there  is  the  same  relation  between  subject  and 
object.  "  Thinking  is  like  perception,  and  con- 
sists in  being  affected  by  the  object  of  thought 
or  in  something  else  of  this  nature.  Like  sense 
then,  thought  or  reason  must  be  not  entirely  pas- 
sive, but  receptive  of  the  form  —  that  is,  it  must 
be  potentially  like  this  form  but  not  actually 
identical  with  it ;  it  will  stand  in  fact  toward 
its  objects  in  the  same  relation  as  that  in  which 
the  faculty  of  sense  stands  toward  the  objects  of 
perception."2  It  seems  natural  to  infer  from 
such  passages  that  Aristotle's  rendering  of  the 
principle  that  like  is  known  by  like,  is  that  the 
form  in  the  mind  is  a  copy  of  the  form  indepen- 
dent of  the  mind. 

Yet  there  are   also   passages   in  Aristotle's  writ- 
ings in   which   it   is  stated  that   rational  thought 

1  DC  Anima,  II,  12  (Wallace's  Translation). 

2  De  Anima,  III,  4. 


DEFINITION  OF  KNOWLEDGE  21 

and  its  object  are  identical.  He  may  be  sup- 
posed to  mean  that  the  universal,  which  is  one  in 
the  many  individuals,  is  still  the  same  when  it 
shows  itself  in  the  knowing  mind.  There  is, 
therefore,  here  a  tendency  to  pass  from  the  doc- 
trine that  like  is  known  by  like  ;  for  likeness 
gives  place  to  identity.  Aristotle  can  here  be 
seen  to  approach  that  modern  idealism  which  regards 
thought  as  at  once  subject  and  object.  Yet  he 
does  not  go  the  length  of  such  idealism. 

5.  There  is  yet  another  knowledge-theory  be- 
longing to  the  Greek  period  of  which  it  is  impor- 
tant to  take  account.  It  is  found  in  the 
mysticism  of  Plotinus.  This  thinker  offered  some 
serious  modifications  of  the  doctrine  of  Plato  and 
Aristotle.  It  seemed  to  him  that  the  absolute 
Being  could  not  be  described  as  though  know- 
ledge were  its  essential  activity.  For  in  know- 
ledge there  is  a  distinction  of  subject  and  object, 
and  the  absolute,  being  one,  cannot  have  this  dis- 
tinction applied  to  it.  The  absolute  unity  is  the 
undefinable.  Yet,  as  Plotinus  proceeds  to  show, 
it  gives  rise  to  reason,  which  in  its  turn  produces 
the  ideas  of  things;  and  so  there  is  a  downward 
evolution  till  matter  is  finally  reached.  The 
task  of  the  human  soul  is  to  reverse  this  process, 
and  rise  through  its  degrees  till  it  reaches  the 


22  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

absolute  unity.  In  this  ascent  it  arrives  at  the 
stage  of  reason  which  Plato  and  Aristotle  regarded 
as  the  climax  of  human  attainment.  Here  it  enjoys 
the  contemplation  of  the  ideas ;  and  this  is  good ; 
but  it  is  not  the  best.  The  soul  passes  upward 
to  gain  perfect  unity  with  the  Supreme  Being. 
This  condition  is  reached  in  ecstasy,  in  which 
the  union  with  God  is  so  complete  that  self- 
consciousness  is  obliterated,  and  no  awareness  of 
other  existence  disturbs  the  rapturous  sense  of 
possession  by  God. 

It  is  important  to  notice  in  regard  to  mysticism 
that  it  looks  for  another  kind  of  unity  with  the 
absolute  than  that  which  the  rationalists  seem  to 
reach.  It  may  be  that  the  condition  of  ecstasy 
has  little  claim  to  stand  for  the  realization  of  such 
ideals,  yet  the  search  for  some  other  method  of 
reaching  reality  than  that  of  logical  categories 
demands  careful  attention.  Another  peculiarity  of 
mysticism  which  concerns  us  more  at  present  is 
that  its  ideal  of  knowledge  involves  the  absorption 
of  the  individual  in  the  absolute.  It  may  be 
urged,  indeed,  that  mysticism  is  not  a  theory  of 
knowledge,  since  it  is  denied  by  Plotinus  that 
the  highest  state  can  be  described  in  terms  of 
knowledge.  But  we  must  not  be  misled  by  words. 
If  knowledge  means  the  way  in  which  the  human 


DEFINITION  OF  KNOWLEDGE  23 

spirit  comes  into  contact  with  the  absolute  reality, 
it  is  not  to  be  decided  a  priori  that  the  ideal  which 
it  has  before  it  is  truly  represented  in  the  meaning 
usually  associated  with  the  term.  It  is  necessary 
to  keep  in  mind  mysticism  as  a  form  of  knowledge- 
theory. 

6.  The  Greek  era  passed,  and  the  Middle  Ages 
came  with  the  dominion  of  the  Christian  Church, 
and  the  insistence  upon  the  lesson  that  man's 
supreme  task  in  life  is  the  salvation  of  his  soul. 
The  lesson  was  learned;  the  greatness  of  the  soul 
was  realized.  At  the  same  time,  the  nature  that 
environed  man  was  ignored.  But  this  period  also 
passed.  Science  revived,  and  nature  was  studied 
anew.  She  could  no  longer  be  ignored,  and  each 
new  discovery  of  science  served  to  exalt  her,  and 
display  her  greatness.  But  the  lesson  of  the 
Middle  Ages  was  not  forgotten.  Man  came  to 
the  contemplation  of  nature  with  a  deepened  self- 
consciousness.  Modern  philosophy  began,  there- 
fore, with  two  seemingly  distinct  entities  before  it, 
—  man  and  nature ;  and  no  small  part  of  its  work 
has  been  devoted  to  the  determination  of  their 
relations.  The  problem  presented  itself  at  first 
as  that  of  the  relation  of  mind  and  body.  Des- 
cartes, the  Occasionalists,  Spinoza,  and  Leibnitz 
were  taken  up  with  questions  of  this  kind.  The 


24  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

discussion  touched  a  deeper  level  when  Locke 
asked,  what  our  ideas  are,  and  whether  they  can 
be  applied  to  things. 

7.  When  such  questions  were  asked,  it  seemed 
natural   to   say  that  our  ideas  reveal   objects   only 
as  they   appear,   not    as    they   are    in    themselves. 
There   is   no  longer  the   original    Greek   unity   of 
spirit    and    nature.      Each    thing    is    a    substance 
which  cannot  disclose  itself  save  in  its  effects  on 
others ;    and  further  reflection  seems  to  show  that 
this  is  true  not  only  of  external  things,  but  of  the 
Ego  :   it  is  known  in  its  appearances.     One  of  the 
most    characteristic   theories    of    modern    times    is 
agnosticism. 

8.  Locke  gives  expression  to  agnostic  views  when 
he  declares  that  the  mind  is  limited  to  ideas,  and 
that  all   its   knowledge  consists   in  the   joining  or 
separating   of  ideas   according  to   their   agreement 
or  disagreement ;  but  he  does  not  preserve  his  con- 
sistency, for  he  very  soon  proceeds  to  speak  of  a 
knowledge   in  which  our  ideas   agree  with  reality. 

9.  Hume's  analysis  of  the  contents  of  the  mind 
shows  that   they  are  made  up  of   impressions   and 
ideas.     The  impressions  are  distinguished  from  the 
ideas  by  their  greater  strength  and  vividness ;  thus, 
the  imagination  of   a  scene,  if   compared  with  the 
actual  contemplation  of  one,  is  seen  to  be  pale  and 


DEFINITION  OF  KNOWLEDGE  2$ 

obscure.  It  proves  on  further  reflection  that  all 
the  ideas  are  copies  of  impressions :  in  a  sense 
they  are  all  memories.  They  may  be  compounded 
in  various  ways  and  so  yield  the  ideas  of  imagina- 
tion, but  the  materials  are  originally  derived  from 
impressions.  The  great  question  then  arises, 
Whence  do  impressions  come,  and  what  know- 
ledge do  they  bring  ?  They  arise  from  "  unknown 
causes."  They  may  come  from  objects,  or  from 
God,  or  from  the  mind  itself.  What  a  doctrine 
of  knowledge  can  do  is  to  trace  the  forms  which 
these  impressions  and  ideas  assume.  Hume  sets 
himself  to  prove  this  in  tracing  the  history  of  the 
"philosophical  ideas  of  relation,"  such  as  space, 
time,  causality.  He  does  not  find  that  these  ideas 
add  anything  new  to  our  mental  content.  They 
are  simply  particular  ideas  considered  in  a  certain 
light.  The  idea  of  time  is  not  something  different 
from  the  succession  of  ideas.  There  is  a  succession 
of  ideas  in  us,  and,  looking  at  that  in  such  a  way  that 
the  aspect  of  succession  is  prominent,  we  have  the 
idea  of  time.  Time  as  an  abstract  idea  sundered 
from  the  succession  of  particular  ideas  or  impres- 
sions does  not  exist.  Thus  the  study  of  the  ideas 
of  relation  confirms  the  view  that  there  is  nothing 
in  the  mind  save  impressions  and  copies  of  impres- 
sions. The  case  of  causality  has,  so  far  as  the 


26  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

account  of  the  intellect  is  concerned,  a  somewhat 
exceptional  treatment.  Causality  is  resolved  into 
constant  conjunction  in  time ;  but  this  does  not 
seem  fully  to  explain  the  necessity  which  exists 
in  the  causal  bond,  and  Hume  says  that  this  neces- 
sity is  a  new  impression  which  arises  when  the 
constant  conjunction  is  exhibited.  Hume  thus 
admits  a  special  mode  of  origin  for  this  mental 
factor.  But  he  does  not  assign  such  an  origin  to 
other  relations,  nor  does  he  attribute  to  this  origin 
any  special  cognitive  value.  The  necessity  in 
causality  is  merely  a  new  impression. 

10.  Kant  offers  a  theory  of  knowledge  which 
agrees,  in  important  respects,  with  that  of  Hume. 
He  also  regards  impressions  as  due  to  unknown 
causes.  The  thing  in  itself  affects  the  sensibility, 
and  thus  produces  the  multiplicity  of  sensations. 
But  these  sensations  do  not  reveal  that  thing  in 
itself :  they  are  only  modes  of  the  sensibility. 
Neither  do  they  reveal  the  Ego  in  itself ;  they 
present  only  its  modes.  The  thing  in  itself  re- 
mains absolutely  unknown. 

Kant  differed  from  Hume  in  his  account  of  the 
"philosophical  ideas  of  relation,"  or,  to  use  his 
own  expression,  "categories."  Quantity,  quality, 
substance,  cause,  and  the  rest,  are  not  merely  par- 
ticular impressions,  or  ideas  "viewed  in  a  certain 


DEFINITION  OF  KNOWLEDGE  2/ 

light."  Neither  are  they  new  impressions.  They 
are  conceptions,  distinct  from  sense-data,  and  owing 
their  origin  to  the  spontaneous  activity  of  the 
mind.  It  might  have  been  expected  that  Kant 
would  regard  these  categories  as  representing  the 
thing  in  itself,  for  while  sensations  are  merely 
states  of  a  conscious  subject  these  mind-originated 
concepts  might  seem  entitled  to  be  thought  of  as 
objective.  Yet  Kant  does  not  so  view  them.  They 
are,  as  far  as  the  thing  in  itself  is  concerned,  merely 
subjective.  They  bring  order  and  unity  into  the 
chaos  of  sensation;  through  them  that  sense-ma- 
terial is  woven  into  the  wonderful  web  which  nature 
presents.  Yet  this  web  remains  a  mental  product. 
Nature's  laws  are  the  creatures  of  the  understand- 
ing. Thus  categories  fail  as  completely  as  sensa- 
tions to  give  us  a  knowledge  of  things  in  them- 
selves. 

It  is  true  that  there  are  in  Kant  hints  toward 
a  very  different  theory  of  knowledge.  He  speaks 
of  the  possibility  of  an  intelligence  that,  unlike 
ours,  is  not  "  discursive,"  but  intuitive,  and  so 
knows  things  in  their  truth.  Moreover,  while 
intellectually  we  cannot  reach  absolute  reality,  we 
come  into  contact  with  it  through  our  moral  facul- 
ties, and  the  great  moral  principles  of  the  universe 
are  made  known  to  us.  Some  of  these  suggestions 


28  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

will  be  seen  to  be  of  great  significance.  Yet  it 
remains  true  that  the  theory  which  Kant  most 
explicitly  formulated  and  most  carefully  elaborated 
is  that  which  is  agnostic  in  its  principles. 

11.  It  is  not  necessary  to  consider  other  exposi- 
tions  of   agnosticism,  for   they  contain   little   that 
is  new.     The  doctrine  seems,  at  first  sight,  to  have 
assumed  a  much  more  developed  form  in  the  hands 
of  Mr.   Spencer.     Yet  what  is  most  distinctive  of 
his  theory  is  his  account  of  the  evolution  of  ideas. 
His  agnosticism  does  not  differ  from  that  of  Hume  : 
the  manifestations  of  the  unknowable  are,  he  says, 
impressions  and  ideas. 

12.  It   remains   to   determine    the    definition    of 
knowledge   which  agnosticism   sanctions.      For    in 
saying    that    knowledge   is   impossible    it    implies, 
obviously,   a   theory   of   the  nature   of  knowledge. 
And   it   is   also   apparent   that   the  view  of  know- 
ledge  is  like  the  Greek  view.      The    mental   ele- 
ments must  resemble  the  elements  to  be  cognized. 
Thoughts    must    be   equal    to   things.      The   early 
Greek  view  and  the   modern   agnostic   view  agree 
in  their  presupposition  as  to  the  nature  of  know- 
ledge.1 

13.  There  has,  however,  developed  from  Kant  a 

1  Cf.  Hume,  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  Bk.  I,  Part  II,  §  2 ; 
Kant,  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft  (herausg.  von  Kehrbach),  p.  222. 


DEFINITION  OF  KNOWLEDGE  29 

very  remarkable  theory  of  knowledge,  which,  from 
its  wide  influence  at  the  present  time,  demands 
somewhat  careful  examination.  Kant's  agnosticism 
has  been  described.  But  it  is  to  be  observed  that, 
while  he  teaches  that  the  categories  are  merely 
principles  of  unity  among  sensations,  and  there- 
fore unable  to  give  us  knowledge  of  things  in  them- 
selves, he  yet  describes  the  judgments  which  spring 
from  categories  as  knowledge  :  it  is  a  priori  know- 
ledge, necessary  and  universal.  This  account  of 
knowledge,  as  not  consisting  in  relations  between 
the  mind  and  objects,  but  as  being  the  develop- 
ment of  the  mind's  spontaneous  activity,  seemed 
complete  without  any  reference  to  an  object  or 
thing  in  itself.  It  developed  into  Absolute  Ideal- 
ism. Thus,  Hegel  does  not  allow  that  truth  refers 
to  the  agreement  of  cognition  with  reality,  but 
contends  that  it  denotes  the  adequate  realization 

of  the  Idea,  as  we  mean  by  a  true  man  one  who 

* 

fully  realizes  manhood.  A  similar  view  is  repre- 
sented by  T.  H.  Green.  "  Knowledge,"  he  says, 
"consists  in  the  consciousness  of  relations,  or  re- 
lated facts."  l  Nor  is  there  an  objective  world  of 
which  these  relations  found  in  consciousness  are  a 
copy.  The  eternal  intelligence  communicates  to 
us  "in  inseparable  correlation,  understanding  and 

1  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  Bk.  I,  §  67. 


30  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

the  facts  understood,  experience  and  the  experienced 
world." 1  Many  other  writers  might  be  cited 
who  regard  the  distinction  between  subject  and 
object  as  belonging  to  a  lower  stage  of  the  develop- 
ment of  thought,  and  who  describe  knowledge  as 
an  activity  of  the  mind  unrelated  to  anything 
beyond  itself. 

14.  This  theory  is,  in  part,  a  reaction  against 
agnosticism,  and  in  its  zeal  for  the  validity  of 
knowledge,  it  proclaims  that  knowledge  of  an  ab- 
solute kind  is  possible  because  the  facts  to  be 
known  are  all  facts  of  consciousness.  It  thus 
seems  to  meet  all  the  demands  of  knowledge. 
And  it  may  be  that  it  has  a  truth  to  suggest  in 
regard  to  the  individual  human  being's  knowledge 
of  his  conscious  states :  we  shall  consider  later 
whether  each  of  these  may  be  at  once  knowing 
and  being.  The  validity  of  the  theory  might  be 
conceded  also,  had  we  to  deal  simply  with  an  ab- 
solute Reason  whose  being  was  his  rational  activ- 
ity. Yet  even  at  this  standpoint  difficulties  present 
themselves  in  the  statements  of  idealists.  For 
when  it  is  said  that  the  process  of  the  universe  is 
the  knowledge  or  self-defining  of  itself  by  the  ab- 
solute, it  seems  clear  that  there  is  not  merely  the 
unfolding  of  the  Idea,  but  that  this  unfolding  is 

1  Prolegomena,  Bk.  I,  §  36. 


DEFINITION  OF  KNOWLEDGE  31 

guided  by  the  purpose  of   having  a  subject   which 
is  distinct  from,  if  also  identical  with,  its  object. 

Apart  from  this,  however,  there  is  a  further 
problem.  It  cannot  be  repeated  too  often  or  with 
too  great  emphasis  that  in  the  investigation  into 
knowledge  there  is  first  to  be  considered  the  know- 
ledge of  one  individual  by  another.  Hegel  did  not 
do  justice  to  the  fact  of  individuality,  and  trans- 
cendentalists  generally  have  been  his  partners  in  this 
error.  But  the  experiences  of  individual  human 
beings  are  facts  ;  and  part,  at  least,  of  the  problem 
of  knowledge  is  the  question  how  one  individual 
consciousness  is  to  know  the  experience  of  another. 
My  neighbour's  actual  experience  as  he  reads  the 
book,  or  enjoys  the  sunshine, — how  am  I  to  lay 
my  consciousness  alongside  of  his  so  that  I  can  in 
any  true  sense  know  his  ?  It  may  be  said  that  we 
can  know  him  by  universals,  for  knowledge  comes 
only  by  such.  The  assumption  is  great,  but  it 
need  not  be  here  criticised.  If  my  neighbour  is 
made  up  of  universals,  yet  they  are  so  knit  to- 
gether as  to  make  him  an  individual  with  a 
unique  experience,  and  when  I  wish  to  know  him 
I  wish  to  reproduce  that  particular  plexus  of  uni- 
versals. There  are  still,  therefore,  subject  and 
object  which  are  to  meet  in  the  fellowship  of 
knowledge. 


32  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

It  may  be  said  that  when  they  attain  this  fel- 
lowship there  is  unity  in  the  universal.  The 
reasons  for  and  against  this  opinion  need  not  be 
stated  at  present.  Suppose  it  to  be  true,  it  is  to  be 
observed  that  this  unity  is  an  ideal  to  be  reached. 
There  is  a  relation  of  subject  and  object,  and  the 
object  determines  the  subject.  There  is  not  merely 
the  spontaneous  activity  of  an  evolving  Idea. 
There  is  the  contrast  of  two  individuals  and  the 
effort  of  one  to  become  parallel  to  the  other. 

One  cause  of  the  triumph  of  the  transcenden- 
talist  view,  to  so  name  it,  is  the  success  with 
which  it  has  seemed  to  dispose  of  the  material 
world.  That  world  seems  to  be  completely  ex- 
plained when  it  is  resolved  into  sense-data  and 
intellectual  relations.  We  do  not  seem  to  lose 
anything  when  matter  is  so  regarded.  Thus  the 
act  by  which  matter  is  created  seems  to  be  the  act 
by  which  it  is  known :  knowing  and  being  are  in 
every  sense  identical.  The  success  of  this  kind 
of  argument,  however,  is  due  to  our  complete  ig- 
norance of  matter.  Matter  is  still  an  inscrutable 
mystery.  Were  our  ignorance  less  complete,  we 
might  find  that  material  things  cannot,  any  more 
than  human  individuals  or  the  lower  animals,  lose 
themselves  in,  or  be  resolved  into,  the  mental  states 
of  an  intelligence.  In  any  case,  the  facts  which 


DEFINITION  OF  KNOWLEDGE  33 

must  determine  a  theory  of  knowledge  are  those 
of  which  we  actually  know  something  ;  and  these 
facts  are  our  own  experiences,  and  the  experiences 
of  other  human  beings.  The  being  of  one  man 
and  the  knowing  of  him  by  his  neighbours  are,  in 
certain  profound  senses,  not  to  be  identified.  We 
are  thus  brought  face  to  face  with  a  problem  such 
as  that  which  the  Greeks  recognized. 

15.  It  is  appropriate  at  this  point  to  take 
account  of  a  theory  of  truth  which  is  sometimes 
met  with.  It  is  said  that  the  only  true  know- 
ledge that  is  to  be  attained  by  the  mind  is  a 
system  of  consistent  judgments.  "We  must  seek 
the  criterion  of  truth  within  and  not  without  the 
world  of  consciousness.  It  can,  then,  be  nothing 
else  than  the  inner  harmony  and  consistency  of 
all  thoughts  and  experiences."1  Such  a  view 
naturally  presents  itself  when  the  presuppositions 
of  Locke  and  Kant  are  conceded.  If  knowledge 
consists  in  the  combining  or  synthetizing  of  ideas, 
the  consistency  of  a  system  of  knowledge  may  well 
be  the  only  possible  test  of  its  truth.  And  at  all 
times  such  consistency  must  be  admitted  to  have 
its  value  as  a  criterion.  But  when  we  are  called 

1Hoffding,  Outlines  of  Psychology,  translated  by  Mary  E. 
Lowndes,  p.  219.  Cf.  Hume,  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  Bk.  I, 
Part  III,  §  5. 


34  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

upon  to  renounce  all  knowledge  save  that  which 
is  given  in  such  a  consistent  system,  the  vital 
interest  of  knowledge  is  ignored.  To  refer  to  the 
crucial  test,  the  man  who  wishes  to  know  his 
neighbour  does  not  aim  merely  at  consistency.  The 
goal  of  his  effort  is  not  that,  but  the  reality  as 
it  lives  before  him. 

16.  We  have  briefly  surveyed  the  main  theories 
of  knowledge,  and  they  can  be  seen  to  fall  into 
two  groups.  The  view  of  knowledge  of  which 
Empedocles  was  taken  as  the  representative  is  ex- 
pressed in  the  formula,  Like  is  known  by  like. 
This  had  the  adhesion  of  Aristotle  when  he  said 
that  truth  was  the  agreement  of  thought  with 
reality.  It  seems  also  to  be  the  presupposition  of 
agnosticism.  The  other  view  of  knowledge  is 
that  which  makes  it  identical  with  its  object : 
Aristotle  in  certain  passages  identifies  the  univer- 
sal in  the  mind  with  that  which  is  manifested  in 
things ;  Plotinus  seeks  for  the  merging  of  self- 
consciousness  in  the  absolute  Being  ;  Hegel  regards 
knowledge  as  the  unfolding  of  the  Idea.  With 
this  group  of  theories  may  perhaps  be  classed 
that  which  finds  the  test  of  truth  in  consistency. 
The  truth  of  the  first  view  is  in  its  recognition  of 
the  distinction  between  subject  and  object;  but  in  its 
formulation  there  is  not  any  proper  recognition  of 


DEFINITION  OF  KNOWLEDGE  35 

the  peculiarity  of  self-knowledge.  The  second  view 
has  truth  in  reference  to  self-knowledge;  it  fails  to 
recognize  the  problem  of  the  knowledge  which  one 
individual  has  in  the  contemplation  of  another  in- 
dividual, and  thus  is  fatally  incomplete  as  a  theory 
of  knowledge. 

17.  This  historical  survey  has  prepared  the  way 
for  a  determination  of  the  nature  of  knowledge. 
Since,  in  the  effort  to  know,  the  mind  seeks  to 
think  things  as  they  are  in  themselves,  and  since 
the  facts  to  be  known  by  a  human  being  are  the 
knowing  self  and  a  world  of  other  persons  and 
things,  knowledge  may  be  denned  as  the  presence 
in  the  mind  immediately,  or  in  copy,  of  that  which 
constitutes  objects. 

The  full  exposition  and  justification  of  this  defi- 
nition will  be  given  in  the  chapters  which  follow. 
It  may  be  pointed  out,  however,  that  the  definition 
is  not  meant  to  decide  at  the  outset  how  the  sub- 
jective state  and  the  object  known  are  ultimately 
related.  Whether  the  subject  and  object  while 
retaining  their  individuality  reach  in  knowledge  an 
inner  identity,  or  by  their  individuality  are  excluded 
from  such  identity,  is  a  question  left  at  present 
unanswered.  Again,  it  is  not  intended  to  decide 
the  question  as  to  the  knowledge  which  the  self 
has  of  itself  in  each  moment  of  its  existence.  It 


36  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

remains  to  be  considered  whether  it  must  become 
an  object  to  itself  as  other  things  are  objects  to 
it;  or  is  in  some  more  intimate  way  knower  of 
itself  in  every  state  of  consciousness.  What  is 
affirmed  in  the  definition  is  that  the  object,  whether 
self  or  not-self,  must  be  present  to  the  knowing 
mind  in  copy  or  in  some  more  intimate  way. 

It  is  further  to  be  remembered  that  the  defi- 
nition presents  the  ideal  of  knowledge.  It  is  not 
less  the  true  ideal  because  men  have  failed  to 
attain  it,  and  in  their  efforts  after  it  have  used  many 
false  methods,  and  taken  many  an  illusion  for  the 
prize  of  their  search. 

It  is  here  left  undetermined  how  far  this  ideal 
is  possible  of  attainment.  It  may  be  that  the  ag- 
nostic conclusion  is  in  important  respects  the  correct 
one.  Even  the  argument  of  Berkeley,  that  God 
has  not  given  His  children  a  strong  desire  for  any- 
thing that  He  has  forever  put  beyond  their  reach, 
is  one  that  must  be  used  with  caution.  It  will 
have  to  be  decided  how  far  it  is  possible  to  reach 
the  absolute  reality.  But  the  ideal  is  the  ideal  of 
knowledge.  It  will  justify  itself  as  such  as  we 
proceed,  and  it  will  be  the  true  test  of  the  methods 
of  knowledge. 


CHAPTER  II 

SENSATION,  FEELING,  AND  VOLITION  AS   COGNITIVE 
FACTOKS 1 

1.  If  the  question  were  asked,  How  do  we  get 
our  knowledge  of  objects?  it  is  likely  that  most 
people  would  answer  without  hesitation  that  we 
get  it  through  the  senses.  The  panorama  of  nature 
is  spread  before  the  eye ;  her  music  comes  to  the 
soul  through  the  ear.  All  that  we  know  of  her 
seems  known  by  the  senses  :  they  are  the  "  gateways 
of  knowledge."  Moreover,  things  are  believed  to 
exist  in  themselves  just  as  the  senses  report  them. 
The  colours  of  earth,  and  cloud,  and  human  face 
are  thought  to  be  just  the  same  when  no  eye  beholds 
them ;  the  symphony  of  nature  is  the  same  whether 
or  not  there  are  living  creatures  to  listen  to  it. 
Sensation  is  thus  taken  to  be  the  great  method  of 
knowledge.  "  It  seems  evident,"  says  Hume,  "  that 
men  are  carried  by  a  natural  instinct  or  preposses- 
sion to  repose  faith  in  their  senses." 

1  While  feeling  and  volition  are  not  usually  recognized  as  instru- 
ments of  knowledge,  the  present  discussion  of  sensation  seems  to 
afford  a  proper  opportunity  for  attempting  an  estimate  of  their 
cognitive  value. 

37 


38  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

2.  "  But,"  Hume  adds,  "  this  universal  and  pri- 
mary  opinion   is   soon   destroyed   by   the    slightest 
philosophy."     And,  in   truth,    from   the   beginning 
of    philosophy,   sensation    has   for   various   reasons 
been  disparaged  as  a  method  of  knowledge.     Even 
empiricists,   who    seem    to    restrict    themselves    to 
sensation,  do  not  regard  it  as  yielding  knowledge 
in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word ;  generally  they  are 
agnostics.      It  is  only  among   those   unaccustomed 
to  reflection  that  sensation  is  taken  for  the  method 
of  knowledge. 

3.  The  reason  for  rejecting  sensation  is  not  that 
the  senses  are  often  the  victims  of  illusions.     The 
objections  are  to  the  deliverances  of  the  senses  when 
all  so-called  illusions  have  been  corrected. 

Thus  there  is  the  contention  of  the  trauscenden- 
talists  that  the  cognitive  or  objective  element  in  the 
mind  is  other  than  sensation.  To  externalize  such 
sense-qualities  as  sound  and  colour  and  to  make 
them  objects  is  to  go  beyond  the  warrant  of  mere 
sensation.  A  sensation  is  a  purely  subjective 
somewhat.  A  colour  by  itself  is  not  the  thought 
of  an  object.  To  make  it  an  object  there  are 
called  into  operation  the  categories  of  space  and 
substance.  At  the  best,  sensation  serves  as  an 
occasion  for  the  exercise  of  reason.  Just  as  the 
word  tree  is  not  the  representation  of  the  actual 


SENSATION,  FEELING,  AND    VOLITION       39 

tree,  but  may  suffice  to  call  into  exercise  the  facul- 
ties which  are  necessary  to  the  distinct  figuring  of 
the  tree,  so  the  sensation  serves  to  call  into  exercise 
the  rational  faculty,  and  elicit  not  images  but  con- 
cepts or  categories,  in  which  alone  knowledge  is  to 
be  found. 

Nor  is  it  the  transcendentalist  alone  who  finds 
sensation  wanting.  The  researches  of  the  physicist 
seem  to  establish  similar  conclusions.  The  physi- 
cist finds  that  the  objective  system  of  things  is  a 
system  of  forms  of  energy,  possibly  associated  with 
a  material  substrate.  This  system  bears  no  simi- 
larity to  the  series  of  sensations  by  which  its 
existence  is  indicated  to  us.  Vibrations  in  the 
ether  which  are  the  objective  counterpart  of  colours 
are  yet  in  no  way  like  colours  ;  and  vibrations  in 
the  air  are  not  like  sounds.  The  objective  world 
is  not  coloured  ;  nor  is  it  a  vocal  world.  There  is 
thus  a  breach  between  the  intimations  of  the  senses 
and  the  objective  world  revealed  by  science. 

A  very  similar  objection  presents  itself  to  the 
view  of  physiological  psychology.  When  there 
is  studied  not  merely  the  movement  in  the  world 
external  to  the  body,  but  the  process  in  the 
nervous  system,  the  contrast  of  the  physical  and 
psychical  processes  is  not  less  striking.  The 
physiologist  finds  certain  activities  of  a  physical 


40  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

and  chemical  kind  carried  on  in  the  cells  and 
fibres  which  constitute  the  nervous  system.  In 
an  ordinary  sense-experience  some  agent  in  the 
physical  world  starts  the  activities  of  the  so-called 
end-organs  ;  the  action  is  propagated  to  the  brain ; 
and  a  sensation  results.  But  the  sensation  is  not 
a  knowledge  of  the  brain-activity.  The  two  bear 
no  resemblance  to  each  other.  The  student  of 
the  brain  confesses  that,  however  intimately  he  may 
come  to  know  the  brain,  he  does  not  expect  to 
diminish  the  disparateness  between  the  appear- 
ance which  it  presents  and  the  sensations  which 
are  due  to  its  activities.  Thus  the  objects  to  which 
sensations  might  be  referred,  whether  they  are  the 
immediately  antecedent  physical  processes  in  the 
brain,  or  the  more  remote  objects  to  which 
the  nervous  activities  are  ultimately  to  be  traced, 
show  themselves  to  be  of  another  quality  of  being 
than  these  sensations.  It  seems  just,  therefore, 
to  conclude  that  as  reflection  progresses  the  cogni- 
tive value  of  sensation  diminishes  in  credit. 

4.  These  criticisms  of  sensation  will  be  consid- 
ered more  or  less  directly  as  we  proceed ;  and  it 
will  be  seen  that  while  they  have  certain  obvious 
facts  to  rest  on,  the  conclusions  are  of  little  value. 
They  have  been  referred  to  here  to  account  for 
the  common  disparagement  of  sensation.  There  is, 


SENSATION,  FEELING,  AND    VOLITION       41 

however,  a  characteristic  of  sensation  which  is  so 
far  a  justification  of  these  criticisms,  or,  at  least, 
specifies  the  sense  in  which  sensation  is  not  cogni- 
tive. Sensation  is  subjective  ;  it  is  a  state  of  the 
subject ;  there  is  no  reason  for  thinking  that  it  is 
a  state  of  the  object  at  the  time  when,  and  in  the 
form  in  which,  this  object  acts  as  stimulus.  When 
a  man  looks  on  his  neighbour's  face,  he  has  certain 
sensations  of  colour.  He  does  not  thereby  know 
his  neighbour,  for  there  need  be  nothing  in  his 
neighbour's  physical  or  mental  constitution  of  which 
that  sensation  is  the  likeness.  The  colour  is  his 
feeling,  not  his  neighbour's.  It  is,  therefore,  right 
to  reject  the  naive  uncritical  view  that  things  exist 
just  as  our  senses  report  them.1  The  view  is  as 
false  as  the  view  would  be  that  a  word  resembles 
the  object  for  which  it  stands. 

5.  But  there  is  a  sense  in  which  the  sensibility  is  a 
truly  cognitive  faculty.  There  is  a  sphere  in  which 
it  alone  can  give  knowledge,  —  the  sphere  of  sensa- 
tion itself.  Since  like  is  known  by  like,  sensation 
can  be  known  only  by  sensation. 

1  Yet  there  is  a  tendency  on  the  part  of  some  writers  to  return 
to  this  uncritical  view.  Mach,  e.g.,  says,  "The  world  with  my 
Ego  appeared  to  me  as  one  coherent  mass  of  sensations."  (Con- 
tributions to  the  Analysis  of  the  Sensations,  translated  by 
C.  M.  Williams,  p.  23,  note.) 


42  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

First  of  all,  it  must  be  insisted,  sensations  are 
facts.  They  are  such  as  truly  as  anything  in  the 
universe  of  thought  and  things.  The  sensation  of 
green  when  I  look  at  the  grass  is  as  much  a  fact 
as  the  force  of  gravitation.  And  if  it  is  a  fact,  then 
•it  is  legitimate  to  seek  to  know  it.  Again,  the 
sensations  are  not  exclusively,  or  even  primarily, 
mere  utilities  in  the  preservation  of  life.  The 
idea  of  evolution  and  of  function  as  determined 
by  its  utility  in  the  struggle  for  existence  has  led 
to  the  view  of  sensation  as  a  means  to  an  end 
beyond  it.  Sensation  is  thus  regarded  as  a  teleologi- 
cal  instrument,  and  thus  it  is  contemned.  But 
originally  it  is  not  a  means  to  an  end.  It  is  simply 
the  mind's  state,  or  activity.  The  rush  of  the 
winds,  the  flow  of  the  water,  the  shining  of  the 
stars,  these  we  describe  simply  as  activities.  They 
are  not  designed  to  redound  to  the  good  of  wind, 
or  sea,  or  star.  Even  so,  sensations  are  not  a  set 
of  signs  invented  by  the  mind  for  its  convenience 
in  discerning  advantages  or  dangers.  They  are  its 
activities,  or  its  states.  Not  that  the  forces  present 
in  evolution  fail  to  affect  the  mental  life.  A  period 
of  sifting  comes  with  the  struggle  for  existence. 
The  fittest  survive  ;  the  organisms  which  have 
certain  characters  survive.  It  is  not  meant  that 
these  organisms  produced  such  characters  by 


SENSATION,  FEELING,  AND   VOLITION      43 

design.  The  characters  are  due  to  the  operation 
of  laws  which  are  regarded  as  blind  and  mechani- 
cal. The  stronger  survives,  just  as  the  torrent 
sweeps  away  barriers  which  are  less  strong  than 
itself.  So  those  minds  are  "selected"  by  nature 
in  this  period  of  stress  which  happen  to  possess 
certain  sensations  and  certain  modes  of  relating 
sensations.  Now  it  is  one  set  of  sensations  that 
must  be  developed  —  say,  those  of  smell ;  now 
another  —  say,  those  of  sight.  The  animal  with 
the  acuter  faculty  survives.  In  this  manner  sen- 
sations are  teleological.  In  themselves,  however, 
they  are  not  teleological,  any  more  than  the  clay 
is  in  itself  teleological  which  is  used  to  stop  a 
hole. 

Nor  is  sensation  merely  a  sign  for  the  convenience 
of  the  intellect.  It  is  not  to  be  thought  that  it 
indicates  something  to  us,  and  may  then  be  for- 
gotten while  that  other  thing  is  being  studied.  It 
is  not  merely  an  instrument  to  something  beyond  it ; 
it  is  a  fact  for  knowledge.  Knowledge  has  no  instru- 
ments which  are  merely  instruments.  It  must  fulfil 
in  the  case  of  all  its  special  function  ;  it  must  know 
them  so  far  as  they  can  be  known.  The  sensation 
of  green  and  other  sensations  must  be  known  in 
themselves. 

If  sensations  are  objects  of  knowledge,  it  is  evi- 


44  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

dent  that  the  likeness  of  idea  and  object  which  con- 
stitutes knowledge  can  be  reached  in  their  case,  only 
if  the  knower  has  sensations.  To  know  a  sensation 
of  green  as  a  fact  in  his  own  or  some  other's  con- 
sciousness, the  knower  must  have  the  sensation  of 
green.  The  blind  man  cannot,  strictly  speaking, 
know  colours.  He  may  have  much  that  usually  goes 
by  the  name  of  knowledge  of  them  ;  he  may  asso- 
ciate with  the  term  many  ideas  like  those  which 
other  men  have,  and  he  -may  understand  the  demon- 
strations of  optical  laws  as  well  as  others.  But  the 
sensations  of  red  and  green  and  yellow,  which  are 
experiences  of  other  men,  and  facts  in  the  universe, 
are  forever  unknown  to  him.  Sensations  in  one 
man  are  known  by  corresponding  sensations  in  an- 
other who  is  knower  ;  or  in  the  same  man  in  an 
•act  of  memory.  A  fuller  vindication  of  these  state- 
ments will  be  given  when  the  complete  method  of 
knowledge  is  expounded. 

6.  The  importance  of  the  principle  laid  down  is 
great  in  proportion  to  the  importance  to  be  attached 
to  sensation.  Sensation  is  important  inasmuch  as  it 
is  a  fact  of  consciousness.  Great  interest  is  felt  in 
the  study  of  matter  even  when  matter  is  regarded 
as  dead.  If  it  is  dead,  much  more  interest  should 
be  felt  in  this  vital  element  of  the  mind.  If  the 
physical  universe  is  merely  mechanical,  Hegel  is 


SENSATION,  FEELING,   AND    VOLITION       45 

justified  when  he  says1  that  the  meanest  of  man's 
fancies  affords  a  better  knowledge  of  the  being  of 
God  than  any  object  in  nature ;  that  is,  the  most 
insignificant  fact  of  consciousness  has  a  more  divine 
worth  than  anything  in  nature.  Again,  it  must  be 
admitted  by  every  one,  transcendentalist  as  well  as 
empiricist,  that  sensation  occupies  a  very  large 
place  in  consciousness.  Our  conscious  experience 
is  to  a  great  extent  made  up  of  sensations.  They 
come  in  seemingly  infinite  numbers,  some  in  the 
noonday  of  attention,  others  in  its  twilight.  They 
change  from  moment  to  moment,  one  picture  as  it 
is  created  giving  way  to  another  scene.  Add  to 
these  the  imaginings,  the  dreams  by  day  and  night, 
the  memories,  all  which  give  sensations  again, 
though  often  faded  and  indistinct,  and  it  can  be 
seen  how  largely  life  is  made  up  of  sensations. 
Moreover,  all  must  agree  that  sensation  contributes 
largely  to  the  interest  of  life  ;  were  the  sensations 
of  taste  and  smell,  sight  and  hearing,  deducted  from 
conscious  experience,  the  residuum  would  be  of  the 
tamest  character. 

It  may  be  also  that  the  senses  will  have  in  the 
future  a  still  higher  place  assigned  to  them.  Partly 
because  of  the  intellectual  theories  which  have  pre- 
vailed, and  partly  because  of  the  ascetic  morality 

1  JEncydopadie,  §  248. 


46  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

which  is  our  heritage  from  the  past,  we  look  on 
them  with  indifference,  or  even  suspicion.  But 
they  are  the  manna  of  our  spirits,  or,  rather,  they 
are  the  very  life-pulses  of  our  spirits.  Nor  does 
the  fact  that  they  are  common  justify  our  neglect 
of  them.  What  is  more  common  than  the  flowers 
by  the  wayside,  or  the  stars  in  the  sky?  Yet  to 
those  who  study  them  these  familiar  objects  become 
worlds  of  increasing  interest.  And  it  is  likely  that 
the  common  sensations  will  prove  to  have  a  wealth 
of  interest  and  beauty  which  at  present  is  not  sus- 
pected. Art  has  done  much  to  honour  them,  but 
much  more  must  be  done  to  wean  us  from  the 
abstractions  which  we  now  honour  so  highly,  and 
bring  us  to  the  warmer  and  more  vital  experiences. 

Whatever  may  be  thought  as  to  the  future  recog- 
nition which  sensation  is  destined  to  receive,  there 
cannot  be  any  hesitation  in  saying  that  it  has  a  very 
important  place  in  the  experience  of  human  intel- 
ligence. Hence  the  importance  which  it  has  as  a 
cognitive  factor.  Like  is  known  by  like.  Sensa- 
tion is  known  by  sensation.  This  varied  and  chang- 
ing manifold  must  have  as  its  counterpart  in  the 
mind  of  the  knower  an  equally  varied  and  changing 
manifold. 

7.  It  can  also  be  seen  that  sensation  is  inti- 
mately connected  with  self-knowledge  or  self-con- 


SENSATION,  FEELING,  AND    VOLITION       47 

sciousness.  Whether  it  is  said  that  the  self  has 
sensations  as  its  states,  or  that  it  is  manifested  in 
sensations,  or  that  it  is  made  up,  in  whole  or  in 
part,  of  sensations,  the  vital  connection  of  sensation 
and  self-knowledge  scarcely  needs  demonstration. 
The  precise  nature  of  this  connection  is  a  question 
which  will  be  taken  up  later. 

8.  The  principles  which  have  been  found  to 
hold  in  the  case  of  sensation  hold  also  in  the  case 
of  feeling  and  will.  These  have  usually  been 
classed  among  the  non-cognitive  mental  elements 
of  the  mind.  It  is  true,  they  are  admitted  to 
have  some  relations  to  the  process  of  knowledge. 
The  sentiments  of  interest,  curiosity,  doubt,  and 
so  on,  are  described  as  intellectual.  There  are 
pleasures  and  pains  of  the  mind.  The  will,  too, 
is  seen  to  be  so  closely  associated  with  the  intel- 
lectual faculties  that  belief  is  spoken  of  by  some 
as  a  moral  act.  Yet  feelings  and  volitions  are  not 
thought  to  be  directly  cognitive.  A  choice  is  not 
a  knowledge  of  things ;  a  pain  or  a  pleasure  is 
not  a  disclosure  of  anything  save  the  condition  of 
the  subject. 

But  these  mental  elements  are  cognitive  in  the 
way  in  which  sensation  is  cognitive.  They  are 
subjective  even  as  sensation  is,  and  thus  the 
sphere  of  their  cognitive  application  is  made  clear. 


48  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

Through  them  the  mind  knows  the  states  of  other 
subjects.  Pain  would  be  unintelligible  to  any 
one  who  had  never  felt  pain.  A  volition 
would  be  unintelligible  to  any  one  who  had  not 
the  power  of  willing.  The  subjective  conditions, 
to  be  known,  must  be  paralleled  by  similar  sub- 
jective conditions  in  the  knower.  And  their  im- 
portance for  cognition  is  proportionate  to  their 
importance  in  human  life.  It  need  not  be  added 
that  they  also,  like  sensation,  must  contribute  to 
the  knowledge  of  the  self. 

9.  The   principle   that   feeling   and   volition    are 
cognitive   holds,  whatever  view   be   adopted   as  to 
their  origin  and  their  relation  to  sensation.      Yet 
it  will  prove  instructive  to  look  at  the  connection 
of  these  three  factors.     For  the  study  of  this  con- 
nection, while  it  may  seem  to  be  a  digression  from 
the  main  argument,  suggests  a  point  of  view  from 
which    the    sense    of    the    reasonableness    of    that 
argument  gains  an  added  force. 

10.  It  can  readily  be  seen  that  the  feelings  are 
closely  related  to    the    sensations.      Pleasure   and 
pain  have  often  been  regarded  as  aspects   or  attri- 
butes   of    sensations.       Or    if    the    hypothesis    of 
separate   nerve-endings    for    pain   be  corroborated, 
that  feeling  should  be   regarded  as   being  in  some 
of    its     forms     a     sentient     experience    coordinate 


SENSATION,  FEELING,   AND    VOLITION       49 

with  sensation.  There  is  one  group  of  feelings 
whose  sensational  character  can  scarcely  be  ques- 
tioned. The  sensations  which  have  this  affective 
nature  are  those  which  come  from  the  organs  of 
breathing  and  digestion  and  other  vital  functions. 
They  are  not  clearly  defined  or  localized  like  the 
sensations  of  sight  or  hearing.  While  they  are 
sensations,  it  is  largely  pleasure  or  pain  which 
they  indicate  to  us.  Accordingly  the  persistent 
states  of  pleasure  or  pain  which  are  called  moods, 
are  persistencies  of  these  sensations.  The  larger 
feelings  of  well-being  or  ill-being  which  colour  life 
as  a  whole  are  these  elementary  organic  sensa- 
tions. Moreover,  they  join  themselves  to  the 
more  aesthetic  and  intellectual  sentiments.  The 
deeper  thrill  which  we  have  in  the  contemplation 
of  a  work  of  art  or  in  the  solution  of  a  problem 
means  that  there  are  associated  with  the  more  re- 
fined feeling  these  massive  sensations.  It  may  be 
added  that  it  is  probably  when  attention  is  turned 
to  these,  that  there  can  be  perceived  the  element 
of  truth  in  Wundt's  theory  of  feeling  as  the  reac- 
tion of  the  apperception  upon  sensations.  For  these 
sensations  are  not  only  readily  evoked  by  all  kinds 
of  influence ;  they  are  precisely  the  sensations 
which,  as  we  shall  have  occasion  to  see,  go  to 
make  up  to  so  great  an  extent  the  primary  idea 


50  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

of  the  self.  Pleasure  or  pain  as  the  "  Re- 
actionsweise  der  Apperception "  means  largely 
the  pleasure  or  pain  given  in  these  sensations 
which  form  the  core  of  the  apperceptive  con- 
sciousness. 

Doubtless  this  question  of  the  relation  between 
sensation  and  emotion  will  depend  for  its  final  so- 
lution on  a  study  of  mental  growth.  One  of  the 
most  promising  theories  is  that  of  Horwicz 1  and 
Stanley,2  who  hold  that  the  primal  psychical  fact 
is  the  pleasure-pain  experience.  It  must,  indeed, 
in  view  of  such  a  theory,  be  asked  whether  our 
present  feeling  of  pleasure  and  pain  is  not  differ- 
entiated from  the  primal  consciousness.  Yet  the 
suggestion  is  important  that  this  pleasure-pain  ex- 
perience is  the  one  most  closely  akin  to  the  primi- 
tive consciousness ;  and  it  may  be  that  the  more 
ideational  phenomena  should  be  regarded  as  devel- 
opments from  this  root ;  sensation  receiving  an- 
other content  while  it  retains  in  most  cases  more 
or  less  of  the  pleasure-pain  character. 

The  emotions  do  not  call  for  detailed  treatment 
in  this  investigation.  They  are  blends  of  various 
mental  elements,  —  sensations,  ideas,  impulses.  So 
far  as  they  are  the  "  conscious  reflection  of  instinc- 

1  Psychologische  Analysen,  Erster  Theil,  §  62. 

2  Evolutionary  Psychology  of  Feeling,  Chap.  II. 


SENSATION,  FEELING,  AND    VOLITION       51 

tive  reactions," 1  it  can  be  seen  that  they  are  made 
up  of  sensations  or  copies  of  sensations. 

11.  The  will  has  long  been  regarded  as  a  distinct 
faculty,  and  it  has  seemed  to  occupy  a  position  of 
peculiar  dignity.  It  is  taken  to  be  that  faculty 
by  which  man  is  master  of  his  life,  and  is  thus  made 
the  source  of  moral  action.  This  sovereign  faculty 
gifted  to  a  finite  being  is  a  mystery,  but  it  is  the 
mystery  of  personality.  This  faculty  seems  ulti- 
mate and  irreducible;  some  declare  that  will  is  the 
ultimate  reality  in  the  universe. 

Yet  many  attempts  have  been  made  to  bring 
volitions  into  continuity  with  other  conscious  ex- 
periences. Many  idealists  have  identified  the  will 
with  reason.  On  the  other  hand,  the  empiricists 
have  reduced  the  phenomena  of  will  to  a  mat- 
ter of  causal  connection,  or,  more  strictly,  of 
sequence  obtaining  among  the  sensations,  ideas, 
pleasures,  and  pains  of  conscious  experience.  Much 
interest  attaches  to  the  efforts  of  some  recent 
psychologists  to  show  that  the  finer  analysis  ap- 
plied in  the  present  day  exhibits  the  phenomena 
of  the  will  as  a  series  of  sensations.  According 
to  them,  the  consciousness  of  a  volition  is  the  idea 
of  an  action  accompanied  by  the  feeling  of  effort. 
The  idea  of  the  action  must  be  present,  otherwise 

1  Marshall,  Pain,  Pleasure,  and,  ^Esthetics,  p.  65. 


52  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

the  action  cannot  be  willed,  and  this  idea  is  the 
prefiguring  of  sensations  like  those  the  action  will 
produce.  The  feeling  of  effort  is  also  sensational; 
it  is  made  up  of  sensations  from  brow,  throat,  and 
chest,  the  muscles  of  these  parts  being,  during 
effort,  in  a  state  of  tension. 

The  full  consideration  of  these  views  involves  a 
protracted  discussion  with  which  we  must  dispense. 
We  are,  therefore,  precluded  from  reaching  any 
sure  conclusion  as  to  their  truth ;  and  in  any  case, 
an  attempt  at  a  final  statement  would  at  present 
probably  be  premature.  But  the  effort  to  find 
continuity  between  the  will  and  other  faculties 
must  be  commended,  and  is  doubtless  to  be  re- 
garded as  in  a  general  way  a  prophecy  of  its  own 
success. 

12.  Some  light  is  thrown  on  the  problem  of  the 
connection  of  the  mental  elements  by  the  discov- 
eries and  suggestions  of  physiological  psychology. 
This  science  has  to  do  with  the  problem  because 
of  the  correlation  of  psychical  and  physical  phe- 
nomena, but  the  science  is  so  incomplete  that  its 
hypotheses  must  not  suffer  too  much  stress.  Physi- 
ology finds  in  the  nervous  system  cells  and  fibres, 
and  the  activity  of  these  may  be  regarded  as  a 
typical  activity  repeated  in  numberless  forms. 
The  cell  may  be  stimulated  by  a  fibre  coming  from 


SENSATION,  FEELING,  AND    VOLITION       53 

the  periphery,  or  it  may  receive  impulses  from 
other  cells  within  the  brain.  Amid  possible  indi- 
vidual variety  there  is  yet  general  uniformity. 
The  continuity  in  constitution  and  activity  is  still 
more  clearly  seen  when  it  is  remembered  that  all 
the  cells  are  the  offspring  of  a  common  parent,  or 
stand  in  a  still  closer  relation  to  each  other.  The 
conclusion  to  which  this  points  is  that,  as  there  is 
one  form  of  nervous  activity  and  constitution, 
there  is  one  form  of  conscious  activity ;  that  this 
may  be  described  as  sentiency ;  and  that  all  the 
variety  of  consciousness  is  due  to  differences  in  the 
intensity  and  quality  of  that  primal  typical  form. 

13.  Again,  the   evolutionary   treatment   of    psy- 
chology points  to  the  same  continuity.     Evolution 
knows  no  breaks  in  its  history.      Nothing  foreign 
is  grafted  into  the  growth  which   it  describes.     It 
is   at  least   probable   that   the   soul  will   prove   no 
exception  to  this  law.     From  its  simplest  germ  to 
its  highest  fruitage,  it  is  of  one  tissue. 

14.  It  is  continuity  that  has   been   emphasized; 
the     idea    of     continuity    is    very    prominent     in 
the   doctrine    of    evolution.      It    must,   indeed,   be 
pointed  out  that  continuity  is  not  the  whole  truth. 
It   does    not    explain    the    existence    of    anything. 
Change  may  be  continuous,   but   in   every  change 
there    is    something    new  introduced.       The    new 


54  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

ideas,  the  new  theories,  the  new  purposes  that 
come  to  the  soul  may  be  shown  to  be  continuous 
with  the  past  life,  to  have  the  same  "elements," 
but  it  would  be  as  correct  to  say  that  they  are  new 
creations.  The  principle  is  true,  even  in  the  ma- 
terial world.  A  dust-heap  is  not  simply  a  collec- 
tion of  the  old  identical  particles  which  remain 
unchanged  in  spite  of  change  of  place.  They  are 
in  a  new  relationship  :  it  is  as  if  a  new  world  had 
been  made.  There  might,  therefore,  be  continuity 
in  the  soul's  evolution,  and  yet,  since  new  qualities 
and  new  faculties  emerge  without  any  breach  of 
continuity,  the  mere  fact  of  continuity  is  no  war- 
rant for  conclusions  as  to  function.  It  is  evident 
that  all  such  conclusions  must  be  qualified  by  the 
reflection  that  the  experience  of  man  and  nature  is 
always  changing,  and  that  each  form  of  it  is  new 
and,  in  a  sense,  unique. 

But  the  fact  of  continuity  is  so  far  an  evidence 
of  homogeneity.  Anything  is  not  the  cause  of  any- 
thing. Stones  do  not  bear  apples.  The  scenery 
of  a  landscape  does  not  enter  into  the  dreams  of 
the  man  born  blind.  That  which  is  new  in  the 
mind  shows  when  it  is  examined  that  it  is  made  of 
the  material  of  the  old. 

15.  Let  it  be  repeated,  it  is  not  essential  to  the 
present  investigation  to  settle  the  question  of  conti- 


SENSATION;  FEELING,  AND  VOLITION     55 

nuity.  The  doctrine,  for  instance,  that  like  is  known 
by  like  holds,  however  heterogeneous  the  mental 
elements  may  be.  Yet  unity  and  simplicity,  and  the 
presentation  of  evolutionary  relations,  are  to  be 
desired  in  epistemology  as  elsewhere.  And  there  is 
a  further  value  in  these  discussions.  They  serve  to 
bring  into  clear  view  the  fundamental  fact  that  the 
mental  factors  are  conscious  and  intelligible.  The 
will,  for  instance,  is  not  a  blind  something  in  man, 
like  a  hidden  driving  force.  The  will,  so  far  as  it 
is,  or  can  be,  spoken  of  intelligently,  is  a  series,  or 
a  member  of  a  series,  of  conscious  phenomena.  The 
statement  that  volition  and  emotion  are  cognitive 
thus  becomes  less  paradoxical.  They  are  parts  of 
consciousness.  And  it  is  a  great  truth,  which  will 
become  clearer  as  we  proceed,  that  knowledge  is  one 
of  the  primal  functions  of  every  part  of  conscious 
experience,  as  assimilation  is  a  constant  function  of 
living  cells.  Consciousness  in  all  its  forms  reflects 
similar  consciousnesses.  Life  is  known  by  life. 
Moreover,  all  consciousness  is  self-knowledge. 

There  is  a  still  further  interest  in  these  discus- 
sions. They  prepare  for  a  consideration  of  the 
relation  between  the  elements  already  spoken  of 
and  other  mental  constituents.  There  remains  one 
important  class  of  mental  facts,  which  seem  to 
many  to  belong  to  a  distinct  type,  removed  from 


56  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

all  those  that  have  been  described.  These  are  the 
forms,  or  categories,  of  reason.  It  will  be  neces- 
sary to  study  these  with  care,  and  it  will  be  found 
that  they  have  their  origin  in  the  processes  of  sen- 
sation and  feeling.  There  will  thus  be  confirmation 
given  to  the  view  that  there  is  unity  of  type  in 
all  conscious  experiences,  and  that  they  all,  in  an 
important  sense,  stand  on  the  same  cognitive  plane. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  CONCEPTUAL   VIEW   OP   KNOWLEDGE 

1.  It  was   stated   in   the   Introduction   that  the 
object  aimed  at  by  science  and  philosophy  has  been 
a  system   of  universals   or  concepts.      This  state- 
ment must   now  be    explained    and  verified.      Its 
meaning,   and    also   its   correctness,   will    be    most 
clearly  perceived  if  we  look  at  the  history  of  the 
doctrine   of    concepts,  especially  its   early  history, 
and  then  at  the  form  of  the  doctrine  presented  in 
logic. 

2.  The  first  philosopher  to  give  prominence  to  the 
concept  was  Socrates.     Men  had  used  concepts  be- 
fore ;  Socrates  did  not  invent  them.     When  Thales 
said  that  water  was  the  principle  of  all  things,  he 
was  using   a  general   concept.     But   Socrates   was 
the  first  to   call   attention   to  the  concept   as  the 
great  instrument  of  science. 

It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  Socrates  differed 
from  his  predecessors  in  laying  emphasis  on  the 
subjective  character  of  thought.  He  did  not  say 
that  thought  was  the  supreme  actuality,  in  con- 

67 


58  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

trast  with  the  world  of  material  things,  nor  did  he 
say  that  the  concept  was  a  mental  manufacture  to 
be  used  in  the  cognition  of  objects.  Such  a  con- 
trast of  subject  and  object  was  somewhat  strange  to 
the  men  of  that  time,  even  in  their  scepticism  ;  for 
in  their  scepticism  they  believed  that  they  were 
showing  the  nullity  of  things  as  well  as  of  thoughts. 

But  Socrates  made  an  advance  upon  earlier  phi- 
losophy in  saying  that  the  concepts  of  things  are 
their  explanation.  He  assumed  their  objectivity, 
and  treated  them  as  the  ground  or  reality  of  things. 
He  would  not  have  asked  after  the  cause  of  water, 
or  the  effects  of  water ;  he  would  have  tried  to 
define  water ;  and  he  would  have  shown  the  general 
or  universal  nature  of  this  concept  by  considering 
the  many  concrete  cases  in  which  it  is  illustrated. 

His  use  of  this  method  was  the  beginning  of  a 
new  era  in  the  history  of  philosophy.  He  deter- 
mined, Win  del  band  remarks,1  for  all  the  future 
the  essential  nature  of  science. 

It  may  be  doubted  whether  Socrates  was  strong 
enough  to  mould  the  doctrines  of  philosophy  ;  but 
the  work  he  began  was  taken  up  by  Plato  and 
Aristotle. 

3.  The  doctrine  of  Plato  that  the  idea  is  the 
real,  that  it  exists  as  an  independent  entity  apart 

1  Geschichte  der  Philosophic,  p.  76. 


CONCEPTUAL    VIEW  OF  KNOWLEDGE        59 

from  individual  things,  and  that  knowledge  con- 
sists in  its  contemplation,  has  been  already 
referred  to.  It  has  also  been  indicated  that  the 
idea  is  the  general  concept :  the  idea  of  beauty 
is  the  one  beauty  in  contrast  with  the  many 
beautiful  things;  or,  to  use  another  of  Plato's 
illustrations,  the  idea  of  bed  is  the  one  bed  of 
which  God  is  the  maker,  in  contrast  with  the 
many  beds  produced  by  man's  device.  The  con- 
cept is  for  Plato  the  presentation  to  the  mind  of 
the  absolute,  transcendent  reality. 

It  is  the  natural  corollary  to  this  doctrine  that 
Plato  should  regard  sensation  as  incapable  of  giv- 
ing us  knowledge.  As  the  concept  is  related  to 
reality,  so  is  sensation  to  this  changing  world  of 
phenomena.  Individual  things  in  time  and  space 
are  connected  with  the  ideas,  are,  in  some  way, 
copies  of  them;  but  they  also  partake  of  nonen- 
tity. They  belong  to  the  stream  of  change,  and 
their  coming  into  existence  is  their  passing  into 
non-existence.  This  changing,  vanishing  show 
presents  itself  to  the  mind  in  sensation.  Sensa- 
tion is,  therefore,  not  the  medium  of  our  know- 
ledge of  absolute  reality. 

Plato  has  drawn  the  outlines  of  a  system  of 
ideas.  The  relations  in  which  the  ideas  stand  to 
each  other  are  those  of  the  subordination  and 


60  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

coordination  of  concepts.  Plato  has,  indeed,  done 
little  to  fill  in  this  outline.  He  speaks  of  being, 
justice,  and  a  few  other  ideas ;  and  he  gives  the 
good  the  supreme  place  in  this  system;  but  a 
further  completeness  he  does  not  present.  Yet 
he  has  announced  the  great  ideal  of  science  as  an 
organized  system  of  concepts. 

4.  Aristotle  adopted  the  view  of  Plato  that 
concepts  form  the  content  of  scientific  knowledge. 
At  the  same  time  he  has  modified  Plato's  presen- 
tation of  it.  The  concept  is  not  separate  from 
things,  but  in  things,  and  hence  Aristotle  is  led 
sometimes  to  insist  that,  as  the  individual  only  is 
real,  knowledge  can  be  only  of  the  individual. 
It  has  seemed,  indeed,  to  some  of  his  critics  that 
Aristotle  is  here  contradicting  what  he  says  of 
truth  as  found  only  in  universals.  But  the  con- 
tradiction ceases  to  be  felt  when  it  is  remembered 
that,  while  only  individuals  exist,  the  universal  is 
the  essence  of  the  individual.  Knowledge  is 
therefore  of  the  individual,  yet  is,  at  the  same 
time,  of  the  universal.  That  which  is  not  dedu- 
cible  from  the  universal,  the  varying  effects,  say, 
which  an  individual  produces  in  other  individuals, 
is  accidental,  and  is  not  a  matter  of  science. 

Aristotle  also  teaches  that  there  is  a  system  of 
such  concepts.  At  the  same  time  he  does  not 


CONCEPTUAL   VIEW  OF  KNOWLEDGE        6 1 

find  absolute  unity  in  the  system.  There  is  not 
one  supreme  concept  under  which  all  others  can 
be  ranged.  There  is  not  one  science,  but  several. 

An  important  place  in  the  development  of  know- 
ledge is  assigned  to  sensation.  All  knowledge  is 
dependent  on  experience,  and  experience  is  to  be 
traced  ultimately  to  the  senses.  Without  sensation 
there  are  no  images,  and  without  images  there  is  no 
thought:  the  soul  thinks  the  "forms  in  images." 
Yet  while  sensation  is  thus  important,  it  does  not 
fulfil  the  function  of  the  cognitive  faculty.  It 
only  serves  as  a  matter  for  the  higher  activity  of 
the  reason  which  thinks  in  concepts.  Moreover, 
while  our  knowledge  starts  from  experience,  Aris- 
totle declares  that  the  highest  concepts  are  of  a 
self-evident  character,  and  that  from  such  all 
other  concepts  must  in  an  ideal  system  of  know- 
ledge be  derived. 

5.  The  great  Greek  masters  determined  the 
course  which  human  thought  was  to  take.  Their 
work  has  never  been  undone.  In  spite  of  the 
Renaissance  and  Bacon  they  control  the  think- 
ing of  to-day.  Aristotle  may  still  be  described 
as  the  master  of  them  that  know ;  the  funda- 
mental conception  of  knowledge  is  his.  The  name 
of  Kant,  one  of  the  most  influential  and  represen- 
tative of  modern  thinkers,  at  once  recalls  the 


62  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

emphasis  which  he  laid  on  concepts.  The  data  of 
the  senses,  he  says,  give  no  knowledge  of  them- 
selves ;  they  must  have  concepts  joined  to  them. 
The  concept  brings  light  to  the  sense  world,  for 
sensation  without  it  is  blind.  It  yields  unity  and 
objectivity  and  order.  It  may  still  be  doubtful 
for  Kant  whether  this  product  is  absolute  know- 
ledge, but,  at  least,  it  is  that  which  constitutes 
science.  Concepts  or  categories  have  a  still  higher 
place  in  the  systems  of  Hegel  and  the  other  ideal- 
ists. They  are  not  merely  regarded  as  principles 
of  synthesis :  they  constitute  the  being  of  the 
Absolute  ;  they  are,  in  Hegel's  words,  God  in  His 
eternal  essence.  It  is  unnecessary  to  cite  other 
illustrations  of  this  view.  The  doctrine  of  the 
empiricists  needs  separate  consideration;  it  will 
be  seen,  as  has  already  been  stated,  that  it  does 
not  differ  essentially  from  the  view  described. 

6.  Further  illustration  of  this  view  is  gained 
when  the  teaching  of  logic  is  considered.  And 
the  importance  of  this  testimony  is  great  when 
the  relation  of  logic  to  science  and  philosophy 
is  considered.  There  has  been  not  a  little  perplex- 
ity as  to  the  function  of  logic.  It  used  to  be  a 
subject  of  debate  whether  logic  should  be  regarded 
as  a  science,  or  as  an  art ;  whether  it  gave  the  laws 
of  thought,  or  was  an  instrument  in  mental  train- 


CONCEPTUAL    VIEW  OF  KNOWLEDGE        63 

ing.  It  may  seem  to  settle  the  matter  to  say  that 
logic  is  the  science  of  correct  reasoning  or  think- 
ing, and  the  statement  is  so  far  right.  Yet  it  is 
to  be  remembered  that  logic  studies  fallacies. 
Perhaps  the  happiest  definition  of  logic  is  that 
given  by  Professor  Sigwart  at  the  beginning  of 
his  great  work :  "  Logic  is  the  ethics  of  thought." 
Yet  this  is  not  to  be  understood  quite  as  Sigwart 
understands  it,  as  an  account  of  the  methods  of 
correct  thinking,  as  if  logic  were  a  method  of 
reaching  something  beyond  itself.  An  ethic  does 
not  merely  give  precepts  which  may  guide  to  some- 
thing other  than  themselves,  but  describes  the  ideal 
life  itself.  Logic  does  not  merely  give  rules  for 
reaching  a  beyond  ;  it  describes  the  forms  which 
thought,  at  present  imperfect  and  fallacious,  must 
assume  when  its  work  is  perfected. 

The  importance  of  the  testimony  of  logic  in  the 
present  inquiry  can  at  once  be  seen.  It  is  to  logic 
that  we  ought  to  turn  to  be  informed  as  to  the 
ideals  of  science  and  philosophy,  and  we  should 
thus  know  what  forms  a  perfect  knowledge  is  ex- 
pected to  take.  Unfortunately  this  testimony  is 
far  from  being  so  clear  as  it  should  be.  Logic  has 
failed  to  understand  clearly  its  peculiar  function. 
In  hearing  what  it  has  to  say,  we  must  remember 
that  it  wavers  between  the  function  of  a  normative 


64  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

science  and  that  of  a  science  which  presents  a  cer- 
tain number  of  actual  psychological  processes. 

7.  The  first  chapter  of  logic  deals  with  the 
subject  of  terms.  There  are  various  forms  of 
speech  reflecting  the  various  forms  of  thought,  but 
logic  restricts  its  attention  to  nouns,  adjectives, 
and  verbs.  The  other  forms  of  speech  are  taken 
account  of  only  if  they  are  metamorphosed  into 
the  so-called  categorematic  forms.  But  this  is  not 
all ;  a  further  sifting  takes  place.  It  is  the  noun 
which  is  selected,  and  from  the  many  kinds  of  noun 
the  common  noun  is  taken.  It  is  the  class  name, 
which  does  not,  like  the  proper  noun,  indicate  an 
individual,  nor,  like  the  abstract,  specify  a  quality. 
It  has  for  its  function  to  indicate  the  one  in  the 
many.  So  it  has  denotation  or  extension,  and  con- 
notation or  intension. 

It  cannot  be  said  that  the  ordinary  logic  justi- 
fies this  selection  of  the  common  noun.  Yet  it 
does  by  this  sifting  process  point  to  it  as  the  final 
form  of  logical  thinking.  It  thus  makes  the  con- 
cept or  the  intension  of  the  term  the  object  of 
thought,  this  being,  at  the  same  time,  the  content 
of  the  things  "denoted." 

Logic  becomes  more  distinctly  ethical  in  prescrib- 
ing the  way  in  which  the  concept  is  to  be  treated. 
The  work  of  definition  must  be  carried  out ;  the 


CONCEPTUAL    VIEW  OF  KNOWLEDGE        65 

elements  in  the  concept  are  to  be  distinguished 
and  specified.  Definition,  however,  to  be  satisfac- 
tory, must  be  preceded  by  division  and  classifica- 
tion. The  concepts  must  be  ranged  in  a  certain 
order.  They  form  an  ascending  scale  of  general- 
ity and  stand  in  the  relation  of  genus  and  species. 
The  ideal  of  such  a  classification  is  indicated  in  the 
three  scholastic  rules  for  its  direction.  First,  the 
number  of  the  species  is  not  to  be  diminished ; 
that  is,  all  the  species  contained  in  the  universe 
are  to  be  discovered.  Secondly,  the  summum  genus, 
or  highest  concept,  is  to  be  reached.  The  third 
rule  is  that  the  division  shall  not  make  a  leap  ;  all 
the  intermediate  species  and  genera  are  to  be 
given.  The  survey  of  this  part  of  logic  shows 
that  there  is  presented  as  the  ideal  of  knowledge  a 
system  of  concepts. 

8.  The  account  given  of  the  judgment  points, 
though  by  no  means  clearly,  to  the  same  conclu- 
sion. Light  on  this  subject  is  not  so  much  to  be 
gained  from  definitions  of  the  judgment,  for  these 
vary  ;  it  is  to  be  found  rather  in  the  treatment  to 
which  the  judgment  is  subjected.  Judgments  are 
divided  into  four  classes,  —  universal  affirmative, 
universal  negative,  particular  affirmative,  and  par- 
ticular negative.  The  judgments  being  thus  classi- 
fied are  also  said  to  be  distinguished  by  the 


66  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

distribution,  or  non-distribution,  of  subject  and 
predicate.  A  term  is  distributed  when  it  is  taken 
in  its  whole  extent ;  thus  the  universal  affirmative, 
all  S  is  P,  has  the  subject  distributed,  but  the 
predicate  is  undistributed,  as  only  a  part  of  the 
things  it  denotes  are  indicated.  This  way  of  pre- 
senting the  judgment  indicates  that  we  are  dealing 
with  classes.  The  class  or  number  of  individuals 
indicated  by  the  subject  is  contained,  to  keep  to 
the  illustration  of  the  universal  affirmative,  in  the 
class  indicated  by  the  predicate.  The  relation  is 
made  one  of  quantity,  and  this  reduction  of  the 
judgment  seems  a  deviation  from  the  conceptual 
view.  At  the  same  time,  this  demarcation  of  the 
class  depends  on  the  presupposition  of  the  concept 
which  the  class  name  indicates,  and  indeed  the 
concept  has  already  in  the  doctrine  of  the  term 
been  taken  for  the  content  of  the  individuals  indi- 
cated by  the  name.  We  seem  obliged  to  conclude 
that,  while  the  doctrine  of  the  judgment  refers  only 
to  individuals  in  certain  quantitative  relations,  it 
implies  a  reference  to  the  concept  as  the  basis  for 
determining  such  relations,  and  proves  to  be  un- 
consciously a  reminiscence  of  the  superordination 
and  subordination  of  the  world  of  concepts. 

9.    The  treatment  of  the  syllogism  is  similar  to 
the  treatment  of  the  judgment.     The  syllogism  is 


CONCEPTUAL    VIEW  OF  KNOWLEDGE        6/ 

an  instrument  to  help  in  determining  the  relations 
of  classes.  In  Aristotle's  hands  it  was  meant  to  ex- 
hibit the  connection  of  the  individual  or  the  species 
with  the  higher,  and  ultimately  with  the  high- 
est, universal.  But  while,  as  used  in  the  schools, 
it  admits  of  this  use,  this  is  not  shown  to  be  its 
main  function,  and,  even  were  it  so  employed, 
it  would  use  those  quantitative  relations  to  which 
we  have  seen  the  judgment  to  be  restricted.  So 
that  the  syllogism,  like  the  judgment,  does  not 
directly  bear  witness  to  the  concept,  though  in  it, 
as  in  the  judgment,  the  concept  is  implied. 

10.  In  its  treatment  of  the  judgment  and  the  syl- 
logism logic  has  degenerated  into  formalism  :  it  has 
not  been  faithful  to  the  doctrine  of  the  concept ; 
and  it  has  not  fulfilled  in  any  adequate  way  its 
ethical  function  of  presenting  the  ideal  to  be  at- 
tained by  knowledge.  When  we  turn  to  the  doc- 
trine of  induction  we  find  a  different  mode  of 
treatment.  It  is  here  that  logic  shows  itself  in 
most  vital  contact  with  the  procedure  of  science  ; 
and  it  is  here  also  that  logic  returns  to  the  doc- 
trine of  the  concept. 

Inductive  logic  shows  how  the  relations  of  phe- 
nomena are  to  be  stated.  The  connection  is  to  be 
given,  and  the  statement  is  to  be  made  in  universal 
form.  What  is  true  of  one  case  is  to  be  presented 


68  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

as  the  truth  of  all  similar  cases.  In  other  words, 
the  law  of  the  phenomena  is  to  be  given,  and  the 
case  or  cases  studied  are  regarded  as  exemplifica- 
tions of  the  law.  It  is  thus  that  induction  deter- 
mines the  form  of  the  ideal  concept,  for  the  law  is 
the  modern  scientific  form  of  the  concept. 

Why,  then,  is  the  method  of  induction  treated 
apart  from  the  question  of  the  formation  of  the 
concept  ?  It  must  be  remembered  that  the  con- 
cept which  is  described  first  by  logic  is  the  con- 
cept at  the  stage  which  is  reached  by  unscientific 
thought.  It  is  also  the  concept  as  it  presented 
itself  to  Aristotle.  The  world  is  regarded  by  him 
as  a  world  of  individual  things  or  substances. 
Qualities  coexist  in  these  substances :  a  man  is  wise 
and  tall  and  dark.  The  universal  concept,  like- 
wise, is  a  presentation  of  qualities  that  coexist  ; 
only,  in  the  concept  the  coexistence  is  necessary. 
Nor  does  Aristotle  transcend  this  view  in  his  ac- 
count of  induction.  Induction  is  a  syllogism  in 
the  third  figure  and  presents  two  qualities  as  co- 
existing because  found  to  inhere  in  a  common  sub- 
ject. Thus,  to  use  his  illustration,  man,  horse, 
and  mule  are  gall-less  ;  they  are  also  long-lived  ; 
therefore,  long-lived  and  gall-less  are  qualities  that 
coexist.  It  is  this  primitive  view  of  the  world, 
as  consisting  of  things,  which  is  embodied  in  the 


CONCEPTUAL    VIEW  OF  KNOWLEDGE       69 

doctrine   of    Aristotle,   and   in  the   logic   which   is 
ultimately  to  be  traced  to  him. 

Modern  science,  however,  has  ceased  to  lay  ex- 
clusive emphasis  on  the  idea  of  thing.  With  the 
revival  of  the  atomic  theory  in  the  Renaissance 
period,  another  view  of  the  world  began  to  gain 
favour.  Things  were  resolved  into  atoms,  and  the 
interactions  of  the  atoms  seemed  to  be  the  facts 
most  worthy  of  attention.  Even  the  atoms  came, 
as  reflection  on  them  continued,  to  have  a  merely 
hypothetical  existence.  That  which  was  traced 
everywhere  was  energy.  The  doctrine  of  energy 
is  the  centre  of  modern  science.  The  world  is  not 
so  much  a  world  of  things ;  it  is  a  world  of 
processes.  Hence  the  new  view  of  induction.  It 
is  not  to  determine  coexistence  but  sequence.  It 
does  not  deal  with  qualities  that  are  conjoined, 
but  with  processes  that  pass  into  each  other ;  it 
traces  the  transformations  of  energy.  The  methods 
of  induction  formulated  by  J.  S.  Mill,  in  their 
contrast  with  those  of  Aristotle,  show  the  changed 
point  of  view.  They  are  entirely  methods  for  discov- 
ering causes.  Even  when  there  is  a  coexistence  of 
phenomena  presented,  the  statement  of  them  in  terms 
of  coexistence  is  only  provisional  ;  for  the  coexist- 
ence must  be  explained  as  due  either  to  causal  agency 
on  the  part  of  one  of  the  phenomena,  or  to  the  fact 


70  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

that  both  of  them  are  necessary  results  of  a  com- 
mon cause.  This  causal  process  is  the  most  im- 
portant of  the  ideas  associated  with  the  great 
scientific  term  law.  It  can  thus  be  seen  that  the 
law  which  science  seeks  to  formulate  is  the  modern 
development  of  the  concept.  It  can  also  be  seen 
that  the  ordinary  logic  text-book  presents  its 
somewhat  chaotic  appearance  because  the  older 
doctrine  of  the  concept  and  the  modern  treat- 
ment of  it  under  the  head  of  induction  are  not 
presented  in  their  true  relation. 

11.  But  while  the  doctrine  of  induction  has 
been  developed,  logic  seems  on  the  other  hand 
to  have  changed  its  view  of  the  importance  of 
the  concept.  It  is  the  judgment  which  is  often 
regarded  by  modern  logicians  as  the  universal 
form  of  rational  activity.  In  such  treatises  on 
logic  as  those  of  Mr.  Bradley  and  Mr.  Bosanquet, 
the  concept  seems  at  first  either  to  be  ignored,  or 
to  be  put  in  a  very  subordinate  place.1  Yet  it  is 
only  in  appearance  that  the  concept  is  discarded. 
When  the  judgment  is  examined,  it  is  found  to 
contain  a  universal.  When  Mr.  Bradley  says 
that  the  judgment  is  the  reference  of  an  idea  to 

1  Cf.  Sigwart,  Logik,  Einleitung,  §  1  ;  Schuppe,  Grundriss  der 
Erkenntniss-Theorie  u.  Logik,  §  66;  Riehl,  Der  philosophischc 
Kriticismus,  Bd.  U,  Einleitung ;  etc. 


CONCEPTUAL    VIEW  OF  KNOWLEDGE         71 

reality,  the  "  idea "  proves  to  be  the  universal. 
Mr.  Bosanquet  speaks  of  the  judgment  as  an 
identity  in  difference,  but  again  it  is  clear  that 
the  "  identity "  is  the  universal :  the  universal,  it 
is  taught,  is  not  present  except  in  the  judgment, 
but  there  is  no  judging  or  thinking  in  which  it 
is  not  found  ;  in  thinking  the  one  does  not  exist 
apart  from  the  many,  yet  the  many  are  consti- 
tuted by  the  one.1 

12.  It  has  thus  been  shown  that  from  a  very  early 
period  in  the  history  of  philosophy  the  concept  has 
been  taken  for  the  ultimate  form  of  knowledge,  and 
that  the  later  philosophy  has  been  faithful  to  the 
tradition  of  the  earlier.  The  testimony  of  logic  has 
also  been  considered,  because  it  is  the  function  of 
logic  to  state  the  ideals  of  knowledge  ;  and,  while 
the  witness  it  bears  is  far  from  being  unmistakable, 
it  never  entirely  belies  its  Aristotelian  origin  ;  and, 
when  it  seriously  faces  the  questions  of  modern 
science,  it  points  clearly  to  the  concept  or  the  univer- 
sal that  is  not  merely  extensive  and  quantitative,  but 
intensive  and  qualitative.  Finally,  we  have  seen 
that,  even  where  the  judgment  is  said  to  be  the  con- 
crete act  of  thought,  the  concept  or  universal  is  still 
regarded  as  its  truth,  or  as  essential  to  its  truth. 

1  In  this  connection  v.  Schuppe,  Erkenntniss-Theorie  u.  Logik, 
§6. 


CHAPTER   IV 

THE   ORIGIN   OF   CONCEPTS 

1.  In  the  present  age  when  the  idea  of  evolution 
has  so  largely  leavened  the  minds  of  men,  there  are 
few  questions  studied  with  such  eagerness  as  those 
that  relate  to  origins.  This  kind  of  inquiry  is  pur- 
sued with  special  zeal  in  the  case  of  living  growths. 
It  is  felt  that  their  structure  and  functions  are 
understood  only  as  it  is  known  how  they  have  been 
made.  The  structure  of  the  horse's  hoof  and  the 
swift  running  of  that  animal  are  truly  intelligible 
when  the  story  of  the  horse's  evolution  is  told.  The 
language  of  a  people  is  known  by  the  modern  stu- 
dent when  he  can  tell  the  stages  of  its  growth  from 
birth  to  maturity.  Who  understands  the  English 
constitution  that  does  not  know  English  history? 
We  are  here  called  upon  to  estimate  the  function  of 
concepts,  and  we  shall  understand  it  best  when  we 
have  not  only  looked  at  the  record  of  the  use  of 
concepts  in  systems  of  science  and  philosophy,  but 
have  also  studied  what  may  be  called  their  psycho- 
logical genesis. 

72 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS  73 

The  work  is  a  large  one,  for  it  means  little  less 
than  a  history  of  the  evolution  of  intellect.  Only 
a  brief  summary  of  that  history  can  be  here  at- 
tempted. It  will  be  our  aim  to  trace  first  the 
stages  in  the  development  of  empirical  concepts, 
and  then  to  see  how  the  principles  reached  in  this 
investigation  are  to  be  applied  to  the  rational  con- 
cepts, or  categories. 

2.  It  is  important,  first  of  all,  to  observe  that 
the  concept  is  not  necessarily  different  from  the 
particular  concrete  image.  The  particular  image 
becomes  a  general  concept  by  being  used  univer- 
sally. A  name  is  a  good  illustration  of  this  kind 
of  concept.  It  is  a  mere  particular  sound,  but  it 
comes  to  be  used  of  a  class,  and  so  becomes  general 
or  common.  Or,  let  a  man  hear  for  the  first  time 
some  sound,  such  as  the  hooting  of  an  owl,  the 
sound -image  seems  to  be  particular.  But  when  it 
is  said  to  him,  all  owls  hoot  in  that  way,  the  sound 
is  recognized  as  a  general  or  universal  concept.  It 
is  not  necessary  that  the  sound-image  should  be 
changed  in  the  mind  in  order  to  become  a  universal. 
It  remains  simply  the  original  sensation  or  width  of 
sensation.  Any  sense-quality  or  idea  is  implicitly  a 
universal ;  it  may,  as  it  were,  float  in  the  mind  ready 
to  attach  itself  to  a  variety  of  objects.  As  Hegel 
has  remarked,  "  this,"  "  here,"  "  now,"  are  universals. 


74  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

3.  Again,  there  may  be  a  combination  of  two  or 
more  qualities  to  form  the  concept.     The   hooting 
of  the  owl  and  the  peculiar  shape  of  the  bird,  when 
it  is  seen,  may  rise  up  together  in  the  imagination 
whenever  any  owl  is  mentioned.    Many  general  con- 
cepts are  formed  by  thus  "abstracting"  from  their 
context   and   combining    certain   qualities    actually 
observed,  and  then  making  this  abstract  idea  uni- 
versal.    It  may  be  added,  that  the  complex  concept 
may    be    framed,    not    by    the    conjoining    of    dis- 
tinct qualities,  but  by  the  analysis  of  that  which 
presented  itself  at  first  as  a  unity.     Let  it  also  be 
observed  that  this  abstract  concept  is  still  an  image ; 
the   qualities   do  not   lose   this   character,   though, 
when  brought  together,  they  may,  in  a  greater  or 
smaller  degree,  modify  each  other. 

4.  It  is  also  fitted  to  make  the  nature  of  the 
concept  clearer,  to  observe  that  there  may  be  framed 
the   concept   of  an  individual,  say,  Socrates.     We 
may  hesitate  to  call  the  concept  general,  because  we 
restrict  it  in  its  application  to  one  subject.     Soc- 
rates has   such   a   variety  of  spatial  and  temporal 
relations  that   the  concept  seems  to  have  only  one 
unique  application  ;  and,  moreover,   there   is   asso- 
ciated with  it  the  feeling  of  reality,  which  appar- 
ently precludes  its  being  regarded  as  general.     Yet, 
on  the  other  hand,  there  might  be,  theoretically, 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS  75 

many  Socrateses  ;  it  was  the  earnest  belief  of  some 
of  the  ancients  that  the  cycle  of  the  world  brought 
back  at  each  turn  exactly  the  same  conditions,  and 
that  Socrates  in  all  his  relations  was  reproduced 
each  time  in  the  same  way.  Thus  all  that  seems 
unique,  including  the  feeling  of  reality,  becomes 
universal.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  point  out 
that,  when  we  restrict  our  attention  to  a  limited 
number  of  qualities,  these  readily  form  a  general 
concept ;  and  we  say  of  a  man,  he  is  a  Socrates. 
Probably  many  of  our  class  concepts  wear  the 
features  of  some  individual.  The  term  tree  calls 
up  the  tree  we  are  wont  to  see  from  the  window ; 
dog  is  the  household  guardian. 

5.  There  is  another  form  that  appears  in  the 
development  of  the  concept.  There  is  the  concept 
which  does  not  resemble  any  particular  image 
known  to  experience.  The  concept  man  may  be 
unlike  Socrates  or  Plato  or  any  other ;  the  tree 
may  not  answer  to  the  oak  or  maple  or  any  other 
actual  species. 

In  the  case  of  children,  the  first  images  may  be 
supposed  to  be  vague.  The  child  calls  all  men 
Papa,  probably  because  it  does  not  notice  the  dif- 
ferences in  the  visual  images  they  furnish.  After- 
ward, with  developing  perceptive  power,  it  notes 
the  peculiarities  of  individuals.  Yet  the  original 


76  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

vague  image  is  not  lost ;  it  retains  a  relative  inde- 
pendence as  the  concept  man. 

Accompanying  this  process  and  tending  to  super- 
sede it  is  another,  by  which  the  observation  of  a 
multitude  of  individuals  results  in  the  formation 
of  a  concept.  Many  trees,  for  instance,  have  been 
seen — the  oak,  the  ash,  the  maple,  the  sapling,  and 
the  tree  of  a  hundred  years.  When  a  number  of 
individuals  are  thus  observed,  each  individual  may 
contribute  to  the  general  concept,  and  the  concept 
may  thus  be  a  resultant  that  is  not  to  be  identified 
with  any  of  the  individuals  that  have  produced 
it.  Mr.  Galton  has  furnished  an  excellent  illustra- 
tion of  the  forming  of  such  concepts  by  the  process 
of  taking  composite  photographs.  As,  in  the  taking 
of  the  composite  photograph,  the  various  individual 
photographs  are  exposed  for  a  certain  time,  so  that 
the  resultant  image  has  in  bold  and  strong  outline 
those  features  which  are  most  nearly  alike  in  all, 
while  the  other  features  are  vague  and  shadowy  ;  so, 
in  the  observation  of  the  members  of  a  class,  the 
sensitive  plate  of  the  imagination  receives  the 
strongest  impression  from  those  parts  in  which  they 
all  agree,  while  the  other  parts  show  more  or  less 
nebulous.1  The  illustration  helps  us  to  understand 
how  a  large  number  of  the  concepts  indicated  by 

1  Cf.  Spinoza,  Ethica,  Par.  II,  Propos.  40,  schol. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS  77 

the  common  noun  are  possible.  The  concept  in  such 
cases  is  not  merely  a  quality  as  given  immediately  in 
sense-experience  ;  nor  is  it  the  complex  idea  of  an  in- 
dividual which  has  also  been  given  in  experience ;  it 
is  a  quality,  or  group  of  qualities,  differing  from  the 
original  qualities,  and  present  as  something  relatively 
new.  Thus  the  term  word  may  call  up  to  us  a  dim 
image  of  a  word  in  a  line  on  a  printed  page,  so  dim 
that  no  letters  are  clearly  discernible  in  it.  The  term 
tree  may  call  up  an  image  of  a  trunk  with  branches 
leaving  it,  the  rest  of  the  complete  image  being  vague 
or  absent.  This  fragmentary  image  is  not  necessarily 
the  counterpart  of  any  tree  actually  seen.  Let  it  be 
carefully  noted  in  this  case  also  that  the  product  is 
still  an  image;  though  shadowy  and  indeterminate,  it 
does  not  differ  essentially  from  more  definite  images. 
6.  The  concept  being  formed  in  these  ways,  there 
arises  the  important  question  of  its  relation  to  in- 
dividual things.  It  is  regarded  as  the  essence  of 
the  individuals.  It  is  that  which  constitutes  them 
members  of  the  class  or  species.  They  are  thought 
by  means  of  it.  This  is  seen  in  the  ordinary  judg- 
ments in  which  a  common  noun  is  used.  To  say 
that  Socrates  is  a  man  means  that  the  immediate 
mental  presentation,  Socrates,  is  interpreted  as 
having  for  its  constituent  that  which  is  indicated 
by  the  concept  man.  Socrates,  as  subject,  does 


78  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

not  include  the  man  of  the  predicate ;  this  would 
be  in  a  sense  true  even  were  the  judgment  meant 
to  be  merely  the  unfolding  of  what  is  contained 
in  the  subject.  When  the  judgment  is  not  ex- 
plicative, it  is  clearly  an  interpretation  of  that 
which  is  presented  in  the  subject ;  that  is,  the 
concept  given  in  the  predicate  interprets  the  sub- 
ject by  representing  its  true  essential  being. 

Now,  the  concept,  like  the  sensation,  has  in  primi- 
tive thinking  an  objective  character.  It  is  a  real 
thing.  This  is  the  stage  at  which  are  to  be  found 
Plato  and  Aristotle,  and  their  ancient  and  modern 
followers.  The  concept  gotten  from  particulars 
is  treated  as  an  objective  reality.  But  a  peculiar 
problem  is  herein  involved.  How  is  the  concept, 
which  is  a  unity,  related  to  the  many  individuals 
to  which  it  is  applied?  Socrates  is  a  man,  but 
Plato  also  is  a  man,  and  Aristotle  is  a  man  :  how 
is  the  universal,  man,  related  to  these  three  indi- 
viduals? For  our  ordinary  thinking  the  solution 
is  found  in  a  numerical  multiplication  of  the  essence. 
In  three  men  there  are  three  essences ;  the  essences, 
though  exactly  alike,  are  numerically  distinct.  Not 
that  in  our  every-day  thinking  we  recognize  this 
process  with  any  distinctness.  But  should  an  analy- 
sis of  our  mental  content  be  made  it  would  be  found 
that  this  idea  is  present,  though  in  a  dim  form. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS  79 

With  the  advance  of  reflection  this  view  changed. 
As  attention  was  turned  to  the  general  concept  by 
the  Greek  thinkers,  the  doctrine  of  its  reality  and 
individuality  was  explicitly  formulated.  It  was  the 
natural  outcome  of  this  kind  of  reflection  to  con- 
clude that  the  concept  is  the  one  in  the  many.  This 
doctrine  of  the  one  in  the  many  has  played  such 
an  important  part  in  the  higher  development  of 
the  doctrine  of  concepts  that  it  is  important  to 
have  its  precise  significance  realized.  The  universal 
is  still  kept  distinct  from  the  particular.  The 
universal  is,  however  vague,  an  individual  image 
or  idea.  The  particular  is  another  individual 
image.  Yet  the  particular  is  referred  to  the  uni- 
versal for  its  ground  or  explanation,  as  when  we 
say,  Socrates  is  a  man.  It  was  thus  natural  that 
the  particular  should  come  to  be  thought  of  as 
that  which  the  universal  has  made,  or  that  into 
which  the  universal  is  changed.  Since  the  indi- 
vidual is  the  metamorphosed  universal,  it  might 
be  supposed  that  it  would  for  the  mind  supersede 
the  universal.  Yet  the  two  are  kept  distinct. 
There  is  one  important  reason  for  their  remaining 
distinct.  The  process  traced  out  in  the  case  of 
one  particular  is  carried  through  for  a  multitude 
of  particular  cases.  The  universal  is  metamorphosed 
into  the  many.  At  the  same  time,  as  a  concept  or 


80  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

universal,  it  remains  one.  There  thus  emerges  the 
doctrine  of  the  one  in  the  many,  and  yet  distinct 
from  them.  It  has  changed  into  them,  for  they 
are  the  realities,  yet  it  has  still  an  independent 
reality,  for  when  we  would  know  them  we  must 
look  on  it,  not  merely  as  their  potent  producer  in 
the  past,  but  as  their  present  essence. 

7.  With  the  advance  of   science   other  changes 
take  place  which  concern  the  content  of  the  concept. 
These  have  been  already  referred  to,  and  need  only 
be   mentioned.      The   general   concept  is  found  to 
have  been  in  many  cases  formed  hastily,  and  to  be 
vague  in  character,  and  care  must  be  taken  to  define 
precisely  the   qualities   which  truly  enter   into   it. 
There  is  a  further  and  still  more  profound  change. 
The    original    concept   made   of    a   combination   of 
sense-qualities  is  seemingly  discarded.     The  tree  is 
not  a  subject  coloured  and  fragrant ;  the  tree  is  a 
plexus   of   forces,  or,  otherwise   expressed,  it  is  a 
system  of  laws. 

8.  Along  with  these  developments  of  the  concept, 
and  yet  independently  of  them,  there  is  proceeding 
a  further  refinement  of  thought,  which,  indeed,  is 
the  natural   result  of    the  process   of   abstraction. 
Thought,  like  other  living  activities,  tends  to  be 
economical.     In  using  a  number  of  concepts  it  re- 
tains just  so  much  of  their  content  as  is  necessary 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS  8 1 

to  the  proper  conducting  of  its  processes.  For 
quickness,  and  for  the  saving  of  energy,  it  must 
thus  limit  itself.  The  word  associated  with  the 
concept  is  often  all  that  we  have  in  mind.  When 
such  sentences  as,  Virtue  is  the  cause  of  happiness, 
Logic  is  a  useful  study,  are  read  to  us,  there  is 
probably  often  nothing  in  consciousness  beyond  the 
words.  Or  at  most  there  is  some  fragment  of  an 
image  or  feeling  associated  with  them ;  by  the 
term  virtue  there  may  be  roused  the  first  pulses 
of  a  feeling  of  reverence  ;  with  happiness  may  go 
a  slight  wave  of  pleasant  feeling.  In  the  reading  of 
a  paragraph  it  often  happens  that  all  that  is  in  the 
mind  is  practically  a  series  of  words.  Language  is 
the  algebra  of  thought,  as  Berkeley  remarked ; 
words  are  counters  or  symbols  which  take  the 
place  of  the  original  concepts. 

9.  It  can  now  be  seen  that  the  concept,  in  what- 
ever form  we  find  it,  is  the  creature  of  the  imagination. 
The  concept,  whether  it  is  a  simple  quality,  or  a 
group  of   qualities,  or   a   composite  photograph,  is 
still  an  image;  or,  again,  if  it  is  represented  by  a 
mere  fragment  of  an  image,  or  by  a  symbol  asso- 
ciated with  it,  such  as  a  word  or  name,  the  frag- 
ment or  symbol  is  still  an  image.     It  will  be  shown 
later  that  the  idea  of  force  is  also  a  sensory  image. 

10.  We  come  now  to  the  group  of  concepts  com- 


82  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

monly  known  as  categories.  They  have  been  thought 
to  have  a  peculiar  dignity  and  value  in  the  cogni- 
tive realm.  Hegel  speaks  of  the  categories  as  a 
Pantheon  of  god-like  figures.  They  have  played 
such  an  important  part  in  the  history  of  thought 
that  they  demand  a  separate,  careful  investigation. 

11.  It  has  been  a  common  doctrine  that  the  fac- 
ulty which  uses  categories  is  not  the  imagination, 
but  the  reason.  This  doctrine  has  been  much  em- 
phasized in  modern  times  by  Hegel  and  his  school. 
The  category  is  said  to  be  not  Vorstellung  but 
Begriff ;  or,  if  in  the  evolution  of  thought  it  ap- 
pears at  first  as  a  Vorstellung,  its  destiny  is  to  be 
transformed  into  a  Begriff. 

The  doctrine  that  thoughts  are  not  images  has 
certain  facts  to  appeal  to.  The  categories  seem  to 
have  no  kinship  with  the  familiar  images  of  the  five 
senses.  They  mingle  with  these  images;  they  are 
"  mediated "  by  means  of  images ;  but  they  only 
stand  out  in  greater  distinctness,  the  more  closely 
they  are  brought  into  comparison  with  images. 
When  a  man  understands  something,  there  seems 
to  be  nothing  of  the  Vorstellung  about  that  which 
is  in  a  special  sense  his  thought. 

But  it  is  not  to  be  inferred  straightway  that  our 
categories  do  not  arise  from  sensory  experience.  A 
category  may  not  be  like  a  shout,  or  the  picture  of 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS  83 

a  cow,  or  the  smell  of  roast  beef ;  but  it  is  not 
thereby  proved  that  it  belongs  to  another  than  the 
sensory  realm.  The  sensory  factors  become,  in  the 
process  of  abstraction,  attenuated  and  shadowy. 
Besides,  the  category  may  originate,  not  in  the 
"five"  senses,  but  in  obscure  visceral  or  muscular 
feelings.  A  more  careful  psychological  analysis 
shows  that  the  distinction  drawn  by  the  transcen- 
dentalist  between  sense  and  reason  must  be  annulled, 
and  that  the  categories  are  to  be  regarded  as  products 
of  sensory  experiences.  The  category  and  the  empir- 
ical concept  belong  to  one  type. 

12.  These  statements  can  be  established  only  by 
a  study  of  the  particular  categories.     While  Kant 
recognized  twelve  categories,  Hegel  has  given  ac- 
count of    a   much   larger    number,    and    Professor 
James  says  the  feelings  of  relation  are  numberless. 
The  examination  of  them  might  thus  seem  to  be  a 
great,  or  even  an  endless,  labor.     Yet,  doubtless  the 
categories  may  be  reduced  to  a  definite  number  of 
types ;  and  it  may  suffice  here  to  consider  some  of 
those  that  are  more  common  or  important. 

13.  We   shall   begin,   as   Kant   did,   with   space, 
though,  indeed,  he   did   not   rank   space   with   the 
categories  proper.     It  is  important  to   notice,  first 
of   all,  the  presence  of   the   space   idea   in   all   our 
mental  life.     The   experiences   with  which   it  has 


84  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

been  thought  to  be  chiefly  connected  are  the  sensa- 
tions of  sight,  touch,  and  movement.  Yet  it  comes 
through  all  the  senses,1  and  all  the  mental  experi- 
ences. It  may  be  said  that,  of  course,  this  is  so, 
because,  as  Kant  taught,  space  is  the  form  of 
sense.  Yet  it  is  not  merely  the  form  of  sense. 
It  is  one  of  the  characteristics  of  all  our  mental 
activity  that  we  put  the  contents  of  consciousness 
side  by  side.  We  cannot  construct  an  abstract 
argument,  or  put  the  most  intellectual  conceptions 
before  us  in  any  other  way.  They  cannot  be  con- 
ceived as  existing  in  any  other  way.  Not  only 
must  we  think  of  two  coloured  surfaces  as  existing 
outside  of  each  other ;  when  we  think  of  time,  or 
of  substance  and  property,  or  of  cause  and  effect, 
or  of  any  other  abstract  category,  we  have  still  the 
spatial  form.  The  points  that  hold  the  attention 
are  arranged  in  space. 

For  illustration,  let  time  be  considered.  Time  is 
not  space,  yet  when  we  think  of  time  we  find  that 
the  idea  is  largely  spatial.  Even  Kant  speaks  of 
time  as  a  line,  or  as  possessed  of  two  dimensions ; 
and  there  is  no  valid  reason  for  denying  it  the 
tri-dimensional  character.  The  past  years  reach 
into  the  distance,  like  the  objects  of  a  landscape. 
Shakespeare  speaks  of  the  "dark  backward  and 

1  Cf .  James,  Psychology,  Vol.  II,  p.  134. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS  85 

abysm  of  time,"  showing  in  what  form  time  pre- 
sented itself  to  one  for  whom  it  was  such  an  over- 
powering reality.  It  is  true  that  there  is  more 
than  the  spatial  element  in  the  idea  of  time;  there 
is  the  appearance  of  the  figures  ranged  in  past 
time,  as  they  stand  ghostly  and  unreal:  there  is 
associated  with  the  past  the  sense  of  loss;  the 
future  also  has  its  peculiar  unreality.  These  ele- 
ments are  all  fused  in  the  idea  of  time  ;  yet  none 
the  less  the  distinction  of  moments  in  time  is 
spatial.  What  is  true  of  time  is  true  of  other 
intellectual  conceptions :  wherever  there  is  the  dis- 
tinction of  elements,  the  multiplicity  presents  itself 
as  a  position  of  one  thing  beside  another.  The  claim 
that  thought  is  not  spatial  is  probably  due  to  the 
difficulty  of  giving  its  constituents  a  place  in  the 
visible  or  tangible  area. 

This  universality  of  space  is  not  only  a  fact  which 
it  is  interesting  to  notice  :  the  consideration  of  it 
helps  to  an  understanding  of  the  significance  of  the 
space-concept.  When  there  is  distinction  of  men- 
tal contents,  there  is  extensity.  This  distinction 
is  facilitated  by  the  variety  which  characterizes  our 
sensory  experiences.  Yet  if  we  should  make  the 
theoretical  supposition  of  an  entirely  homogeneous 
width  of  sensation,  we  should  even  in  such  a  case 
find  that  the  distinction  exists. 


86  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

It  is  an  important  question  in  the  investigation 
of  the  genesis  of  the  space-concept,  whether  the 
distinction  of  mental  contents  is  primary  and  nec- 
essary in  sentient  experience.  Hume  believed  that 
the  minimum  visibile  has  no  magnitude;  and  were 
this  admitted,  it  might  further  be  admitted  that 
there  may  be  orders  of  being  for  which  such  a 
form  of  perception  is  normal.  But  whether  the 
human  minimum  visibile  is  of  this  non-spatial  char- 
acter is  more  than  doubtful.  And  the  possi- 
bility of  such  a  non-spatial  perception  in  other 
intelligences  is,  to  say  the  least,  purely  theoretical. 

Such  speculations  have  no  reference  to  the  actual 
experience  of  man  after  birth.  By  the  conditions 
of  that  experience  there  is  not  possible  for  it  such 
a  singleness  of  sensation.  From  birth  man  is 
exposed  to  a  multitude  of  simultaneous  impressions. 
It  is,  at  the  same  time,  difficult  to  realize  the  mean- 
ing of  extensity  or  manifoldness  in  the  first  experi- 
ences when  there  are  no  developed  ideas  of  up  and 
down,  right  and  left.  It  is  also  to  be  remembered 
that  the  first  images  are  of  a  very  blurred  char- 
acter :  the  finer  analysis  of  them  is  the  work  of 
the  years  to  come. 

Let  it  be  granted  that  human  experience  has 
from  the  beginning  this  character  of  extensity  or 
manifoldness,  it  is  to  be  noticed  that  we  have  not 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS  8/ 

yet  reached  the  abstract  idea  of  space  or  quantity. 
In  much  of  the  ordinary  thinking,  even  of  adults, 
there  is  present  to  the  mind  simply  a  manifold  of 
sensations  without  any  further  space-idea.  Hegel 
finds  the  qualitative  manifold  to  be  different  from, 
and  logically  prior  to,  the  concept  of  quantity. 
It  is  this  qualitative  manifold  which  is  given  in 
the  beginning  of  human  experience.  Further, 
though  there  is  this  distinction  of  the  constituents 
of  the  manifold,  the  distinction  is  not  due  to  the 
presence  in  the  mind  of  the  categories  of  likeness 
and  difference.  We  cannot  attribute  these  cate- 
gories to  the  infant,  or  to  the  lower  forms  of  ani- 
mal intelligence.  There  are  present  in  experience 
two  or  more  sensations  of  different  qualities,  but 
the  mind,  though  having  different  feelings,  does  not 
react  to  them  with  the  idea  of  difference. 

How  is  the  idea  of  space  derived  from  this  qual- 
itative manifold?  It  arises  because  there  are 
changes  in  the  content  of  the  sensuous  area.  To 
refer  to  the  visual  experiences,  one  variegated 
scene  or  manifold  gives  place  to  another.  It  is 
now  the  furniture  of  the  room  that  is  seen,  now 
the  landscape,  now  a  human  face.  Of  these  various 
fillings  of  the  visual  field  there  is  formed  a  kind 
of  composite  image,  or  abstract  idea.  The  partic- 
ular contents  cancel  each  other,  and  disappear. 


88  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

There  is  not,  indeed,  an  abolition  of  all  quality, 
but  the  quality  becomes  homogeneous,  and  any 
particular  quality  is  indifferent.  There  is  thus 
left  in  the  mind  a  variety  that  is  no  variety,  but 
simply  a  multiplicity  that  is  a  repetition  of  the 
sense-quality.  This  featureless  yet  manifold,  quality 
is  quantity  or  space. 

In  a  fuller  study  of  the  origin  of  this  concep- 
tion, great  attention  should  be  given  to  the  ideas 
of  movement,  for  these  have  probably  much  to 
do  with  the  final  form  of  the  idea  of  space.  The 
tactile  sense-experiences  should  also  be  considered. 
In  both  cases  there  is  a  process  analogous  to  that 
which  we  have  traced  in  the  visual  experiences. 
There  is  a  multiplicity  of  sensations,  which,  either 
actually  or  in  representation,  are  given  together. 
The  resultant  of  a  series  of  mental  fillings  of  this 
kind  is  the  pure  manifoldness  of  space. 

The  analysis  of  the  idea  of  space  confirms  this 
account  of  its  origin.  Space  is  multiplicity  of  a 
perfectly  homogeneous  quality.  It  has  this  pecu- 
liar character  inasmuch  as  it  is  the  residuum  of  a 
variety  of  qualities. 

It  can  now  be  seen  why  space  is  the  form  of 
all  experience,  or  the  form  of  the  world.  It  is 
derived  or  abstracted  from  universal  experience. 
It  is  the  shadow  of  the  multiplicity  in  experience. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS  89 

It  can  also  be  seen  how  far  Kant  is  right  in  deny- 
ing that  space  is  of  the  nature  of  a  concept.  It 
does  not  appear  as  one  general  space  embodied  in 
many  particular  spaces,  as  the  concept  tree  is 
embodied  in  many  particular  trees,  but  as  one 
space  that  contains  the  many  spaces.  Neverthe- 
less, it  is  a  concept,  or  resultant  image.  It  is 
derived  from  a  series  of  qualitative  manifolds. 
There  may  be  many  such  spaces  which  are  not 
united  into  one  space.  It  is  the  work  of  reflection 
to  show  that  these  are  parts  of  one  space. 

It  is,  therefore,  necessary  to  regard  the  space- 
concept  as  developing  like  other  empirical  con- 
cepts. It  is  the  resultant  image  of  a  multitude 
of  perceptions  in  which  a  variety  of  sensory  con- 
tent has  been  furnished.  Whether  or  not  the 
qualitative  manifold  is  the  necessary  form  of  the 
original  psychical  state,  it  is  the  form  of  all 
post-natal  experience  of  the  human  being.  And 
the  various  manifolds  give  rise  to  the  idea  of 
space  proper  in  the  ordinary  empirical  fashion. 

14.  After  what  has  been  already  said  of  time, 
in  the  discussion  of  space,  it  is  unnecessary  to 
take  much  time  to  demonstrate  that  it  is  an 
empirical  concept.  It  may,  however,  be  pointed 
out  that  not  only  are  our  ideas  ranged  in  space 
with  feelings  of  reality  or  unreality  associated 


90  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

with  them;  the  comparison  of  a  thing  as  real, 
with  itself  as  distant  and  unreal,  evokes  a  peculiar 
feeling,  which  is  the  distinctively  new  element  in 
the  time-feeling. 

15.  The  category  of  being  or  reality  is  one 
of  our  most  elementary  categories.  It  is  also 
one  of  the  most  universal :  it  is  thought  to  hold 
of  the  universe  and  all  that  it  contains.  It  is 
one  of  the  interesting  suggestions  of  recent  psy- 
chology 1  that  the  category  of  reality  is  derived 
from  the  sense  of  touch.  A  thing  is  real  when 
we  touch  it.  Other  senses  may  deceive  us,  but 
we  are  assured  of  the  reality  of  things  when 
they  appeal  to  the  sense  of  pressure.  It  is  the 
evidence  of  this  sense  that  the  doubting  Thomas 
declares  conclusive  when  he  demands  proof  that 
the  Lord  is  risen.  It  is  noteworthy  that  Berke- 
ley, in  speaking  of  the  relation  of  sight  and  touch, 
always  goes  on  the  assumption  that  touch  is  the 
reality  sense.  The  tangible  qualities,  along  with 
the  spatial  form,  are  denominated  the  "primary" 
qualities  of  bodies.  The  common  refutation  of 
idealism  has  been  an  appeal  to  the  sense  of 
touch. 

It   is   true   that    the   other    sensations   not  only 

1  American  Journal  of  Psychology,  Vol.  IV,  p.  429 ;  James' 
Psychology,  Vol.  II,  p.  306. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS  91 

refer  us  to  this  class  of  sensations;  they  them- 
selves may  be  designated  real,  and  the  same  epi- 
thet may  be  applied  to  all  the  other  ideas  of  the 
mind.  Yet  even  in  such  cases  the  reality-idea 
remains  the  touch-idea.  There  is  always  the 
sense  of  solidity  or  resistance  when  the  category 
shapes  itself  into  a  definite  thought. 

Touch  has  this  preeminence  among  the  senses 
for  reasons  of  utility.  A  colour  or  a  sound  is  not 
directly  of  vital  moment,  but  that  which  touches 
the  body  is  of  immediate  practical  concern. 
Hence  those  sensations  are  important  as  they  are 
interpreted  in  terms  of  touch.  The  category  of 
being,  though  derived  from  this  sense,  is  not 
any  particular  touch-feeling.  A  great  variety  of 
touches  have  been  experienced,  and  this  category  is 
their  resultant  or  composite  image.  It  is  thus  one 
of  the  ideas  of  the  understanding.  It  becomes, 
through  use,  to  some  extent  unlike  the  original 
feelings  from  which  it  is  derived ;  it  is  as  when 
a  fragment  of  rock  is  broken  from  its  original 
resting-place  and  worn  into  a  smooth  pebble,  so 
that  it  is  hard  to  tell  its  starting-point.  But  as 
the  pebble  tells  the  secret  of  its  history  to  a 
closer  observation,  so  this  category  is  seen  to  be 
derived  from  certain  definite  sense-experiences. 

There  may  be  need  at   this  point  to  repeat  that 


92  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

not  only  do  conceptual  images  become  attenuated; 
there  may  be  in  the  mind  nothing  beyond  their 
names.  The  category  of  reality  and  the  other 
categories  are  often  so  represented.  But  we  are 
not  on  this  account  justified  in  supposing  that 
they  are  thoughts  which  have  nothing  sensory 
about  them. 

There  is  one  respect  in  which  the  category  of 
being  differs  from  that  of  space  to  which  it  is  of 
importance  to  [call  attention.  Space  is  derived 
from  universal  experience ;  hence,  it  is  by  nature 
absolutely  universal  in  its  application.  Being  or 
reality  has  an  artificial  universality:  it  is  derived 
from  a  small  part  of  experience,  and  then  it  is 
made  universal  by  being  attached  to  all  experi- 
ence. 

16.  The  categories  of  being,  including  space 
and  time,  are,  as  Hegel  has  taught,  primary  and 
elementary,  and  are  added  to,  or  transcended,  as 
the  mind  advances  in  the  intellectual  construction 
of  the  world.  So  long  as  the  bare  idea  of  reality 
is  adhered  to,  there  is  not  necessarily  any  distinc- 
tion of  subject  and  object.  The  sensation  of  hard- 
ness is  real  in  the  sense  that  to  it  other  sensations 
are  referred ;  but  it  is  not  the  reality  of  distinct, 
self-enclosed,  isolated  individuality.  Just  as  little 
is  it  thought  of  as  merely  subjective.  It  belongs 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS  93 

to  a  stage  of  thought  at  which  distinctions  of  sub- 
ject and  object  have  not  necessarily  made  their 
appearance.  A  new  advance  is  made  when  the 
world  shapes  itself  before  the  mind  into  a  system 
of  units,  so  that  a  man  distinguishes  himself  from 
other  individual  things  around  him.  The  denning 
of  the  spatial  limits  of  bodies,  which  comes  with 
observation  of  their  movements,  involves  the  tran- 
sition to  this  view.  It  does  not,  however,  concern 
us  here  to  trace  all  the  steps  by  which  this  break- 
ing up  into  units  takes  place  ;  it  is  the  result  of 
the  process  that  is  important.  There  is  an  associa- 
tion of  the  group  of  feelings  which  may  be  called 
the  inner  feelings  of  the  body  with  the  body's 
visible  and  tangible  reality ;  and  the  man  who 
has  accomplished  this  association  in  the  case  of 
his  own  body,  associates  with  other  bodies  psychic 
experiences  similar  to  his  own.  It  is  to  this  ejec- 
tion of  the  inner  feelings  that  a  number  of  cate- 
gories are  to  be  traced.  It  is  true  that  the 
categories  of  being  illustrate  this  process  of  ex- 
ternalizing the  feelings.  Yet  the  process  takes 
a  new  aspect  when  man  begins  to  regard  the  world 
as  consisting  of  feelings  like  those  which  he  also 
thinks  as  peculiarly  his  own  inner  life.  The  cate- 
gories which  spring  from  this  source  are  those 
which  Hegel  has  grouped  under  the  head  of  es- 


94  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

sence :    they  are   such   as   essence,   similarity,  sub- 
stance, and  causality. 

17.  The  category  of  essence1  reveals  this  new 
mode  of  thinking,  though  still  in  a  somewhat 
obscure  way.  The  essence  of  a  thing  means  cer- 
tain qualities  which  make  the  thing,  and  are 
enumerated  when  we  give  a  definition.  As  Locke 
says,  it  is  the  being  of  anything  whereby  it  is 
what  it  is.  Yet  since  the  judgment  as  to  what 
is  essential  varies,  it  may  be  said  that  the  essence 
of  a  thing  consists  of  those  qualities  on  which  the 
attention  has  been  centred.  This  concentration 
upon  them  is  due  to  various  reasons :  the  qualities 
are  attended  to  which  are  permanent,  and  so  force 
themselves  upon  us,  as  when  we  think  of  the  stem 
and  branches  of  a  tree  as  essential,  while  the  leaves 
which  come  and  go  are  non-essential ;  or  they  may 
be  qualities  associated  with  some  utility:  the 
power  to  cut  is  essential  to  a  knife,  whereas  the 
colour  of  the  knife-handle  is  non-essential.  The 
essence,  it  can  be  seen,  is,  so  far,  one  with 
the  general  concept,  but  there  is  also  something 
added  to  the  concept.  This  new  factor  is  the 
feeling  of  strain  that  we  have  when  we  hold  on  to 
anything.  It  is  a  feeling  of,  or  connected  with, 

1  The  derivation  of  this  category  is  to  be  taken  as  somewhat 
tentative. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS  95 

prolonged  muscular  strain.  We  project  this  feel- 
ing into  the  qualities  which  have  permanence. 
This  projection  is  similar  to  that  by  which  we 
objectify  sensations  of  all  kinds :  when  certain 
qualities  exhibit  tenacity,  we  associate  with  them 
the  feelings  which  we  have  when  we  show 
tenacity. 

Essence  has  thus  an  empirical  origin  ;  yet  the 
idea  is  a  resultant  of  many  particular  images,  and 
has  thus  become  a  category  of  the  understanding. 

18.  Another  category  which  must  be  referred  to 
here  is  similarity.  Its  consideration  is  the  more 
important  because,  even  by  empiricists,  it  is  re- 
garded as  given  in  some  form  in  the  mind's  first 
intuitions.  There  is  truth  in  the  view  that  it  is 
given  early  in  experience,  if  it  is  meant  that  one 
sensation  is  not  another  sensation.  To  have  the 
sensations  of  red  and  green  is  not,  however,  to 
know  that  they  are  alike,  or  that  they  are  differ- 
ent. The  transcendentalist  is  justified  in  pointing 
out  that  a  category  is  being  joined  to  sense-experi- 
ence when  we  make  such  predications.  How  then 
does  the  category  arise  ?  It  has  been  contended 
that  to  see  the  similarity  of  objects  is  to  see  their 
partial  identity.  Yet  this  contention  must  appeal 
rather  to  the  metaphysics  of  similarity  than  to  its 
psychology.  When  we  look  at  two  objects,  say, 


96  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

two  windows,  we  perceive  their  likeness,  but  we 
cannot  be  said  to  perceive  any  identity  in  them. 
Each  keeps  to  every  detail  its  individuality.  The 
likeness  is  a  third  idea,  blending,  indeed,  with 
them,  and  forming  a  unity  with  them,  yet  coming 
from  its  own  peculiar  source.  That  the  idea  is 
not  any  constituent  of  the  two  objects  present  to 
the  mind  is  further  shown  by  the  fact  that  it  is 
practically  the  same  idea  when  applied  to  windows, 
or  apples,  or  faces.  What  then  is  its  nature?  It 
seems  to  consist  in  certain  bodily  or  visceral  feel- 
ings which  are  aroused  when  there  are  two  or 
more  objects  which  affect  the  mind  in  the  same 
way.  It  is  not,  indeed,  meant  that  this  feeling  is 
gained  by  a  perception  of  the  sameness,  any  more 
than  the  peculiar  effect  of  a  repetition  of  blows  is 
due  to  a  perception  of  the  similarity  of  the  blows. 
The  sameness  is  not  perceived  as  such  at  first.  It 
is  a  new  feeling,  induced  by  a  repetition  of  con- 
scious experiences,  or  a  simultaneity  of  certain  ex- 
periences. These  are  not  in  themselves  recognized 
as  like  or  unlike  ;  but  they  are  followed  by  this 
feeling.  The  feeling  is,  after  the  usual  fashion, 
objectified,  and  made  a  link  between  the  two  or 
more  things  with  which  it  is  associated,  and  then 
by  virtue  of  it  they  are  felt  to  be  "  like."  It  seems 
to  consist,  as  we  have  said,  in  certain  bodily  sen- 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS  97 

sations ;  these  are  obscure,  and  difficult  to  analyze, 
as  the  internal  bodily  sensations  usually  are.  It 
is  gradually  refined  and  sublimated,  and  at  last 
the  idea  is,  in  many  instances  of  its  use,  scarcely 
to  be  distinguished  from  the  word. 

19.  This  ejection  of  internal  bodily  feelings, 
which  we  have  found  so  obscurely  intimated  in 
the  ideas  of  essence  and  similarity,  is  unmistak- 
able in  the  categories  of  substance  and  causality. 

The  substance  of  a  thing  is  the  support  or  sub- 
stratum of  its  qualities.  The  qualities  change 
their  form ;  they  have  modes  or  accidents,  whereas 
the  substance  is  the  permanent  one.  Locke  says 
that  this  substratum  is  "something,  we  know  not 
what,"  and  this  agnostic  view  has  been  common. 
Yet  it  is  soon  evident  that  substance  is  not  en- 
tirely unknown.  The  idea  of  it  is  the  idea  of 
something ;  and  it  is  of  something  contained  in 
the  object.  Further  light  is  thrown  upon  it  when 
it  is  considered  what  stands  to  each  man  for  his 
own  substance;  it  is  found  that  the  ideas  of  sub- 
stance and  self  coincide. 

What  are  the  self -feelings  ?  Self -consciousness 
has  often  been  regarded  as  that  attribute  of  man  in 
which  he  shows  likest  God.  It  should  be  noticed, 
however,  that  the  self-consciousness  which  has  so 
high  a  dignity  is  an  ideal  self-consciousness.  It 


98  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

is  thought  of  as  belonging  to  the  man  who  knows 
the  self  as  identical  with  the  source  of  all  that  is, 
and  yet  as  infinitely  superior  to  all  that  is  merely 
natural.  Self-consciousness  is  thus  a  large  part  of 
philosophy.  It  is  doubtful  whether  the  perfectly 
developed  self  would  view  itself  quite  as  such 
theories  suppose.  In  any  case,  the  ordinary  con- 
sciousness of  self  is  of  a  different  nature.  When 
the  individual  first  distinguishes  himself  from  other 
things,  it  is  the  spatial  distinctness  of  his  body 
which  is  present  to  the  mind.  The  self  is  the 
body ;  self-consciousness  is  primarily  what  has  been 
called  "  somatic  consciousness."  In  this  somatic 
consciousness  the  chief  importance  attaches  to  the 
feelings  of  the  trunk.  The  muscular  feelings  of 
this  part  of  the  body ;  closely  associated  with 
these,  the  extended,  peripheral  touch  feelings  ;  fur- 
ther, the  feelings  derived  from  the  organs  of 
breathing,  digestion,  and  circulation,  —  all  these 
give  filling  to  the  idea  of  the  self.  Characteristic 
of  these  feelings  is  their  relative  constancy.  They 
abide  with  us.  Ideas  come  and  go;  nothing  is 
more  changeable  than  the  ideational  life.  Arms 
and  legs  are  now  in  motion  and  now  at  rest. 
But  many  of  the  trunk  feelings,  if  not  without 
variableness,  are  much  more  permanent;  and  this 
constancy  fits  them  to  represent  the  self.  They 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS  99 

are  further  fitted  for  this  function  by  their  emo- 
tional quality.  They  give  the  greatest  sense  of 
well-being  or  ill-being ;  they  determine  the  moods 
of  melancholy  and  happiness ;  they  add  thrill  and 
reverberation  to  other  finer  feelings  of  pleasure 
and  pain.  It  should  be  added  that,  even  in  such 
strongly  contrasted  states  as  pleasure  and  pain, 
there  is  much  that  remains  constant.  The  parts 
affected  are  the  same ;  they  may  even  be  similarly 
affected.  This  brings  us  back  to  what  is  in  some 
respects  the  most  important  qualification  of  these 
feelings  for  yielding  the  idea  of  the  self :  they 
have  a  well-marked  local  character.  Usually,  in- 
deed, they  are  said  to  be  vague,  and  badly  local- 
ized ;  and,  in  one  sense,  the  statement  is  correct : 
an  internal  pain  may  be  difficult  to  locate  with 
definiteness.  But  these  feelings  are  local,  inas- 
much as  they  are  recognized  as  belonging  to  the 
trunk.  They  are  body-filling,  and  at  the  same 
time  body-limited.  The  ideas  of  imagination  have 
a  much  less  definite  location;  they  seem  to  be 
where  the  things  thought  of  are,  and  they  thus 
may  be  anywhere,  save  for  the  muscular  sensations 
connected  with  them.  The  trunk  feelings,  on  the 
other  hand,  are  distinctly  subjective. 

The   feelings  which  make   up   the   somatic   con- 
sciousness are  vague.     The  idea  of  the  self  is  not 


100  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

these  feelings  in  their  immediate  form  and  quality. 
It  is  the  resultant  of  the  feelings  experienced  at 
various  times.  It  is  a  composite  photograph  of 
them.  Further,  the  various  feelings  are  combined 
in  a  massive  continuum.  They  blend  in  an  undif- 
ferentiated  mass.  This  is  the  idea  of  the  self  which 
follows  a  man  like  his  shadow.  To  this  other 
features  may  be  added.  One  of  the  most  strongly 
marked  is  the  faculty  of  volition.  The  predomi- 
nant interests  of  the  individual,  scientific,  aesthetic, 
or  religious,  also  go  to  complete  the  idea. 

But  while  each  individual  tends  to  gain  a  more 
specialized  conception  of  his  self,  a  contrary  pro- 
cess takes  place  in  the  development  of  animism. 
The  world,  which  is  regarded  as  a  world  of  living 
souls,  begins  to  show  to  a  closer  inspection  the 
diversities  of  classes  and  individuals.  There  are 
differences  in  form  and  size,  and,  as  some  do  not 
speak  or  move,  there  is  manifest  diversity  in  feel- 
ings of  activity,  and  in  response  to  stimuli.  There- 
fore only  certain  elements  in  the  self  can  be  rightly 
projected  outwards.  Those  must  be  selected  which 
are  common  to  all  the  selves.  If  the  intellectual 
has  been  recognized  at  all,  it  must  be  pronounced 
non-essential.  The  muscular  feelings,  so  far  as 
connected  with  volition,  are  probably  an  uncer- 
tain fringe  around  the  idea  of  the  self.  There  is 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS  101 

left,  as  the  common  element  in  all  individuals, 
the  blend  of  vague,  massive,  body-filling  sensa- 
tions. This  residuum,  this  permanent  identical  core 
of  individual  things,  is  substance.  It  is  the  same 
substance  for  material  as  for  living  things.  Even 
the  later  division  of  substances  into  extended  and 
spiritual  does  not  affect  the  generic  concept. 

It  is  now  possible  to  see  the  meaning  of  the 
support  which  substance  renders  to  attributes. 
The  phenomenal  life,  made  up  of  quickly  chang- 
ing sensations  and  ideas,  seems  to  rest  on  this  sub- 
strate of  the  abiding  self.  We  can  also  see  the 
explanation  of  the  agnosticism  which  tends  to  ad- 
here to  the  conception.  The  feelings  which  enter 
into  it  are  massive  and  vague,  little  comparable 
to  the  finely  differentiated  sensations  of  sight  and 
hearing.  It  is  the  vagueness  of  these  organic  sen- 
sations that  is  the  original  justification  of  the 
common  doctrine  of  a  mysterious,  unintelligible 
background  of  phenomena. 

20.  Still  clearer  is  the  empirical  orgin  of  the 
category  of  causality.  This  is  one  of  our  most 
common  categories ;  it  is  also  one  of  the  great 
concepts  of  science.  Its  origin  has  been  often 
discussed.  The  study  of  it  led  Kant  to  his  theory 
of  the  spontaneity  of  the  understanding  in  the 
production  of  such  concepts.  Yet,  in  spite  of  Kant, 


102  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

it  must  be  averred  that  the  investigation  of  it  has 
shown  that  its  origin  is  to  be  sought  in  our  com- 
mon sense-experience. 

Reid,1  when  expounding  the  notion  of  active 
power,  makes  these  sagacious  remarks  :  "  The 
conception  of  an  efficient  cause  may  very  probably 
be  derived  from  the  experience  we  have  had  in 
very  early  life  of  our  own  power  to  produce  cer- 
tain effects.  ...  If  it  be  so  that  the  conception 
of  an  efficient  cause  enters  into  the  mind  only  from 
the  early  conviction  we  have  that  we  are  the 
efficients  of  our  own  voluntary  actions  (which  I 
think  is  most  probable),  the  notion  of  efficiency 
will  be  reduced  to  this,  That  it  is  a  relation  be- 
tween the  cause  and  the  effect  similar  to  that 
which  is  between  us  and  our  voluntary  actions. 
This  is  surely  the  most  distinct  notion,  and,  I  think, 
the  only  notion  we  can  form  of  real  efficiency." 
In  other  words,  we  associate  with  our  own  bodily 
movements  feelings  of  effort ;  we  then  associate 
with  the  movements  of  external  things  similar 
feelings  of  effort :  the  thing  which  we  call  a  cause 
is  regarded  as  such  because  it  makes,  we  think, 
an  effort  such  as  we  make  when  we  will  to  do 
anything. 

In  view  of  such  an  analysis  it  cannot  be  said 
1  Essay  on  Active  Power  in  General,  Chap.  V. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS  103 

that  the  category  of  causality  is  a  product  of  the 
pure  understanding.  It  is  derived  empirically 
from  the  phenomena  of  volitional  activity.  The 
truth  of  this  is  apparent  if  we  accept  the  view 
that  the  feeling  of  effort  is  a  complex  of  periph- 
eral sensations.  And  the  case  is  not  much 
altered,  if  the  "  feeling  of  innervation  "  be  insisted 
on.  If  such  a  feeling  exist,  distinct  from  periph- 
eral sensations,  is  it  not  simply,  as  Hume  would 
say,  a  "  new  impression "  ?  Or,  to  speak  in  physio- 
logical terms,  it  betokens,  like  sensations,  the 
metabolism  going  on  in  the  brain  cells.  We  may 
conclude,  therefore,  that  it  is  a  phenomenon,  if  it 
exists  at  all,  not  essentially  different  from  those 
"  feelings  "  we  call  sensations. 

21.  This  derivation  of  causality  is  all  the  more 
important,  as  it  indicates  at  the  same  time  the 
origin  of  the  conceptions  of  energy  and  force, 
which  have  so  large  a  place  in  modern  science. 
Energy  seems  to  be  the  modern  substitute  for 
causality ;  when  science  traces  the  causes  of  things, 
it  traces  the  transformations  of  energy.  Yet  it 
has  the  same  essential  content.  The  word  energy 
suggests  even  more  directly  than  cause  the  an- 
cestral source  of  both  conceptions :  it  still  recalls 
the  feeling  of  effort  and  strain.  Energy  differs 
from  causality  chiefly  in  the  doctrine  which  has 


104  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

been  developed  concerning  it;  while  causality  is 
intermittent,  as  our  feelings  of  effort  are,  the  energy 
of  the  world  has,  we  are  taught,  a  certain  persis- 
tence and  constancy.  It  is  not  necessary  here  to 
consider  the  distinction  between  energy  and  force. 

22.  This  category   of   causality  has   brought  us 
in  sight  of  other  categories,   which    are    derived 
even   more   directly   than  it   from    observation    of 
the  phenomena  of  the  mind  and  will. 

23.  One  of  the  chief  categories  in  this  class  is  that 
of  teleology.     It  is  one  that  has  received  very  great 
prominence  in  recent  philosophy.     It  comes  origi- 
nally from  observation  of  human,  and,  to  some  extent, 
animal  experience.     Man  thinks  of  an  end  and  uses 
means  to  its  realization  :  he  wishes  a  harvest,  and  he 
ploughs   his   field,   and    sows   the   seed,    and   rises 
night  and  day.     We   have   here   simply  a   special 
form  of   representation   of   a   causal   series.       The 
man's  past  experience  has  associated   harvest   with 
seed-time   as   effect   with   cause.       Now   when   he 
thinks  of  the  effect,  he  thinks  of   its  cause,  or  of 
the   chain   of    causes,  and    he   thinks    of    them   in 
their  actual  order.     If  the  ideas  of  his  own  contri- 
butions to  this  series  become,  for  any  reason,  vivid 
enough,  they  are  translated  into  action  ;  for  as  we 
shall  have  occasion  to  see,  it  is  the  nature  of  ideas 
of  action  thus  to  translate  themselves. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS  105 

There  is  no  material  difference  between  such 
cases  and  those  in  which  an  end  is  sought  of  a 
kind  that  has  never  been  present  to  man's  actual 
observation ;  an  inventor  tries,  for  instance,  to 
make  a  flying-machine.  Even  in  such  cases  the 
separation  from  experience  is  not  absolute.  The 
new  idea  is  due  to  the  plastic  power  of  the  imagina- 
tion as  it  works  on  old  material. 

It  is  from  observation  of  such  processes  that  the  idea 
of  teleology,  or  purpose,  or  final  cause,  is  derived. 

The  idea  seems  to  have  a  special  significance 
when  an  immanent  teleology  is  spoken  of.  A  tree 
develops,  or  humanity  develops,  or  the  universe 
develops  :  through  the  life  of  the  individual,  and 
through  the  ages  a  purpose  runs  ;  but  the  purpose 
is  not  in  some  mind  external  to  the  process  ;  the 
end  which  is  reached  is  said  to  be  present  ideally 
throughout  the  whole  movement ;  or,  the  teleology 
is  immanent.  The  peculiarity  of  the  idea  when 
so  rendered  is  obviously  that  the  end  or  purpose 
is  no  longer  dependent  on  a  thinker,  but  is  re- 
garded as  independent,  and  as  possessed  of  a  causal 
efficiency  of  its  own.  We  have  thus  the  render- 
ing of  the  teleological  concept  which  is  so  promi- 
nent in  many  systems  of  idealism  from  the  time 
of  Aristotle  onward.  Its  empirical  origin  does  not 
demand  further  demonstration. 


106  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

24.  The   meanings    attaching    to    the   word   self 
have  been  referred  to  in  the  analysis  of   the  cate- 
gory of  substance.     The  concept  reason   is   gained 
from  empirical  observation  of  that  group  of  mental 
phenomena  to  which  the  name  refers.       The    con- 
cept of  will  comes  from  the  consciousness  of  effort, 
and    also    from    the    consciousness    of    choice,    or 
decision,  or   what  is   called  the  fiat  of    the    will. 
This  fiat  seems  to  indicate  the  sense  of   an   overt 
action,  as  it  is  vividly  contrasted  with  the  incipient 
or  ideational  acting  of  a  state  of  indecision.     What- 
ever  its  meaning,  this  fiat  lends  a  distinct  colour 
to  the  idea  of  the  will.     Yet   there  is   nothing  in 
it  to  suggest  that  volition,  though    Hegel  puts   it 
in  his  list  of  categories,  is  a  thought  of  other  than 
empirical  origin. 

25.  Our  concepts,  categories,  universals,  all  be- 
long to   one  type  ;  they  grow  in  one  way.     They 
are   all   alike   the   offspring   of   experience.      Some 
of  the  so-called  categories  seem  to  have  a  univer- 
sality   which    is   inexplicable    on    this    basis,    but 
they  get   their  universality   just   as   the    ordinary 
empirical  concept   gets   its   sphere.      Any   quality, 
as  we  have   seen,  is,  or  may  be,  a  universal,  and 
becomes  such  by  being   used  universally.     And  it 
is   in   this   way   that   the    categories    have    gained 
what  may  be   called   their  numerical   universality. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS  107 

They  are  all  derived  from  fragments  of  experience, 
with,  perhaps,  the  exception  of  space,  which  repre- 
sents something  common  to  all  our  human  expe- 
rience. Then  they  are  given  dominion  over  a 
much  wider  sphere.  Causality,  for  instance,  is 
taken  from  a  bit  of  experience  even  as  the  con- 
cept tree  is.  Tree  is  not  applied  except  to  the 
objects  from  which  it  is  derived.  Causality  has  a 
much  wider  range  than  the  phenomena  which  are 
its  source,  because  we  think  our  own  actions  as 
mediated  through  the  inward  feeling  of  energy, 
and,  further,  because,  being  inveterately  animistic 
in  our  interpretation  of  phenomena,  we  interpret 
all  changes  in  terms  of  our  own  actions.  The 
more  constant  and  prominent  ideas  and  feelings 
are  transferred,  so  far  as  is  possible,  to  all  other 
objects  ;  and  thus  the  categories  which  represent 
them  gain  their  widely  extended  application. 

26.  There  is  a  possible  criticism  of  this  deriva- 
tion of  the  categories  which  should  be  considered. 
It  may  be  said  that  the  account  given  of  them 
presents  them  when  they  have  come  to  recognition 
as  the  result  of  reflection ;  yet  this  is  not  their 
creation  :  they  are  implicit  in  the  earlier  experience, 
and  determine  its  form  ;  and  thus  seem  to  emerge 
from  that  which  really  owes  its  shape  to  them.  Thus, 
space  was  implicit  in  what  has  been  called  the  quali- 


io8  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

tative  manifold,  for  it  was  by  virtue  of  the  presence 
of  this  form  that  it  was  a  manifold.  It  is  causality 
that  determines  the  sequence  of  phenomena  ;  and 
its  emergence  in  connection  with  the  phenomena 
of  volition  merely  indicates  that  these  are  the  facts 
which  bring  it  before  the  reflective  consciousness. 
In  answer  to  such  criticisms  it  must  be  pointed 
out  that  to  say  that  the  categories  are  "  implicitly  " 
or  "potentially"  in  the  earlier  consciousness,  is  to 
use  expressions  which  are  apt  to  cover  a  very 
doubtful  metaphysical  theory.  When  a  phenome- 
non in  a  series  is  said  to  be  implicitly  or  poten- 
tially in  the  earlier  members  of  that  series,  all 
that  the  statement  is  entitled  to  mean  is  that  the 
phenomenon  belongs  to  the  series,  and  occurs  at 
a  certain  determinate  place  in  it.  It  is  further  to 
be  observed  that  it  is  necessary,  if  the  presupposi- 
tions of  such  criticism  be  adopted,  to  hold  that 
the  categories,  which,  after  all,  are  known  to  us 
as  facts  of  consciousness,  are  at  the  early  stages 
of  experience  at  once  absent  from  consciousness, 
and  yet  somehow  present  as  potent  factors  in  it. 
But  even  if  it  should  be  possible  to  harmonize 
these  seeming  contradictions,  the  fatal  fact  remains 
that  the  content  of  the  categories  is  empirical  or 
sensational.  They  presuppose  experience  ;  they 
are  not  presupposed  by  it.  The  form  of  space  is 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS  109 

made  of  nothing  but  sensations  ;  the  categories  of 
substance  and  cause  contain  nothing  but  sensory 
elements ;  even  the  categories  of  teleology  and 
reason  are  of  the  same  material.  The  concepts 
have  not,  it  may  be  repeated,  the  vividness  of 
sensation  ;  they  are  fainter  and  more  evanescent ; 
yet  nevertheless  they  are  sensory.  The  Begriff  is 
a  dried  and  faded  Vorstellung. 

27.  It  is  thus  impossible  to  subscribe  to  the 
doctrine  of  Kant,  that  the  categories  are  not  de- 
rived from  the  sensibility,  but  are  a  priori  in  the 
mind,  and  are  to  be  attributed  to  the  spontaneity 
of  the  understanding.  We  have  seen  that  this 
Melchisedek  origin  is  not  to  be  attributed  to 
them.  Kant's  suggestion,  that  the  sensibility  and 
the  understanding  may  have  a  common,  though 
to  us  unknown,  root,  falls  short  of  the  truth  which 
psychology  is  revealing  to  us.  Rather  must  we 
say  that  the  sensibility  is  the  root,  and  the  cate- 
gories are  growths  from  that  root.  Yet  Kant's 
doctrine  of  the  spontaneity  of  the  understanding 
is  important  in  showing  the  nature  of  growth. 
When  considering  the  continuity  of  the  mental 
life,  we  saw  that  the  explanation  of  anything 
is  not  given  in  the  history  of  that  thing  ;  even 
in  the  dust-heap  formed  by  the  wayside  we  have 
not  merely  a  recombination  of  old  particles ;  we 


110  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

find  a  manifestation  of  being  that  is  original  and 
unique.  And  in  the  growth  of  mind,  in  the  re- 
combination and  modification  of  sensory  elements, 
there  is  not  merely  the  old.  The  resultant  con- 
cept is  other  than  the  images  from  which  it 
comes.  There  is,  in  truth,  a  spontaneity  of  the 
understanding.  The  life  of  the  mind,  like  all 
other  life,  does  not  repeat  itself,  but  ever  assumes 
new  forms.  Yet  let  the  bearing  of  this  principle 
be  recognized.  It  may  be  true  that  the  cate- 
gories are  new  mental  entities ;  but  so  is  every 
work  of  the  imagination,  every  fancy  of  an  idle 
hour.  What  Kant  showed  to  be  true  for  a  few 
mental  entities,  is  true  for  unnumbered  others 
that  are  not  of  the  order  of  the  categories.  The 
object  of  the  above  discussion  has  not  been  to 
call  in  question  the  fact  of  the  newness  of  certain 
facts  in  the  mental  life  ;  it  has  rather  been  to 
show  that  this  newness  is  not  characteristic  of 
these  alone,  but  is  similar  to  that  which  we  find 
in  the  familiar  processes  of  the  fancy  and  imagi- 
nation, and  also  that  it  can  be  construed  in  entire 
consistency  with  the  doctrine  that  the  mental  life 
is  continuous  from  the  simplest  sensation-germ  to 
the  highest  intellectual  attainment. 

28.    There  remains  to  be  considered  the  Kantian 
proof  that  the  categories  are  a  priori  in  the  mind. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONCEPTS  III 

It  is  meant  to  show  that  they  are  necessary  to 
experience.  Thought,  according  to  Kant,  is  syn- 
thesis or  conjunction,  and  as  the  data  of  sense 
do  not  in  themselves  present  a  unity,  the  mind 
must  supply  it  by  its  spontaneous  activity.  This 
unifying  activity  is  manifested  in  the  application 
of  the  categories  to  sense-data. 

This  view  of  sensations  as  discrete  units  is  one 
that  is  natural  enough  at  all  times,  and  had  been 
specially  developed  in  the  writings  of  the  British 
philosophers.  So  Kant  regards  our  sense-intuitions 
as  made  up  of  a  multitude  of  sensations.  But  this 
means  that  the  idea  of  multiplicity  gained  from 
the  sensory  experience  by  the  conceptual  process 
is  taken  to  describe  that  original  experience  from 
which  it  is  differentiated.  We  shall  see  the  falsity 
of  this  method  in  the  next  chapter.  There  is  no 
real  ground  for  Kant's  view  ;  a  sensory  experience 
is  not  a  multiplicity  of  discrete  points.  Moreover, 
synthesis,  while  it  is  a  metaphor  derived  from  the 
very  familiar  experiences  of  putting  things  together, 
is  not  therefore  of  absolute  validity  as  an  account 
of  thought ;  unity,  as  well  as  plurality,  is,  when 
the  absolute  nature  of  thought  is  considered,  an 
irrelevant  idea. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  COGNITIVE  VALUE  OF  CONCEPTS 

1.  In   the   definition    of    knowledge   which   was 
given  above,  it  was  determined  that  for  the  attain- 
ment of  truth  thought    must   copy  the   object   or 
hold   to   it   a   still   closer    relation.      The   kind  of 
thought   embodied   in   the   concept    has   now  been 
described  :  the  manner  of  its  growth  has  been  ob- 
served ;  the  content  of  some  of  the  most  important 
concepts  has  been  analyzed.     It  is  now  to  be  de- 
cided whether  this  form  of  thought  meets  the  re- 
quirements of  knowledge.     What   verdict  must  be 
pronounced  on  realism  in  its  various  forms,  —  now 
affirming  that  the  categories  constitute  the  eternal 
essence  of  the  absolute  being,  and  now  proclaiming 
that   the   laws   of  nature   represent  the   nature   of 
things  ?     Is  the  concept  the  method  of  knowledge  ? 
Or  must  it  be  denied  that  knowledge  is  its  function  ? 

2.  The  concept  is  either  a  quality  separated  from 
others  by  abstraction,  or  a  group  of  qualities,  or  a 
composite  image.     Let  the  last  case  be  considered 
first.     This  general  image,  though  constructed  out 

112 


THE  COGNITIVE   VALUE  OF  CONCEPTS     113 

of  many  images,  is,  nevertheless,  one  image,  and, 
being  an  individual  image  among  other  images,  it 
is  unable  to  resemble  them  all.  It  is  even  as  a 
general  image  specially  unfitted  to  resemble  them, 
for  the  peculiarities  of  the  individuals  cancel  each 
other,  and  the  general  image  thus  fails  to  be  a  copy 
of  any  one  of  them.  It  is,  as  we  said,  a  relatively 
new  image,  for  there  may  not  be  absolute  agreement 
of  the  individuals  in  any  one  feature.  The  con- 
cept man,  for  instance,  is  thought  to  hold  of  many 
individuals,  though,  when  they  are  compared,  there 
may  be  nothing  iii  the  experience  of  any  one  which 
is  identical  with  the  experience  of  another,  and 
there  may  be  nothing  in  any  experience  accurately 
corresponding  to  the  concept.  It  may  be  said 
that  all  men  agree  in  having  such  faculties  as 
memory,  conscience,  will  ;  yet  it  can  be  readily 
seen  that  these  are  concepts  which  in  their  turn 
stand  for  experiences  that  in  their  concrete  details 
fail  to  correspond  with  each  other,  and  likewise 
fail  to  correspond  with  their  concepts.  The  con- 
cept thus  fails  to  be  knowledge  of  a  class. 

3.  But  there  are  concepts  which  claim  to  repre- 
sent a  part  of  all  the  individuals  of  a  class.  There 
may  be  a  quality,  or  nucleus  of  qualities,  which  is 
the  same  in  all  the  individuals  of  a  class,  and  this 
nucleus  may  be  copied  in  the  concept.  But  this 


114  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

vindication  of  the  concept  is  also  unsuccessful,  for 
such  a  nucleus  is,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  not  to  be 
found.  It  may  seem,  indeed,  to  present  itself  in 
such  a  case  as  that  of  objects  fashioned  alike  by 
human  design  ;  there  may,  for  instance,  be  a  num- 
ber of  tables  made  of  the  same  size  and  shape  and 
painted  the  same  colour.  But  when  such  cases  are 
examined,  it  is  found  that  the  likeness  subsists  only 
in  such  an  external  character  as  spatial  form.  It 
is  extremely  unlikely  that  the  wood  of  which  one 
table  is  made  copies  in  all  the  details  of  its  fibres 
the  wood  of  any  other  table  ;  it  is  probable  that 
each  molecule  in  the  mass  is  unique.  Besides,  each 
table  being  external  to  the  others  is  exposed  to  a 
special  set  of  influences  which  do  not  affect  the 
other.  Theoretically,  we  may  see  no  reason  why 
individuals  should  not  resemble  each  other,  but 
probably,  even  in  class-characters,  they  never  reach 
perfect  likeness. 

As  regards  the  spatial  form,  it  is  to  be  observed 
that  while  it  is  true  that  space  is  homogeneous, 
and  that  each  part  in  it  seems  like  every  other 
part,  the  space  answering  to  this  description  is 
space  in  its  conceptual  presentation.  We  shall  see 
reasons  for  believing  that  this  concept  has  nothing 
objective  to  correspond  to  it,  yet  if  it  is  regarded 
as  objective,  the  peculiar  differences  that  hold 


THE  COGNITIVE   VALUE  OF  CONCEPTS     115 

within  it  must  not  be  overlooked.  If  it  is  to  be 
taken  seriously  and  is  to  be  an  object  of  cognition, 
its  here  must  be  known  as  here,  and  its  there 
as  there.  The  spatial  similarity  must  not  be  em- 
phasized while  the  peculiar  spatial  difference  is 
ignored. 

4.  There  is  yet  another  way  of  stating  the  rela- 
tion of  the  general  to  the  particular.  The  concept 
is  the  one  in  the  many,  it  is  said.  This  does  not 
mean  that  there  is  a  quota  of  qualities  that  are 
identical  in  a  number  of  individuals.  There  is  an 
identity,  but  it  is  an  identity  that  clothes  itself  in 
diversity.  The  one  spirit,  for  instance,  is  revealed 
in  a  kingdom  of  souls.  Or,  again,  the  one  soul 
puts  on  many  forms  in  the  evolution  of  the  indi- 
vidual. 

In  the  analysis  of  this  doctrine  given  in  the  pre- 
ceding chapter,  it  became  clear  that  the  universal, 
while  creating  or  being  changed  into  the  individ- 
ual, is  still  regarded  as  a  distinct  entity.  We 
have  now  to  inquire  whether  this  relationship  is 
presented  in  anything  that  falls  within  our  ob- 
servation. Do  we  know  the  one  in  the  many? 

It  is  clear  that  it  is  not  possible  to  have  such  an 
idea  exemplified  in  the  external  or  spatial  form  of 
things.  A  spatial  outline  that  changes  into  an- 
other, constituting  that  other,  yet  somehow  hidden 


Il6  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

in  it,  is  something  which  has  never  been  seen  and 
can  never  be  seen.  The  one  in  the  one  —  for  that 
relation  demands  consideration  before  the  relation 
of  the  one  in  the  many  —  is  not  to  be  found  in 
this  sphere  in  the  sense  that  the  theory  demands. 
The  familiar  relation  of  the  part  to  the  whole  is 
the  only  representation  that  can  be  made  at  all 
resembling  that  called  for. 

Let  us  turn  to  what  may  be  called  the  inner 
being  of  things.  Let  our  own  conscious  life  be 
considered.  For  it  is  of  importance  here,  and 
throughout  this  investigation  into  knowledge,  to 
remember  that  the  only  inner  being  which  we  can 
properly  be  said  to  know  is  the  life  of  consciousness. 
The  inner  being  of  material  objects  may  be  guessed 
at ;  if  it  resembles  our  own  we  may  gain  some  ac- 
quaintance with  it,  though  only  by  inference  from 
our  own.  What  is  directly  and  immediately  pres- 
ent to  us  is  our  own  conscious  life,  and,  therefore, 
we  must  test  theories  of  the  inner  constitution  of 
things  by  reference  to  the  conditions  of  our  own  ex- 
perience. When  we  examine  that  experience  to 
see  if  the  idea  of  the  one  in  the  many  has  therein 
its  counterpart,  we  fail  to  find  any  such  relation. 
We  have  a  series  of  concrete  experiences,  but  the 
universals  which  the  theory  supposes  to  be  incor- 
porated in  them  do  not  exist  for  the  consciousness 


THE  COGNITIVE   VALUE  OF  CONCEPTS     117 

of  these  experiences.  We  are  conscious  of  the  sen- 
sations of  red  and  green,  and  we  have  distinct  from 
these  the  general  idea  of  colour-sensation;  but  we 
are  not  conscious  of  that  general  idea  of  colour-sen- 
sation as  present  in,  and  constituting,  the  sensa- 
tions of  red  and  green.  We  are  conscious  of  many 
wishes,  and  also  of  the  general  idea  of  wish,  yet 
not  of  that  general  idea  as  incorporated  in  the  par- 
ticular wishes.  Any  one,  therefore,  who  sought  to 
know  these  concrete  conscious  facts  would  err  if 
he  thought  to  copy  the  particulars  by  thinking  of 
a  universal  somehow  present  in  them. 

But,  it  may  be  contended,  this  criticism  ignores 
the  fact  that  the  universal  is,  or  has  become,  the 
many  individuals,  and  is  not  to  be  found  as  a  sepa- 
rate entity  in  them.  This  is,  so  far,  a  just  objec- 
tion. We  have  treated  the  universal  as  in  some 
sense  distinct,  for  only  on  the  supposition  of  its 
distinctness  can  the  concept  claim  to  be  a  copy, 
and  so  a  cognition,  of  the  reality.  When  the  per- 
sistence of  the  universal  is  denied,  and  the  unique- 
ness of  the  individuals  is  acknowledged,  there  is  a 
clearer  recognition  of  facts,  but  the  claim  of  the 
concept  to  be  cognitive  has  correspondingly  lost 
in  validity.  The  concept  ceases  to  be  the  copy  or 
counterpart  of  anything  objective  ;  the  one  is  not 
a  copy  of  any  of  the  many  individuals. 


Il8  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

5.  And  even  did  there  still  remain  grounds  for 
believing   that   there   is   a   universal   in   the    many 
individuals,  there   could  not   be   gained   by  know- 
ledge   of   it    all    the    knowledge    that    is    desired. 
Knowledge  of  the   universal  is   not  knowledge   of 
the  concrete.     And  the  concrete  is  the  reality;   it 
comprises  the  world  of  our  living  experiences,  our 
sensations  and  fancies,  joys  and  sorrows,  hopes  and 
fears.     This   is   the   world   of   whose   actuality   we 
are  assured.     To  know  the  universal,  even  if  it  is 
objective,    is    not    to    know   these    concrete    facts. 
The  knowledge   of  the   one  must  still  be   outside 
the  knowledge  of  the  other.     The  heroism  of  men 
is  not  repeated  in  its  actual  forms  in  the  general 
idea  of  it.     The  bitter-sweet  of  an  act  of  self-sacri- 
fice is   not   reproduced  in   the   general   concept   of 
self-denial.     The   concept  is   not   the    measure    of 
reality. 

6.  Nor  may  it  be   said  that   the   concrete   indi- 
vidual is  not  constituted  by  one  universal,  but  is  a 
meeting-place   or  plexus   of  many  universals,   and 
that   an  exhaustive  knowledge   of   these  would   be 
true  knowledge  of  the  individual.     Each  universal 
would  in  turn  betray  its  externality  to  the  concrete 
facts.     And,  even  were  it  admitted  that  the  indi- 
vidual is  a  plexus  of  laws,  the  plexus  is  more  than 
the  universals  taken  abstractly.     The  elements  of 


THE  COGNITIVE   VALUE  OF  CONCEPTS    119 

protoplasm  when  separated  by  the  chemist  are  not 
protoplasm  in  the  synthesis  of  life.  That  new  ele- 
ment, or  quality,  that  new  life,  which  comes  with 
the  supposed  synthesis  of  universals,  must  be  made 
an  object  of  cognition.  To  complete  the  list  of 
them  is  not  to  give  that  life ;  the  continuous  dis- 
covery of  new  laws  is  not  contact  with  the  true 
life  of  the  object.  To  seek  knowledge  in  concepts 
is  to  seek  the  living  among  the  dead. 

7.  There   is   still    another   way   of    representing 
the  function  of   the   universal.     It   may  be   looked 
upon   as    a    principle   of    synthesis,   as    it   was    in 
Kant's  system.     It  might  further  be  supposed  that 
the   products    of    such   a   work   of    synthesis    may 
themselves  become  objects  of  knowledge.     In   this 
case  universal  would  copy  universal.     It  may  suf- 
fice  here  to  point   out  that   on   this  theory   these 
universals,  though  cognitive  of  each  other,  are  still 
left  external  to  the  phenomena  they  hold  together. 
These   phenomena   may  be   synthetized    by   them ; 
they   are    not    known    by   them.      Again,   we   are 
obliged  to  seek  alongside  the  knowledge  given  in 
universals  a  knowledge  of  another  kind.     For  uni- 
versals  can  copy  universals,  but   they  cannot  copy 
facts  of  another  order. 

8.  It  might  still   be  said   that   there   is  validity 
in  this  view  of  the  one  in  the  many  ;  only,  it  is  a 


120  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

validity  that  is  recognized  by  thought  or  reason, 
and  not  by  imagination.  This  distinction  of  the 
Beyriff  from  the  Vbrstellung  has  already  been  con- 
sidered, and  it  has  been  found  that,  whenever  the 
Begriff  is  examined,  it  proves  to  be  a  Vorstellung 
in  disguise.  It  is  further  to  be  noted  here  that, 
if  the  Begriff  differs  from  the  Vorstellung  so  much 
as  is  alleged,  it  is  thereby  unfitted  in  the  case  of 
certain  facts  for  the  cognitive  function.  The  Vor- 
stellung is  a  fact  and  yet  cannot  be  copied  by  the 
Begriff. 

9.  For,  in  short,  if  knowledge  is  a  subjective 
copy  of  an  objective  order,  it  cannot  consist  sim- 
ply of  universals.  Universals  do  make  up  part  of 
the  objective  order ;  they  are,  at  least,  facts  in 
the  human  mind ;  and  they  can  be  known  or 
copied  only  by  universals.  But  there  is  much  else 
that  cannot  be  thus  cognized.  The  whole  stream 
of  sensations  and  emotions,  which  makes  so  large 
a  part  of  the  facts  offered  for  cognition,  must  be 
copied  by  something  other  than  the  universal.  The 
faculty  by  which  we  have  sensory  or  emotional  ex- 
perience is  not  that  exercised  by  the  mind  when 
it  frames  concepts  of  that  sensory  and  emotional 
experience.  The  two  series  of  mental  facts  are 
disparate  ;  therefore,  the  one  cannot  afford  a  cog- 
nition of  the  other. 


THE  COGNITIVE   VALUE  OF  CONCEPTS    121 

10.  This   criticism   of    the    concept   will   receive 
additional   illustration    as   we    proceed    to    inquire 
into  the   objective   validity  of  the   categories.      It 
will,   further,   be   found    that    the   categories   have 
not  only  the  faults  of   the  ordinary  empirical  con- 
cepts, but  others  which  attach   especially  to  them- 
selves.     Their  wider   universality   is,  in   the   case 
of   most  of  them,  fatal   to   their   truth.     They  are 
applied  to  phenomena   other   than   those   in  which 
they   originate,   with    the    result    that   when    thus 
applied    they   fail    more    completely    to    represent 
realities. 

11.  Let   space   be   first    considered.      It    should 
be  remarked  at   the  outset  that  the  criticism  just 
passed  on  the  categories  does  not  apply  to  space ; 
for  it  is   derived   from   universal    experience,   and 
has  a  peculiar  title  to  be  regarded  as  the  form  of 
all   things.      It    is    not    thereby   settled,   however, 
whether  the  idea  of   space  is  a  copy  of   anything 
objective. 

Space,  we  have  seen,  is  a  concept  or  idea  derived 
from  the  manifold  of  sense ;  or,  rather,  it  is  yielded 
by  the  meeting  of  many  such  manifolds.  First  of 
all,  is  the  concept  knowledge  of  these  manifolds? 
It  can  be  knowledge  of  them  only  by  resembling 
them.  But  it  is  not  like  them.  It  does  not  even 
resemble  a  part  common  to  them  all.  Space  is  not 


122  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

a  part  or  element  of  the  manifold.  Quantity  is 
not  a  part  or  element  of  quality.  That  it  is  an 
idea  distinct  from  quality,  is  taught  by  Kant  when 
he  insists  that  space  is  distinct  from  sense-data, 
and  is  a  form  for  them  all. 

From  this  it  follows  that  the  truth  of  this  mani- 
fold cannot  be  presented  in  terms  of  space.  The 
place  of  the  spatial  relation  in  the  method  of  truth- 
finding  is  not  hereby  determined.  But  the  claim 
of  space  to  absolute  truth,  when  predicated  of  the 
qualitative  manifold,  is  disallowed.  The  idea  of 
pure  space,  while  derived  from  this  manifold,  is 
external  to  it.  The  charge  of  externality,  and  con- 
sequent estrangement  from  truth,  can  be  brought 
with  still  greater  justice  against  such  abstractions 
as  number.  The  measurement  of  psychical  states 
in  respect  of  intensity  offers  no  exception  to  this 
principle.  Though  the  relation  of  one  intensity  to 
another  may  be  given  in  quantitative  terms,  the 
description  is  external.  The  reality  of  the  feelings, 
as  they  are  felt,  or  as  they  actually  exist,  is  not  thus 
reproduced,  nor  is  any  part  or  element  of  them  so 
reproduced.  The  feeling  of  greater  intensity  is 
not  a  multiple  of  less  intense  feelings ;  and  even 
were  it  granted  that  it  is  such  a  multiple  or  com- 
pound, the  quantitative  statement  would  not  cease 
to  be  external.  Again,  were  intensity  resolved 


THE  COGNITIVE   VALUE  OF  CONCEPTS    123 

into  extensity,1  there  must  still  be  recognized  the 
difference  between  the  extensity  of  feelings  as  felt, 
and  that  presented  in  geometry. 

But  there  is  another  question  that  is  more  promi- 
nent in  the  inquiry  concerning  the  reality  of  space. 
It  is  not  asked  merely  whether  space,  being  empiri- 
cally derived  from  experience,  is  like  the  experiences 
from  which  it  comes.  It  is  also  asked  whether  the 
idea  we  have  of  pure  space  is  the  counterpart  of 
an  objective  reality. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  concept  of  pure  space 
can  be  like,  and  can  therefore  represent  cognitively, 
only  an  object  that  is  similar,  that  is,  another  con- 
cept of  pure  space.  The  concept  which  each  man 
forms  may  be  made  an  instrument  of  knowledge 
whereby  other  men's  ideas  of  space  are  discerned. 
It  may  well  be,  as  Kant  remarks,  that  all  finite  in- 
telligences agree  in  this  respect  with  man,  and  thus 
the  cognitive  use  of  the  concept  may  have  a  wide 
range. 

Doubtless  this  view  of  the  cognitive  value  of 
space  seems  to  ignore  the  problem  of  its  objectivity. 
Is  there  not,  it  is  asked,  a  space  independent  of  the 
mind  to  which  the  mental  representation  corre- 
sponds? It  must  be  answered,  that  to  affirm  the 

1  Cf.  Miinsterberg,  Beitrdge  zur  Experimentellen  Psychologic, 
Heft  3. 


124  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

existence  of  such  space  is  to  say  that  there  is,  as  a 
counterpart  to  our  idea  of  space,  an  idea  of  space 
independent  of  our  thinking.  We  cannot  suppose 
that  the  space  in  the  mind  is  an  idea,  while  the  ob- 
jective space  is  something  other  than  idea.  If  the 
space  in  the  mind  is  a  fact  of  consciousness,  the 
objective  space  must  likewise  be  a  fact  of  conscious- 
ness ;  otherwise  the  relation  of  knowledge  cannot 
obtain  between  them.  It  may  seem  to  remove  this 
difficulty  to  attribute  the  objective  idea  of  space 
to  the  Divine  consciousness.  Yet  when  it  is  re- 
membered that  space  is  a  product  of  fragmentary 
experiences,  and  represents  the  result  of  the  can- 
celling of  one  qualitative  variety  by  another,  it 
can  be  seen  that  it  has  too  many  of  the  marks  of 
finitude  to  be  attributed  to  the  absolute  intelligence. 

We  have  thus  found  that  the  idea  of  space  does 
not  give  us  the  truth  of  our  conscious  experiences ; 
it  also  fails  to  represent  anything  objective,  save 
as  it  mirrors  similar  ideas  in  other  finite  minds. 

It  has  been  stated  already  that  number  is  exter- 
nal to  our  concrete  sensory  experiences.  It  may 
be  added  that,  even  if  the  objective  nature  of  space 
be  insisted  on,  it  cannot  be  rightly  represented  by 
the  sciences  of  arithmetic  and  geometry.  These 
cannot,  so  to  speak,  reveal  its  heart.  The  feeling 
of  these  is  not  the  feeling  of  space,  and  therefore 


THE  COGNITIVE   VALUE  OF  CONCEPT      12$ 

it  is  not  known  by  them.  Likewise  questions  about 
the  infinite  divisibility  of  space  do  not  arise  in  re- 
gard to  the  sensory  manifold ;  nor  do  they  arise  in 
regard  to  the  general  idea  of  space  until  the  mind 
has  substituted  for  the  first  form  of  that  concept 
the  idea  of  a  system  of  discrete  units.  Moreover, 
infinite  divisibility  is  an  expression  that  has  be- 
come merely  symbolic,  and  does  not  represent  any 
adequate  cognitive  appreciation  of  objective  facts. 
This  is  true  also  of  the  expression  infinite  exten- 
sion. Into  a  further  psychological  analysis  of  the 
ideas  of  infinite  divisibility  and  infinite  extension 
it  is  not  necessary,  for  the  present  inquiry,  to  enter. 

12.  The    category    of    time    does    not    demand 
detailed  criticism.     So  far  as  it  is  made  up  of  the 
idea  of  space,  the  conclusions  to  be  reached  regard- 
ing it  have  been  determined  in  the  discussion  of 
that  concept.     So  far  as  reality  and  unreality  are 
concerned,  it  may  suffice  to  refer  to  the  study  of 
these    which    immediately    follows.      The    feeling 
which   arises   upon    their    comparison,    and   is   the 
new   element   in   the   idea   of    time,    cannot,   when 
stripped  of  its  associates,  be  taken  for  the  objective 
form  or  entity  which  time  is  thought  to  be. 

13.  Being    or   reality   was    shown    to    have    its 
origin  in  sensations  of  touch ;   and  the  first  ques- 
tion regarding  it  should  be  :  Does  it  give  the  truth 


126  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

of  these  sensations?  The  answer  is  to  be  found 
in  the  principle  that  general  ideas  are  not  the  truth 
of  the  particular  cases  from  which  they  are  derived. 
Being  is  a  composite  image  of  touch-sensations, 
and  cannot  mirror  the  experience  of  the  individual 
sensations.  The  category  can  copy,  or  cognize,  only 
another  idea  that  is,  like  itself,  the  resultant  of  cer- 
tain bodily  feelings. 

There  cleaves,  however,  to  this  category,  as  it  is 
usually  employed,  the  weakness  of  a  spurious  uni- 
versality. It  is  not  restricted  to  sensations  of 
touch,  but  is  applied  to  everything  in  the  universe. 
From  the  time  of  Porphyry,  being  has  been  recog- 
nized as  the  summum  genus  which  could  be  predi- 
cated of  all  things. 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  show  that  this  uni- 
versal application  of  the  category  is  unwarranted. 
Let  conscious  experience  be  first  considered.  The 
sensations  of  touch  are  only  one  group  of  sensa- 
tions ;  those  of  sight  and  smell  have  nothing  of 
the  touch  character,  and  when  they  are  brought 
into  relation  to  touch  they  are  simply  associated 
with  it.  If  we  would  know  the  sensations  of  sight 
and  smell,  it  is  they  themselves  that  must  be  laid 
hold  of  by  the  mind ;  it  is  not  directly  to  the  pur- 
pose, from  the  cognitive  point  of  view,  to  associate 
with  them  images  derived  from  some  other  sense. 


THE  COGNITIVE   VALUE  OF  CONCEPTS    127 

Likewise  our  emotional  experiences  and  our  argu- 
mentations cannot  be  understood  in  their  truth  by 
means  of  this  category. 

Of  the  things  of  nature  we  know  little,  and,  there- 
fore, can  dogmatize  little  as  to  what  is  predicable 
of  them.  It  may  be,  therefore,  that  being  can  be 
attributed  to  them.  Yet  let  it  be  repeated,  this 
idea,  if  it  is  to  be  cognitive,  must  be  like  an  idea. 
If  it  is  maintained  that  external  things  have  real- 
ity, it  must  be  meant  that  there  is  associated  with 
them,  as  part  of  their  constitution,  this  composite 
image  of  touch-feelings.  But  it  is  at  once  evident 
that  to  say  this  is  to  indulge  in  crude  and  pre- 
carious hypotheses.  The  complacency  with  which 
we  use  the  category  must  disappear  when  there  is 
reflection  on  its  origin  and  content. 

14.  The  idea  of  essence  was  traced  to  certain 
feelings  of  muscular  strain.  It  is  not  necessary  to 
repeat  the  criticism  passed  upon  empirically  derived 
concepts  that  they  do  not  yield  the  truth  of  the  ex- 
periences from  which  they  have  originally  come.  It 
is  to  be  more  carefully  observed  that  this  category 
does  not  give  the  truth  of  other  mental  experiences  ; 
when  we  say  that  certain  mental  phenomena  are 
essential  to  the  soul,  we  are  adding  to  the  phe- 
nomena an  extraneous  idea.  If  they  have  not  the 
same  content  as  the  idea  of  essence,  that  idea  cannot 


128  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

be  a  copy  or  cognition  of  them.  Again,  the  applica- 
tion of  the  idea  to  external  objects  means  the  ex- 
ternalization  of  certain  subjective  feelings  ;  and  the 
justification  of  such  a  process  as  contributory  to 
knowledge  has  never  been  attempted. 

15.  The  category  of  similarity  also  fails  to  yield 
the  truth  of  the  many  things  to  which  it  is  applied. 
It  is  not  an  element  of  the  things,  but  is  an  inde- 
pendent idea,  derived  from  internal  sensations,  and 
then  applied  to  the  relation  of  facts  physical  and 
mental.     This   relational   character  which  it  wears 
is  proof  that  in  respect  to  these  facts  it  is  not  cog- 
nitive.    It  is  not  knowledge  of  the  facts ;  it  is  a 
bond  between   them.     It  would   be   cognitive,  did 
there  subsist  as  a  link  between  the  two  objects  the 
kind  of  organic  feeling  which  forms  the  substance 
of  this  idea  ;  but  there  is  no  proof  that  it  exists. 
It  is  not  found  between  conscious  states  until  it  is 
supplied  in  the  act  of  cognition,  and  the  hypothesis 
of  its  existence  as  a  bond  between  external  objects 
is  without  the  barest  foundation  of  evidence.     The 
question    is,    of    course,    not    yet    being    decided, 
whether  similarity,  when  employed  as  a  symbol,  is 
not  exceedingly  useful  in  the  mental  construction  of 
the  world  ;  the  present  inquiry  concerns  its  abso- 
lute truthfulness. 

16.  The  category  of  substance,  also,  illustrates 


THE  COGNITIVE   VALUE  OF  CONCEPTS    129 

the  failure  of  concepts  to  meet  the  requirements  of 
cognition.  It  is,  in  the  first  instance,  an  interpre- 
tation of  the  self  as  made  up  of  the  somatic  con- 
sciousness. But  there  is  not  to  be  found  this 
persistent  or  identical  element  in  the  soul's  ex- 
periences. In  the  somatic  consciousness  there  is 
an  approximation  to  such  a  monotone,  but,  even  in 
it,  variations  show  themselves.  As  little,  or  still 
less,  does  experience  justify  the  view  that  this 
concept  is  so  connected  with  the  other  phenomena 
of  the  soul's  life  that  it  may  be  offered  as  a  true 
representation  of  them.  Again,  this  category  is 
applied  to  all  existences,  material  as  well  as  spirit- 
ual, and  is  thought  to  be  the  inner  reality  behind 
their  appearance.  But  the  precarious  character  of 
the  hypothesis  needs  no  demonstration  ;  the  vague 
body-sensations  cannot  be  proved  to  be  the  inner 
reality  of  material  objects.  We  have  no  evidence 
that  there  is  one  material  object  which  is  to  be  thus 
interpreted  ;  we  are  still  further  from  knowing  that 
there  are  many  such. 

This  category  has  played  an  important  part  in 
the  history  of  science  and  philosophy,  and  many 
attempts  have  been  made  to  define  it,  and  formu- 
late the  deductions  from  it  in  precise  scientific 
terms.  It  received  its  most  elaborate  treatment 
in  philosophy  in  the  system  of  Spinoza.  It  is 


130  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

impossible  to  offer  here  any  complete  criticism  of 
that  system,  especially  as  Spinoza  mixed  up  with 
the  idea  of  substance  other  doctrines  relatively  in- 
dependent of  it,  such  as  that  of  genus  and  species. 
Yet  it  may  be  said  that  Spinoza  made  a  quite 
uncritical  use  of  the  concept,  and  that,  had  he 
instituted  a  thorough  psychological  investigation 
of  its  origin,  such  as  he  suggests  in  the  case  of 
some  concepts,1  he  would  never  have  made  it  the 
basis  of  his  system. 

The  scientific  doctrine  of  substance  is  restricted 
primarily  to  the  physical  world,  and  is  presented 
in  the  formula  that  the  substance  of  the  world  is 
permanent.  At  the  same  time,  this  doctrine  is 
probably  now  expressed,  so  far  as  it  is  of  scientific 
interest,  in  the  principle  of  the  conservation  of 
energy  :  the  permanence  of  substance  is  for  science 
a  permanence  of  mass,  and  thus  a  manifestation  of 
energy. 

17.  We  are  thus  brought  to  the  categories  of 
causality  and  energy.  Let  it  be  remembered  that 
causality  is  one  of  our  most  widely  applied  con- 
cepts. It  is  thought  to  hold  of  the  agency  of 
God,  of  the  voluntary  actions  of  men,  and  of  the 
changes  in  material  objects;  moreover,  it  is  one 
form  of  connection  which  is  ordinarily  thought  to 

ics  Par.  II,  Propos.  40,  schol. 


THE  COGNITIVE   VALUE  OF  CONCEPTS     131 

obtain  in  all  these  cases.  The  validity  of  these 
pretensions  must  be  estimated.  It  has  been  seen 
that  causality  is  derived  from  our  feelings  of 
effort.  Now  the  theory  which  makes  causality  a 
metaphysical  reality  is  not  only  claiming  that  these 
feelings  are  to  be  found  in  mental  changes  ;  it  is 
ejecting  them  into  the  external  universe.  It  would 
lend  little  support  to  this  theory  to  say  that  the  feel- 
ing of  effort  is  the  feeling  of  innervation.  Even 
that  feeling,  if  it  exist,  cannot  a  priori  claim  any 
more  metaphysical  dignity  than  a  sensation  of  smell 
or  taste. 

It  finds  no  real  evidence  for  its  claims  in  the 
facts  of  conscious  experience.  This  seems  at  first 
sight  a  paradoxical  statement,  for  causality  is  a 
mental  phenomenon,  and  it  is  a  matter  of  experi- 
ence that  it  does  conjoin  other  mental  phenomena; 
thus,  a  man  wishes  to  walk,  has  the  feeling  of 
energy,  and  then  experiences  the  sensations  con- 
nected with  actual  walking.  It  may  seem  that 
in  such  a  case  the  wish  is  the  cause  of  the  sen- 
sations of  walking.  But  the  feeling  of  effort 
which  conjoins  the  two  and  seems  a  clear  mani- 
festation of  causal  connection  is  simply  another 
feeling,  or  set  of  feelings,  interposed  between 
them.  No  member  of  the  series  is  creative:  the 
series  is  a  succession  of  conscious  states;  the  feel- 


132  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

ing  of  causality,  however  closely  it  joins  with  the 
other  ideas,  is  yet  external  to  them  and  relatively 
independent  of  them,  and  does  not  represent  their 
constitution.  The  concept  is  therefore  not  cog- 
nitive of  the  two  states ;  it  relates  to  something 
foreign  to  them.  Further,  it  is  only  in  cases  of 
voluntary  action  that  the  feeling  of  effort  comes 
into  consciousness.  In  other  cases  in  which  a 
causal  connection  is  asserted,  the  concept  does  not 
appear  in  the  experience,  but  only  in  the  intellect 
of  him  who  reflects  on  the  experience.  The  hear- 
ing of  his  friend's  death  is,  we  say,  the  cause  of 
the  man's  grief.  But  the  man  who  grieves  has 
not  present  in  his  consciousness  the  complex  of 
ideas  indicated  by  the  category.  It  is  present 
only  to  the  reflection  that  would  explain  or  inter- 
pret his  experience.  By  far  the  larger  number  of 
our  experiences  are  neither  preceded  nor  followed 
by  anything  resembling  the  category  of  causality, 
nor  does  the  analysis  of  them  show  a  trace  of  its 
presence.  So  true  is  this,  that  psychology  no 
longer  seeks  the  causal  bond  in  the  mental  series, 
but  in  the  physiological  series  which  is  regarded 
as  its  basis  :  the  stream  of  consciousness  is  a  suc- 
cession; it  is  not  construed  as  a  causal  chain. 

The   application  of   the  category  to  the  physical 
series  of  events  means,  we  have  seen,  the  ejection 


THE  COGNITIVE   VALUE  OF  CONCEPTS    133 

of  a  special  set  of  feeling.  Again,  as  in  the 
previous  cases  of  such  hypotheses,  we  must  con- 
fess our  ignorance  of  external  things,  and  our  in- 
ability to  say  what  concepts  are  applicable  to 
them.  But  we  must,  also,  again  point  to  the 
peculiarly  crude  character  of  such  theorizing.  If 
we  are  in  this  animistic  way  to  ascribe  feelings 
of  effort  similar  to  our  own,  to  all  things  in  the 
universe,  we  should  offer  some  justification  for 
the  procedure. 

18.  The  category  of  energy  is,  as  we  have  seen, 
closely  akin  to  that  of  causality.  Like  causality, 
it  has  the  important  place  it  occupies  in  thought 
simply  because  of  our  inveterate  association  of 
change  with  effort.  The  theory  of  energy  is  ex- 
pressed in  the  principles  of  the  conservation  and 
transformation  of  energy,  and  an  estimate  of  the 
cognitive  value  of  the  category  may  thus  be  re- 
solved into  an  estimate  of  these  principles. 

Let  the  principle  of  the  transformation  of  energy 
be  first  looked  at.  It  is  said  that  the  energy  while 
remaining  the  same  appears  in  various  forms ;  here 
it  is  light,  there  it  is  heat,  while  in  another  place 
it  is  electricity ;  or  it  may  adopt  these  various 
forms  in  succession.  There  is  first  to  be  noticed 
here  the  old  Aristotelian  idea  of  the  one  in  the 
many;  the  energy  appears  in  a  variety  of  particu- 


134  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

lar  forms.  But  not  only  does  the  theory  present 
this  untenable  view ;  it  joins  to  it  another  doctrine 
not  less  hard.  It  teaches  that  one  form  of  energy 
passes,  or  is  transformed,  into  another.  Of  this, 
however,  science  offers  no  proof.  It  presents  a 
series  of  phenomena,  and  shows  that  one  gives 
place  to  another ;  but  this  is  all  that  it  shows. 
And  the  analogy  of  conscious  experience  warrants 
no  such  statement  of  transformations.  It  offers 
a  succession  of  conscious  states  each  of  which  is 
qualitatively  distinct ;  one  is  not  changed  into 
another ;  at  least  the  act  of  transformation  is  not 
given  in  consciousness.  This  doctrine  regarding 
energy  thus  proves  to  be  untrue  of  anything  that 
comes  within  the  sphere  of  experience. 

In  place  of  "transformations  of  energy,"  the 
more  cautious  expression  "  correlation  of  forces  " l 
has  been  used.  The  expression  indicates  the  view 
that,  while  it  is  right  to  say  that  one  force  pro- 
duces another,  it  is  yet  not  legitimate  to  say  that 
one  is  transmuted  into  another.  This  recognition 
of  difference  in  the  forces  is  valuable,  but  the  prin- 
ciple is  not  carried  far  enough.  Each  force  is  still  a 
general  concept,  and  the  attempt  to  unify  the  modes 
of  one  force  is  exposed  to  objections  as  much  as  the 
attempt  to  reduce  all  the  forms  of  energy  to  unity. 

1  Sir  W.  K.  Grove,  The  Correlation  of  the  Physical  Forces. 


THE  COGNITIVE   VALUE  OF  CONCEPTS    135 

The  law  of  the  conservation  of  energy  states 
that  the  energy,  while  undergoing  change,  re- 
mains the  same  in  amount.  This  law  fails  to 
meet  the  requirements  of  cognition,  because  it 
reverts  to  the  idea  of  quantity  to  explain  what 
is  qualitative.  Let  it  be  remembered  that  the 
idea  of  energy  is  derived  from  feelings  of  effort, 
and  that  thus  the  physical  world  is  being  inter- 
preted after  the  analogy  of  our  conscious  exist- 
ence. So  far  as  the  physical  universe  has  for  its 
being  feelings  of  effort  or  feelings  of  any  kind, 
these  must  be  supposed  to  change  from  moment 
to  moment,  as  a  man's  would  change,  were  he 
hauled,  now  one  way,  now  another.  To  say  that 
the  quantity  of  his  sensations  remained  the  same, 
would  be  to  apply,  as  we  have  already  seen, 
categories  external  to  the  facts  that  are  to  be 
stated.  In  absolute  cognition,  ideas  of  quantity 
can  be  applied  only  to  ideas  of  quantity. 

It  may  still  seem  impossible  to  think  energy  to 
be  annihilated,  or  created,  and  it  may,  therefore, 
be  concluded  that  it  is  never  lost  from  space. 
But  the  seeming  impossibility  of  thinking  energy 
away  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  idea  of  being  is 
associated  with  it,  and,  so  long  as  we  hold  to  the 
idea  of  being,  we  cannot  at  the  same  time  intro- 
duce the  idea  of  its  non-being.  To  refer  again 


136  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

to  our  conscious  experience,  we  find  that  each 
moment  it  is  new,  and  then  vanishes,  never  to 
return.  So  the  experiences  of  nature,  the  past 
manifestations  of  energy,  have  vanished.  And  it 
could  not  be  asserted  that  our  experiences  or  those 
of  the  physical  world  are  still  preserved  somewhere. 
The  fact  of  change  presents  to  reflection  difficulties 
enough,  but  it  is  not  likely  to  be  explained  by  the 
hypostatizing  of  space,  the  supposition  that  this 
space  is  permanent,  and  the  further  supposition 
that  our  experiences  are  moved  around  in  it. 

It  need  not  be  said  that  no  attempt  is  being 
made  to  call  in  question  the  value  for  science  of 
the  principles  of  the  conservation  and  transforma- 
tion of  energy.  These  may  be  taken,  as  we  shall 
have  occasion  to  note,  to  refer  simply  to  relations 
of  succession  and  coexistence  among  phenomena. 
It  is  not  necessary  that  science  should  regard  en- 
ergy as  a  metaphysical  entity. 

19.  It  is  not  out  of  place  here  to  refer  to  the 
attempts  made  by  Schopenhauer,  and  other  meta- 
physicians since  his  time,1  to  install  the  will  in 
the  place  of  the  absolute.  These  attempts  are 
natural  products  of  the  thought  of  the  modern 
world.  Causality  is  the  category  made  prominent 
in  modern  science,  and  it  has  developed  into  the 

1  Wundt,  Paulsen,  Deussen,  may  be  mentioned. 


THE  COGNITIVE  VALUE  OF  CONCEPTS    137 

idea  of  energy,  as  the  explanation  of  the  physi- 
cal world.  It  was  also  natural  that  it  should 
give  rise  to  the  theory  that  the  will  is  the  basal 
faculty,  and  that  the  universe,  physical  as  well 
as  spiritual,  is  a  manifestation  of  will.  Causality, 
energy,  force,  are  ideas  derived  from  our  feelings 
of  effort,  and  it  is  from  the  same  source  that  the 
elements  of  the  idea  of  will  are  largely,  if  not 
entirely,  derived.  The  doctrine  that  the  physical 
world  is  will  and  the  doctrine  that  it  is  energy  are 
scarcely  to  be  distinguished.  In  view  of  what  has 
been  said  regarding  causality  and  energy,  a  de- 
tailed criticism  of  the  theory  may  be  dispensed 
with. 

20.  The  category  of  teleology  is  a  general  idea 
derived  from  the  contemplation  of  a  variety  of 
actions  directed  to  ends.  It  has  the  weakness  of 
other  general  concepts  and  cannot  afford  true  cog- 
nition of  any  one  such  action.  There  is  still  greater 
departure  from  truth  when  it  is  thought  that  there 
is  some  peculiar  efficiency  in  the  idea  of  an  action 
which  in  a  teleological  process  precedes  the  action 
itself.  This  idea  is,  like  others,  part  of  the  stream 
of  consciousness,  and  has  no  special  productivity. 
To  speak  in  terms  of  causality,  it  is  the  effect  of 
the  ideas  that  precede  it,  and  the  cause  of  those 
that  follow  it. 


138  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

When  an  immanent  teleology  is  proclaimed,  there 
is  a  theory  offered  which  the  facts  of  experience  do 
nothing  to  illustrate.  An  idea  which  exists  only 
"  ideally,"  according  to  the  demand  of  such  theories, 
is  manifestly  something  of  which  we  have  no  direct 
experience,  for  all  our  experiences  are  concrete  and 
actual,  and  cannot  in  this  sense  be  ideal.  And  it 
is  difficult  to  see  by  what  right  such  a  conception, 
which  cannot  sustain  its  claims  in  the  sphere  to 
which,  by  the  terms  of  it,  it  specially  belongs,  is  to 
be  applied,  for  cognitive  purposes,  to  other  exist- 
ences, such  as  plants  or  animals,  or  even  to  the 
universe  as  a  whole. 

This  category  has  had  great  prominence  in  modern 
philosophy.  It  has  been  used  to  interpret  the  abso- 
lute, not  only  in  the  design  argument,  but  also  in 
such  philosophical  systems  as  those  of  Lotze  and 
Von  Hartmann.  So  recent  a  writer  as  Professor 
Royce1  says  that  while  some  of  the  categories  are 
descriptive  of  the  appearance  of  things  in  space  and 
time  and  fail  to  reach  their  inner  being,  that  inner 
life  is  "appreciated"  in  teleological  ideas.  We  are 
now,  however,  in  a  position  to  see  how  far  this  cate- 
gory is  from  giving  an  appreciation  of  that  life,  if 
by  appreciation  is  meant  a  knowledge  of  its  actual 
experiences. 

1  Spirit  of  Modern  Philosophy,  p.  426. 


THE  COGNITIVE   VALUE  OF  CONCEPTS    139 

In  The  Riddles  of  the  Sphinx,  it  is  pointed  out 
that  concepts,  inasmuch  as  they  are  timeless,  cannot 
present  the  truth  of  this  changing  universe ; J  yet 
it  is  thought  that  the  universe  may  be  interpreted 
by  the  teleological  concept.2  It  need  scarcely  be 
pointed  out  that  teleology  is  as  static  as  any  other 
category,  and  is  as  little  able  to  mirror  the  chang- 
ing scene  of  things.  The  concept  of  a  stream  is  not 
itself  a  stream. 

21.  Finally,  the  category  of  reason  must  be  con- 
sidered. It  is  gained  by  observation  of  the  work  of 
the  mind  in  cognition  and  ratiocination.  The  value 
of  the  category  as  a  means  to  cognition  has  been 
considered  by  many  to  be  very  high.  Such  idealists 
as  Hegel  have  made  it  the  ultimate  truth  and  ex- 
planation of  all  things.  But  doubts  of  its  cog- 
nitive validity  readily  arise.  The  fact  that  it  is 
derived  from  observation  of  those  very  abstractions 
which  have  proved  to  be  so  phantasmal,  is  enough 
to  awaken  suspicion  regarding  it.  It  does  not 
represent  even  the  rational  process.  It  does  not 
resemble  the  immediate  sensory  or  emotional  ex- 
periences. It  is  not  to  be  assumed  that  it  is  like 
anything  in  the  experience  of  natures  lower  than 
the  human.  When  these  lower  natures  have  to 
be  explained  by  it  there  is  called  to  its  assistance 

i  pp.  81  f.  2  pp.  180,  199,  etc. 


140  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

the  idea  of  evolution;  in  the  lower  nature  reason 
is  said  to  be  in  process  of  evolution ;  and  then  to 
explain  this  evolution  recourse  is  had  to  the  idea 
of  an  immanent  teleology.  But  the  use  of  the 
category  is  thus  rendered  yet  more  unsatisfactory. 

22.  It   is   the   more   necessary   to   call    attention 
to  the  criticism  of  this  category ;  for  it  is  generally 
its  claims  in  a  somewhat  different  form  which  we 
meet,  when  it  is  said  that  the  self  is  a  clear  illustra- 
tion of  unity  in  diversity.     The  self  is  said  to  be 
in  its  various  experiences.     The  reason  for  saying 
this  seems  to  be  that  when  we  in  the  act  of  reflection 
frame  the  idea  of  the  self,  as  being  in  the  experi- 
ences, what  we  really  have  for  the  idea  of  the  self 
is  an  individual  idea  ;  and  when,  on  the  other  hand, 
we  turn  to  the  experiences,  we  fail  to  find  in  them 
the  self  as  represented  in  our  idea;    and  then  the 
self   is  said  to  be  not  apart  from  our  experiences, 
but  given  only  in  them.      All  this  only  serves  to 
show  that  the  idea,  not  being  like  all  the  various 
experiences,  is  not  cognitive  of   them.      It  can  be 
cognitive  only  of  an  idea  like  itself. 

23.  The   categories    have    thus    been   proved   to 
be  wanting  when   tried  by  the  ideal  of  knowledge 
with   which   we   started.      They  have    the    defect 
of   the  empirical  concept  and  cannot  represent  the 
individual  facts  which  have  produced  them.     And, 


THE  COGNITIVE   VALUE  OF  CONCEPTS    141 

in  so  far  as  they  are  applied  to  a  wider  range  of 
facts,  they  are  rendered  yet  more  false.  The  con- 
cept as  an  individual  thought  may  correspond  to 
an  individual  objective  fact.  But  to  say  that 
there  is  such  a  fact  in  the  world  beyond  our  con- 
sciousness is  to  make  a  theory  for  which  no  evi- 
dence can  be  discovered.  The  most  that  it  is 
legitimate  to  say  is  that  a  category,  as  a  mental 
fact,  can  be  used  in  the  cognition  of  just  such  a 
category. 

Concepts,  as  we  said,  have  been  held  in  honour 
by  many  of  the  great  philosophers,  but  their 
claim  to  this  honour  cannot  be  established.  They 
were  raised  to  the  high  eminence  they  occupy  by 
Socrates  and  his  disciples;  but  the  investigation 
of  their  origin  and  their  constitution  proves  their 
inadequacy  to  the  function  assigned  them.  Their 
sway  is  only  an  episode  in  the  development  of 
knowledge.  The  faith  in  universals  and  laws 
of  nature  must  be  put  aside  with  many  another  of 
man's  primitive  beliefs. 

24.  Even  were  the  category  supposed  to  have 
another  origin  than  that  indicated  above,  it  would 
not  necessarily  follow  that  it  gives  knowledge. 
Even  were  it  given  a  priori,  independently  of  sen- 
sibility, it  would  not  of  necessity  give  truth.  We 
should  still  be  obliged  to  ask  concerning  it,  Does 


142  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

it  resemble  this  sensation  or  that  idea  to  which 
it  is  applied?  The  disparateness  would  be  glar- 
ing, whatever  the  origin  of  the  category.  Kant 
may  be  appealed  to  as  teaching  that  categories 
due  to  the  spontaneity  of  the  understanding  do 
not  necessarily  have  any  correspondence  with 
things  in  themselves.  At  the  same  time,  the 
search  for  the  empirical  source  of  the  categories 
has  served  to  make  clearer  the  meaning  of  this 
lack  of  correspondence.  It  brings  to  light  the  real 
content  of  the  category  and  enables  us  to  estimate 
more  justly  its  value  as  a  copy  of  other  objects. 

25.  The  above  criticism  has  been  directed  to 
the  claim  of  concepts  and  categories  to  represent 
supposed  objective  realities.  Other  lines  of  criti- 
cism might  have  been  followed.  Mr.  Bradley,  in 
his  work,  Appearance  and  Reality,  has  criticised 
the  categories  in  respect  of  their  content,  and,  as 
the  result  of  his  work,  has  shown  the  contradic- 
tions which  each  contains  within  itself :  "  unity  in 
diversity "  is  an  instance  of  such  contradictory 
conceptions.  The  importance  of  criticism  of  this 
kind  is  great.  Yet  whatever  contradiction  may 
be  ultimately  involved  in  some  of  our  concepts,  it 
has  not  been  the  special  aim  of  this  work  to  point 
it  out ;  the  aim  has  been  to  determine  what  sense 
the  categories  and  other  concepts  do  actually  pos- 


THE  COGNITIVE   VALUE  OF  CONCEPTS    143 

sess  for  the  mind,  and  then  to  decide  whether 
they  are  correspondent  with,  or  cognitive  of,  the 
actual  facts  present  to  us. 

26.  It  is  not  unimportant  to  consider  the  bear- 
ing of  the  conclusions  that  have  been  reached  on 
doctrines  that  have  been  widely  prevalent  regard- 
ing the  necessities  of  thought.  Our  thinking  is 
said  to  be  dominated  by  the  so-called  primary 
laws  of  thought,  —  the  laws  of  identity,  non-con- 
tradiction, and  excluded  middle.  These  may 
indeed  be,  and  have  often  been,  interpreted  as 
maxims  that  guide  our  subjective  thinking;  thus, 
the  law  of  identity  is  said  to  teach  that  we 
should  keep  to  one  signification  for  a  concept 
through  all  our  treatment  of  it.  Yet  it  is  evi- 
dent that  the  maxims  are  not  merely  subjective ; 
if  thought  agrees  with  things,  the  enunciation  of 
such  laws  implies  that  they  are  laws  of  things, 
and  thus  they  regain  that  ontological  significance 
which  they  had  for  Aristotle. 

When  they  are  used  in  this  objective  way,  they 
may  be  described  as  the  laws  of  the  category  of 
being  or  reality.  They  belong  to  one  distinct 
category,  and  tell  the  procedure  of  thought  when 
it  is  using  that  category.  But  thought  has  other 
categories,  and  each  category  has  its  own  laws. 
The  "primary  laws"  of  thought  are  not  the  only 


144  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

laws  of  thought ;  thought  has  many  laws.  Space 
is  a  conception  which  is  not  of  the  same  quality 
as  being,  and  it  presents  relations  and  laws  of  its 
own.  The  laws  of  geometry  are  laws  of  thought,  as 
much  as  the  law  of  non-contradiction.  Other  con- 
ceptions, such  as  substance  and  causality,  present 
other  laws.  The  laws  apply  only  as  the  category 
applies ;  its  limits  are  theirs. 

But,  it  may  be  objected,  these  laws  are  necessary. 
It  may  be  admitted  that  in  a  sense  they  are  neces- 
sary. If  we  use  the  category,  we  must  use  it  in 
a  certain  way.  If  we  think  that  a  thing  is,  we 
cannot  at  the  same  time  think  that  it  is  not.  Even 
so,  the  two  sides  of  a  triangle  must  be  thought  to 
be  together  greater  than  the  third  side;  they  can- 
not be  thought  to  be  less.  Yet  where  such  cate- 
gories are  irrelevant,  the  laws  have  no  cogency. 
Moreover,  the  idea  of  necessity  must  be  criticised. 
Whenever  it  is  used,  it  will  be  found  upon  investi- 
gation that  the  idea  of  causality  or  force  is  its  true 
significance.  When  we  speak  of  the  necessities  of 
thought,  we  are  associating  with  the  current  of  ideas 
this  somewhat  crude  category.  When  from  such 
so-called  necessities  the  extraneous  idea  of  force 
is  eliminated,  all  that  can  be  said  is  that  one  idea 
always  accompanies  or  follows  another.  If  this  is 
true  in  regard  to  deductions  from  concepts  or  ideas, 


THE  COGNITIVE   VALUE  OF  CONCEPTS    145 

it  is  yet  more  manifestly  true  in  regard  to  those 
judgments  in  which  different  ideas  are  combined. 
The  causal  judgment,  for  instance,  is  said  to  be 
necessary.  It  is  necessary  in  the  above  sense  if 
the  judgment  run,  every  effect  has  a  cause.  It 
may  also  be  necessary  if  it  take  the  form,  every 
change  has  a  cause;  for  there  may  be  present  the 
idea  of  something  to  be  changed,  and  thus  of 
something  which  binds  the  two  appearances  to- 
gether ;  or  there  may,  unawares,  be  carried  into  the 
very  idea  of  change  the  idea  of  force.  But  if  it 
is  said  that  every  phenomenon  must  have  a  cause, 
there  is  not  only  no  necessity  in  the  judgment ;  we 
have  found  reason  for  deciding  that,  in  many  cases, 
at  least,  it  has  no  claim  to  truth. 

27.  It  is  not  to  be  inferred  from  what  has  been 
said  that  concepts  have  no  function  at  all  in  the 
mental  life.  First  of  all,  they  are  of  great  utility. 
Long  before  Socrates  reflected  on  them  they  had 
proved  their  value  in  the  economy  of  life.  In 
the  ordinary  concept  certain  qualities  are  conjoined, 
and  one  of  them  occurring  to  the  mind  calls  up 
the  others  with  it.  The  sight  of  one  fruit  sug- 
gest edibility  and  pleasure ;  the  sight  of  another 
suggests  poison.  The  utilitarian  value  of  the  con- 
cept is  enhanced  by  its  character  of  universality; 
for,  though  the  fruit  now  seen  is  not  in  all  respects 


146  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

like  the  fruits  seen  on  previous  occasions,  it  yet 
awakens  the  general  idea,  and  edibility  is  inferred. 
This  ignoring  of  individual  peculiarities  may  be 
attended  by  disastrous  consequences,  but  this  only 
leads  to  a  revision  of  the  concept.  The  method  of 
thinking  in  general  ideas  has  the  great  advantage 
of  using  past  experience  for  present  guidance.  Con- 
duct ceases  to  deal  with  a  series  of  disconnected 
facts;  it  brings  life  under  general  rules.  The 
variety  of  the  world  is  reduced  for  practical  purposes 
to  simplicity. 

Again,  the  concept  is  of  value  in  the  search  for 
knowledge.  For  the  concept  tells  what  qualities 
are  found  together,  and  in  the  form  of  law  it  pre- 
sents the  coexistences  of  phenomena.  This  is 
not  knowledge,  but  it  is  an  indispensable  instru- 
ment of  knowledge.  It  is  better,  however,  to  post- 
pone the  further  study  of  the  way  in  which  the 
concept  ministers  to  knowledge,  till  we  have  deter- 
mined more  completely  wherein  knowledge  consists. 


CHAPTER  VI 

EMPIRICISM 

1.  When  we  studied  sensation,  we   found   that 
it   constitutes   to   a   very   large   extent,  to  say  the 
least,   the   materials   and   also    the    instruments   of 
knowledge.       The    investigation    of    concepts    has 
not   only   discredited    their    claim    to    be    in    any 
special   sense   cognitive ;    it    has   shown   that   they 
are    made     of     the    materials     yielded    by    sense- 
experience.     It   is   important   now  to  estimate  that 
theory   of  knowledge   which  has  professed  to  keep 
closer  to   sense-experience,    and   to   find   in   it   the 
source  of  all  that  goes  by  the  name   of   cognition. 

2.  For   empiricism   combats    the    transcendental 
theory   that    reason    is    an   independent   source   of 
cognition.       The   theory   that    there    are   a  priori 
principles  of  thought,  it  opposes  with  the  doctrine 
that    these    principles    so    far    as    they   have    any 
existence   are   products   of    sense-experience    under 
the  laws  of  association.     Nihil  est  in  intellects,  quod 
non  prius  fuerit  in  sensu. 

The  theory  in  its  modern  form  attempts  to  give  a 
147 


148  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

natural  history  of  the  mind.  It  begins  with  the 
simplest  constituents  of  consciousness,  and  traces 
their  combinations.  Its  point  of  view  resembles 
that  of  the  atomic  theory  :  as  the  atoms  are  the 
ultimate  constituents  of  the  physical  world, 
sensations  are  the  ultimate  constituents  of  the 
mental  world ;  and  as  atoms  are  conjoined  into 
systems  and  make  the  physical  universe,  so  sen- 
sations are  joined  or  associated  together  to  make 
the  system  of  consciousness.  The  revived  atomic 
theory  seemed  to  furnish  to  the  modern  world 
the  model  of  scientific  explanation,  and  it  was 
natural  that  its  method  should  be  applied  in  the 
study  of  the  mind.  Locke  was,  therefore,  working 
in  the  spirit  of  the  science  of  his  time  when  he 
traced  the  development  of  the  mind  from  simple 
ideas.  Hume  expressly  announces  that  his 
Treatise  is  "an  attempt  to  introduce  the  experi- 
mental method  of  reasoning  into  moral  subjects," 
and  his  procedure  shows  that  he  has  in  mind,  not 
only  the  experimental  method,  but  also  the  pre- 
suppositions of  the  science  in  vogue.  In  more 
recent  times  the  theory  of  empiricism  has  under- 
gone certain  modifications.  One  influence  which 
has  profoundly  affected  it  is  that  exerted  by  modern 
biology.  This  science  finds  each  member  in  the 
complex  organism  developed  for  its  utility ; 


EMPIRICISM  149 

and  thus  there  is  a  new  light  thrown  on  the 
history  of  living  growths.  In  this  light  the 
history  of  the  mind  has  been  eagerly  re-read,  and 
the  aim  of  the  empiricist  is  now  to  show  that  each 
faculty  is  useful,  or,  in  the  evolutionary  sense, 
teleological.  While  this  interpretation  of  the 
facts  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  atomic  theory 
of  mind,  any  more  than  the  doctrine  of  evolution 
is  inconsistent  with  the  atomic  theory  of  matter, 
recent  psychology  tends  to  some  degree  to  bring 
the  atomic  theory  of  mind  into  discredit ;  for  it 
does  not  regard  complex  ideas  as  combinations 
of  atomic  states  of  consciousness ;  and  it  finds 
that  the  principle  of  association,  which  Hume 
declared  to  be  the  law  of  gravitation  in  the  sphere 
of  ideas,  does  not  fully  account  for  the  coming 
and  going  of  ideas  in  the  mind.  Yet,  notwith- 
standing such  modifications  of  its  earlier  doctrine, 
empiricism  has  never  been  turned  aside  from  the 
purpose  to  trace  the  natural  history  of  mind  as  a 
continuous  growth  from  the  simplest  germs  of 
sense-experience. 

3.  Yet,  while  the  historical  method  is  so  fruit- 
ful in  epistemology,  and  while  it  was  employed 
by  the  empiricists  long  before  evolution  was  the 
watchword  of  all  the  schools,  it  must  be  charged 
against  empiricism  that  it  has  failed  to  deal 


150  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

rightly  with  the  epistemological  problem.  For 
this  failure  the  historical  method  is  itself  partly 
responsible.  When  attention  is  centred  on  the 
work  of  tracing  the  evolution  of  the  mind,  the 
question,  how  mental  states  are  related  as  cognitions 
to  things  independent  of  the  mind,  is  more  likely 
to  be  neglected.  Empiricism  has  tried  to  reach 
an  analysis  of  the  human  mind  rather  than  a 
theory  of  knowledge.  There  is  a  further  reason 
for  the  neglect  of  epistemology  by  the  empiricist. 
The  mind  has  been  treated  as  a  separate  individual 
thing  with  its  own  private,  subjective  states  ;  and 
since  these  states  are  thus  subjective,  they  have  no 
cognitive  reference  to  any  object.  This  is  the  point 
of  view  taken  by  Hume  when  he  says  that  im- 
pressions arise  from  unknown  causes  ;  we  can  only 
watch  these  impressions  as  they  range  themselves 
into  a  system  without  hoping  to  find  anything 
cognitive  in  them.  J.  S.  Mill  teaches  that  we 
have  to  do  simply  with  sensations  and  their 
order  ;  matter  is  the  possibility  of  sensation.  Mr. 
Spencer1  has  also  endeavoured  to  show  that  while 
all  other  modes  of  consciousness  are  derivable 
from  experiences  of  force,  these  experiences  are 
the  subjective  correlative  of  an  unknowable  power. 
It  seems  necessary  to  the  empiricist  to  give  up  the 

1  First  Principles,  §§  18,  60. 


EMPIRICISM  151 

hope  of  finding  any  consonance  between  our  ideas 
and  possible  things,  and,  therefore,  he  neglects  the 
further  problems  of  epistemology. 

4.  Agnosticism    will   be    considered    later.       It 
must,  however,  be  said  here  that  it  is  no  necessary 
accompaniment    of    empiricism,    though   they   have 
been  so  often  allied.     A  gnostic  theory  might   be 
reared  on  empirical  foundations.       It    is,  therefore, 
incumbent  on  us   to  inquire  whether   the   work   of 
empiricism  has   resulted    in    an    indication   of    the 
way  in  which  knowledge  is  to  be  attained. 

5.  It  is   not   necessary  to   enumerate    again   the 
advantages    of     the    historical    method    to    which 
empiricism   has   been    so   faithful,    or   the    miscon- 
ceptions which  are  apt  to  attend  upon  its  employ- 
ment.    Nor  is   it   necessary  to   do   more   than   call 
attention  to  the  great  service   done   by  empiricism 
in  the  emphasis  it  has   laid   upon    sensation.     The 
philosophers  of  the  transcendental    schools,  ancient 
and  modern,  have  poured  contempt  upon   sensation 
and  exalted  reason.    In  this  disparagement  of  sensa- 
tion they  have  blinded  themselves  to  facts.    It  is  the 
merit  of  the  empiricists  to  have  been  faithful  to  this 
order  of  facts,  and  to  have  recognized  its  importance 
in  the  constitution  of  mind,  and  thus  to  have  pre- 
pared the  way  for  a  theory  of  knowledge  in  more  com- 
plete accord  with  the  actual  conditions  of  experience. 


I$2  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

6.  The  question  as  to  the  meaning  and  function 
of  universals  in  the  theories  of  the  empiricists  is  one 
of  importance,  and  one  which  cannot  be  answered 
by  any  sweeping  statements.  There  has  not  been 
agreement  in  the  school  as  to  the  presence  of  gen- 
eral concepts  in  the  mind.  Locke,  who  may  be 
regarded  as  the  founder  of  the  modern  empirical 
school,  accepted  abstract  ideas  as  mental  facts, 
and  proceeded  to  inquire  into  their  nature  and 
origin.  In  his  account  of  them  he  has  in  view 
now  one  and  now  another  kind  of  abstraction. 
He  says  that  the  mind  makes  the  "  particular  ideas 
derived  from  particular  objects  to  become  gen- 
eral," by  separating  them  from  "  all  other  ex- 
istences, and  the  circumstances  of  real  existences, 
as  time,  place,  or  any  other  concomitant  ideas."1 
But,  while  Locke  gives  this  account  of  abstrac- 
tion, there  is  a  well-known  passage  in  which  he 
speaks  of  an  abstraction  of  another  order.  "  Does 
it  not  require,"  he  asks,  "some  pains  and  skill 
to  form  the  general  idea  of  a  triangle  ;  .  .  .  for  it 
must  be  neither  oblique  nor  rectangle,  neither 
equilateral,  equicrural,  nor  scalenon,  but  all  and 
none  of  these  at  once  ?  In  effect,  it  is  something 
imperfect  that  cannot  exist,  an  idea  wherein  some 
parts  of  several  different  and  inconsistent  ideas 
1  Essay,  Bk.  II,  Chap.  XI,  §  9. 


EMPIRICISM  153 

are  put  together." 1  Locke  seems  here  to  be  de- 
scribing, though  in  an  awkward  enough  way, 
those  ideas  which  are  the  resultants  of  many 
particular  perceptions.  It  is  to  be  added  that 
Locke  likewise  recognizes  the  categories,  such  as 
space,  time,  substance,  cause.  Probably  the  clearest 
evidence  of  this  is  found  in  his  treatment  of  sub- 
stance. The  mind  is,  he  explains,  furnished  with 
a  great  number  of  simple  ideas,  conveyed  in  by 
the  senses,  or  by  reflection  on  its  own  operations  •, 
it  sees,  moreover,  that  certain  numbers  of  these  go 
constantly  together,  and  not  imagining  how  these 
simple  ideas  can  subsist  by  themselves,  it  sup- 
poses some  substratum  ;  this  substratum  is  called 
substance.  At  the  same  time,  substance,  while 
an  individual  mental  entity,  is  said  not  to  be  a 
"  clear  or  distinct  idea."  Locke  does  not  pursue 
his  analysis  of  the  conception  further. 

Berkeley  writes  sometimes  as  an  empiricist, 
and  sometimes  as  a  transcendentalist.  In  his 
Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  he  says  that  he 
can  abstract  in  the  sense  of  separating  one  part 
of  an  image  from  another  by  the  exercise  of  his 
imagination,  or  he  can  consider  the  qualities  or  re- 
lations of  things  without  attending  to  other  quali- 
ties which  are  in  real  existence  inseparable  from 
1  Essay,  Bk.  IV,  Chap.  VII,  §  9. 


154  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

them,  as  when  a  man  considers  a  figure  merely  as 
triangular  without  attending  to  the  particular 
qualities  of  the  angles  or  relations  of  the  sides. 
But  a  general  idea  of  a  triangle  like  that  which 
Locke  demanded  is  to  him  quite  unintelligible. 

But  Berkeley  also  finds  that  the  mind  has  "no- 
tions" of  things  which  cannot  be  presented  as 
sense-images.  Again,  he  speaks  of  the  soul  as  a 
substance  ;  and,  in  doing  so,  he  clearly  wishes  to 
distinguish  substance  from  the  mere  association  of 
conscious  states.  In  Siris,  he  shows  his  sympathy 
with  the  Platonic  doctrine  of  ideas.  So  that,  while 
sometimes  he  seems  to  promise  a  development  of 
the  empirical  method  of  Locke,  at  other  times  he 
proves  to  be  moving  in  a  very  different  direction. 

Hume  carried  out  the  empirical  method  of  criti- 
cism in  a  more  consistent  and  thoroughgoing  fash- 
ion. Berkeley's  doctrine,  that  general  ideas  are 
nothing  but  particular  ones  which  recall  upon 
occasion  other  individuals,  is,  Hume  says,  "  one  of 
the  greatest  and  most  valuable  discoveries  that 
has  been  made  of  late  years  in  the  republic  of 
letters."  Abstract  ideas  are,  therefore,  particular 
ideas  which  are  "  general  in  their  representation  "  ; 
they  are  particular  ideas  which  happen  to  have 
many  associates.  Hume  applies  his  principles  to 
the  categories,  and  finds  that  they  do  not  exist 


EMPIRICISM  155 

save  as  particular  ideas,  or  particular  ideas  viewed 
in  a  certain  aspect.  Yet  it  is  necessary  again  to 
call  attention  to  the  fact  that  when  he  has  to  ex- 
plain causality  he  does  not  resolve  the  whole  idea 
into  succession,  but  accounts  for  the  causal  nexus 
or  the  feeling  of  necessity  as  a  new  impression. 

Hume  thus  gave  clear  and  adequate  expression 
to  the  atomic  theory  of  consciousness.  After 
Hume,  empiricists  developed  the  same  theory,  giv- 
ing it  a  still  more  mechanical  form.  No  category 
appears,  though  but  as  a  new  impression.  There 
are  in  the  mind  only  impressions  of  sense,  and 
ideas  which  are  copies  of  these  impressions.  It  is 
a  natural  corollary  to  this  theory,  and  illustrates 
it,  to  say  that  the  imagination  has  no  creative 
power,  but  can  only  give  a  new  form  or  a  new 
order  to  the  materials  provided  by  sense.  It  can 
thus  be  seen  that,  in  the  matter  of  concepts,  the 
empiricists  have  not  explained  them,  but  have  ex- 
plained them  away. 

It  is  interesting  to  observe  that  in  more  recent 
empiricism  there  is  a  tendency  to  recognize  fully 
the  existence  of  concepts  as  distinct  from  particular 
sensations.  Huxley,1  though  an  adherent  of  the 
empirical  school,  censured  Hume  for  his  denial 
of  the  existence  of  relations.  Whether  or  not  the 

1  Hume,  p.  69. 


156  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

criticism  of  Hume  is  entirely  justified,  the  signifi- 
cance of  Huxley's  position  is  great.  In  this  con- 
nection may  be  quoted  the  testimony  of  Professor 
James  as  a  representative  of  that  modern  psy- 
chology which  has  so  largely  assumed  in  the  em- 
piricists' spirit  the  task  of  tracing  the  genesis  of 
the  mental  faculties.  He  denies  that  there  is  a 
distinct  faculty,  to  answer  to  the  name  reason, 
which  creates  categories ;  yet  he  maintains  that 
categories  exist  as  feelings :  they  are  feelings 
of  relation.  "As  surely,"  he  says,  "as  relations 
exist  in  rerum  natura,  so  surely  do  feelings  exist 
to  which  these  relations  are  known." 

This  increasing  agreement  of  empiricists  and 
transcendentalists  is  a  hopeful  sign  of  the  times, 
inasmuch  as  it  shows  that  apparently  irreconcilable 
differences  of  opinion  yield  to  the  harmonizing 
influence  of  more  careful  investigation.  But  great 
caution  must  be  shown  in  accepting  the  general 
statement  of  Professor  James  that  the  "  feelings  of 
relation  "  are  cognitive.  We  have  seen  that  while 
categories  are  cognitive  of  categories,  their  cogni- 
tive function  extends  no  further. 

7.  It  has  been  important  to  consider  the  dis- 
position shown  by  empiricists  to  reject  concepts 
and  categories  as  independent  mental  facts;  for  the 
hope  is  natural  that,  though  they  may  have  been 


EMPIRICISM  157 

untrue  to  psychological  facts  in  this  denial  of  the 
existence  of  concepts,  they  will  prove  to  be  the  more 
sure  to  grasp  the  true  method  of  knowledge.  But 
when  we  turn  to  the  legacy  of  method  left  by  this 
older  empiricism,  we  find  that  it  is  disappointing. 
We  find  only  the  method  of  universals  in  disguise. 

8.  The  empirical  doctrine  of  the  method  of 
knowledge  is  expressed  in  the  theory  of  the  asso- 
ciation of  ideas. 

To  understand  aright  the  value  of  this  theory 
of  knowledge,  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish  clearly 
between  the  fact  of  association  and  the  recognition 
of  the  association.  A  man  may  find  himself  think- 
ing of  some  social  gathering  at  which  he  was 
present,  and  may  wonder  why  his  thoughts  hap- 
pened to  take  that  particular  direction.  After  a 
time  he  may  discover  that  it  was  some  odour  that 
greeted  his  nostrils  which  furnished  the  associative 
link.  In  such  a  case,  there  was  association  before 
and  apart  from  any  recognition  of  association.  The 
principle  of  association  appears  as  the  great  princi- 
ple in  the  sequence  of  our  conscious  states  ;  yet  the 
associative  links  may  be  hidden  from  the  unreflect- 
ing consciousness.  But  the  series  of  ideas  whose 
connection  is  not  made  intelligible  for  conscious- 
ness, is  not,  according  to  empiricism,  knowledge. 
Knowledge  appears  when  the  mind  recognizes  the 


158  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

association  or  consciously  joins  the  two  ideas  to- 
gether. The  odour  is  one  of  a  number  of  images 
with  which  it  is  apprehended  as  "  coexisting  "  ;  or, 
it  is  perceived  to  be  "  like  "  other  odours ;  or,  it  is 
connected  with  a  flower  as  its  "cause."  Associa- 
tion has  thus  ceased  to  be  a  mere  fact ;  it  denotes 
a  perceived  relation. 

This  is  not  less  clear  when  we  turn  to  the  scien- 
tific ideal  presented  by  the  associationalist,  which 
is  the  statement  of  the  facts  of  the  world  in  terms 
of  coexistence  and  sequence.  J.  S.  Mill,  whose 
Logic  may  be  regarded  as  giving  the  logic  of  asso- 
ciationalism,  finds  that  such  a  presentation  is  the 
aim  of  induction.  He  assigns  an  independent  place 
in  science  to  the  laws  which  express  coexistence 
among  phenomena.  At  the  same  time,  he  devotes 
his  chief  attention  to  the  formulation  of  the  methods 
for  the  discovery  of  causes,  for  the  notion  of  cause 
is  the  "  root  of  the  whole  theory  of  induction  " ;  and 
since,  on  his  analysis,  cause  resolves  itself  into  se- 
quence, the  great  object  of  inductive  science  is  the 
statement  of  the  phenomena  of  the  universe  in  terms 
of  invariable  sequence.  It  is  obvious  from  this  that 
science  is  not  satisfied  with  the  simple  fact  that 
ideas  occur  ;  its  ideal,  even  as  expressed  by  asso- 
ciationalists,  is  to  present  the  ideas  in  certain 
perceived  relations. 


EMPIRICISM  159 

9.  It  is  evident  that,  in  proportion  as  attention 
is  given  to  these  relations,  there  is  a  return  to  the 
old  doctrine  of  concepts  or  categories.  Coexist- 
ence is  simply  another  name  for  the  category  of 
space.  Succession  is  the  time-relation.  Nor  is  it 
to  be  supposed  that  the  empiricist  has  escaped  the 
necessity  of  using  the  categories  in  his  presentation 
of  his  propositions.  Along  with  the  ideas  that  are 
associated  and  distinct  from  them  is  the  idea  of 
their  relation.  Ideas  might  follow  ideas  without 
any  thought  of  their  succession  ;  that  thought  is 
not  given  immediately  in  them  ;  and  when  they 
are  thought  to  form  a  succession,  this  new  idea  has 
joined  itself  to  them.  In  the  same  way  coexistence 
may  be  shown  to  be  a  new  idea.  The  relation  of 
similarity,  if  it  is  added  to  the  principles  of  asso- 
ciation, is  likewise  a  case  in  which  a  new  idea  is 
joined  to  the  related  ideas.  Hume,  indeed,  says 
that  the  relation  of  resemblance  is  discoverable  at 
first  sight,  and  falls  more  properly  "  under  the  prov- 
ince of  intuition  than  demonstration.  When  any 
objects  resemble  each  other,  the  resemblance  will  at 
first  strike  the  eye,  or  rather  the  mind."  But  two 
objects  which  we  learn  to  pronounce  similar  may  be 
present  to  the  mind  long  before  the  likeness  is  rec- 
ognized. In  such  cases,  when  a  resemblance  which 
has  long  been  overlooked  is  appreciated  after  pro- 


160  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

tracted  contemplation,  the  newness  of  the  idea  of 
similarity  is  readily  perceived. 

Thus  the  empiricist  is  really  maintaining  the  doc- 
trine of  categories  which  he  believed  he  had  over- 
thrown. For  him,  as  for  the  transcendentalist,  the 
cognitive  ideas  are  universals. 

10.  Yet,  as  used  by  the  empiricist,  they  prove  to 
have  no  cognitive  function.    So  far,  indeed,  as  their 
existence  has  been  denied,  no  such  function   could 
be  sought  for  them.    Were  it  recognized,  they  could 
be  cognitive  only  in  relation  to  what  is  independent 
of  the  ideas  they  associate,  or  in  relation  to  these 
ideas  themselves.     The  possibility  of  knowledge  on 
either  of  these  suppositions  has  been   already  con- 
sidered.     In  the   former   case  we   should  have  to 
affirm  that  the  peculiar  psychological  product  which 
these  principles  of  association  represent  has  its  exact 
counterpart  in  the  objective  world,  on  which  view 
knowledge  of  the  particulars  associated  is  still  want- 
ing ;  in  the  latter  case,  we  are  asked  to  take,  as  cog- 
nitive  of  the   ideas,  an  idea  that  is  external  and 
strange  to  them. 

11.  It  may,  however,  be  urged  that  in  this  inter- 
pretation of  empiricism   the   emphasis  falls   in   the 
wrong  place,  and  that,  whether  or  not   these   uni- 
versals are  actual  ideas  in  the  mind,  the   stress   is 
to  be  laid  on  the  particular  concrete   ideas  which 


EMPIRICISM  l6l 

are  associated  together ;  the  universal  is  a  mere 
sign  of  the  connection.  This  way  of  expounding 
empiricism  is  legitimate,  and  we  have,  therefore,  to 
inquire  whether  the  method  thus  left  is  the  method 
of  truth.  Does  the  conjoining  of  ideas  give  us  the 
truth  of  the  ideas  ? 

It  is  the  characteristic  of  association  that  it  is 
utterly  restless.  If  knowledge  of  one  thing  is  sought, 
there  is  straightway  reference  to  something  else.  If 
a  is  to  be  known,  b  is  called  up  ;  if  now  the  pur- 
pose is  to  know  6,  c  is  called  up.  If  this  tree  is 
to  be  known,  other  trees,  like  and  unlike,  are 
brought  to  mind  ;  or  the  ideas  of  soil  and  sun- 
shine and  other  things  usually  designated  causes  of 
the  tree's  existence.  When  I  wish  to  know  my 
neighbour's  happiness,  association  refers  me  to  the 
good  news  he  has  heard  ;  if  now  I  think  to  under- 
stand his  hearing  of  this  news,  I  am  referred  to  the 
kind  heart  of  his  friend.  When  the  mind  is  thus 
transferred  from  one  point  to  another,  its  desire  for 
knowledge  is  mocked.  Knowledge  of  the  soil  and 
sunshine  and  all  the  forces  which  have  "entered 
into  "  the  tree  is  not  knowledge  of  the  tree  itself. 
Knowledge  of  his  friend's  kind  heart  is  not  know- 
ledge of  the  man's  hearing  of  good  news,  and  know- 
ledge of  this  latter  fact  is  not  knowledge  of  the 
happiness  which  followed  it.  It  can  thus  be  seen 


162  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

how  complete  is  the  failure  of  the  common  attempt 
to  know  things  by  reference  to  their  causes.  The 
cause  is  different  from  the  effect.  A  metaphysical 
assertion  of  their  identity  is  foreign  to  a  consistent 
empiricism,  but,  even  should  it  be  made,  it  should 
not  be  allowed  to  blind  us  to  their  manifest  differ- 
ences. One  cannot,  therefore,  be  substituted  for  the 
other,  nor  can  an  idea  which  is  a  copy  of  one  be  a 
copy  of  the  other.  If  causality  is  the  root  of  the 
whole  theory  of  induction,  it  must  be  concluded 
that  induction  is  not  the  method  of  absolute  truth. 
12.  It  can  now  be  seen  that  the  associationalist 
fails,  in  certain  respects  even  more  than  those 
who  sought  the  one  in  the  many,  to  gain  abso- 
lute knowledge.  For  those  who  explained  the 
particular  by  reference  to  a  universal  embodied  in 
it  were  more  faithful  to  the  nature  of  thought  as 
interpretation ;  they  seemed  to  be  passing  to  the 
deeper  significance  of  the  thing  itself.  The  em- 
piricist always  conducts  from  the  thing  to  be  known 
to  something  other  than  it ;  even  when  he  presents 
a  universal,  in  the  sense  of  a  particular  idea  that 
has  many  associates,  this  idea  is  never  offered  as 
the  inner  truth  of  its  associates,  but  as  an  idea  that 
has  an  external  connection  with  them.  Empiri- 
cism has  endeavoured  to  hold  to  the  view  that 
thought  is  synthetic  in  its  function. 


EMPIRICISM  163 

13.  It  need  not  be  said  that  it  does  not   alter 
the  nature   of   this   method   to   make  research   mi- 
croscopic.    The  minuteness   of   the   parts  that  are 
associated   with   others    as    their    concomitants    or 
antecedents  does  not  mitigate   the   gravity   of  the 
associationalist  fallacy. 

14.  It  is  not  meant  that  association  is  without 
value  in  the  mental  life,  and  can  be  dispensed  with. 
It   is   association,   in   some   sense,   that   guides   the 
movements  of  the  mind;   it  is,  therefore,  involved 
in  all  perception  of  things  that  is  not  given  immedi- 
ately in  the  data  of  the  senses.     The  empiricist  has, 
therefore,    done   great   service   in   laying    emphasis 
upon  association,  and  in  seeking  to  reduce  its  pro- 
cesses to  simplicity.     Yet,  while  association  is  thus 
indispensable  to  cognition,  the  reference  from  one 
thing  to  another  which  it  provides  is  not  to  be  con- 
fused with  that  relation  of  the  mind  to  the  things 
which  constitutes  truth. 

15.  It  is  appropriate  at  this  point  to  consider  an 
assertion  that  is  sometimes  made  by  scientific  men. 
It  is  claimed  that  the  chief  end   of   science   is  to 
find  facts.      On  this  view,  science  does   not,  after 
all,  make  the  discovery  of  laws  its  chief  function; 
laws  have  their  great  importance  only  because  they 
are  convenient  in  the  grouping  of  facts,  or  because 
they  lead  the   way   to   new  facts.      Science   seeks 


164  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

laws  for  the  sake  of  facts,  not   facts  for  the   sake 
of  laws. 

In  dealing  with  this  assertion,  it  is  necessary  to 
determine  what  is  meant  by  facts.  It  is  possible 
that  the  reference  is  to  facts  of  sensation.  On 
this  supposition,  the  law  has  value  as  it  indicates 
what  sensations  are  to  be  associated;  the  law  of 
gravitation,  for  instance,  indicates  to  us  that, 
should  two  clusters  of  colours  and  touch-sensations 
be  presented  to  the  mind,  their  future  mode  of 
presentation  in  a  possible  conscious  experience  can 
be  determined.  Science  would  thus  take  for  its 
basis  the  philosophy  of  Berkeley ;  or  it  would  say 
that,  while  there  may  be  an  unknown  order  of 
facts  behind  our  sense-experience,  sensations  are 
all  that  we  have  to  do  with.  It  is  clear  that  we 
have  here  just  one  of  the  varieties  of  empiricism 
already  considered.  It  is  that  form  of  the  doc- 
trine of  association  in  which  the  emphasis  is  put 
on  the  ideas  rather  than  on  the  principle  of  their 
association.  It  may  again  be  pointed  out  that 
there  is  still  association,  or  the  reference  from  one 
thing  to  another.  The  scientific  man  does  not 
hold  to  the  particular  sensation  in  itself,  but  con- 
siders it  in  its  relation  to  others.  It  may  be  added 
that  the  fact,  that  science  is,  in  an  increasing  de- 
gree, mathematical,  is  an  evidence  that  sense-data 


EMPIRICISM  165 

are  considered  in  their  relations.  Thus  the  claim 
that  science  deals  with  facts  becomes,  when  sensa- 
tions are  taken  as  the  facts,  discredited.  Each 
fact  when  it  presents  itself  proves  under  scientific 
methods  elusive,  and  gives  place  to  something 
else. 

But  it  is  probable  that  the  scientist  means  some- 
thing different  when  he  speaks  of  facts  as  distin- 
guished from  laws.  His  protest  is  against  the 
general  statement  of  laws  in  abstraction  from  in- 
dividual things.  He  wishes  to  see  how  the  laws 
are  manifested  in  particular  cases.  The  concrete 
fact  is  a  bundle  of  laws,  and  the  aim  of  knowledge 
is  to  analyze  this  combination,  determine  what 
laws  are  represented  in  it,  and  see  how  they 
modify  each  other's  action.  It  is  obvious  that  in 
this  case  science  is  still  laying  the  stress  upon 
laws.  The  only  question  that  needs  to  be  asked 
is,  In  what  sense  is  the  term  law  used?  If  it  is 
not  used  in  the  empirical  sense  of  an  association 
of  sense-experiences,  it  must  be  used  to  designate 
the  forces  back  of  sense-experience.  The  law  is 
the  general  concept  of  the  force,  and  the  concrete 
fact  is  explained  by  a  number  of  concepts.  It  is 
not  necessary  to  repeat  the  criticisms  already 
passed  upon  such  views  as  this.  It  has  become 
clear  that  while  science  is  to  be  commended  for  its 


166  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

effort  to  keep  close  to  the  concrete,  while  its  in- 
stinct for  facts  is  a  true  instinct,  it  has  not  yet 
shown  itself  able  to  transcend  the  traditional  con- 
ception of  knowledge.  The  concrete  is  reality, 
and  the  true  method  of  knowledge  must  enable 
us  to  reach  the  concrete  ;  it  must  not  conduct  us 
back  to  the  universals  which  have  already  proved 
so  disappointing. 


CHAPTER  VII 

KNOWLEDGE  BY   SYMPATHETIC   IMITATION 

1.  That  in  a  man's  knowledge  of  other  persons 
and  things  there  should  be  reproduced  in  the 
mind,  by  copy  or  otherwise,  that  which  consti- 
tutes objects,  is  the  theory  with  which  we  set  out. 
The  methods  of  knowledge  which  have  been  passed 
in  review  have  shown  themselves  unable  to  meet 
the  requirements  of  such  an  ideal  as  the  theory 
holds  up.  It  is  not  to  be  inferred  that  the  demand 
for  knowledge  of  this  kind  is  illegitimate.  It  is 
now  to  be  shown  that  there  is  among  our  familiar 
experiences  a  method  of  relating  the  mind  to  the 
objective  reality  which  can  satisfy  the  demands  of 
the  cognitive  ideal.  In  the  cases  in  which  con- 
scious experience  is  the  object  to  be  known,  there 
may  be  in  the  mind  of  the  knower  a  conscious 
experience  like  it.  We  can  know  our  fellow-men 
through  sympathy ;  we  can  by  this  faculty  re- 
produce that  which  constitutes  their  conscious 
existence. 

167 


1 68  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

Let  it  be  observed  that  it  is  the  knowledge  of 
other  persons  and  things  with  which  we  are  at 
present  concerned.  There  are  also  certain  phases 
of  self-knowledge  which  are  now  to  be  accounted 
for ;  as,  for  instance,  the  knowledge  by  the  Ego  of 
its  past  states.  But  the  question  how  the  Ego 
knows  itself  in  each  moment  of  its  conscious  experi- 
ence needs  separate  consideration  ;  for  such  know- 
ledge sympathy  is  not  an  indispensable  requisite. 

2.  Imitation  is  a  faculty  found  in  a  number  of 
the  lower  animals.  Let  the  leader  of  a  flock  of 
sheep  leap  at  a  certain  place,  the  leap  will  be 
repeated  by  the  whole  procession.  Parrots  show  a 
remarkable  aptitude  for  imitating  sounds,  whistling, 
laughing,  crying,  and  even  uttering  articulate  words. 
Dogs  have  been  thought  to  learn  modes  of  hunting 
by  imitation.  Monkeys  are  known  to  be  specially 
clever  imitators.  An  animal  may  even  have  its 
instincts  modified  by  imitation.  Stories  are  told 
of  dogs  which  were  brought  up  by  cats  and  learned 
the  habits  of  their  foster-parents ;  one  dog  which 
had  been  suckled  by  a  cat  showed  fear  of  rain  and 
wet  places,  and  used  to  watch  a  mouse-hole  for 
hours  together.1 

Yet  while  these  cases  of  imitation  are  not  without 
significance  in  the  present  inquiry,  it  is  man  that 

1  Vide  Romanes,  Mental  Evolution  in  Animals,  Chap.  XIV. 


KNOWLEDGE  BY  SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION    169 

is,  as  Aristotle  observed,  the  most  imitative  of 
animals.  The  faculty  is  manifested  in  children 
at  a  very  early  age.  In  their  second  year,  or 
even  earlier,  they  show  a  very  marked  disposition 
to  copy  the  actions  of  those  about  them.  The 
child  laughs  when  others  around  it  are  laughing, 
and  it  cries  when  they  are  weeping.  Its  attempts 
to  speak  are  imitations  of  the  sounds  it  hears,  and 
if  articulate  words  are  often  too  hard  for  it,  it 
renders  more  successfully  the  sounds  of  animals, 
as  the  lowing  of  the  cow  or  the  barking  of  the 
dog.  It  assumes  the  attitudes  of  any  one  it  is 
watching;  it  goes  through  the  form  of  smoking; 
or  when  some  one  laces  and  cleans  his  shoes  in 
its  presence,  it  tries  to  execute  similar  motions. 

Nor  does  imitation  cease  with  the  period  of 
earliest  childhood.  The  "six-years  darling"  often 
shows  remarkable  dramatic  power,  acting  over 
again  what  he  has  seen  of  business,  or  of  wed- 
dings and  funerals. 

"  Filling  from  time  to  time  his  '  humorous  stage  ' 
With  all  the  persons,  down  to  palsied  Age, 
That  Life  brings  with  her  in  her  equipage ; 

As  if  his  whole  vocation 

Were  endless  imitation." 

As  life  advances  there  is  mucli  to  interfere  with 
the  free  exercise  of  the  faculty.  Yet  even  in  more 


1 70  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

mature  age  there  are  many  examples  of  spontaneous 
imitation  of  movements  and  gestures.  With  older 
persons,  as  with  children,  laughter  and  tears  are 
contagious.  A  cough  in  church  is  answered  by  a 
volley  of  coughs.  It  is  a  malicious  trick  to  yawn 
in  company :  a  corresponding  spasm  seizes  the 
neighbouring  jaws.  And  there  are  many  who  cannot 
help  catching  the  tricks  of  speech  and  manner  of 
those  with  whom  they  associate,  especially  if  these 
are  superiors  who  must  be  observed  closely. 

These  simpler  forms  of  external  imitation  may 
suffice  not  only  to  show  how  familiar  are  the  mani- 
festations of  this  faculty,  but  also  to  give  us  the 
clew  to  the  interpretation  of  the  general  principle 
of  imitation,  and  thus  to  render  intelligible  those 
sympathies  which  are  not  necessarily  shown  in 
visible  movements,  yet  are  of  such  profound  sig- 
nificance in  the  search  for  the  method  of  know- 
ledge. 

3.  It  is  obvious,  first  of  all,  that  in  the  imitation 
there  is  an  association  of  ideas  or  mental  processes. 
The  child  sees  an  action  and  then  makes  an  effort 
to  reproduce  it  by  using  certain  muscles  ;  the  visual 
image  and  the  muscular  feeling  are  two  entirely 
distinct  mental  states,  which  are  conjoined.  To 
take  another  instance,  the  hearing  of  a  word  leads 
to  the  speaking  of  it  by  an  association  of  the  two 


KNOWLEDGE  BY  SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION    171 

heterogeneous  mental  states,  —  a  sensation  of  hearing 
and  a  muscular  feeling. 

4.  It  is  also  evident  in  many  cases  that,  before 
the  imitation,  this  association  has  been  established. 
Imitation  depends  more  or  less  directly  upon  habit. 
The   child  who  moves  his  hand  on  seeing  another 
person's  hand  move  is   not   necessarily  associating 
the  visual  image  with  the  movement  image  for  the 
first  time.    His  past  experience  may  have  established 
the  association,  so  that  the  new  stimulus  only  calls 
up  associates  which  have  been   linked  before  with 
similar    stimuli.      We    cough   when   others   cough, 
because  with  the  sound  of  our  own  coughing  there 
has   been   associated    the    feeling    of    irritation    in 
throat  or  chest ;  then  when  we  hear  another  cough- 
ing  the   image   of    that    irritation    is   revived,   the 
associated  effort  to  get  relief  from  it  is  also  repro- 
duced,  and   thus   the   actual    coughing    process    is 
started. 

5.  Yet  it  is  of  great  moment  to  observe  that  the 
associations  are  often  modified  by  the  imagination. 
The  imagination  is  the  creative  plastic  power  which, 
when  the  materials  furnished  by  experience  are  pre- 
sented to  it,  causes  new  shapes  to  arise  from  them. 
The  child  copies  a  movement  which  is  new  to  it ; 
for  instance,  it  sees  its  father  brushing   his   shoes, 
and  then,  for  the  first  time  in  its  life,  goes  through 


172  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

the  motions  of  brushing  its  own.  It  is  true,  the 
materials  of  this  new  image  were  derived  from  ex- 
perience ;  the  child  had  used  its  hands  in  various 
ways,  and  knew  also  what  it  meant  to  reach  to 
its  feet  and  touch  them.  Yet  the  combination  of 
muscular  movements  which  was  imaged  before 
being  executed  was  new.  It  was  as  in  other  cases 
of  the  productive  imagination  :  the  materials  de- 
rived from  experience  were  modified  and  recast. 
Imitation,  therefore,  does  not  depend  merely  on 
habit.  It  uses  habit,  and,  again,  discards  it,  as 
service  is  best  rendered  to  its  own  peculiar  end. 
The  habitual  action  is  not  merely  habitual,  but 
is  allowed  its  course  as  a  means  to  an  end.  The 
aim  of  imitation  being  to  copy  the  object,  all  that 
goes  to  constitute  it  has  its  presence  determined  by 
that  which  constitutes  the  object.  Memory  and 
imagination  are  used,  as  need  be,  that  the  copy 
may  be  true. 

6.  The  fact  that  imitation  is  determined  by  the 
object,  or  gives  a  copy  of  the  object,  brings  into 
view  its  essential  function.  Imitation  is  a  mode 
of  perception  or  cognition.  It  can  be  seen  that  it 
is  not  the  perception  of  immediate  sensation,  for 
with  the  sensation  ideas  are  associated.  Imitation 
is  that  form  of  perception  in  which  the  mind 
interprets  what  is  given  in  sensation.  Its  per- 


KNOWLEDGE  BY  SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION    173 

ceptive  character  is  not  altered  by  the  fact  that  the 
imagination  is  called  into  play.  Perception  needs 
not  only  the  memory,  but  the  creative  imagination. 
For  perception  is  interpretation ;  and  the  memories 
of  the  past  do  not  in  themselves  suffice  for  a  ren- 
dering of  the  new  facts  of  experience. 

7.  The  presence  of  external  movement  in  the 
cases  of  imitation  that  have  been  considered  seems, 
at  first  sight,  to  adapt  itself  awkwardly  to  such  a 
view.  What  is  the  significance  of  these  move- 
ments, which  are  popularly  taken  for  the  important 
part  of  imitation? 

It  has  become  one  of  the  accepted  truths  of 
psychology  and  physiology  that  the  vivid  thought 
of  an  action  is,  in  a  measure,  the  performance  of 
the  action.  The  idea  of  the  action  has  become  so 
firmly  associated  with  the  doing  of  it  that  it 
excites  the  beginnings,  at  least,  of  the  muscular 
movements.  The  image  of  a  word  is  the  incipient 
speaking  of  it ;  as  Professor  Bain 1  expresses  it, 
the  idea  of  speech  is  a  "  suppressed  articulation "  ; 
or,  again,  "thinking  is  restrained  speaking."  So 
much  is  this  the  case  that  some  persons  when 
they  think  intently  become  hoarse. 

It  naturally  follows  that  when  the  image  is 
more  vivid,  or  when  the  inhibition  on  overt  action 

1  Senses  and  Intellect,  3d  ed.,  pp.  339,  340. 


174  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

is  withdrawn,  the  action  passes  beyond  the  incipient 
stage,  and  becomes  the  gross  movement.  Thinking 
readily  becomes  talking  to  himself  in  the  case  of 
the  man  who  lives  much  alone,  and  so  is  more 
free  from  family  and  society  criticism.  The  clearest 
illustration  of  the  nature  of  ideo-motor  action  is 
to  be  found  in  those  actions  which  a  man  performs 
in  spite  of  himself.  A  man  is  sometimes  more 
ready  to  throw  himself  over  a  precipice  by  reason 
of  the  fear  that  he  will  do  so :  the  fear  gives 
the  idea  of  the  action  such  vividness  that  he  tends 
to  cast  himself  over.1  The  conclusion  to  be  drawn 
from  the  observation  of  such  cases  is  the  principle 
already  indicated,  that  the  greater  the  attention 
given  to  the  image  of  a  movement,  the  more  cer- 
tain is  the  realization  of  that  movement. 

When  the  child  thinks  of  a  movement,  it  thinks 
of  it  in  this  vivid  way;  the  motor  image  absorbs 
the  attention,  and  so  leads  to  the  execution  of  the 
movement.  The  thinking  of  the  adult  is,  for  the 
most  part,  not  of  this  kind.  He  is  economical  in 
the  use  of  his  energies,  and  does  not  allow  them 
to  be  spent  in  useless  muscular  exertion;  and, 
therefore,  the  tendency  of  his  ideas  to  act  them- 
selves out  is  inhibited.  Besides,  there  is  economy 
in  the  sphere  of  thought  itself.  The  mind  calls 

1  Bain,  Senses  and  Intellect,  3d  ed.,  p.  343. 


KNOWLEDGE  BY  SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION    175 

up  the  details  of  its  images  only  so  far  as  the 
necessities  of  its  procedure  require.  A  faint 
fragment  of  an  image  is  often  all  that  is  needed. 
It  is  true  of  much  of  our  thinking  that,  the  more 
it  is  turned  to  any  subject,  the  more  abstract  and 
symbolic  does  it  become.  But  the  child  is  not 
economical  in  its  thinking.  At  first,  at  least,  it 
does  not  think  in  symbols.  In  its  case  thought 
is  not  a  suppressed  articulation.  When  it  thinks 
clearly  of  an  action,  it  thinks  or  lives  it  out. 
Hence  the  wonderful  dramatic  exhibitions  of 
the  "six  years'  darling."  When  he  thinks  of 
the  wedding  or  funeral,  he  acts  it  out ;  when  he 
thinks  of  the  dialogue  of  business,  love,  or  strife, 
he  conducts  it. 

Bearing  this  in  mind,  we  have  to  consider  the 
child's  perception  of  an  action  which  is  performed 
in  its  presence.  Let  it  be  remembered  that  the 
child  has  formed  the  habit  of  associating  with 
the  visual  images  which  the  movements  of  its 
own  body  produce,  the  motor  images  excited  by 
the  movements;  or  it  has  associated  with  the 
sound  of  its  voice  the  feelings  of  articulation. 
Thus  the  visual  image  of  another's  movements 
awakens  familiar  motor  images  in  the  child's 
mind ;  the  sound  of  another's  voice  awakens 
the  motor  images  of  articulation.  Through  this 


176  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

association  the  child  comes  to  perceive  the  action, 
or  have  an  idea  of  it  like  the  idea  of  the  actor. 

The  place  of  the  external  movement  can  now 
be  understood.  When  the  motor  image  occupies 
attention,  the  physiological  consequence  thereof  is 
the  movement  of  the  body's  members.  But  it  is 
not  essential  to  the  imitative  process,  which  might 
be  complete  were  the  movement  checked.  It  is 
the  conscious  motor  image  that  is  of  consequence. 

The  motor  image  thus  stands  on  the  same  plane 
with  other  images  that  fill  consciousness  -and  con- 
stitute perceptions.  It  is  thus  going  too  far  to 
say  that  the  little  child  acts  as  if  his  whole  voca- 
tion were  endless  imitation,  for  motor  images 
form  only  a  part  of  the  things  that  interest  him. 
Colours,  touches,  and  other  sensations  fascinate 
his  curiosity,  and  absorb,  each  in  turn,  his  con- 
sciousness. Movements  have  a  special  power  to 
attract  his  attention,  yet  they  do  not  necessarily 
lead  to  imitation,  —  the  joyful  leaps  of  the  dog 
may  produce  from  him  shrieks  of  terror ;  and,  be- 
sides, there  are  many  movements  which  baffle  his 
imitative  efforts,  or  can,  at  best,  be  represented  only 
in  a  fragmentary  way  :  the  actions  which  are  copied 
are  chiefly  those  of  human  beings,  and,  to  a  less 
extent,  those  of  the  lower  animals.  So  far  as  he 
is  interested  in  the  motor  images,  and  is  able  to 


KNOWLEDGE  BY  SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION" 

represent    them,   his   vocation  is   imitation   of    the 
external  kind.1 

8.  Exception  may  be  taken  to  this  account  of 
imitation,  by  which  it  is  represented  as  being  of  the 
nature   of  perception.      Imitation   seems  to  prove, 
rather,  to  be  an  exhibition  of  will,  for  a  voluntary 
action  is  one  in  which  the  idea  of  the  action  pre- 
cedes the  action.     But  it  should  rather  be  observed 
that,  on  this  analysis,  voluntary  action  is  resolved 
into  perception.     If  there  is  anything  distinctive  of 
the  will,  it  is  to  be  found  in  a  fiat-uttering  power 
that  is  distinct  from  the  play  of  motor  images.     The 
motor   image   in  itself  is  as  passive  as  any  of  the 
images  which  the  mind  possesses.     It  is,  as  much  as 
any  image,  the  instrument  of  perception. 

9.  Reference   has   been   made    especially  to    the 
child's  experience  for  illustrations  of  imitation,  for 
such  experience  represents  the  process  more  faith- 
fully.    In  the  adult  the  same  process  may  be  ob- 
served, but   usually    the    adult    has  less   external 
imitation.     Moreover,  when  he  does  take  to  mim- 
icry, he  is  economical  in  his  imitating,  as  in  the  other 
activities  of  his  nervous  system,  and  the  process  is 
abridged.     A  fragment  of  an  image  may  be  signal 
enough,   without   any   further   presentation   of   the 

1  For  a  similar  theory  of  imitation  or  sympathy,  v.  Bain,  Mental 
Science,  Bk.  II,  Chap.  I,  13,  and  Bk.  Ill,  Chap.  XI,  5. 

N 


178  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

action  in  consciousness,  to  start  the  muscular  move- 
ment. Such  economy  diminishes  the  perceptive 
truth  of  the  imitation. 

10.  The  results  which  have  been  reached  may  now 
be   stated.      The   child   or   man  who   imitates   an- 
other's muscular  movement  reproduces  that  move- 
ment.   But  the  original  movement  was  preceded  by 
a  conscious  state,  and  the  movement  which  is  a  copy 
is  also  preceded  by  a  conscious  state  like  the  first 
conscious    state.     This  imitation  of  conscious  states 
is  the  significant  fact.     It  is  entitled  to  be  called  a 
perception,  inasmuch  as  the  associated  imitative  ideas 
interpret  a  sensory  impression. 

11.  We  are  now  brought  to  a  study  of  imitations 
in  which  the  muscular  movement  is  not  present,  or 
is  not  such  as  to  attract  attention.     The  conscious 
states  known  as  motor  images  are  not  intrinsically 
different  from  other  conscious  states  ;  they  are  simi- 
lar to,  or  part  of,  our  sensations,  feelings  of  pleasure 
and  pain,  and  abstract  ideas.      The  conclusion   is, 
therefore,  to  be  drawn,  that  other  conscious  states 
can   be   copied,  and  that   there    is    real  imitation, 
though  there  may  be  no  visible  outward  movement. 

Let  a  child  or  a  man  see  a  wound  in  his  hand,  and 
at  the  same  time  feel  the  pain  of 'it,  wound- vision 
and  pain-feeling  are  associated  in  his  mind.  Let 
him  next  see  a  wound  in  his  neighbour's  hand,  the 


KNOWLEDGE  BY  SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION    179 

pain-feeling  is  revived.  He  thus  imitates  his  neigh- 
bour's pain-feeling.  Or,  let  him  associate  the  act  of 
eating  an  apple  with  the  taste  of  the  fruit,  he  may, 
when  he  sees  his  neighbour  eating  an  apple,  discover 
in  his  mind  the  taste-sensation.  Thus  in  respect  of 
this  sense  he  copies  his  neighbour's  experience.  Or, 
to  take  another  case,  illustrative  of  much  in  life,  let 
him  associate  an  image  or  idea  with  the  sound  of  a 
certain  word  which  he  has  uttered,  he  will,  when  he 
hears  this  sound  uttered  by  another,  associate  that 
image  or  idea  with  it ;  and,  since  that  sound  was 
thus  an  associate  of  the  same  mental  content  in  the 
case  of  both  speaker  and  listener,  the  reproduction 
of  that  content  in  the  mind  of  the  listener  is  to  be 
called  an  imitation.  Thus  the  word  horse  is,  when 
spoken,  the  sign  of  a  certain  image  in  the  speaker's 
mind  ;  it  calls  up  an  imitative  image  in  the  lis- 
tener's mind.  More  complex  illustrations  might  be 
added,  but  it  is  unnecessary  to  adduce  them  to  prove 
that  the  whole  of  life  —  its  emotions,  its  sensations, 
its  intellections,  its  volitions  —  lends  itself  to  imita- 
tion, so  that  apart  from  external  movements  the 
experiences  of  each  individual  may  be  mirrored  in 
the  consciousness  of  others. 

It  has  not  been  the  intention  here  to  state  that 
these  states  of  mind  have  never  any  physiological 
consequences.  There  are  manifold  effects  produced 


180  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

by  those  conscious  states  which  to  ordinary  observa- 
tion seein  passive.  There  may  even  be  produced  in 
the  body  of  the  observer  a  condition  like  that  which 
he  is  contemplating  in  another.  One  of  the  most 
remarkable  of  such  cases  is  that  of  Louise  Lateau, 
who  meditated  on  the  sufferings  of  Christ  till  the 
blood  oozed  from  hands  and  brow  ;  there  is  here 
presented  the  phenomenon  of  a  pain-idea,  associated 
with  the  image  of  a  certain  part  of  the  body,  produc- 
ing in  that  part  the  most  powerful  effects.  Other 
cases  of  a  similar  kind  might  be  cited.  It  is  not  nec- 
essary here  to  inquire  further  into  the  physiological 
significance  of  such  cases.  They  not  only  show  that 
images  used  in  imitation  may  produce  striking 
bodily  effects  ;  they  also  throw  light  on  the  truthful- 
ness of  the  imitation.  But  such  violent  effects  are 
not  to  be  looked  for  in  all  imitations.  In  a  large 
part  of  experience  the  stream  of  ideas  is  not  at- 
tended by  any  gross  movement ;  and  the  imitation 
must  be  like  the  original  in  its  quiet  flow.  In  any 
case,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  what  we  are  ulti- 
mately concerned  with  is  the  conscious  experience: 
it  is  the  imitation  of  idea  by  idea  that  is  important. 
12.  The  kind  of  knowledge  thus  yielded  may 
be  appropriately  designated  sympathetic  imitation. 
The  term  imitation  alone  is  fitted  to  express  ade- 
quately its  nature ;  but  it  is  most  frequently  used  to 


KNOWLEDGE  BY  SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION    i8l 

denote  the  external  movement,  and  often  suggests 
that  nothing  more  than  this  is  copied,  for  the 
mimic  would  usually  regard  it  as  interfering  with 
his  special  purpose  of  making  sport,  should  he 
allow  the  imitation  of  ideas  to  occupy  him.  The 
faculty  that  imitates  conscious  states  is  best  de- 
noted by  the  term  sympathy.  Sympathy  means, 
literally,  being  affected  with  :  we  sympathize  with 
another  when  we  make  his  inner  experience  our  own. 
There  are,  indeed,  objections  to  this  term.  It  has 
been  used  chiefly,  though  by  no  means  exclusively, 
to  indicate  fellow-feeling  with  pain ;  and  its  pre- 
vailing associations  are  emotional,  or,  it  might 
even  be  contended,  sentimental.  But  the  value 
of  the  expression  consists  in  this,  that  it  has 
reference  to  conscious  states  rather  than  external 
movements,  and  that  it  indicates,  even  if  in  a 
restricted  sphere,  the  mode  of  relation  between 
conscious  persons  which  is  precisely  that  relation 
which  constitutes  knowledge.1  The  sphere  of  this 
relation  must  be  widened  to  meet  the  full  require- 
ment of  knowledge.  I  can  sympathize  with  my 
neighbour  in  all  his  conscious  life.  Not  only  may 

1  Yet  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  the  term  sympathy  is  also 
used  to  cover  the  more  general  instinctive  distress  which  is  felt  in 
the  presence  of  certain  forms  of  suffering  and  which  may  have  little 
imitation  in  it.  Cf.  Baldwin,  Mental  Development,  Social  and 
Ethical  Interpretations,  p.  220. 


1 82  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

I  feel  his  pain  when  he  suffers  :  when  he  sees  a 
red  colour,  I  may  call  up  the  image  of  red  in 
my  imagination;  when  he  is  conducting  an  argu- 
ment, I  can  copy  in  my  mind  the  train  of  imagery 
and  abstract  ideas  which  is  proceeding  in  his. 
This  is  sympathy  in  the  larger  sense.  Yet  prob- 
ably the  term  sympathy  does  not  promptly  sug- 
gest this  meaning,  and  the  misleading  associations 
of  both  the  terms,  imitation  and  sympathy,  can 
be  avoided  by  the  use  of  the  expression  already 
given  :  the  method  of  truth  is  sympathetic  imita- 
tion. 

13.  The  value  of  this  method  will  be  more  fully 
appreciated,  if  we  contrast  the  knowledge  which  it 
yields  with  the  knowledge  that  is  offered  by  science 
and  philosophy.  If  a  sensation  of  red  is  in  ques- 
tion, science  has  much  to  say  of  the  structure  of 
the  eye,  and  optic  nerve,  and  cerebral  cortex  ;  of 
the  character  of  the  ether-waves  which  produce  the 
sensation ;  of  the  place  of  red  in  the  spectrum  ; 
of  the  phenomena  of  colour-contrast;  and  of  other 
such  things.  If  the  philosopher  wishes  to  present 
the  truth  regarding  this  sensation,  he  may  proceed, 
as  an  empiricist,  to  show  that  all  we  are  concerned 
with  is  the  phenomenal  series,  and  that  red  holds 
a  clearly  ascertained  place  in  that  series;  or.  he 
may,  as  an  idealist,  trace  the  development  of  the 


KNOWLEDGE  BY  SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION    183 

Idea  in  all  the  phases  of  consciousness,  finding  the 
sensation  to  be  one  moment  in  this  development. 
But  the  scientist  and  philosopher  fail  to  know  the 
sensation  of  red  by  these  methods.  They  are 
explaining  it  by  referring  it  to  something  else, — 
another  phenomenon,  or  a  law,  or  the  absolute  Idea. 
They  do  not  get  the  sensation  in  itself.  If  we 
consider  the  fact  that  the  faculty  by  which  the 
sensation  is  given  is  not  the  faculty  by  which 
such  cognition  is  attained,  the  disparateness  of  the 
knowledge  and  its  object  is  still  more  apparent. 
By  the  method  of  sympathetic  imitation  we  seek 
to  know  the  sensation  by  having  the  same  sensa- 
tion. Were  other  concrete  experiences  called  up, 
they  would  with  not  less  clearness  prove  to  be 
knowable  by  sympathy,  and  not  by  the  methods  of 
science.  The  chasm  between  the  scientific  formulas 
of  psychology  and  concrete  human  experience  is 
as  wide  as  that  between  algebraic  symbols  and  the 
realities  they  represent.  But  by  sympathy  the 
observer  knows  the  actual  mental  processes,  for  he 
lives  them  through  in  his  own  experience.  He 
does  not  use  his  rational  faculty  as  equally  cogni- 
tive of  all  forms  of  experience  :  Tie  knows  the  experi- 
ence of  each  of  the  other  faculties  by  a  corresponding 
faculty  in  himself.  For,  if  like  is  known  by  like, 
if  in  the  mind  of  the  knower  that  which  consti- 


1 84  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

tutes  the  object  must  be  reproduced,  it  follows  that 
for  knowledge  of  an  emotion  it  is  necessary  to 
experience  that  emotion ;  for  knowledge  of  a 
man's  act  of  will  it  is  necessary  to  "put  ourselves 
in  his  place "  ;  for  knowledge  of  an  abstract  idea 
or  reasoning  process  it  is  necessary  to  think  an 
idea  or  a  process  in  all  respects  corresponding  to 
the  original.  Not  that  other  modes  of  thinking 
are  unnecessary.  We  shall  find  that  the  mind 
must  use  them  in  order  to  exercise  sympathy 
aright.  But  in  cognition  they  are  to  be  used  as 
subserving  the  faculty  of  sympathy :  the  essence 
of  knowledge  is  sympathetic  imitation. 

14.  To    sum    up  :    Knowledge    must    consist    in 
sympathetic    imitation,   if    it   is   a   reproduction   of 
that   which   constitutes   objects ;    and   that   such   a 
relation  to  objects  is  not  a  fantastic  dream,  but  a 
genuine    possibility,   is   suggested   by  our   common 
experiences. 

15.  In  view  of  the  importance  of  this  faculty,  it 
is  desirable  to  determine   its  relation   to  the  other 
faculties  of  the  psychical  life.     It  has  been  the  cus- 
tom to  construe  life  on  the  principle  of  utility.     All 
the  members  of  the  living  body,  and  all  the  actions 
it  performs,  are  thought   to  serve,  directly  or   in- 
directly,   some    useful    purpose.      Is    imitation     a 
utilitarian  function  ?       It   is   claimed   by  Professor 


KNOWLEDGE  BY  SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION    185 

Baldwin l  that  it  is  such  :  imitation  is  a  "  circular  " 
or  stimulus-repeating  reaction,  and  the  stimulus, 
so  often  as  it  is  reproduced,  repeats  the  reaction; 
the  stimuli  which  are  thus  maintained  are  said  to  be 
"vital." 

16.  In  considering  the  present  question,  it  is 
necessary  to  remember,  first  of  all,  that  under  utili- 
tarian actions  are  comprised  two  species  very  differ- 
ent in  character.  There  are  actions  that  are  useful, 
in  the  sense  of  pleasure-giving,  and  these  actions  are 
repeated  that  the  pleasure  may  be  renewed.  The 
child  that  has  picked  up  some  grains  of  sugar,  and 
tasted  them,  will  repeat  the  action  to  get  once  more 
the  sweet  taste.  Many  habits  are  covered  by  the 
formula,  that  the  living  organism  seeks  to  renew 
the  pleasure  it  has  experienced. 

There  are  other  actions  which  are  useful  to  the 
organism,  which  cannot  be  so  described.  Many  of 
those  which  are  the  response  to  painful  stimuli  are 
not  fitted  to  secure  vital  stimulations  after  the  man- 
ner of  the  actions  already  spoken  of.  They  may 
frequently  be  useful,  but  it  is  as  when  a  man's  faint- 
ing on  the  battlefield  saves  him  from  being  shot. 
The  animal  that  shams  death  is  by  so  doing  saved 
from  its  persecutors,  but  the  action  is  not  done  with 

1  Mental  Development,  Methods  and  Processes,  pp.  216,  487, 
et  passim. 


1 86  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

the  purpose  of  securing  some  good;  the  animal  is 
probably  paralyzed  by  fright.  The  contraction  of 
the  organism  when  it  is  suffering  pain  may  have  the 
result  that  it  exposes  less  surface  to  its  enemies,  but 
it  does  not  contract  thus  with  the  purpose  of  saving 
its  life.  The  contraction  means  loss  of  energy,  and 
is  due  to  the  action  of  forces  which  the  organism  is 
unable  to  resist.  And  the  various  manifestations 
of  pain,  the  depression  of  the  vital  functions,  trem- 
bling, and  weakness,  are  primarily  pathological,  and 
when  finished  bring  forth  death.  These  pathologi- 
cal processes  may,  to  repeat,  be  useful;  but  they 
are  not  designed  for  use,  any  more  than  a  man's 
heart  disease  is  designed  in  order  that  he  may  be 
exempted  from  military  service. 

Moreover,  it  is  probable  that  many  reactions  are 
simply  pathological,  and  do  not  secure,  either  di- 
rectly or  indirectly,  any  good  to  the  organism.  And 
such  actions  pass  into  habits. 

Again,  there  are  the  actions  which  have  been 
designated" random."  These  are  thought  to  be  pro- 
duced by  an  overflow  of  energy  from  the  brain 
which  is  not  directed  by  the  will,  but  takes  its  way 
to  the  most  convenient  muscles.  The  infant's  wav- 
ing of  hands  and  feet  may  be  taken  as  an  instance 
of  them.  To  these  may  be  joined  the  actions  which 
are  due  to  habits  once  useful,  but  now  useless,  or 


KNOWLEDGE  BY  SYMPATHETIC   IMITATION    187 

even  hurtful.1  The  truth  is  that  the  activities  of 
organic  beings  are  not  at  any  stage  necessarily  utili- 
tarian. Those  actions  are  useful  in  which  the  en- 
ergy expended  secures,  directly  or  indirectly,  its 
own  renewal.  And  it  can  readily  be  seen  how  great 
the  advantage  is  of  this  regeneration  of  energy. 
In  the  struggle  for  existence  those  organisms  are 
successful  which  do  not  waste  any  of  their  energy. 
The  elimination  of  the  non-utilitarian  and  the  non- 
economical  has  been  complete  in  proportion  to  the 
fierceness  of  the  struggle.  Yet  this  regeneration  of 
energy  is  not  the  only  activity  of  the  organism.  If 
we  should  describe  the  utilitarianism  of  the  organ- 
ism as  its  centripetal  tendency,  we  must  also  recog- 
nize the  presence  in  it  of  a  centrifugal  tendency. 

17.  The  bearing  of  all  this  upon  the  question  of 
imitation  may  now  be  made  clear.  Actions  are  not 
all  utilitarian  or  pleasure-giving ;  even  habitual 
actions  are  not  always  of  this  kind.  It  follows  that 
associations  are  not  all  of  the  utilitarian  kind.  It 
seems  clear  that  at  all  stages  in  the  development  of 
mind  the  formation  of  associations  must  have  been 
determined  by  the  play  of  contingencies  that  were 
not  subject  to  the  teleological  principle.  Associa- 
tion cannot  be  construed  on  utilitarian  principles. 
Imitation,  therefore,  since  it  uses  all  kinds  of  associ- 

1  Cf .  Darwin,  Expression  of  the  Emotions,  p.  39. 


1 88  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

ation,  cannot  be  put  among  functions  that  are 
intrinsically  utilitarian. 

If  we  recall  the  characteristics  of  imitation  in 
greater  detail,  we  see  that  this  conclusion  is  estab- 
lished. It  is  of  great  importance  to  observe  that 
whereas,  if  pleasure  is  sought,  all  the  actions  of 
others  are  disregarded,  and  new  adaptations  are 
welcomed,  if  thereby  the  pleasure  is  made  more  sure, 
in  imitation  the  supreme  effort  is  to  reproduce  that 
which  is  objective.  So  much  is  this  the  case,  that 
painful  actions  are  copied  :  the  imitator  weeps  at 
the  sight  of  another's  tears.  Again,  there  are  imita- 
tions which  do  not  result  in  useful  reactions  :  the 
inner  sympathies  have  physiological  consequences, 
but  they  do  not  in  all  cases  produce  beneficial 
effects  ;  still  less  do  they  produce  overt  utilitarian 
actions. 

It  may  still  be  urged  that  imitation  is  originally 
of  this  utilitarian  character,  but  that  it  becomes  a 
habit  in  itself,  and  thus  it  is  that  imitations  may 
take  place  which  are  attended  by  pain.  It  is  to  be 
observed,  however,  that  there  is  herein  a  recogni- 
tion of  what  we  have  called  the  centrifugal  ten- 
dency in  organisms,  or  the  non-teleological  element 
in  them.  It  is  also  acknowledged  that  imitation  has 
changed  its  character.  It  is  no  longer  imitation 
simply  for  the  sake  of  pleasure-renewal :  it  is 


KNOWLEDGE  BY  SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION    189 

imitation  for  the  sake  of  the  imitation.  It  is, 
therefore,  to  be  studied  in  view  of  this  new  func- 
tion. It  may  be  historically  true  that  the  hand 
had  originally  the  function  of  a  fore-foot  as  well 
as  that  of  a  prehensile  organ,  but  it  is  now  to  be 
studied  as  a  developed  hand.  The  historical  gene- 
sis is  of  great  importance,  yet  the  newness  of  the 
function  is  of  no  less  significance.  If  the  pleas- 
ure-seeking interest  was  the  source  of  imitation, 
it  has  dropped  out,  and  imitation  now  subserves 
another  interest. 

Let  it  be  added  here,  that  this  principle,  that 
the  function  of  imitation  is  not  determined  by  its 
original  causes,  is  to  be  applied  to  other  forms  of 
the  utilitarian  derivation  of  this  faculty.  Mr. 
Herbert  Spencer  traces  it  to  the  conditions  in 
which  gregarious  animals  live.  When  animals  live 
in  flocks,  they  have  a  large  number  of  common 
experiences.  The  danger  which  threatens  them  is 
a  common  danger,  and  they  all  flee  at  once.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  food  that  attracts  one  attracts 
all  simultaneously.  Accordingly,  the  sheep  that 
has  fled  with  the  flock  before  the  wolf  is  ready, 
as  often  as  it  sees  the  others  run,  to  run  with 
them,  even  though  the  object  inspiring  their  terror 
is  hid.  Thus  sympathy  is  thought  to  arise.  It 
may,  indeed,  be  that  some  forms  of  sympathy 


IQO  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

have  arisen  in  this  way,  for  it  may  have  been  pro- 
duced in  very  varying  conditions.  When  produced, 
however,  it  has  its  own  special  characteristics  and 
laws. 

18.  The  argument  for  the  utility  of  imitation 
may  put  on  another  form,  and  thereby  come  into 
line  with  the  ordinary  hedonistic  account  of  con- 
duct. It  may  be  said  that  if  imitation  becomes  a 
habit,  this  habit  in  its  turn  is  practised  for  the 
sake  of  pleasure,  and  thus  pleasure  proves  to  be 
still  the  end  of  action  of  this  kind.  But  it  can 
be  seen  that  in  spontaneous  imitation,  which  is 
due  to  the  free  association  of  ideas,  there  is  no 
question  of  pleasure  involved.  And  in  the  more 
complete  exercise  of  sympathy  the  imitator  so  iden- 
tifies himself  with  the  happiness  or  the  sorrows  of 
another  that  the  pleasure  of  the  self  passes  out 
of  sight.  At  the  most,  it  could  be  said  that  a 
man  launches  himself  in  this  course  of  sympathy 
because  of  pleasure  which  he  will  experience  at 
the  end  of  it.  But,  in  such  a  case,  the  pleasure 
is  something  external  to  the  sympathy,  as  the 
pleasure  of  the  man  who  fattens  a  sheep  that  he 
may  dine  upon  it  is  external  to  the  physiological 
processes  of  the  living  animal.  Moreover,  it  is 
to  be  remembered  that  in  the  case  of  sympathy 
the  pleasure  is  of  the  kind  that  a  man  feels  in 


KNOWLEDGE  BY  SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION    191 

view  of  the  interests  of  others,  and  may  continue 
to  feel  even  when  these  involve  his  own  effacement. 
19.  We  thus  are  brought  back  to  the  view  that 
imitation  is  a  form  of  perception,  and  is  thus  not 
more  directly  connected  with  pleasure  and  utility 
than  perception  is.  Various  influences  may  have 
stimulated  its  development,  but  it  is  probable  that 
in  any  case  it  would  have  developed  with  the 
growth  of  the  perceptive  power.  The  vessel  may 
be  driven  down  the  river  by  steam,  but  the  cur- 
rent would  have  carried  it  down  in  any  case. 
This  faculty  coexists  with  large  intelligence,  and 
hence  shows  itself  so  fully  in  monkeys,  and  still 
more  in  men.  In  them  there  is  a  special  develop- 
ment of  the  nervous  system ;  the  fund  of  brain- 
energy  is  great.  Usually  this  energy  is  not  all 
required  for  the  useful  reflexes  of  a  life  of  habit. 
It  is  thus  left  for  exercise  that  is  not  utilitarian. 
There  is,  accordingly,  not  mere  observation  of  the 
obvious  qualities  of  objects,  and  inference  as  to 
their  injurious  or  beneficial  character,  and  the 
adoption  of  the  course  of  action  most  suitable  for 
self-preservation ;  there  is  curiosity,  examination, 
and  investigation,  for  the  delight  of  these  exer- 
cises themselves.  Perception  of  this  nature  is 
thus  due  to  the  abundance  of  energy.  To  the 
same  abundance  of  energy  imitation  is  to  be 


IQ2  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

traced :  great  perceptive  energy  must  inevitably 
give  rise  to  imitation,  or  the  complete  thinking 
out,  of  what  is  observed.  Imitation  may  thus  be 
regarded  as  a  form  of  play. 

20.  In  truth,  the  rise  of  the  imitative  faculty 
marks  a  new  departure  in  the  psychical  develop- 
ment of  the  world.  It  is  one  of  the  character- 
istics of  living  organisms  to  seek  pleasure  and 
avoid  pain,  to  use  their  environment  solely  for 
purposes  of  self-preservation.  And  when  the  in- 
tellect is  humble,  and  the  struggle  for  existence 
is  fierce,  action  of  this  kind  tends  to  be  the 
exclusive  occupation.  In  such  conditions,  actions 
observed  lead  to  actions  in  no  way  resembling 
them.  The  wolf,  seeing  the  lamb  at  play,  is 
moved  to  do  its  murderous  work.  The  roar  of 
the  lion  causes  the  antelope  to  tremble.  Or  we 
may  find  illustrations  in  our  own  experience : 
where  the  flower  opens  its  beauty,  we  put  forth 
our  hands  to  it ;  where  the  serpent  is  seen  glid- 
ing, we  shun  the  spot ;  when  a  certain  signal  is 
waved,  we  steer  our  course  in  a  new  direction. 
In  all  these  cases,  the  action  does  not  resemble 
the  action  observed  :  the  movement  of  the  serpent 
is  not  copied  by  the  start  of  terror ;  the  act  of 
steering  is  not  like  the  act  of  signalling.  It  is 
true  that  in  the  primal  life  of  organic  beings  an 


KNOWLEDGE  BY  SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION    193 

action  is  copied  when  it  brings  pleasure,  or  when 
it  is  judged  from  the  observation  of  others  to  bring 
pleasure.  But  in  such  cases  it  is  a  particular  pleas- 
ure that  is  the  end  of  the  action,  and  the  imitation 
is  discarded  at  once  if  the  pleasure  is  not  gained,  or 
if  a  short  cut  to  it  is  discovered.  A  new  depart- 
ure is  taken  when  imitation  becomes  an  end  in 
itself,  or  the  experience  of  the  object  is  contem- 
plated for  its  own  sake.  The  song  does  not 
betray  the  singer  to  his  enemy ;  it  is  echoed  by 
the  song.  The  wound  when  it  is  seen  does  not 
tempt  to  an  assault  on  a  bleeding  and  weakened 
victim :  the  pain  of  the  wound  is  felt  by  the 
observer  as  his  own.  It  is  the  era  of  that  tru- 
est and  profoundest  contemplation  which  we  call 
sympathy. 

21.  We  are  now  prepared  to  understand  that  the 
human  intellect,  in  the  exercise  of  its  cognitive 
faculty,  has  always  made  use  of  imitation.  Animism 
is  a  great  essay  toward  knowledge,  in  the  proper 
sense  of  the  word.  There  is  in  it  not  merely  reac- 
tion to  stimuli ;  the  abstract  view  of  the  individual's 
welfare  is  transcended.  There  is  apprehension  of 
the  inner  nature  of  things,  and  that  apprehension  is 
gained  by  imitation  or  sympathy.  For  the  mental 
process  of  the  animist  is  of  the  kind  we  have  found 
in  imitation.  With  the  form  of  his  body  he  associ- 


194  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

ates  certain  conscious  experiences,  and  with  other 
forms,  such  as  those  of  tree,  stream,  ocean,  cloud, 
he  associates  similar  experiences.  He  makes  the 
assumption,  indeed,  that  his  experiences  may  be 
regarded  as  objective,  yet  this  is  the  assumption  of 
all  imitation,  and  of  all  perception.  And  if  the 
primitive  animist,  with  his  polytheism  and  mythol- 
ogy, has  crude  results  to  show,  it  is  yet  true  that 
he  has  adopted  the  methods  of  the  cognitive  life. 
Nor  does  man  leave  animism  behind  when  he  passes 
to  the  sphere  of  philosophy.  The  concepts  of  science 
and  philosophy  are  animistic  attempts  at  imitation 
of  the  reality.  It  is  important  to  observe  that,  while 
the  method  of  concepts  differs  from  that  of  sym- 
pathetic imitation  in  so  striking  a  manner,  it  yet 
springs  ultimately,  as  it  is  commonly  employed, 
from  the  same  root.  Knowledge  is  a  copying  of 
the  reality.  When  Heraclitus  said  that  all  things 
are  "becoming,"  when  Parmenides  affirmed  that 
only  being  is,  they  were  proceeding  upon  the  prin- 
ciple of  imitation;  they  made  these  subjective  con- 
cepts the  interpretation  of  the  things  which  met 
their  senses.  Likewise,  when  science  speaks  of  law, 
or  of  energy,  it  is  by  the  same  imitative  method 
interpreting  facts  ;  it  is  ejecting  into  things  what  is 
subjective.  Imitation  is  not  left  behind  with  the 
childhood  of  the  individual,  or  the  childhood  of  the 


KNOWLEDGE  BY  SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION-    195 

race.  There  is  a  sense  in  which  all  objective  cogni- 
tion is  imitation.  And,  therefore,  the  question  is 
not,  whether  or  not  we  will  be  imitative,  but 
whether  or  not  we  will  cultivate  the  right  kind 
of  imitation.  We  can  interpret  things  only  in  the 
imitative  way.  But  the  charge  against  science  and 
philosophy  has  been  that  they  have  not  been  faithful 
to  the  principles  of  a  successful  imitation.  Individ- 
ual concrete  facts  cannot  be  properly  imitated  by 
universals,  and  least  of  all  by  universals  whose 
origin  is  not  at  all  in  these  particular  facts.  The 
experiences  of  the  conceptual  faculty  may  imitate 
the  experiences  of  the  conceptual  faculty:  they  can- 
not imitate  the  experiences  of  the  other  faculties. 
It  is  necessary  to  return  to  the  study  of  childhood 
that  it  may  be  understood  at  what  point  science  and 
philosophy  have  gone  astray,  and  how  the  right  way 
is  to  be  regained.  We  have  seen  that  in  childhood 
the  faculty  which  knows  is  similar  to  the  faculty  to  be 
cognized;  and  except  we  become,  in  imitativeness 
and  sympathy,  as  little  children,  we  cannot  enter  the 
kingdom  of  truth. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

SYMPATHETIC   IMITATION  IN    ART 

1.  While    science    has    departed    from    the   true 
principles  of  imitation,  it   can  be  shown  that  this 
faculty  has   been   cultivated   by  art   and  morality. 
It  is  important,  not  only  to  prove  the  fact  that  they 
use  it,  but  also  to  consider  their  use  of  it,  in  order  to 
get  the  light  which  they  throw  on  its  nature;  and, 
further,  to  determine  how  far  in  their  employment 
of  it  cognition  is  attained. 

2.  Art  is  one  of  the  chief  forms  of  the  mental  life 
of  man.     Notwithstanding  the  extension  of  science, 
it  still  remains  true  that  the  majority  of  those  who 
participate  in  the  intellectual  life  find  their  enjoy- 
ment in  poetry  and  other  forms  of  art  rather  than 
in  science.     The  histories  and  biographies  which  are 
most  popular  have  more  affinity  for  art  than  for  sci- 
ence.    Moreover,  many  of  the  choicest   spirits  that 
the   world  has  known  are  those  which  have  been 
consecrated  to  art. 

The  interest  in  art  has  been,  to  a  certain  extent, 
intermittent.     When  the  struggle  for  existence  is  at 

196 


SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION  IN  ART          197 

its  sternest,  there  is  little  development  of  art ;  but, 
when  the  storms  abate  their  fierceness,  the  flowers 
of  art  begin  to  bloom.  The  times  which  allow  the 
cultivation  of  science  are  usually  the  times  which 
allow  devotion  to  art.  And  thus  art  grows  beside 
science,  supplying,  especially  in  its  poetical  form, 
that  which  science  lacks. 

3.  Art  deals  with  the  concrete.  Science  deals 
with  the  abstract,  having  for  its  ideal  a  system  of 
concepts  or  laws  ;  art  has  its  attention  fixed  on  the 
individual.  Science  gives  a  general  definition  of 
tree,  or  man ;  art  paints  an  individual  tree,  or  por- 
trays a  living  character.  Science  gives  a  treatise  on 
political  economy;  art  sees  the  "city  dawn  amid 
the  clouds."  It  may  be  admitted,  indeed,  that  the 
highest  art  is  universal ;  but  it  is  so  in  the  sense  of 
presenting  to  us  that  which  is  of  universal  interest ; 
and  it  is  precisely  art  of  this  high  type  which  pre- 
sents to  us  every  scene  and  every  character  in  indi- 
vidual shapes.  The  art  which  tried  to  represent 
abstract  qualities,  as  in  the  dramas  in  which  each 
character  stood  for  a  virtue  or  a  vice,  is  justly  con- 
demned as  inferior  to  that  which  holds  up  the  mirror 
to  living  men  and  women.  Yet  even  the  drama  in 
which  the  actors  are  abstractions  does  not  become 
a  treatise  in  psychology  or  ethics  :  the  abstractions 
must  act  and  speak  as  individual  human  beings. 


198  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

Even  in  allegories,  in  which  the  abstractness  of  the 
thought  is  only  disguised  by  a  thin  veil,  the  quali- 
ties that  appear  are  in  the  form  of  concrete  realities  ; 
courage  is  a  warrior  with  sword  and  helm ;  justice 
is  a  maiden  holding  a  balance.  For  the  true  artist, 
if  he  allegorizes,  does  so  because,  when  he  con- 
templates the  categories  of  science,  he  cannot  leave 
them  cold  and  dead  :  human  eyes  seem  to  look  out 
on  him  ;  human  hands  take  hold  of  him.  Art  ceases 
to  be  art  when  it  loses  the  concrete  in  the  abstract. 
4.  The  important  question  now  arises,  How  does 
art  deal  with  the  concrete  ?  It  is  to  be  regarded  as 
having  a  twofold  function,  for  it  deals,  on  the  one 
hand,  with  the  world  of  sense-impressions,  and,  on  the 
other,  with  that  inner  realm  which,  so  far  as  the 
individual  contemplates  the  lives  of  others,  is  known 
only  by  association  and  inference.  When  sense- 
impressions  or  their  copies  in  the  imagination  are 
taken,  not  as  signs  which  the  intellect  uses,  but  as 
they  are  in  themselves,  they  begin,  under  this  foster- 
ing of  attention,  to  let  their  interest  and  their  pleas- 
ure-pain aspect  emerge  into  prominence  ;  and  thus 
art  has  the  function  of  ministering  to  the  sensuous 
nature.  The  experiences  of  others  are  reached  in 
their  concrete  reality  only  by  being  copied  ;  hence 
art  has  its  sympathetic  function.  This  dualism  in 
the  aesthetic  life  is  closely  related  to  the  dualism  of 


SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION  IN  ART         199 

self-regarding  and  other-regarding  impulses  in  the 
ethical  life. 

5.  The   art  that    is    directly   sensuous    may  be 
briefly  considered  here,  because  of  the  need  of  dis- 
tinguishing its  function   from   that  of   sympathetic 
art.     This  consideration  of  it  will  also  prepare  for 
that  reference  to   it  which  will  be  necessary  when 
the  nature  of  self-knowledge  is  investigated. 

6.  It  might  seem  natural  to  say  that  the  function 
of  sensuous  art  is  to  minister  pleasure.     And,  doubt- 
less, this  is  part  of  its  function.     For  all  the  senses 
have  a  pleasure-pain  aspect.     They  are  not  merely 
the  gateways  of  knowledge  :    they  are  the  goblets 
from  which  we  quaff  the  wine  of  pleasure.     And  the 
filling  of  every  sense  with  joy  is  one  of  the  great 
ends  of  living  ;  and  it  is  one  of  the  functions  of  art 
to  draw  forth  this  joy  and  bear  it  to  men.     Yet  to 
say  merely  that  sensuous  art  tries  to  minister  pleas- 
ure is  to  give  too  narrow  a  view  of  its  work.     It 
is  not  merely  the  pleasure  of  the  sensation  that  is 
of  interest  to  consciousness  :  the  peculiar  quality  of 
the  sensation  itself  has  its  interest.      The  redness 
of  this  rose  gives  pleasure  ;  but  it  is  not  merely  the 
pleasure,  it  is  also  the  redness,  that  is  of  aesthetic 
interest.      Pain   tends  to  inhibit  interest ;  yet  the 
interest  is  not  dependent   merely  on   the   pleasure. 
It  is  to  be  remembered,  therefore,  when  the  sensu- 


200  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

ous  pleasure  of  art  is  spoken  of,  that  the  pleasure  is 
not  the  only  aesthetic  element. 

7.  The  art  that  is  sensuous  is  probably,  in  the 
order   of  nature,   the  first.     The  earliest   form   of 
aesthetic  appreciation  is  simply  interest  or  delight 
in  some  sense-experience.     The  long  story  of  sexual 
selection  is  thought  to  illustrate  this  kind  of  appre- 
ciation, as  it  is  found  even   in  the   lower  animals. 
When  the  beautiful  male  finds  favour  in  the  eyes  of 
the  female,  her  pleasure  in  mane  or  crest  is  aesthetic. 
The  primitive  human  being  has  this  aesthetic  enjoy- 
ment of  what  is  sensuous.     The  child  evinces  it  also 
by  its  attraction  to  what  is  brightly  coloured. 

Further,  if  man  has  interests  of  this  sensuous 
kind,  it  is  natural  that  he  should  try  to  perpetuate 
them,  and  reproduce  them,  and  find  new  modes  of 
them.  Interest,  unless  it  is  painful,  is  a  motive 
to  its  own  renewal.  In  this  fact  is  to  be  found 
the  explanation  of  a  large  part  of  artistic  activity. 

8.  The  selection  of  colours  and  combinations  of 
colours  illustrates  these   principles.      Certain  com- 
binations  are   painful  to   the   eye ;    others  attract 
and    please.      It    is    one   of    the    purposes   of    the 
painter  to  present  the  colours  in  that  relation,  and 
in  that  proportion,  which  yield  the  most  agreeable 
result. 

Again,   there    are    sounds,   and   combinations   of 


SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION  IN  ART         2OI 

sounds,  and  successions  of  sounds,  which  are  pleas- 
ing and  attractive,  while  others  are  painful.  The 
purely  sensuous  element  is  an  important  element  in 
music. 

The  muscular  sense,  also,  has  its  interests,  its 
pleasures,  and  pains  ;  and  it  is  probable  that  these 
experiences  constitute  not  a  little  of  the  beauty 
or  ugliness  which  we  attribute  to  objects.  There 
are  lines  of  beauty  which  have  that  character  be- 
cause of  the  agreeable  exercise  of  the  muscles  as 
the  eye  sweeps  along  them.  Part  of  the  beauty 
of  buildings,  or  of  human  faces,  resides  in  this 
sense. 

It  might  be  shown  that  the  sensations  of  the 
other  senses  have  their  aesthetic  value.  The  sen- 
sations of  touch  have  this  aesthetic  quality ;  nor 
is  there  any  good  reason  why  such  a  quality  should 
be  denied  to  the  sensations  of  smell  and  taste.  It 
is  to  be  added,  the  aesthetic  feeling  of  one  sense 
may  blend  with  that  of  another  ;  it  is  found,  also, 
that  with  the  pleasures  and  pains  of  the  special 
senses  there  blend  the  massive  feelings  derived 
from  the  internal  organs  of  the  body. 

9.  But  the  direct  ministry  to  the  sensuous  nature 
is  not  the  sole  function  of  art.  Art  is  perceptive 
in  a  profounder  sense.  It  deals  with  the  concrete ; 
but,  as  we  have  already  seen,  the  concrete  is  not 


202  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

merely  that  which  is  technically  called  phenome- 
non ;  it  is  also  the  inner  life  of  the  being  that  is  ob- 
served. Art,  to  be  realistic,  must  present  that  inner 
reality  also.  But  this  reality  is  independent,  and 
cannot  be  known  directly.  The  artist  knows  di- 
rectly only  his  sense-affections,  and  knows  only  in 
an  indirect  way  that  which  these  sense-affections 
suggest.  The  perception,  therefore,  is  indirect; 
and  when  it  is  such  as  to  grasp  the  actual  life,  it 
is  of  the  kind  we  have  designated  sympathetic. 

10.  There  is  a  natural  transition  from  the  im- 
mediately sensuous   function   of  art  to  the  sympa- 
thetic function.     The  attractive  object,  because  of 
its  attractive  qualities,  becomes  the  centre  of  inter- 
est, and  is  then  contemplated  till  its  objective  exist- 
ence  is   appreciated.     It  is   as   in  the  marriage  of 
two  souls  which,  attracted  by  charms  and  delights, 
pass  by  virtue  of  these  delights  to  the  profoundest 
sympathy  with,  and  understanding  of,  each  other. 
The  interest  leads  to  this  penetrating  observation. 
The  pleasure  felt  leads  to  kindness.     And  the  two 
feelings  so  blend  together  that  in  many  a  case  it 
is  difficult  to  divide  the  conscious  state  and  render 
to  each  that  which  belongs  to  it. 

11.  It  is  not  meant  that  this  objective  character 
is  never  attributed  to  that  which  is  sensuously  per- 
ceived, as  well  as  to  that  which  is  reached  by  sym- 


SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION  IN  ART         2O3 

pathy.  The  relation  of  the  artist  to  colours  and 
sounds  is  not  always  that  of  one  seeking  subjective 
gratification ;  he  does  not  feel  the  self-reference  of 
one  who  is  using  means  to  please  himself.  The 
colour,  or  the  sound,  appears  to  him  as  a  real 
object ;  he  loves  it  and  admires  it  as  if  it  was 
his  friend  ;  and  the  pleasure  he  finds  in  it  is  like 
his  who  takes  pleasure  in  unselfish  kindness  to  his 
friend.  Beauty  has  been  called  objectified  feel- 
ing or  emotion : 1  it  is  true  that  in  some  cases, 
at  least,  beauty  is  a  subjective  affection  objectified. 
Moreover,  the  term  imitation  is  used  to  describe 
the  art  which  produces  sensuous  beauty  :  the  artist 
is  said  to  imitate  or  copy  the  colour  of  the  rose,  or 
the  sunset.  Yet  though  the  artist,  like  the  unreflect- 
ing man,  objectifies  his  sense-impressions,  it  remains 
true  that  they  are  his  immediate  sense-affections, 
and  they  do  not  enable  him  to  reach  the  independent 
object  as  the  man  reaches  it  who  uses  the  method 
of  sympathy.  Moreover,  the  imitation,  when  a 
psychological  analysis  of  it  is  presented,  proves  to 
be  something  other  than  a  correspondence  of  subject 
and  object.  The  man  who  sees  an  object,  and  then 
proceeds  to  put  it  on  the  canvas,  has  first  an  image 
of  it,  and  then  an  image  of  it  as  reproduced,  this 
second  image  becoming  a  motor  idea,  and  resulting 

1  Santayana,  The  Sense  of  Beauty,  §  10. 


204  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

in  the  actual  reproduction.     It  is  only  in  this  sense 
that  there  is  imitation. 

12.  We  proceed,  therefore,  to  a  study  of  those 
works  of  art  in  which  sympathetic  imitation  finds 
clearer  exemplification.     It  is  interesting  to  look  at 
the  artistic  treatment  of  inorganic  nature.     The  art- 
ist personifies  nature.     The  painter  who  paints  the 
hoary  rock  beaten  by  the  waves  puts  human  feeling 
into  it,  —  constant  suffering,  yet  undaunted  courage. 
The  artist  supposes  this  to  be  there,  as  he  supposes 
the  presence  of  feeling  when  he  sees  the  figure  of 
a   man,  and  enters  into  the   realization   of   it   by 
sympathy. 

13.  In  architecture,  inorganic  nature  is  moulded 
to  man's  thoughts  and  feelings.     Schopenhauer l  has 
given   an   interesting    theory   of    the    meaning    of 
beauty  in  architecture.     He  says  that  it  is  the  func- 
tion  of  this   art  to  present  the   laws  or   forces  of 
matter  ;    and  that  the  building  is  beautiful  which 
exhibits   clearly  the   idea   of  burden  and   support. 
The  natural  tendency  of   the   materials   composing 
the  building  is  to  fall  to  earth  in  a  mass,  but  part  of 
them  is  lifted  and  held  aloft.     In  illustration  of  this 
theory  we  have  his  contention  that  the  Greek  is  the 
most  beautiful  of  all  styles  of  architecture,  because 
the  horizontal  beam  resting  on  the  pillar  brings  out 

1  Die  Welt  als  Wille  und  Vorstelhtng,  Band  I,  §  43. 


SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION  IN  ART         205 

most  vividly  the  idea  of  burden  and  support.  Com- 
pared with  a  Greek  building,  a  Gothic  is  barbarous, 
for  the  idea  of  burden  has  vanished  in  the  arch. 
Exception  might  readily  be  taken  to  these  deduc- 
tions from  the  theory:  it  may  seem  that  they  are, 
even  on  Schopenhauer's  principles,  unjustifiable,  and 
that  the  round  or  pointed  arch  represents,  though  in 
a  different  way,  yet  more  finely  than  the  beam  and 
pillar,  the  idea  of  burden  and  support.  Such  criti- 
cisms, however,  should  not  hide  from  us  the  value 
of  the  general  principle  laid  down. 

If  we  go  on  to  inquire  by  what  exercise  of  the 
mind  this  idea  is  gained,  we  can  see  that  it  is 
reached  through  animistic  sympathy.  This  is  not, 
indeed,  Schopenhauer's  account  of  it.  He  says  that 
in  art  we  are  contemplating  ideas,  not  abstractly,  as 
we  contemplate  them  in  science,  but  as  they  are 
given  in  concrete  things  :  while,  for  instance,  science 
considers  the  laws  of  fluidity,  art  sees  them  em- 
bodied in  a  fountain.  The  statement  is  valuable,  as 
calling  attention  to  the  interest  in  the  concrete 
which  is  characteristic  of  art.  Yet  art  has  no  special 
regard  for  abstract  ideas.  The  reality  is  not  for  it 
an  embodiment  or  knot  of  them.  They  are  for  it, 
as  art,  only  incidents  in  life's  epos,  like  other  con- 
scious experiences.  It  is  by  another  way  than  that 
of  abstract  ideas  that  the  builder  becomes  artistic. 


206  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

The  primitive  man,  when  he  came  to  be  in  a  position 
to  attend  to  such  things,  began  to  notice  the  press- 
ure on  the  rock-pillars  of  his  cave,  or  on  the  posts 
of  his  house.  The  post  or  the  rock-shaft  became  for 
him  a  living  thing  ;  and  he  seemed  to  feel  the  effort 
made  by  it  to  sustain  the  burden.  He  admired  its 
strength,  and  as  he  built  further  he  took  care  that 
the  pillars  should,  like  athletes,  have  their  strength 
tried,  but  yet  that  the  weight  should  not  be,  or 
appear  to  be,  oppressive.  He  became  an  artistic 
architect  because  he  personified,  and  knew  this  per- 
sonified object  by  sympathy  with  its  individual 
feelings. 

14.  In  the  artistic  representation  of  living  or- 
ganisms the  same  sympathetic  treatment  can  be 
observed.  It  is  probably  present,  though  in  an 
obscure  way,  in  the  delineation  of  physical  beauty. 
Probably  in  the  beauty  of,  say,  a  human  face  there 
is  more  than  the  sensuous  pleasure  we  experience. 
Schopenhauer  believes  that  the  touchstone  of  the 
beauty  of  human  features  is  the  utility  of  each  for 
the  well-being  of  the  whole.  The  brow,  he  says, 
must  be  well  developed,  for  that  is  the  seat  of  intelli- 
gence ;  the  mouth  must  not  be  large,  else  it  re- 
sembles the  muzzle  of  a  brute  ;  the  beauty  of  the 
man  is  not  the  beauty  of  the  woman,  for  the  life- 
work  of  the  two  is  different.  If  this  view  is 


SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION  IN  ART         2O? 

correct,  it  is  likely  that  the  painter  and  sculptor  will 
be  found  to  have  an  appreciation  of  these  features 
differing  in  character  from  that  of  the  physiologist. 
It  is,  indeed,  the  tendency  of  men  of  artistic  temper- 
ament to  look  on  each  feature  as  having  an  individu- 
ality, and  even  a  personality,  of  its  own,  and  to 
enter  sympathetically  into  the  feelings  supposed  to 
belong  to  this  objective  entity. 

But  there  is  a  presentation  of  the  outward  form 
of  living  creatures  which  much  more  clearly  re- 
veals the  presence  of  sympathy.  Emerson  quotes 
somewhere  the  remark  of  the  painter  who  said  that, 
to  paint  a  tree,  you  must  for  the  time  be  a  tree ;  you 
must,  so  to  speak,  enter  into  the  tree's  life,  and 
share  its  hopes  and  fears.  The  painter  and  the 
sculptor  can  likewise  represent  a  tiger  or  a  lamb  in 
such  a  way  as  to  make  known  to  us  the  fierceness  of 
the  one,  or  the  timidity  and  meekness  of  the  other. 
But  such  artists  furnish  yet  fuller  insight  into  the 
human  soul :  their  art  reaches  one  of  its  highest 
attainments  in  the  representation  of  the  human  face. 
The  artist  has  to  reveal  the  soul  behind  the  face  that 
is  depicted.  The  revelation  is,  indeed,  only  for  the 
seeing  eye  ;  but  it  is  there  in  those  "  touches  which 
are  known  to  souls."  And  the  appeal  is  made  to 
the  spectator's  sympathy  as  when  the  living  face  of 
the  individual  himself  is  present. 


208  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

15.  There  are,  however,  arts  which   appeal   yet 
more   unmistakably  to   the   sympathies.     It   would 
be   easy  to   offer  plausible  objections  to  what  has 
been  said  of  the  presence  of  sympathy  in  the  arts 
already  considered.      It  might   be   urged  that   the 
painter  and  the  sculptor  are  not  making  use  of  the 
sympathetic  faculty,  but  are  rendering  as  accurately 
as  possible  the  appearance  of  the  object  as  it  affects 
the  senses ;  and  to  say  that  sympathy  is  essential  to 
the  appreciation  of  architecture  might  seem  to  bor- 
der on  the  fantastic.     But  there  are  forms  of  art  in 
the  presence  of  which  such  objections  cannot  be  sus- 
tained.    It  is  doubtful  whether  they  can  be  adhered 
to   in  view  of   certain   kinds   of   music;    it   is  not 
readily  conceivable  how  they  are  to  be  reconciled 
with  certain  forms  of  poetry. 

16.  Music,  as  we  have  seen,  has  charms  which 
are   immediately   sensuous.      But  it   has  a   further 
meaning  :  it  expresses  the  emotions.     All  the  feel- 
ings  of  the   soul   find   their  natural   expression  in 
vocal  sounds.     The  joyful  or  sorrowful  stirrings  of 
the  spirit   are   reflected,  especially   in   the    case   of 
primitive  man,  in  inarticulate  sounds.     Even  when 
that  which  is  offensive  in  such  sounds  is  eliminated, 
their  power  of  suggesting  certain  experiences  is  not 
diminished,  but  may  even  be  increased.     By  virtue 
of  this  empirical  yet  firmly  established   association 


SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION  IN  ART         2OQ 

of  sound  with  emotion,  music  is  able  to  evoke  sym- 
pathy with  the  experiences  of  the  musician.  The 
original  form  of  music  is  that  given  by  the  man  who 
chants  his  own  joys  and  sorrows,  or  those  of  others. 
In  the  use  of  instruments,  and  in  the  rendering  of 
music  apart  from  all  its  natural  context,  there  may 
be  much  to  perplex  the  power  of  interpretation. 
Yet  the  sympathy,  if  rendered  vague  and  uncertain,  is 
still  present.  It  may  be  claimed,  indeed,  that  music 
has  now  gained  a  new  function ;  in  the  case  of  some, 
the  appreciation  of  music  seems  to  become  a  purely  : 
intellectual  perception.  Yet  such  perception  is  like 
that  of  the  students  of  illuminated  texts  who,  ab- 
sorbed in  the  contemplation  of  the  letters,  entirely 
lose  the  ideas  which  the  letters  are  meant  to  convey. 
However  this  may  be,  it  is  true  that  some  music  is 
the  utterance  of  the  emotions,  and  is  able  to  elicit 
sympathy  with  them. 

17.  Poetry,  like  music,  makes  use  of  sounds  ;  but 
the  sounds  which  poetry  uses  are  articulate  words 
that  are  wedded  to  definite  meanings  from  which,  ex- 
cept in  peculiar  conditions,  they  cannot  be  divorced. 
It  is  true  that  poetry,  like  other  arts,  has  an  aesthetic 
element  that  is  immediately  sensuous  :  its  appeal  to 
the  ear  resembles,  in  certain  respects,  the  sensuous 
appeal  of  music.  Yet  the  words  of  which  poetry 
makes  use  convey  ideas  :  they  cannot  lose  their 


210  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

supreme  function  of  acting  as   symbols   of  definite 
conscious  experiences. 

In  the  lyric,  the  poet  is  expressing  his  subjective 
feelings.  His  joys  and  sorrows,  his  loves  and  hates, 
are  the  theme  of  his  song.  Moreover,  the  expression 
of  them  is  direct.  The  poet  is  not  studying  them  in 
a  scientific  way  ;  they  are  not  objective  to  him  ;  he 
is  not  writing  his  autobiography.  He  is  absorbed 
in  the  living  of  them,  and  his  song  is  the  experience 
finding  a  voice.  If  he  speaks  of  other  things  or  per- 
sons, it  is  as  they  are  related  to  this  subjective  mood  : 
the  grass,  the  birds,  the  stars,  are  not  interesting  for 
their  own  sakes,  but  as  they  affect  the  singer. 

"  The  dark,  dreary  winter  and  wild  driving  snaw, 
Alane  can  delight  me." 

"  Break,  break,  break, 
On  thy  cold  gray  stones,  O  sea ! 
And  I  would  that  my  tongue  could  utter 
The  thoughts  that  arise  in  me." 

The  lyric  often,  indeed,  approximates  to  the  epic, 
but  in  so  far  as  it  remains  lyrical  it  retains  this  sub- 
jective character.  Thus,  the  religious  hymn  seems 
to  be  largely  taken  up  with  the  divine  attributes  ; 
but  it  is  not  a  theological  treatise,  inasmuch  as  it 
merely  reflects  the  course  of  ideas  and  emotions 
in  the  writer's  mind. 

It  may  seem  that  the  lyric  excludes  the  exercise 


SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION  IN  ART         211 

of  sympathy  by  reason  of  its  subjectivity;  and  this 
is  the  case  so  far  as  the  lyrist  is  concerned.  The 
sympathy  which  is  elicited  by  the  lyric  is  like  that 
elicited  by  the  music  which  expresses  the  musician's 
experience.  The  lyric  reveals  the  poet's  soul  in  its 
concrete  emotions  and  fancies,  and  thus  evokes  the 
sympathy  of  others.  To  understand  the  lyric  is  to 
perceive  the  concrete  life  of  the  poet,  and  to  feel  it 
as  he  is  living  it. 

There  is  a  special  function  of  the  lyric  which 
should  be  referred  to,  for  it  is  often  used  without 
the  awakening  of  any  sympathy  with  the  writer. 
It  may  be  adopted  by  the  nation,  or  the  church,  and 
each  member  of  these  communities  makes  it  his  own 
without  giving,  it  may  be,  a  moment's  attention  to 
the  author.  But  this  is  because  the  author  aimed 
at  expressing  the  feeling  of  the  community  :  he  sang 
the  song  of  the  community ;  and,  therefore,  the 
community  adopts  the  song  as  its  own.  The  sym- 
pathy referred  to  could  come  only  from  one  outside 
the  community,  or  one  who  for  the  time  should 
adopt  the  attitude  of  an  outsider. 

While,  therefore,  the  sympathy  which  the  lyric  ex- 
cites is  not  that  of  the  poet,  it  is  important  to  note  its 
power  to  evoke  sympathy ;  he  for  whom  it  is  some- 
thing objective  understands  it  only  by  sympathy.1 

1  Music  and  the  lyric  illustrate  Tolstoy's  definition  of  art  (  What 


212  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

The  poet  becomes  the  interpreter  of  that  which 
is  objective  to  him  when  lie  passes  from  the  lyric 
to  the  epic.  In  the  epic  the  poet  is  interested  in 
the  life  of  another  human  being.  The  hero  is 
made  to  live  in  the  poet's  imagination ;  he  speaks 
in  his  own  voice ;  when  he  acts,  the  peculiar  emo- 
tions associated  with  his  action  are  vividly  realized. 
The  poet  may  adopt  less  poetical  modes  of  ex- 
pression, and  speak  of  abstractions  like  justice  or 
courage,  but  all  this  may  be  subordinate  to  the 
representation  of  a  living  personality  in  its  con- 
crete actuality. 

It  does  not  disprove  this  statement  regarding  the 
epic  to  say  that  few  epics  have  been  so  purely 
objective,  and  that  even  a  poet  like  Milton  pro- 
jects his  subjectivity  over  his  characters.  It  only 
shows  the  limits  of  the  poet's  sympathy ;  the 
characters  with  which  he  can  sympathize  are 
those  like  his  own.  None  the  less  is  it  true  that 
he  has  made  these  characters  objective.  And  the 
fact  that  they  are  so  like  himself  is  in  itself  an 
evidence  that  his  relation  to  them  is  that  of 
sympathy. 

The  novel  is,  in  many  respects,  like  the  epic, 
which  it  has  to  a  large  extent  superseded.  Some 

is  art?  translated  by  Aylmer  Maude,  p.  60).     But  that  definition 
does  not  cover  all  forms  of  legitimate  artistic  activity. 


SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION  IN  ART         21 3 

of  the  more  sensuous  factors  in  poetry  are  omitted ; 
and  yet,  while  this  prejudices  the  artistic  com- 
pleteness of  the  novel,  the  loss  is  counterbalanced 
by  the  greater  freedom  which  is  gained.  It  is, 
other  things  being  equal,  a  more  lifelike  picture 
that  is  attained. 

In  the  epic  and  the  novel  the  characters  do  not 
always  speak  for  themselves.  There  are  passages 
in  which  the  writer  is  describing  them.  Such 
descriptions  are  more  or  less  external.  They  do 
not  make  the  appeal  which  the  actual  words  of 
the  character  represented  make ;  for  the  associa- 
tion of  inner  experience  with  such  words  is  of 
the  most  direct  kind  known  to  the  mind.  More- 
over, in  the  epic  or  novel  there  may  be  a  tendency 
to  adopt  some  of  the  methods  characteristic  of 
science :  to  make  much  of  abstractions,  and  to 
expound  causal  relations.  Not  that  it  is  always  a 
disadvantage  to  mingle  the  more  scientific  with  the 
more  artistic.  Except  for  the  greatest  writers,  it 
may  be  a  surer  way  of  attaining  the  end  desired. 
Yet  it  does  not  indicate  the  completest  absorp- 
tion in  the  object. 

That  completer  absorption,  that  more  perfect 
vision,  that  fuller  sympathy,  are  given  in  the 
drama.  The  drama  is  the  synthesis  of  the  epic 
and  the  lyric  :  like  the  epic  it  is  interested  in  the 


214  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

objective ;  it  has  a  lyrical  element,  inasmuch  as 
each  of  the  characters  represented  is  self-revealing. 
The  dramatist  shows  skill  in  selecting  those  pas- 
sages of  the  inner  life  which  are  best  fitted  to 
yield  this  revelation  in  a  clear  form.  He  may, 
indeed,  help  us  to  understand  that  life  better  by 
indicating  its  effects  on  other  lives  ;  yet  the  pri- 
mary method  is  that  of  self -revelation.  It  need 
not  be  said  that  the  account  of  this  inner  life  is 
not  of  the  scientific  kind;  the  life  is  so  disclosed 
that  we  feel  it  as  if  we  were  living  it. 

It  is  worthy  of  being  recalled  that  the  drama 
is  meant  to  be  acted  and  spoken.  Perhaps  all 
poetry  is  taken  too  abstractly,  and  too  much  apart 
from  its  original  intention,  when  it  is  read  silently. 
It  demands  the  human  voice  for  its  instrument. 
The  drama  makes  its  appeal  not  only  through 
spoken  words,  but  also  through  various  bodily 
movements.  There  is  thus  additional  help  toward 
that  insight  into  the  inner  life  which  the  drama  is 
meant  to  yield. 

18.  The  two  principles  of  artistic  insight  and 
artistic  production  which  concern  us  here  may 
now  be  restated.  First,  art  deals  with  the  con- 
crete, not  with  the  abstract  or  universal.  Again, 
since  the  concrete  is  not  merely  sensation  in  its 
immediacy,  but  the  inner  life  of  independent  beings, 


SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION  IN  ART         215 

we  have  found  that  art,  to  fulfil  its  function,  must 
make  large  use  of  sympathy.  It  has  been  seen 
that  for  poetry  especially  sympathy  is  indispensable. 
19.  It  is  important  for  a  clearer  understanding 
of  these  principles  that  we  should  recall  the  two 
main  forms  of  aesthetic  theory.  There  is,  first  of 
all,  the  theory  that  the  object  of  art  is  to  please. 
We  have  seen  that  this  doctrine  is,  so  far,  true : 
there  may  be  many  works  of  art  whose  object  is 
to  give  pleasure.  This  is  true  of  much  sensuous 
art,  though  it  cannot  be  conceded  that  it  is  true 
of  it  all.  But  there  are  many  artistic  activities 
which  the  theory  entirely  fails  to  cover.  It  does 
not  take  account  of  the  objective  interests  of  art. 
Even  so,  to  refer  to  the  parallel  ethical  contro- 
versy, the  utilitarian  theory,  that  actions  are  per- 
formed for  pleasure,  holds  true  of  certain  actions, 
but  it  is  not  true  of  all;  for  instance,  the  impor- 
tant group  of  actions  known  as  ideo-motor  cannot 
be  explained  by  it.  And  there  are  many  artistic 
interests  and  artistic  products  whose  impulse  is  not 
pleasure.  It  might  be  thought  that  the  existence 
of  pleasure  is  at  least  a  negative  condition,  since 
nothing  will  be  sought  after  which  gives  pain  ;  yet, 
though  the  inhibitory  power  of  pain  is  great,  it  is 
doubtful  if  even  thus  much  of  the  theory  can  be 
defended  as  universally  true.  From  what  pleasure 


2l6  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

arises  the  interest  in  a  tragedy?  In  the  tragedy 
men  are  seen  to  become  the  prey  of  disaster.  And 
the  disaster  is  not  necessarily  the  manifestation  of 
retributive  justice  :  it  may  be  such  in  some  cases, 
but  Schopenhauer  is  right  in  scornfully  rejecting 
the  view  that  the  suffering  in  all  cases  is  retribu- 
tive. It  may  be  urged  by  the  optimist  that  the 
suffering  is  to  lead  to  happiness  somehow ;  but 
those  who  cannot  put  confidence  in  such  consola- 
tions may  yet  find  interest  in  the  tragedy.  They 
are  interested  as  they  are  interested  in  the  suffer- 
ings of  their  own  children ;  not  less,  but  more, 
when  they  can  discern  no  prospect  of  alleviation 
or  happy  termination. 

In  connection  with  the  hedonistic  account  of  art, 
reference  may  be  made  to  the  theory  which  Mr. 
H.  R.  Marshall  has  offered  regarding  the  origin 
of  artistic  production.  He  traces  it  to  an  instinct 
to  "  act  in  such  a  way  as  would  attract  advantageous 
objects  to  us."1  Mr.  Marshall  proceeds  to  say  that 
all  selfishness  has  disappeared  from  this  instinct. 
But  we  must  go  a  step  further.  Whether  or  not 
the  artist  originally  sought  to  attract  objects  to 
himself,  he  has  not  only  ceased  to  do  this  selfishly ; 
he  is  in  many  cases  making  other  individual  things, 
or  persons,  the  centre  of  attraction.  He  is  lost 

1  ^Esthetic  Principles,  p.  69. 


SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION  IN  ART         217 

in  his  work :  it  is  his  production  —  the  Madonna, 
or  Apollo,  or  Hamlet  —  that  we  are  interested  in. 
Moreover,  it  is  often  the  inner  life  which  he  presents  : 
that  is  to  say,  he  has  become  sympathetic,  and  is 
enabling  us  to  enter  into  his  sympathies. 

20.  In  sharp  opposition  to  the  hedonistic  view 
of  art  is  the  idealistic  theory  of  writers  such  as 
Schopenhauer  and  Hegel,  which  finds  its  meaning 
in  contemplation  of  the  objective.  The  defect  in 
this  kind  of  theory  is  that  the  objective  is  regarded 
as  a  system  of  ideas  or  categories.  Hegel,  whose 
view  may  be  taken  as  typical,  says  that  the  beautiful 
is  the  Idea  as  it  appears  to  the  senses.  The  meta- 
physics which  identifies  the  reality  with  the  Idea 
need  not  be  criticised  at  this  point.  But  even  were 
it  granted  that  the  Idea  is  the  reality  it  is  alleged 
to  be,  it  must  still  be  said  that  the  Idea  cannot 
appear  to  sense.  The  Idea  can  be  known  only  by 
reason ;  and  sense  can  perceive  only  what  is  sensu- 
ous. The  theory  that  beauty  is  known  by  sense 
remains  a  sensuous  theory.  But,  in  truth,  the  world 
contains  much  more  than  ideas,  in  the  sense  of  uni- 
versals;  and  in  the  appreciation  of  the  beautiful 
there  are  many  other  faculties  besides  sense  called 
into  exercise.  Sense  mirrors  sense ;  but  intellect 
also,  as  we  see  in  the  novel  which  depicts  a  phi- 
losopher's mental  struggles,  mirrors  intellect. 


2l8  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

It  may  be  added,  that  the  perception  of  that 
unity  in  diversity  which  has  often  been  thought 
to  constitute  beauty  might  coexist  with  the  exer- 
cise of  sympathy ;  but,  when  we  consider  that  this 
perception  is  one  of  the  peculiar  activities  of  the 
abstract  intellect,  we  must  hesitate  to  say  that  it 
is  the  distinctive  factor  in  aesthetic  appreciation. 

21.  The  sympathetic  method  of  art  being  now 
analyzed,  it  can  be  seen  in  what  sense  art  is  truer 
than  such  a  science  as  history.  Aristotle  said  that 
poetry  was  more  philosophical  than  history  because 
of  the  unity  of  the  action  which  it  presented  and  the 
typical  character  which  it  reached.  But  it  is  not 
because  of  its  approach  to  conceptual  science  that 
poetry  is  truer  than  the  recital  of  the  succession  of 
phenomena,  but  because  of  its  closer  contact  with  the 
concrete  forms  of  actual  life.  History,  it  is  true, 
has  much  in  common  with  poetry.  It  may  be 
regarded  as  a  development  from  the  epic.  Like 
poetry,  it  tleals  with  what  is  concrete.  While  such 
a  science  as  mechanics  gives  universal  laws,  without 
reference  to  any  particular  individual  existence,  his- 
tory treats  of  individuals  and  of  particular  facts  in 
their  experience.  Nevertheless,  history  treats  the 
concrete  facts  according  to  the  abstract  methods 
of  science.  It  has  become  differentiated  from  the 
epic ;  and  its  ambition  is  to  trace  in  the  sequence 


SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION  IN  ART         219 

of  human  experiences  the  causal  nexus,  or  that 
complex  causality  which  is  indicated  by  the  term 
"development."  But  how  false  this  historical  view 
of  the  facts  is,  we  can  see  by  recalling  the  unsat- 
isfactory character  of  such  concepts  as  causality. 
It  can  be  readily  seen  that  the  poet  resorts  to 
no  such  methods  of  rendering  the  experiences 
which  he  is  recounting.  He  is  not  led  away  from 
them  to  a  study  of  what  are  called  their  relations  : 
he  is  interested  in  the  experiences  as  they  were  ex- 
perienced. The  transition  from  one  experience  to 
another  is  not  for  him  that  which  is  cogitated  by 
an  observer  of  abstract  theoretic  interest :  it  is  the 
transition  as  that  is  in  the  actual  consciousness  of 
the  individuals  he  is  contemplating.  Thus  the  poet 
is  truer  to  facts.  Poetry  has  its  home  in  the  con- 
crete, and  its  method  is  the  method  of  truth. 

It  follows  that  the  other  sciences  which  deal  with 
man,  and  likewise  those  which  have  nature  for 
their  subject-matter,  have  not  the  method  of  truth 
as  it  is  possessed  by  poetry  and  the  other  arts. 

22.  Does  art,  then,  take  the  place  of  science? 
Are  we,  in  order  to  get  that  truth  which  is  the 
ideal  of  thought,  to  leave  the  laboratory  and  the 
historical  archives,  and  betake  ourselves  to  the  study 
of  poetry  ?  In  spite  of  what  has  been  said,  the 
question  cannot  be  answered  in  the  affirmative  with- 


220  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

out  important  qualifications.  For  there  is  a  sense 
in  which  art  does  not  imitate  the  reality.  It  is 
creative ;  it  idealizes.  The  beauty  which  it  pre- 
sents may  be  a  dream.  It  was  not  any  one  indi- 
vidual that  served  as  a  model  for  the  sculptor  of 
a  Greek  god,  or  the  painter  of  a  Madonna  ;  it  is 
not  the  historical  Hamlet  that  Shakespeare  brings 
before  us.  Art  does  not  reveal  the  world  of  actual 
facts  :  it  reveals  a  world  of  its  own  making.  It 
must  not,  indeed,  be  forgotten  that  art,  in  dealing 
with  the  objects  which  it  creates,  applies  the  method 
of  truth,  and  has  in  regard  to  them  the  vision 
divine.  Yet  the  fact  remains  that  it  has  not  held 
itself,  after  the  manner  of  science,  to  the  concrete 
particulars  of  the  actual  world.  It  has  changed 
them  in  its  representation  of  them.  It  is  one  of 
its  glories  that  it  is  a  dreamer  of  golden  dreams. 
It  may  seem  that  there  are  exceptions  to  this  prin- 
ciple. In  architecture  it  is  the  actual  material 
mass  that  is  dealt  with ;  in  sculpture  and  painting 
the  object  may  be  reproduced  with  great  fidelity. 
It  is  to  be  noticed,  however,  that  such  arts  make 
a  less  direct  use  of  the  sympathies.  There  is  sym- 
pathy on  the  part  of  the  artist,  but  he  is  not  com- 
mitted to  any  special  form  of  it.  It  is  in  poetry 
that  sympathy  becomes  more  definite,  and  it  is  pre- 
cisely in  poetry  that  there  is  the  freest  departure 


SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION1  IN  ART         221 

from  the  actual  world.     The  poet  makes  his  own 
world  that  he  may  enter  into  sympathy  with  it. 

While,  therefore,  we  find  that  art  makes  use  of 
sympathy,  and  is  therefore  to  be  regarded  as  possess- 
ing the  method  of  truth,  it  is  yet  to  be  acknow- 
ledged that  it  has  not  employed  the  method  so  as 
to  reach  knowledge.  Art  is  incomplete  when  taken 
alone.  Its  method  must  be  supplemented  by  other 
methods,  that  the  vision  of  truth  may  be  attained. 


CHAPTER  IX 

SYMPATHETIC   IMITATION   IN  MORALITY 

1.  The    morality    of    which    sympathy    may    be 
claimed  to  be  a  constituent  is  that  which  pertains 
to  the   social    relations   of  human    beings.     There 
are  duties  which  are  binding  on  the  solitary  indi- 
vidual :    temperance  would  be  obligatory  were   he 
cut  off  from  his  fellows  in  hopeless  isolation.     But 
there  are  other  duties  which  devolve  upon  the  in- 
dividual  as   a  member    of    society,   and   for    their 
proper  discharge  he  must  exercise   the   faculty  of 
sympathy.     Thus,  in  the  sphere  of  social  relations, 
sympathy  is  one  of  life's  ideals. 

2.  It  is  generally   conceded   that  the   Christian 
statement  of  man's  social  duties  is  the  truest  that 
the   world   has   known,  and   that  in  important  re- 
spects  it  presents   the   final   and   absolute  law  of 
conduct.     Man  is  to  love  his  neighbour  as  himself. 
This  means  first  that  he  is  to  love  those  that  are 
his  friends  ;  it  means  also  that  he  is  to  be  kind  to 
the  unthankful  and  the  evil ;   the  man  who  is  his 
enemy,  he  is  to  feed  and  clothe  ;  and  he  is  to  offer 


SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION  IN  MORALITY   22$ 

his  cheek  again  to  the  smiters.  This  love  shows 
itself  in  ministries  of  all  kinds.  It  takes  upon 
itself  the  lowliest  offices,  such  as  the  washing  of 
feet;  or,  by  the  ministry  of  teaching  and  exhorta- 
tion, it  makes  the  souls  of  others  the  possessors  of 
knowledge  and  virtue.  This  Christian  love  is  a 
social  ideal  which  depends  for  its  realization  on 
sympathy. 

3.  It  is  true  that  there  is  a  love  which  does 
not  depend  upon  sympathy.  Human  beings  are 
attracted  to  each  other  by  various  charms :  beauty 
of  person,  or  sparkling  wit,  or  store  of  instruction, 
or  the  advantages  of  wealth.  To  quote  Spinoza : l 
Amor  est  Icetitia  concomitante  idea  causce  externce. 
The  most  striking  example  of  such  a  relation  is 
found  in  romantic  love  :  the  man  delights  in  the 
beauty  of  the  woman;  the  woman  in  the  beauty  of 
the  man.  There  is  not  necessarily  any  sympathy 
in  such  relations.  Each  seeks  the  other  for  his 
own  pleasure ;  and,  were  that  pleasure  to  cease, 
the  intercourse  would  lose  its  charm.  The  incon- 
stancy of  friends,  so  much  deplored,  is  to  be  ex- 
plained partly  on  the  ground  that  the  friendship 
consisted  in  nothing  other  than  the  pleasure  which 
the  individuals  could  get  from  each  other;  they 
ceased  going  to  the  well  when  it  became  dry* 

1  Ethica,  Par.  Ill,  Propos.  13,  schol. 


224  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

This  love  is  not  to  be  condemned  in  any  sweeping 
way.  It  is  legitimate  for  an  individual  to  receive 
as  well  as  to  give,  to  seek  pleasure  from  others  as 
well  as  to  bestow  it  upon  them.  Yet  it  is,  at  least, 
to  be  observed  that  such  love  is  not  disinterested 
and  sympathetic.  It  may  develop,  even  in  the 
romantic  form,  into  a  great  selfishness. 

There  is  a  theory  adopted  by  some  writers  on 
ethics,  according  to  which  all  so-called  love  is 
ultimately  of  this  interested  character :  a  man 
does  good  to  others,  it  is  said,  in  order  that  he  in 
turn  may  be  helped  by  them.  Yet  it  has  come  to 
be  conceded  that,  as  the  effect  of  habit,  a  change 
has  come  over  the  impulse  to  such  actions,  and 
that  they  are  now  performed  without  a  view  to 
selfish  ends.  It  is  obvious '  that  such  benevolence 
is  not  of  the  same  quality  as  self-interest.  In  any 
case,  the  benevolence  which  is  the  Christian  ideal 
cannot  be  construed  in  terms  of  selfish  interest. 
Love  is  not  pleasure  derived  from  others  :  "  If  ye 
love  them  which  love  you,  what  reward  have  ye." 
A  man  may  do  many  good  deeds  from  a  selfish 
motive;  he  may  give  his  goods  to  feed  the  poor, 
and  yet,  from  the  ideal  point  of  view,  be  nothing. 

4.  It  might,  however,  still  seem  that  sympathy 
is  not  indispensable  to  love  or  benevolence.  It  is 
surely  possible  to  do  good  deeds  from  motives 


SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION  IN  MORALITY   22$ 

that  are  unselfish,  while  yet  there  is  no  exercise 
of  sympathy.  A  man  may  desire  to  relieve  those 
who  have  been  visited  by  famine  in  some  distant 
part  of  the  world,  and  with  this  end  in  view  he 
may  make  a  donation  of  money.  In  giving  the 
money  he  does  not  think  of  advantage  or  renown 
to  accrue  to  himself ;  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  there 
seems  to  be  little  more  sympathy  elicited  by  the 
individuals  befriended  than  there  is  when  he  in- 
vests his  money  in  railway  stock.  It  may  be 
found,  also,  in  many  good  actions  that  are  done 
from  habit  that,  while  there  is  no  conscious  self- 
ishness left,  there  is  likewise  no  conscious  sym- 
pathy. Further,  it  is  noteworthy  that  those  who 
hold  up  benevolence  as  the  great  social  virtue  do 
not  make  prominent  the  element  of  sympathy,  but 
rather  point  to  certain  good  ends  which  are  to  be 
accomplished,  and  call  men  to  supply  the  me"ans 
to  these  ends.  Even  Christian  preachers  do  not 
magnify  the  place  of  sympathy  in  the  ideal  life 
which  they  describe.  They  exhort  to  kindness 
and  forgiveness  in  a  general  way ;  they  also  call 
upon  the  church  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  heathen. 
How  often  do  they  handle  the  theme  of  friend- 
ship? 

5.    Yet,  while   there   is   much  good   to  be   done 
apart   from   any   direct   display   of   sympathy,   and 
Q 


226  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

while  the  obstacles  to  sympathy  are  many,  it  is 
surely  this  finer  relation,  this  closer  intimacy,  that 
is  the  ideal  of  Christianity.  "  Bear  ye  one 
another's  burdens " ;  "  rejoice  with  those  that 
do  rejoice,  and  weep  with  those  that  weep " ; 
"whether  one  member  suffer  all  the  members 
suffer  with  it,  or  one  member  be  honoured  all  the 
members  rejoice  with  it";  the  great  "captain" 
and  "high  priest,"  Jesus,  is  "touched  with  a  feel- 
ing of  our  infirmities "  :  in  the  light  of  these 
sayings  we  should  interpret  the  commandment  of 
Jesus,  "  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbour  as  thyself." 
The  highest  ethical  attainment  in  the  social  life  is 
friendship  ;  and  a  perfect  friendship  is  a  perfect 
sympathy. 

6.  It  is  to  be  noticed  that  this  higher  love  does 
not  conflict  with  that  love  which  is  pleasure  derived 
from   others.     The   delight   which   a  man   feels  in 
others  may  well  bring  him  to  a  closer  interest  in 
them,    and    ultimately    to    sympathy    with    them. 
Romantic  love   often  illustrates  this  process :    the 
mutual  delight  of  man  and  woman  in  each  other  may 
develop,  by  virtue  of  the  interest  which  such  delight 
awakens,  into  the  most  sympathetic  friendship. 

7.  The  love  of  friendship  can  be  seen  to  be  like 
knowledge.     For  what  is  such  love?     "Two  souls 
with    a    single    thought."      Often,    indeed,    when 


SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION  IN  MORALITY  227 

knowledge  has-been  weighed,  it  has  seemed  to  be 
less  than  love;  and  this  judgment  of  knowledge 
is  just  in  view  of  much  that  claims  this  name.  In 
his  Social  Evolution,  Mr.  Kidd  represents  know- 
ledge and  benevolence  as  opposed  to  each  other 
in  their  effects.  This  is  because  the  intellect  is 
taken  abstractly.  When  knowledge  is  at  its  truest, 
the  opposition  disappears  ;  for  knowledge  is  sym- 
pathy. 

8.  The  reason  for  thinking  that  in  the  moral  life 
we  reach  that  acquaintance  with  reality  which  is 
denied  to  the  abstract  intellect  must  not  be  mis- 
understood. Kant  taught  that,  while  the  theo- 
retical reason  fails  to  reach  the  noumenal  world, 
the  eternal  realities  disclose  themselves  to  the 
practical  reason.  But  the  moral  conceptions 
which  Kant  cherishes  are  not  sufficiently  criti- 
cised :  the  moral  maxims  are  not,  as  he  thinks, 
independent  of  experience,  but  are  the  embodi- 
ment of  general  ideas  derived  from  experience. 
It  is  therefore  into  a  realm  of  abstractions  that 
Kant  conducts  us;  and  ethical  concepts  fail  of 
truth,  even  as  do  those  of  the  understanding.  If 
we  are  led  to  reality  through  morality,  it  is  not 
because  starting  from  moral  facts  we  make  ab- 
stract theories,  but  because  in  the  very  living  of 
the  moral  life,  in  certain  of  its  highest  forms,  we 


228  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

are  in  closest  cognitive  contact  with  a  reality 
other  than  our  own  being.1 

9.  Yet  while  morality  is  able  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent to  meet  the  demands  of  knowledge,  it  has 
certain  limitations  which  render  it  incapable  of 
fully  meeting  these  demands.  It  is  hard  for 
morality  to  separate  itself  from  what  is  utili- 
tarian ;  nor  is  it  desirable  for  the  most  part  that 
it  should.  It  looks  to  helpful  action  ;  it  sympa- 
thizes that  it  may  succour. 

It  is  on  the  same  principle  that  morality  is 
limited  in  respect  of  the  objects  with  which  it 
deals.  It  restricts  itself  to  human  beings;  or,  at 
the  most,  it  extends  its  mercy  to  the  needs  of 
creatures  that  have  life.  Lower  in  the  scale  of 
creation  it  does  not  go  :  the  vast  material  uni- 
verse is  ignored.  It  may,  indeed,  be  that,  were 
knowledge  of  the  lower  forms  of  existence  more 
complete,  it  would  be  found  that  in  their  case 
also  men  would  recognize  duties  ;  but  this  sup- 
position only  brings  into  clearness  the  fact  that 
morality  is  interested  in  things  and  persons  only 
in  so  far  as  it  is  able  to  minister  to  them. 

This  principle  is  further  illustrated  in   the   fact 

1  Attention  may  here  be  called  to  Mr.  Leslie  Stephen's  state- 
ment of  the  relation  of  sympathy  to  knowledge  (Science  of  Ethics, 
pp.  228  ff). 


SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION"  IN  MORALITY  229 

that  morality  is  interested  only  in  the  present 
and  future,  and  does  not  dwell  in  the  past.  It  is 
true  that  for  ethical  purposes  men  must  be  inter- 
ested in  the  past,  but  the  sympathetic  recon- 
struction of  the  past  is  not  ethical.  It  may  serve 
ethical  purposes;  yet  when  done  for  its  own  sake, 
it  is  not  ethical.  On  the  other  hand,  the  aspirant 
after  knowledge  must  reconstruct  the  past,  and 
live  over  again  the  life  of  king,  and  poet,  and 
pioneer. 

Knowledge,  therefore,  is  wider  than  morality : 
they  both  use  sympathy  as  a  method,  and  at  cer- 
tain points  they  coincide  ;  yet  sympathy  for  the  sake 
of  sympathy  is  not  the  prerogative  of  morality. 

10.  If  morality  is  compared  with  art,  it  is  seen 
that,    so    far   as    it    exercises    sympathy,    morality 
keeps  to  concrete  living   realities,  while  art  tends 
to    pass    into    a    realm    of    its    own    creation ;    yet 
that,  at  the  same  time,  it  is  art  rather  than  mor- 
ality which  delights   in   contemplation   purely   for 
its  own  sake. 

11.  It  is  not  to  be  forgotten  that  many  of   the 
greatest  thinkers   have  put  knowledge  among    the 
virtues.     Knowledge,  so    far   from  being    a    means 
to    some   form  of   living    other   than    itself,  is    re- 
garded   as    itself    an    end,    and,  moreover,  as    the 
highest    end  in  life.     Yet   it  is  not  precisely  this 


230  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

exaltation  of  knowledge  as  the  highest  of  the 
virtues  that  is  here  advocated.  It  may,  indeed, 
be  that  knowledge  represents  the  highest  ideal 
possible  for  the  human  spirit;  this  view  has 
especial  justification,  if  knowledge  is  to  be  inter- 
preted as  sympathy,  for  then  knowledge,  coincid- 
ing in  part  with  morality,  yet  goes  beyond  it,  to 
take  to  itself  the  interests  of  the  whole  universe. 
Yet  what,  it  concerns  us  here  to  emphasize  is 
that,  even  when  morality  is  taken  in  the  more 
restricted  sense,  it  is  not  merely  one  virtue  to  be 
supplemented  by  knowledge  as  another  virtue,  but 
involves  in  itself  the  exercise  of  that  sympathy 
which  constitutes  the  essence  of  cognition. 

12.  Morality,  to  sum  up,  may  be  taken  to  show 
that    the    sympathetic    relation    is,    in    a    general 
way,  possible  ;  and  also  to  offer  a  clear  illustration 
of  its  character  as  contemplation  of  the  concrete. 

13.  It  may  be  appropriate  at  this  point  to  call 
attention  to  the   important  place   which  sympathy 
has  in  religion,  in  the  forms  which  it  has  assumed 
among    us.     When  fear  is  the   prominent    element 
in    religion,   sympathy   with  God    may   indeed    be 
regarded  as  possible,  but  it  'is  not  likely  to  exist : 
the  effort  of  the   worshipper  is   to   adapt  himself 
to  an  unpleasant  environment.     But  when  religion 
has  become  love  to  God,  sympathy  finds  entrance. 


SYMPATHETIC  IMITATION  IN  MORALITY  231 

There  is  for  Christians  not  only  the  command  to 
love  God  ;  there  is  the  doctrine  that  God  has  been 
manifested  in  a  human  experience,  and  that  He 
dwells  in  the  hearts  of  His  people.  To  this  teach- 
ing may  be  added  the  theory,  which  is  not  directly 
scriptural,  but  which  has  commanded  the  support  of 
many  devout  minds,  that  God  is  immanent  in  all 
things.  Thus  nature  in  man  and  in  things  is  the 
"garment  of  Deity."  He  "prayeth  best,"  hath 
closest  divine  communion, 

«  Who  loveth  best 
Both  man,  and  bird,  and  beast." 

It  may  be  that  when  religion  and  knowledge  are  at 
their  highest,  they  are  not  two,  but  one. 


CHAPTER  X 

SYNTHESIS   OF  THE  METHODS 

1.  The  investigation  into  the  nature  of  sympathy 
has  shown  us  that  it  is  a  method  of  reproducing  in 
the  observer  a  concrete  experience  other  than  his 
own.  We  have  seen  that  this  method  is  essential 
to  the  higher  works  of  art ;  we  have  also  seen  that 
sympathy  is  the  life-blood  of  the  higher  morality ; 
it  has  even  been  found  that  there  is  a  sense  in  which 
it  is  illustrated  in  the  employment  of  general  con- 
cepts. Yet  in  none  of  these  cases  is  there  offered 
such  a  use  of  the  principle  that  the  truth  is  its  sure 
result.  Morality  employs  it  to  determine  action 
and  control  the  utilities  of  life ;  in  art  it  does  not 
devote  itself  to  what  are  usually  designated  facts, 
but  reflects  the  creations  of  the  imagination ;  in  the 
general  concept  there  is  a  departure  from  the  con- 
crete facts  of  which  it  is  supposed  to  be  cognitive, 
and  therefore  one  of  the  first  conditions  of  truth- 
getting  is  neglected.  It  has,  therefore,  still  to  be 
decided  how  sympathy  is  to  be  employed  that  the 
ideal  of  knowledge  may  be  reached.  And  since  it 

232 


SYNTHESIS  OF  THE  METHODS  233 

is  science  that  has  shown  such  zeal  in  its  effort  to 
reach  facts,  and  since  a  certain  kind  of  success,  so 
far  as  the  scrutiny  of  sense-data  is  concerned,  must 
be  conceded  to  it,  the  problem  before  us  may  be 
described  as  the  synthesis  of  the  method  of  science 
with  the  method  of  sympathetic  imitation.  It  is 
still  the  knowledge  that  the  self  has  of  other  per- 
sons and  things,  and  of  its  own  non-immediate  ex- 
perience, which  is  being  studied. 

2.  Let  the  psychological  process  found  in  sympa- 
thetic imitation  be  recalled.  A  man  sees  the  con- 
tortions of  his  neighbour's  countenance,  and  feels 
the  pain  which  his  neighbour  is  suffering.  Here 
there  is  direct  observation  by  means  of  the  senses, 
and  then  with  the  sensations  received  there  is  associ- 
ated a  feeling  or  experience  which  is  not  directly 
observed.  There  is,  therefore,  necessary,  first  of 
all,  exact  observation  of  sense-data.  These  phe- 
nomena, to  call  them  such,  are  not,  it  is  true,  the 
ultimate  reality :  the  sign  and  its  interpretation 
are  not  to  be  confounded.  Yet  the  sign  is  what 
is  immediately  given  us,  and  only  through  it  can 
the  interpretation  be  reached ;  hence  the  careful 
study  to  which  it  must  be  subjected.  And  all  is 
necessary  that  science  has  done  to  make  more 
minute  its  observation,  and  differentiate  one  ob- 
ject from  another.  Nor  can  the  work  be  carried 


234  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

to  too  great  fineness ;  for  any  part  may  prove 
instinct  with  new  meaning :  it  may  be  a  seal  the 
breaking  of  which  opens  another  book. 

3.  Not  only  must  the  phenomena  presented  to 
the  senses  be  observed  as  separate  and  isolated 
facts,  their  relations  must  be  perceived.  Each 
has  a  definite  place  in  a  system,  and  its  environ- 
ment must  be  studied.  The  individual  letter 
may  by  itself  be  meaningless,  and  may  gain  mean- 
ing only  as  part  of  a  word ;  the  word  may  not  be 
truly  intelligible  apart  from  its  context.  The 
various  symptoms  of  a  man's  pain  may  have  to  be 
noted  and  taken  together  that  its  peculiar  quality 
may  be  apprehended.  The  coexistences  of  phe- 
nomena must  therefore  be  made  clear.  Moreover, 
there  are  certain  coexistences  which  always  recur. 
It  is  of  great  moment  to  discover  them  that  we  may 
make  right  interpretations  of  the  nature  of  things 
with  greater  expedition ;  just  as  it  helps  in  the  read- 
ing of  the  printed  page  to  know  that  certain  sylla- 
bles and  words  always  accompany  certain  others. 

Not  only  the  coexistences  of  phenomena,  but 
also  their  sequences,  must  be  detected.  The 
meaning  of  each  moment  is  something  that  exists 
in  and  for  itself :  the  present  is  distinct  from  the 
past,  and  is  lost  when  the  future  arrives.  Yet  it 
expedites  the  process  of  interpretation  to  know 


SYNTHESIS  OF  THE  METHODS  235 

that  phenomena  come  in  a  certain  order.  Hence 
the  importance  of  discovering  the  causal  relations 
of  things.  There  still  remains  the  task  of  associ- 
ating with  each  part  of  the  phenomenal  series  its 
true  meaning;  that  is,  there  is  still  required  the 
sympathetic  function.  But  that  the  fulfilling  of 
that  function  may  be  facilitated,  it  is  desirable  to 
know  the  order  in  which  the  phenomena  to  be 
interpreted  present  themselves. 

The  statement  that  the  coexistences  and  se- 
quences of  phenomena  are  of  a  universal  character, 
is  the  presentation  of  the  true  meaning  of  the 
doctrine  of  concepts.  For  what  the  concept 
really  indicates  is  such  constant  coexistence  and 
succession.  And  this  view  is  not  affected  if  we 
regard  the  concept  as  superseded  by  the  "  law." 
The  empiricist  and  positivist  are  right  when  they 
maintain  that  all  the  facts  which  science  considers 
can  be  presented  in  terms  of  coexistence  and  suc- 
cession. We  must,  therefore,  use  the  method '  of 
concepts,  but  we  must  at  the  same  time  give  this 
interpretation  to  the  concept. 

4.  But  the  question  may  be  asked,  are  not 
space  and  time,  which  are  implied  in  all  statements 
of  coexistence  and  succession,  thus  made  metaphys- 
ical entities?  They  may  be  so  regarded,  and  so 
far  as  they  make  these  metaphysical  claims,  the 


236  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

criticisms  already  passed  on  them  still  hold.  Yet 
they  may  be  regarded  in  another  light.  For  con- 
venience in  discussing  this  question,  let  space  be 
considered  apart  from  the  more  complex  idea  of 
time.  Space  is  an  empirical  concept  with  certain 
peculiarities.  It  is  derived  from  universal  expe- 
rience. It  is  not,  like  substance  or  cause,  applied 
universally,  though  having  nothing  in  its  origin 
to  justify  this  universality :  it  can  claim  that  its 
source  is  all  experience.  Moreover,  it  is  experi- 
ence with  that  which  is  the  particular  quality 
of  each  part  of  it  ignored;  space  is  experience 
with  its  content  reduced  to  indifference,  so  that  it 
seems  to  be  the  frame  or  form  of  experience.  And 
thus,  while  space  is  not  the  a  priori  form  of  expe- 
rience, but  is  the  empirical  form  of  it,  it  is  yet 
not  the  less  fitted  to  represent  the  relations  of  all 
phenomena. 

Thus,  while  space  may  not  be  a  metaphysical 
entity,  it  may  be  entitled  to  the  place  it  occupies 
in  science,  and  the  effort  to  make  science  mathe- 
matical may  be  justified. 

5.  The  spatial  idea,  as  thus  applied  to  things, 
may  be  said  to  have  for  thought  a  symbolic  value. 
A  symbol,  as  we  see  in  its  algebraic  employment, 
may  represent  something  which  it  does  not  in 
itself  resemble.  Thought  may  for  the  time  oper- 


SYtfTHESfS  OF  THE  METHODS  237 

ate  with  these  symbols  as  if  they  were  objective 
entities,  and  may  construct  from  them  a  world  of 
its  own.  Finally,  however,  it  emerges  from  this 
series  of  operations,  and  finds  itself  at  home  with 
the  particular  reality,  which,  indeed,  from  the 
beginning  it  was  its  aim  to  reach.  The  spatial 
representation  of  things,  the  whole  mathematical 
treatment  of  them,  is  of  this  symbolic  character. 
The  spatial  relation  does  not  represent  the  actual 
relation  subsisting  among  the  experiences,  so  to 
speak,  of  the  world  ;  .nor  does  it  represent  a  rela- 
tion among  the  sensations  which  fill  human  con- 
sciousness :  it  is  their  product,  other  than  they, 
and  external  to  them.  Yet  it  is  a  symbolism 
which  thought  uses ;  and  we  have  seen  that  for 
knowledge  the  statement  of  spatial  relations  is 
indispensable. 

The  time  relation  may  likewise  be  employed 
without  any  concession  of  its  claims  to  metaphysi- 
cal existence.  It  is  still  more  obvious  in  the  case 
of  time  than  in  the  case  of  space  that  the  statement 
of  its  relations  has  only  a  symbolic  value,  when 
there  is  borne  in  mind  the  peculiar  origin  of  the 
time  idea  as  a  combination  of  space  with  other 
feelings  such  as  those  of  reality.  Thus,  the  ele- 
ment of  succession  which  appears  in  certain  con- 
cepts, especially  in  those  of  law,  is  a  purely 


238  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

symbolic  device  which  need  not  be  regarded  as 
resembling  anything  in  the  world  which  it  is  used 
to  unravel. 

6.  The    other   categories,   such   as   reality,   sub- 
stance, and   cause,   or   energy,  fail   to  furnish   the 
metaphysical  interpretation  of  phenomena  ;  and,  at 
the  same  time,  they  seem  to  present  something  other 
than  relations  of  sequence  and  coexistence  among 
the  phenomena  to  which  they  are  applied  ;  so  that 
it  might  seem  necessary  to  reject  them  as  altogether 
worthless.     Yet   probably  science   cannot   afford  to 
dismiss     them     altogether    from    its    employment. 
They  also  have  a  symbolic  value  of  their  own. 

7.  Reality   is  the  symbol   of    knowledge   as   op- 
posed to   imagination.     Imagination   creates    ideas 
which,  when  recognized  as  such  creations,  are  con- 
trasted with  the  facts  with  which  knowledge  deals. 
Out  of  the  many  phenomena  presented  to  the  mind 
some   are   chosen   for    knowledge;     others   are   re- 
jected ;  those  that  belong  to  knowledge  are  marked 
by  the  symbol  reality.     This  symbol  must  not  be 
taken  for  a  knowledge  of  the  objects  in  question, 
but  for  a  sign  that   they   are   matter  for   science. 
Originally    betokening    the    concentration    of    the 
mind  upon  that  which  is  in  contact  with  the  body, 
it  has  now  a  wider  application,  and,  though  retain- 
ing its  original  meaning,  associates  itself  with  what- 


SYNTH 'ESIS  OF  THE  METHODS  239 

ever  is  to  be  taken  seriously.  This  association, 
like  others,  may  often  be  mistaken,  but  what  it 
concerns  us  here  to  note  is  that,  only  when  it  takes 
place,  is  a  phenomenon  taken  seriously.  When 
there  is  this  association  with  any  phenomenon,  it 
is  then  matter  for  science,  with  all  the  methods 
at  its  command,  to  study. 

It  need  not  be  said  that  the  illusion  or  the 
fancy  may,  as  much  as  anything  else,  become  an 
object  of  science.  When  it  is  said  that  the  illu- 
sion is  unreal,  it  is  meant  that  it  is  such  in  con- 
trast with  mental  states  which  may  refer  to  things 
beyond  the  individual  mind.  At  the  same  time 
it  may  be  studied  as  a  mental  phenomenon,  and, 
looked  at  from  this  point  of  view,  it  associates  to 
itself  the  category  of  reality. 

Mr.  Bradley  has  defined  judgment  as  the  refer- 
ence of  an  idea  to  reality.  This  definition  is  very 
valuable,  yet  it  is  important  to  carry  psychological 
analysis  further.  In  the  judgment  there  is  an 
association  of  two  relatively  distinct  ideas ;  or 
there  is  the  referring  of  one  idea  to  another.  The 
idea,  however,  to  which  the  other  is  referred  is 
never  simple :  it  has  always  the  idea  of  reality 
associated  with  it.  It  may,  indeed,  be  a  very  com- 
plex idea,  the  product  of  many  judgments  whose 
predicates  have  blended  together  ;  it  may  also  be 


240  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

an  abstract  concept:  in  any  case,  it  is  taken  as  a 
form  of  reality.  Nor  is  this  idea  of  reality  ulti- 
mately wanting  to  the  predicate.  The  predicate 
gives  what  constitutes,  in  whole,  or  in  part,  the 
being  of  the  subject.  The  copula  indicates  that 
the  predicate  is  the  reality  of  the  subject.  It  is 
thus  evident  that  our  knowing  and  thinking  are 
concerned  only  with  that  with  which  we  have  first 
associated  the  idea  of  reality.  The  importance  of 
this  symbol  can  be  seen  to  be  great.  Nevertheless, 
that  it  is  a  symbol  must  not  be  forgotten. 

8.  Substance,  likewise,  is  a  useful  scientific 
symbol.  It  may  not  be  entitled  to  indicate  in 
animistic  fashion  the  inner  self  of  objects  :  it  serves, 
however,  to  indicate  the  relative  permanence  of  cer- 
tain coexistences  in  contrast  with  other  coexist- 
ences which  are  accidental  and  for  a  moment.  A 
table  is  a  substance  ;  that  is,  the  qualities  of  shape 
and  solidity  and  utility  are  associated  in  a  greater 
or  less  permanency.  On  the  other  hand,  the  books 
laid  on  the  table  do  not  form  one  substance  with 
it.  At  the  same  time,  the  relativity  of  this  per- 
manence is  such  that  the  term  substance  has  no 
very  precise  definition.  While  it  is  a  useful  ex- 
pression, it  is  not  exact.  Even  in  the  case  of  a  co- 
existence which  may  be  regarded  as  "  absolute,"  the 
term  substance,  if  used,  does  not  of  itself  denote 


SYNTHESES  OF  THE  METHODS  241 

the  necessity  which  is  supposed  to  be  embodied  in 
the  coexistence. 

9.  Causality  has  its  value  in  indicating  the  order 
which  phenomena  observe.     Apart  from  human  ex- 
perience  there   may  be   nothing    corresponding   to 
that  feeling  of  effort  of  which  it  is  a  modification. 
Yet  it  serves  to   distinguish   the   sequences  which 
are  invariable  from  those  which  are  accidental. 

10.  Likewise  the  principles  of   the   conservation 
and   transformation   of   energy  may  have  no  value 
as  attempts  to  disclose  the  reality  of   nature  ;    but 
they  may  yet  be  taken  to  indicate  certain  character- 
istics of  the  relations  of  succession  and  coexistence 
among    phenomena.      They   teach    that    a    certain 
series  of   phenomena  can,  in   thinkable   conditions, 
be    given    in    reverse    order :    a  is   followed    by  5, 
but  in  certain  other  conditions  b  is  followed  by  a. 

11.  The    category    of   essence    being    a    feeling 
that  associates  itself  with  a  given  permanent  qual- 
ity, or  with  several  such  qualities,  may  still  serve 
as  the   symbol  of   this  kind  of  permanence.     The 
category  of  similarity  does   not   resemble   the   ob- 
jects to  which  it  is  applied  :  it  is   a   symbol   of   a 
group  of  objects  which  may  be  described  as  being 
such  that  knowledge  of  one    facilitates,   or,  within 
certain  limits,  stands  for,  knowledge  of  the  others. 
From  the  analysis  given  above  of  the  category   of 


242  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

teleology  it  can  readily  be  seen  that   it   is   only   a 
symbol  of  a  certain  species  of  succession. 

12.  We  have  thus  seen  that  concepts   and   laws 
resolve  themselves  into  relations  of  coexistence  and 
succession.      We   have    found    that  these   relations 
have    merely    a    symbolic    value.      We    have    also 
found  that  the  other  so-called  categories  are  of  a 
symbolic  character,  having,  for  the  most  part,  the 
power  to  indicate  special  forms  of  coexistence  and 
succession,  and  thus  being  symbols  of  symbols. 

13.  Not    only   must  the    symbolic    character    of 
laws  be  recognized ;  the  sense   in   which   they   are 
universal  must    be   understood.     Many   laws    (e.g. 
chemical     principles)     without     doubt      represent 
averages.     They  state  what  is   valid  within   certain 
limits  of  difference.     The  individual  beings  within 
these    limits    may    vary   widely,    yet   they    coexist 
with,  or    are    followed    by,   certain    other    things. 
The  subject  of  a   universal   proposition    can   prob- 
ably be  taken  to   refer   to   exactly    similar   things 
only    when    these    are    the    points    of    which,    as 
centres  of  energy,  the  universe  might  be  regarded  as 
made  up,  or  are  still  more  hypothetical  existences. 
The  so-called  molecules  may  be  supposed  to  vary 
in  form,  and  the   manifestations    of  energy  in  in- 
tensity, to  an  indefinite  degree.     It  may  be    that 
every  individual  thing   is  unique.     While  the   law 


SYNTHESIS    OF  THE  METHODS  243 

of  gravitation  holds  of  every  particle  of  matter  in 
the  universe,  it  is  probably  true  that  no  two 
pulls  of  gravitating  bodies  are  exactly  alike. 
Thus  the  law  has  limits  like  those  of  the  crude 
concept.  Now,  it  is  the  nature  of  concrete  in- 
dividuals that  must  be  studied.  The  concrete  is 
the  real,  and  it  is  the  form  of  each  actual  con- 
crete thing  that  must  be  observed.  Laws  may  be 
useful  in  various  ways  :  they  are  helpful  to 
knowledge  as  they  lead  us  nearer  things.  They 
present  the  coexistences  and  sequences  which  ob- 
tain among  things  so  long  as  these  things  keep 
within  certain  limits  of  difference.  It  is  in  this 
way  that  they  help  us  to  a  presentation  of  the 
actual  forms  of  things. 

14.  With  this  scientific  study  of  the  appearance 
which  things  present  there  must,  let  it  be  re- 
peated, be  conjoined  the  method  of  sympathetic 
imitation  to  reach  that  which  cannot  become  ap- 
pearance. The  phenomenon  must  be  studied,  in 
order  that  that  of  which  it  is  the  phenomenon 
may  be  revealed.  As  a  man  studies  the  face  of 
another  that  he  may  have  sympathy,  so  it  must 
always  be  in  the  cognition  of  things.  The  con- 
templation of  the  outward  appearance  of  things 
must  be  followed  by  the  sympathetic  acquaint- 
ance with  their  heart.  There  must  be  this  syn- 


244  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

thesis  of  the  methods  that  the  ideal  of  knowledge 
may  be  reached.  The  sympathy  which  finds  such 
striking  illustration  in  the  artist  and  the  moralist 
must  be  joined  to  the  love  of  observation  for  its 
own  sake,  and  the  fidelity  in  the  search  for  facts, 
which  characterize  science. 

15.  In  view  of  this  problem  of  the  synthesis  of 
the  methods,  it  is  instructive  to  recall  the  theory 
of  knowledge  which  Kant  propounded.  Accord- 
ing to  him,  all  the  material  of  knowledge  is 
given  by  the  sensibility  :  it  consists  of  the  sights, 
touches,  and  other  sensations  of  the  external 
senses,  and  the  data  of  the  somewhat  indeter- 
minate "internal"  sense.  The  sensibility  has  two 
a  priori  forms,  space  and  time,  in  which  all  sen- 
sations are  received.  Kant's  account  of  them 
should  be  carefully  noted.  He  is  at  pains  to 
maintain  that  they  are  not  concepts,  but  intu- 
itions, his  reason  being  that  they  contain  a 
manifold ;  they  are  the  a  priori  forms  of  the 
multiplicity  of  sensations. 

It  is  not  less  important  to  notice  the  function 
which  Kant  assigns  to  thought  in  its  operations 
upon  this  material.  To  think  is  to  judge,  and  to 
judge  is  to  bring  a  manifold  under  a  conception : 
it  is  in  this  connection  that  Kant  enumerates  his 
root  conceptions  or  categories.  These  conceptions 


SYNTHESIS  OF  THE  METHODS  24$ 

do  not  reveal  the  constitution  of  things  in  them- 
selves. It  is  their  function  as  the  root  conceptions 
of  thought  to  introduce  unity  into  sense-experience. 
"  I  think  "  is  the  original  synthetical  unity  :  to  say 
that  the  "  I  think  "  unifies  is  to  state  an  analytical 
proposition.  For  instance,  the  category  of  cau- 
sality has  its  significance  in  the  presentation  of  the 
succession  of  phenomena.  The  phenomenon  a  is 
conjoined  with  the  succeeding  phenomenon  b  in  a 
causal  relation  when  a  conditions  6,  or  determines 
the  possibility  of  its  existence.  Not  that  hereby 
the  nature  of  things  in  themselves  is  in  any  way 
revealed.  Causality  is  simply  a  rule  superimposed 
upon  phenomena,  which  apart  from  it  cannot  be 
seen  to  have  any  necessary  connection ;  and  its 
peculiar  quality  as  a  principle  of  synthesis  is 
derived  from  the  application  to  special  time  rela- 
tions of  the  synthetical  unity  of  apperception. 

16.  Kant's  doctrine  of  knowledge  is  remarkable 
for  the  account  which  it  gives  of  the  actual  attain- 
ment of  science  :    science   deals   with  phenomena ; 
that  is,  it  gives  an  account  of  the  relations,  spatial 
and  temporal,  which  obtain  among  sensations. 

17.  Yet  Kant  is  not  entitled  to  restrict  thought 
to  the  presentation  of  such  relations,  for  thought 
can  reach  better   results  than  those  which  science 
has  actually  to  show.     To  go  to  the  heart  of  his 


246  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

theory,  he  is  not  entitled  to  regard  thought  as 
synthesis.  Indeed,  it  may  be  gravely  questioned 
whether  he  has  been  able  to  develop  this  view  of 
thought  with  consistency.  It  is  difficult  to  inter- 
pret his  categories  and  principles  of  judgment  as 
having  reference  only  to  conjunction  of  sensations : 
they  refer  to  something  which  is  indicated  by  sen- 
sation, but  which,  at  the  same  time,  transcends 
sensation.  When  he  gives  as  the  first  analogy 
the  principle,  that  in  all  changes  of  phenomena 
the  substance  is  permanent,  and  its  quantum  is 
neither  increased  nor  diminished  in  nature,  we 
seem  to  have,  in  the  very  statement  of  it,  the 
traditional  contrast  between  the  changing  sense- 
phenomenon  and  a  metaphysical  entity.  Besides, 
Kant  has  not,  in  his  exposition  of  the  principle, 
been  at  pains  to  show  that  he  means  that  in  some 
sense  the  amount  of  sensation  in  the  universe  re- 
mains constant.  Causality  can  be  more  easily 
regarded  as  a  mere  principle  of  synthesis  among 
sensations,  yet  Kant,  at  least,  in  the  second  edition 
of  the  Critique,  has  connected  the  relation  of  cause 
and  effect  with  the  successive  changes  in  substance, 
and  thereby  again  transcended  phenomena.  Kant 
falls  into  this  contradiction,  because  substance  and 
causality  are  not  merely  syntheses :  they  are  prin- 
ciples of  interpretation,  and  transcend  phenomena. 


SYNTHESfS  OF  THE  METHODS  247 

It  is  only  by  a  rejection  of  the  natural  meaning  of 
the  categories  that  they  are  regarded  as  syntheses. 
Kant  did  not  acknowledge  that  he  was  diverting 
the  categories  from  their  original  use,  and  hence 
he  relapses  unconsciously  into  the  original  method 
of  employing  them.  And,  in  truth,  thought  is  not 
merely  synthesis ;  it  is  interpretation.  There  is,  to 
use  the  metaphor  of  synthesis,  a  joining  of  two 
ideas  in  the  judgment,  as  there  may  be  in  other 
conscious  states ;  but  it  is  characteristic  of  the 
judgment,  as  we  have  seen,  that  the  predicate 
expresses  the  being  or  truth  of  the  subject.  Even 
spatial  and  temporal  relations  are  to  be  taken  ob- 
jectively, when  they  are  predicated  in  a  judgment ; 
if  we  come  to  recognize  that  they  are  merely  sym- 
bolic of  something,  this  recognition  is,  in  turn, 
a  judgment  of  interpretation  of  which  they  are 
the  subjects. 

18.  At  the  same  time,  Kant  has  hints  of  a  view 
of  knowledge  as  something  which  is  not  merely  a 
synthesis  of  phenomena.  The  realm  of  things  in 
themselves  is  not  entirely  unapproachable,  for  free- 
dom, immortality,  and  the  existence  of  God  are 
found  to  be  postulates  of  the  moral  nature.  And 
even  if  this  metaphysic  should  seem  somewhat 
crudely  formulated,  Kant  has  other  suggestions 
toward  a  knowledge  of  absolute  reality.  He  ex- 


248  METHODS  OP  KNOWLEDGE 

plains  our  inability  to  know  things  in  themselves 
by  the  character  of  our  human  means  of  cogni- 
tion :  everything  which  belongs  to  intuition  con- 
tains nothing  but  mere  relations,  and  the  whole 
of  our  cognition,  which  is  a  cognition  of  places, 
change  of  places,  and  laws,  contains  nothing  but 
mere  relations  :  yet  by  mere  relations  a  thing  can 
never  be  known.1  Contrasted,  however,  with  this 
knowledge  is  that  of  an  intuitive  understanding, 
such  as  belongs  to  the  Divine  Being,  and  knows 
things  in  themselves.  The  idea  is  merely  prob- 
lematical, but  is  not  contradictory.  Kant  has 
given  the  most  detailed  presentation  of  this  con- 
ception in  the  Critique  of  Judgment,  in  a  discus- 
sion of  the  adaptation  of  nature  to  our  demand 
for  unity  in  knowledge.  Kant  tries  to  show  that 
the  need  for  regarding  such  adaptation  as  designed 
is  due  to  the  peculiarity  of  our  understandings, 
which  must  proceed  from  the  connection  of  parts 
to  the  representation  of  the  whole.  In  contrast 
with  our  understanding  we  may  conceive  one 
which  would  proceed  from  the  intuition  of  a  whole 
to  the  parts.  Kant  seems  to  be  thinking  of  uni- 
versals,  and  even  to  be  anticipating  the  system  of 
absolute  idealism.  But,  in  so  far  as  he  inter- 

1  Kritik  der  reinen   Vernunft,  Transc.  Elementarlehre,  Erster 
Theil,  §  9. 


SYNTHESIS  OF  THE  METHODS  249 

prets  this  intelligence  in  terms  of  concepts,  he  is 
attributing  to  it  the  limitations  of  the  discursive 
understanding.  May  we  not  say  that  the  function 
of  the  intuitive  understanding  is  more  nearly  sup- 
plied by  the  faculty  of  sympathy?  Sympathy  is 
understanding,  inasmuch  as  it  not  merely  is  know- 
ledge of  the  appearance  of  things,  but  transcends 
phenomena.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  intuitive, 
and  not  discursive ;  it  is  directly  perceptive  of 
reality ;  the  veil  of  sensations  and  categories  is 
rent.  True,  Kant  regards  this  intuition  as  pos- 
sible only  for  the  Divine  Being,  in  whom  it  is 
such  as  to  give  the  existence  of  that  which  is  its 
object,  and  thus  it  means  the  divine  living  of  the 
world  rather  than  a  knowledge  of  it.  Sympathy, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  not  creative,  but  is  know- 
ledge of  a  created  object.  Yet,  while  this  is  to 
be  admitted,  it  is  true  that  sympathy,  in  contrast 
with  categories,  gives  knowledge  of  the  object  in 
terms  of  that  divine  living  which  is  the  reality ; 
it  intuites  that  which  God  intuites. 

19.  It  may  seem  that  we  have  made  an  unjusti- 
fied assumption  in  supposing  that  such  knowledge 
as  we  get  by  sympathy  is  knowledge  of  the  "  thing 
in  itself,"  asserted  so  strenuously  to  be  unknowa- 
ble. This  question  as  to  the  existence  of  absolutely 
unknowable  entities  may  be  held  in  reserve.  It 


250  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

must,  however,  be  pointed  out  here  that  an  account 
of  the  sympathetic  faculty  involves  precisely  this 
distinction  between  phenomena  and  things  in  them- 
selves, though  it  indicates  that  the  thing  in  itself  is 
knowable.  An  illustration  may  be  proof  of  this. 
The  wounded  man's  pain  is  known  to  his  neighbour 
by  certain  signs,  such  as  groans,  and  contortions 
of  the  countenance.  These  are  phenomena  of  the 
pain.  They  are  not  the  pain  itself,  and  bear  no 
resemblance  to  it.  Nor  can  the  observer  by  much 
searching  among  phenomena  come  directly  to  the 
pain.  He  might  even  examine  the  man's  brain,  but 
the  conscious  experience  of  the  pain,  while  it  might 
be  indicated  by  new  signs,  would  still  not  be  directly 
brought  to  light.  But  were  it  possible  by  other 
methods  to  know  the  pain,  the  observer  of  it  would 
then  be  acquainted  with  the  thing  in  itself.  Thus, 
at  the  risk  of  paradox,  it  must  be  maintained  that 
such  a  mental  state  as  a  sensation  is  at  once  a 
phenomenon  and  a  thing  in  itself.  The  individual 
A  has  sensations  from  B  ;  that  is,  in  presence  of  B 
he  has  certain  mental  states.  These  do  not  resem- 
ble B  necessarily  ;  they  are  simply  A's  conscious 
states.  But  they  may  be  taken  for  signs  of  B  ;  or, 
in  technical  language,  they  are  the  appearance  or 
the  phenomena  of  B.  But  suppose  that  some  one 
now  attempts  to  know  A;  he  finds  him  made  up 


SYNTHESIS  OF  THE  METHODS  2$l 

largely,  at  least,  of  such  states  as  these  which  we 
have  called  phenomena  of  B.  A  is  these  phenom- 
ena. But  A  is  real ;  he  is  a  thing  in  itself.  Thus 
the  states,  which  are  from  one  point  of  view  merely  phe- 
nomena, are  from  another  point  of  view  things  in  them- 
selves. There  may  or  may  not  be  things  absolutely 
inaccessible  to  us.  Apart  from  that  question,  the 
distinction  between  phenomena  and  things  in  them- 
selves is  valid.  And  when  the  object  of  our  know- 
ledge is  the  thing  in  itself,  as  it  is  when  we  seek  to 
know  other  things,  it  may  be  legitimate  to  treat 
sense-data  by  the  method  that  Kant  prescribed, 
while  for  the  knowledge  of  the  thing  in  itself  a 
distinct  method  may  be  employed. 

20.  The  problem  of  the  synthesis  of  methods  may 
be  looked  at  from  another  point  of  view ;  the  history 
of  intellect  may  be  considered.  In  an  earlier  chap- 
ter, we  saw  that  sensations  are  originally  to  be 
described  simply  as  states  of  consciousness,  with  no 
necessary  cognitive  or  teleological  function  ;  we  also 
saw  that,  in  the  period  of  sifting  known  as  evolu- 
tion, those  minds  are  selected  byt  nature  which 
develop  certain  sensations,  and  certain  modes  of 
relating  sensations.  It  was  also  found  later  that 
the  mind  had  a  faculty  for  making  general  concepts 
from  the  materials  of  sensation.  This  faculty  is 
of  importance  in  the  struggle  for  existence ;  in  the 


2$2  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

business  of  life  it  is  a  great  advantage  to  be  able  to 
abstract  qualities,  and  to  associate  those  which  have 
been  often  found  together.  It  is  important,  when 
the  man  sees  a  bear,  that,  though  he  has  never  seen 
this  particular  bear  before,  he  should  associate  with 
the  visual  image  of  its  form  the  idea  of  its  ferocity  ; 
or,  when  he  sees  a  fruit,  that  he  should  at  once 
think  of  its  edibility.  It  is  not  necessary  to  assert 
that  the  survival  of  the  concept  is  due  entirely  to  its 
utility  ;  it  may  have  been  a  necessary  product  of  the 
faculties  of  memory  and  association  ;  yet,  doubtless, 
its  vitality  is  due  in  some  measure  to  its  utility. 

Another  period  came  when  the  mental  states  of 
the  individual  were  employed  to  reflect  or  copy  the 
being  or  essence  of  other  things.  And  for  this 
purpose  concepts  have  been  the  chief  resource.  But 
the  failure  of  the  concept  has  become  manifest ;  the 
concrete  must  mirror  the  concrete.  The  concept, 
however,  need  not  be  utterly  discarded ;  it  must 
simply  be  relegated  to  its  original  function ;  it  must 
furnish  a  more  or  less  exact  statement  of  the  rela- 
tions of  coexistence  and  succession  that  obtain 
among  phenomena. 

21.  It  is  specially  important  to  consider  this 
problem  of  the  synthesis  of  methods  in  connection 
with  the  doctrine  of  the  correlation  of  mind  and 
brain.  It  is  probably  to  man's  nature  that  we 


SYNTHESIS   OF  THE  METHODS  253 

should  turn  for  the  key  to  the  riddle  of  the  uni- 
verse. It  will  be  seen,  as  we  proceed,  that  we  are 
only  making  more  definite  the  meaning  of  the 
illustrations  already  given  of  human  sympathy. 

22.  One  of  the  most  confidently  accepted  beliefs 
of  modern  psychology  is  that  of  the  correlation  of 
mind  and  brain.  It  is  the  object  of  physiological 
psychology  to  state  all  the  data  of  psychology  in 
terms  of  nerve-movements.  Our  thoughts,  our  voli- 
tions, our  feelings,  are  taken  to  represent  so  many 
movements  of  nerve-molecules  ;  not  an  image  can 
float  before  the  fancy,  not  a  prayer  can  shape  itself 
for  utterance,  without  the  agitation  of  a  portion  of 
the  brain.  The  statement  of  conscious  facts  in  phys- 
iological terms  may  not  be  complete ;  but  the  want 
of  completeness  is  due,  it  is  believed,  not  to  any 
interruption  of  this  correlation,  but  to  the  coarseness 
of  the  methods  of  observation,  or  to  some  more  or 
less  accidental  obstacle.  While  absolute  proof  of 
the  theory  cannot  be  given,  there  is  a  great  and 
increasing  mass  of  evidence  in  its  favor. 

It  is  common  to  say  that  the  series  of  brain-pro- 
cesses is  parallel  to  the  series  of  mind-processes ;  or, 
at  least,  the  mental  has  always  a  corresponding 
material  activity,  though  the  material  may  not 
always  have  a  mental  counterpart.  They  are  also 
often  regarded  as  parallel  in  the  sense  that  they  do 


254  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

not  affect  each  other.  They  are  as  if  belonging  to 
two  kinds  of  existence,  and  cannot  affect  each  other. 
The  body  does  not  act  upon  the  mind,  and  the  mind 
does  not  control  the  body. 

23.  Whatever  may  be  the  ultimate  interpretation 
of  the  facts  on  which  the  theory  of  parallelism  is 
based,  it  serves  to  bring  into  clearness  the  distinc- 
tion between  the  physical  and  psychical  series  as 
data  for  knowledge.  For  the  observer,  they  are  so 
distinct  in  quality  that  they  are  taken  for  separate 
orders  of  existence.  Yet  it  does  not  need  much 
reflection  to  show  that  the  difference  is  within  the 
sphere  of  knowledge.  After  all,  what  is  called  the 
material  series  is  a  series  of  mental  facts  :  it  consists 
of  the  conscious  states  of  the  observer.  It  is,  pri- 
marily, at  least,  a  series  of  sensations  ;  other  ideas, 
such  as  substance  and  cause,  may  be  added,  but  the 
basis  for  them  is  sensation.  The  observation  of  the 
brain  means,  thus,  a  series  of  sensations,  visual  or 
tactile  for  the  most  part,  in  the  mind  of  the  ob- 
server ;  they  are  perceived  immediately,  or  an 
inference  is  made  from  those  so  perceived  to  others 
which  in  themselves  admit  of  the  same  immediate 
perception. 

The  psychical  series,  when  the  observer  is  looking 
at  another  person,  is  not  known  in  this  immediate 
way.  The  observer  infers  its  existence :  and  he 


SYNTHESIS  OF  THE  METHODS  2$$ 

infers  it,  for  it  is  something  which  he  can  never 
immediately  perceive.  His  knowledge  of  the  mate- 
rial series  consists  in  his  own  sensations  ;  his  know- 
ledge of  the  psychical  series  consists  of  inferred 
states  which  can  never  be  known  directly.  It  is 
putting  the  same  truth  in  another  way  to  say  that 
in  the  study  of  the  material  series  he  never  comes  on 
any  fact  of  the  psychical  series  ;  no  scrutiny  of  the 
cells  of  the  brain  discloses  to  him  at  any  point  an 
emotion  of  love  or  hatred,  or  a  feeling  of  pleasure  or 
pain.  The  psychical  series  is  a  thing  in  itself,  and 
he  may  extend  his  knowledge  of  the  phenomenal 
series  indefinitely  without  coining  nearer  that  reality. 
24.  Nothing  has  been  said  of  a  possible  matter 
which  may  present  itself  in  connection  with  these 
two  series  of  facts.  We  are  not  directly  con- 
cerned with  it.  And,  in  truth,  the  temptation  is 
great  to  adopt  the  theory  that  we  have  in  the 
material  and  psychical  series  two  aspects  of  one 
reality.  Viewed  from  without,  the  series  is  said 
to  present  itself  as  material ;  viewed  from  within, 
it  is  mental.  Professor  Royce  illustrates  the 
theory  in  this  graphic  way  :  "  Here  in  my  world 
of  daily  experience  is  my  friend.  If  one  saw  him 
through  and  through,  one  would  experience  as  the 
describable  physical  facts  about  him — a  quivering 
mass  of  molecules.  Especially  complex  with  in- 


256  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

tertwined  spirals  and  streams  of  multitudinous 
molecules  would  be  each  of  the  many  tens  of 
millions  of  cells  of  his  brain.  Thus  my  friend 
might  be  found.  Nay,  I  have  as  yet  found  him 
not  at  all.  I  did  not  mean  this  maze  of  mole- 
cules by  my  friend.  I  meant  his  intelligence."1 
The  physical  appearance  is  "simply  the  way  in 
which  the  true  and  spiritual  self  must  needs  ap- 
pear when  viewed  by  a  finite  being  whose  conscious- 
ness experiences  in  the  forms  of  our  space  and  our 
time."  z  If  we  add  that  the  physical  appearance 
owes  its  peculiarity,  not  merely  to  the  observer's 
forms  of  space  and  time,  but  to  the  fact  that  it  is 
the  observer's  series  of  sensations,  the  theory 
seems  simple  and  reasonable.  Yet,  as  has  been 
indicated,  it  does  not  concern  us  here  to  prove 
such  a  theory,  or  to  refute  the  dogma  of  the  in- 
dependent existence  of  matter.  It  is  enough  to 
show  the  character  of  the  two  series  with  which 
we  are  directly  concerned.3 

1  The  Spirit  of  Modern  Philosophy,  pp.  405  f. 

a  Ibid.,  p.  411. 

8  Avenarius  argues  strenuously  against  "  Introjektion,"  and  the 
distinction  of  "  outer  "  and  "  inner  "  (Der  menschliche  Weltbegriff). 
His  criticisms  are  important :  certain  forms  of  Introjektion  are  crude. 
Yet  it  is  necessary  to  insist  that  the  experience  of  a  man,  A,  does 
not  become  the  experience  of  his  neighbour,  B,  who  observes  him 
in  the  sense  in  which  B  realizesHhe  effects  of  A's  experience  in  his 
own.  These  effects,  to  repeat,  are  B's  immediate,  private  sen- 


SYNTHESIS  OF  THE  METHODS 

25.  If,  then,  we   have   the  two  series    of    facts, 
the  sensations   of    the   observer   of  the   brain    and 
the  psychic  experiences  of  the  person  observed,  the 
question  arises,  what  does  knowledge   of   the   per- 
son   observed   imply  ?     Since    every   conscious  ex- 
perience   in    the    object    of    observation    has    its 
physical  counterpart,  and   since    it   can   be   known 
only   by   inference   from   its   physical   counterpart, 
the    physical   must    be    carefully   studied.     Its    ap- 
pearance   must   be   noted,    and   sequences   and   co- 
existences   must    be    sought    among    the    relations 
which   it   exhibits ;  it   must   be   studied    according 
to  the  methods  of  positive  science.     In  all  this,  it 
need  not  be  repeated,  the  observer  is  dealing  with 
his   own   sense-impressions,  which    bear   no    neces- 
sary likeness  to  the  facts  in  the  experience   which 
he  wishes  to  know.     How  is  he  to   pass   to   these 
objective    facts?     By    the    method    of    sympathetic 
imitation  :  he   must   associate    with   each    phenom- 
enon that  experience  of  which  it  is  the   sign,    and 
he  must  realize  it  as  it  actually  exists. 

26.  It  might  naturally  be  objected  at  this  point, 
that  a  knowledge   of   these   objective   psychic   ex- 
periences need  not   call   for  the   exercise   of   sym- 

sations  ;  the  experience  of  A  is  inferred.  In  presence  of  this  kind 
of  "dualism,"  the  problem  before  us  is  to  determine  how  these 
inferred  states  can  be  truly  known. 


2$8  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

pathy.  Is  not,  it  may  be  asked,  the  science  of 
psychology  proof  that  these  objective  experiences 
can  be  immediately  intuited,  and  that  the  knowledge 
of  them  can  take  the  forms  of  science?  It  may 
be  well,  in  view  of  such  a  question,  to  state  more 
explicitly  what  has  already  been  indicated,  that 
psychology  is  not  knowledge.  Psychology,  like 
other  sciences,  seeks  for  laws  or  statements  of  co- 
existence and  succession.  The  relations  which  it 
thus  presents  do  not  resemble  the  conscious  ex- 
periences which  they  are  supposed  to  represent. 
It  has  often  been  remarked  that  psychological 
analysis  destroys  the  capacity  for  the  feeling  that  is 
studied  :  it  is  a  curious  illustration  of  the  breach 
in  this  sphere  between  what  is  called  knowledge 
and  its  object.  It  is,  of  course,  true  that  psy- 
chology has  its  value,  just  as  the  scientific  presen- 
tation of  any  set  of  facts  has  its  value  ;  but  when 
we  wish  to  know  any  individual  conscious  ex- 
perience in  its  truth,  we  must  use,  not  the 
method  of  psychology,  but  the  method  of  sym- 
pathetic imitation. 

We  have,  then,  in  this  study  of  the  relations  of 
mind  and  brain,  an  important  illustration  of  the 
synthesis  of  the  methods.  The  illustration  is  of 
special  significance,  for  the  relations  are  among  the 
most  important  facts  to  which  the  methods  can  be 


SYNTHESIS  OF  THE  METHODS  259 

applied  ;  moreover,  when  man  "  knows  himself  "  he 
will  be  on  the  way  to  a  knowledge  of  nature. 

27.  Before  this  investigation  into  the  function 
of  each  method  of  knowledge  is  concluded,  there 
is  a  question  of  vital  importance  to  be  considered. 
The  attempt  has  been  made  in  this  criticism  of 
categories  to  discredit  them  as  cognitive  factors. 
But,  nevertheless,  they  seem  essential  to  the  ap- 
plication of  the  method  of  sympathetic  imitation. 
They  seem  to  be  not  merely  instruments  to  be  used 
for  a  truer  kind  of  cognition  than  they  in  them- 
selves afford,  but  to  be  inseparable  elements  of  the 
cognition  for  which  the  claim  of  truth  is  here  made. 
Thus,  it  is  said  that  the  man  who  knows  another 
by  sympathy  has  a  conscious  experience  like  the 
experience  of  that  other.  Here  the  category  of 
quantity  is  employed  :  the  subject  and  object  are 
numerically  distinct.  The  category  of  similarity 
is  also  employed.  Would  not  the  sympathy  col- 
lapse were  these  categories  denied  it?  It  may 
further  be  objected  that  we  cannot  reason  without 
the  categories  :  the  attempt  to  overthrow  them  is 
made  in  the  strength  of  them. 

It  is  true  that,  in  the  exercise  of  sympathy,  use 
is  made  of  the  categories.  Yet  it  does  not  follow 
that  they  enter  into  that  which  is  the  peculiar  act 
of  sympathy.  Rather  must  it  be  said  that  to  that 


260  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

act  they  are  irrelevant.  They  may  precede,  or 
follow,  or  even  accompany,  the  sympathy ;  but 
they  are  present  as  reflections  on  it  and  the  condi- 

•f 

tions  in  which  it  occurs  ;  they  are  present  as  in- 
tegral parts  of  it  only  in  those  special  cases  in  which 
they  appear,  not  as  universals,  but  as  mental  facts 
among  other  mental  facts.  Thus,  when  we  turn  to 
consider  the  sympathy,  and  say  that  in  it  there  is 
one  mental  experience  similar  to  another  mental 
experience,  we  are  treating  it  according  to  scien- 
tific methods.  It  can  readily  be  seen  that  our 
every-day  reflections  on  it  belong  to  the  same  order 
of  thought.  But  such  categories  as  similarity  and 
number  do  not  represent,  save  in  a  symbolic  way, 
objective  relations.  Sympathy  transcends  catego- 
ries. It  cannot  be  described  in  terms  of  them. 
The  truth  which  it  gives  can  be  described  only  in 
its  terms.  We  must  not  confound  the  account  of 
sympathy  which  psychology  gives  with  the  truth 
which  the  act  of  sympathy  gives. 

Again,  it  is  true  that  we  use  the  categories  for 
their  overthrow.  Yet  this  may  be  a  legitimate 
process.  While  concepts  and  categories  are  use- 
ful for  all  reasoning,  they  are  useful  as  algebra  is 
useful.  When  we  finally  compare  the  algebraic 
symbols  and  processes  with  the  realities  for  which 
they  stand,  their  symbolic  character  is  apparent. 


SYNTHESIS  OF  THE  METHODS  261 

So,  while  concepts  are  serviceable,  it  is  yet  found 
when  they  are  compared  with  the  reality,  that  they 
are  not  the  counterpart  of  that  reality.  It  may 
be  extremely  convenient  to  count  things,  yet  it  does 
not  follow  that  number  is  an  objective  entity.  It 
may  also  be  convenient  to  say  that  one  thing  is  like 
another,  though  one  might  refuse  to  believe  that 
likeness,  as  we  think  it,  is  something  subsisting 
objectively  as  a  relation  between  things.  So  con- 
cepts may  by  their  usefulness  in  reasoning  conduct 
us  to  a  view  of  things  by  which  it  is  seen  that  they 
are  not  the  counterpart  of  reality. 

28.  We  can  conceive,  as  Kant  says,  an  intelli- 
gence for  which  concepts  are  not  necessary  :  the 
whole  universe  is  present  to  it  as  it  actually  is  in 
its  concreteness.  For  us  concepts  are  necessary 
because  of  our  fmitude.  We  cannot  have  the  total- 
ity of  the  universe  present  in  one  state  of  con- 
sciousness. We  know  fragments  of  the  universe. 
Experience  is  narrow ;  and  it  comes  to  us  as  a 
stream.  Therefore  we  require  "  discursive "  con- 
cepts ;  in  them  we  have  threads  to  guide  us  among 
the  multitude  of  phenomena  which  form  the  larger 
experience  of  the  universe. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  LIMITS   OF  KNOWLEDGE 

1.  Is  the  method  of   knowledge  which  has  been 
expounded  an  unfailing  one  ?     Is  it,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  possible  by  its  means  to  gain  a  knowledge  even 
of    our   fellow-men?     How  much   of  the   universe 
beyond  man  will  become  so  friendly  to  us  that  it 
will  tell  us  its  secret?     Is  sympathy  the  magic  by 
which  man  can  understand,  not  only  the  song  of  the 
birds,  but  also  the  music  of  wind  and  waters,  and 
can  penetrate  the  mystery  of  sun,  and  stars,  and 
those  other  material  masses  which  have  no  speech 
nor  language  ? 

2.  In  the  consideration  of   the  limits  of  know- 
ledge, it  is   important  at  the  outset  to  deal  with 
certain  views  of  the  possibility  of  knowledge.     First 
of  all,  there  is  the  view  of  idealists  such  as  Hegel, 
who  teaches   that  the  mind  possesses  universals  or 
categories,   and   that,  therefore,  since   the  world  is 
made  up  of  such  universals,  the  mind  has  absolute 
knowledge.     This  theory  of  the  place  to  be  assigned 
to  universals  is  not  to  be  sustained.     Their  presence 

262 


THE  LIMITS  OF  KNOWLEDGE  263 

in  the  mind  is  not  knowledge  of  the  Absolute,  any 
more  than  the  presence  of  any  conscious  state  is 
such  knowledge.  They  have  their  importance  in 
relation  to  a  mind  which  is  incapable  of  universal 
knowledge.  To  an  "  intuitive  understanding  "  they 
are  particular  mental  states  among  other  particular 
states.  The  possibility  of  a  knowledge  of  the  uni- 
verse is,  therefore,  not  to  be  demonstrated  by  the 
mind's  possession  of  so-called  universals. 

3.  But    dogmatic    agnosticism    still    more    than 
absolute  idealism  has  been  characteristic  of  modern 
times.     Agnostics  maintain  that,  after  all  the  possi- 
bilities of  human  knowledge  have  been  exhausted, 
there    must    remain     something    absolutely    unap- 
proachable by  the  human  faculties. 

4.  Kant's   doctrine  of  an   unknowable   thing   in 
itself   was  referred   to    in    the    preceding   chapter. 
While  it  was  shown  that  the  distinction   between 
phenomena  and  things  in  themselves  is  a  legitimate 
one  within  the  sphere  of  the  knowable,  the  question 
was  left  unanswered,  whether  there  may  not  be  out- 
side of  the  knowable  an  unknowable  reality. 

It  is  interesting  to  observe  how  Kant's  view  of 
knowledge  as  synthetic  coheres  with  his  agnosticism. 
Sense-data  are  furnished  us,  but  it  is  not  the  func- 
tion of  thought  or  judgment  to  interpret  them  ; 
it  can  only  conjoin  or  synthetize  them.  It  is 


264  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

only  necessary  to  recall  what  has  already  been 
pointed  out,  that  this  is  not  a  correct  psychological 
account  of  the  judgment ;  for,  while  the  judgment 
is  a  synthesis  of  ideas,  the  predicate  is  not  merely 
joined  to  the  subject,  but  is  given  as  its  truth  or 
meaning. 

To  estimate  fully  the  value  of  Kant's  agnosticism, 
it  is  important  to  see  the  root  from  which  it  springs. 
It  seems  to  come  from  his  treatment  of  the  thing  in 
itself.  This  thing  is  not  a  mere  blank.  It  is  a 
thing.  It  is,  moreover,  in  some  way  the  cause  of 
phenomena,  or  their  ground.  Kant  says  that  our 
intuition  consists  of  the  mode  in  which  we  are 
affected  by  objects  ;  that  is,  the  object  acts  upon  the 
Ego,  and  starts  the  Ego's  sensuous  activity.  It  can 
thus  be  seen  that  the  thing  in  itself  has  the  marks 
of  substance.  It  is  only,  natural  that  Kant  should 
add  that  this  substrate  of  phenomena  is  unknowable. 
Not  that  Kant  would  allow  the  thing  in  itself  to  be 
named  by  the  name  substance ;  he  expressly  de- 
clares that  it  is  not  to  be  thought  as  substance.  But 
when  Kant  makes  this  declaration  his  agnosticism 
tends  to  disappear.  On  the  other  hand,  men  are  in- 
fluenced by  principles  which,  if  recognized,  would 
be  repudiated  by  them ;  and  when  Kant  speaks  of  the 
thing  in  itself  as  a  real  existence,  he  seems  to  have 
recourse  to  the  familiar  idea  of  substance. 


THE  LIMITS  OF  KNOWLEDGE  265 

The  agnosticism  of  substance,  however,  is  spu- 
rious ;  it  is  that  of  vagueness  and  lack  of  analysis. 
Substance  is  an  image  which  lends  itself  less  readily 
than  some  other  images  to  the  methods  of  scientific 
thinking.  But  there  is  ultimately  nothing  unknow- 
able about  it  more  than  about  other  images.  But, 
even  if  Kant  has  allowed  the  thing  in  itself  to 
assume  the  characteristics  of  substance,  are  we 
therefore  to  deny  that  there  is  an  unknowable  some- 
thing ?  Is  Kant  not  justified  in  keeping  in  view  a 
reality  of  whose  inner  being  we  can  in  no  way  form 
a  conception  ?  It  is  to  be  said  in  answer  to  this  that 
the  dogmatic  form  in  which  Kant  presented  his 
agnosticism  must  be  renounced.  When  we  speak 
of  a  "  thing,"  even  though  we  say  it  is  unknowable, 
we  are  using  a  mental  conception,  and  thus  bringing 
it  into  the  area  of  knowledge.  The  conception  of 
substance,  with  all  other  similar  conceptions,  must 
be  renounced,  if  the  unknowability  of  things  is 
to  be  maintained.  For  these  are  interpretative  or 
imitative  ideas,  and  to  apply  them  is,  at  least,  to 
claim  knowledge.  We  cannot  speak  of  unknowable 
things. 

5.  There  are  other  representations  of  agnosti- 
cism, which  demand  consideration.  Mr.  Herbert 
Spencer  has  given  a  number  of  arguments  to  show 
that  we  cannot  know  the  Absolute.  He  reasons 


266  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

that  such  knowledge  is  for  us  unattainable,  because 
in  our  knowledge  subject  and  object  are  related  to 
each  other ;  it  is  impossible  to  know  in  such  rela- 
tions the  absolute,  which  exists  out  of  all  relations. 
But,  as  we  have  seen,  knowledge  is  not  to  be  con- 
strued as  a  relation  in  which  subject  and  object 
merely  affect  each  other.  It  is  the  function  of 
knowledge  to  equate  itself  with  its  object.  As  we 
have  already  seen,  we  may  know  a  man  as  phenom- 
enon, or  we  may  know  him  as  he  is  for  himself. 
This  life  of  his  is  a  series  of  facts,  and  in  knowing 
them  as  they  are  we  have  a  knowledge  of  the  abso- 
lute reality.  It  might  be  objected  that  subject  and 
object  are  still  kept  distinct.  To  this  it  may  be 
answered  that,  if  they  are  distinct,  they  yet  have 
this  peculiar  relation,  that  the  states  of  the  one  form 
a  copy  of  the  states  of  the  other.  At  the  same  time, 
it  must  be  admitted  that  we  cannot  go  beyond  this 
principle  in  claiming  knowledge  of  other  things. 
For,  while  the  temptation  to  resort,  in  the  explana- 
tion of  all  knowledge,  to  the  doctrine  that  subject 
and  object  are  identical  has  presented  itself  to  phi- 
losophers, we  are  not  entitled  to  assert  this  identity 
of  subject  and  object  in  the  knowledge  of  one  indi- 
vidual by  another.  Nor  may  we  assert  it,  even 
though  it  is  true  that  numerical  distinctness  is  a 
symbolical  idea. 


THE  LIMITS  OF  KNOWLEDGE  267 

Again,  Mr.  Spencer  says  that  we  cannot  know 
the  absolute  because  to  know  anything  is  to 
class  it  ;  thus  the  absolute,  which  cannot  be  put 
in  a  class,  cannot  be  known.  In  a  similar  argu- 
ment it  is  contended  that,  as  we  know  things  by 
stating  relations  of  likeness,  the  absolute,  as  it 
cannot  be  said  to  be  like  anything,  cannot  be 
known.  In  regard  to  these  arguments  it  may 
be  pointed  out  that  the  real  objection  to  the  at- 
tempt to  know  by  concepts  is,  that  we  cannot  by 
this  method  know  the  absolute,  unless  the  ab- 
solute is  made  of  concepts.  Mr.  Spencer  comes 
near  a  recognition  of  this  fact  when  he  finds 
further  support  for  agnosticism  in  the  essential 
nature  of  living  organisms.  Life  is  defined  by 
him  as  the  adjustment  of  internal  relations  to  ex- 
ternal relations.  But,  he  proceeds,  the  perception 
of  relations  is  not  the  perception  of  the  things 
themselves.  We  need  not  accept  his  definition  of 
life  to  acknowledge  the  value  of  this  criticism  of 
relations.  But  Mr.  Spencer  has  not  considered  all 
the  possible  methods  of  knowledge. 

It  may  be  added  that  Mr.  Spencer  also  is 
guilty  of  the  fallacy  of  predicating  various  cate- 
gories of  the  absolute  which  he  has  pronounced 
unknowable. 

6.    Another  form   of  agnosticism,  if   it    may   be 


268  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

so  designated,  is  that  presented  by  the  positivist, 
who  abstains  from  all  dogma  regarding  meta- 
physical entities,  and  contents  himself  with  simply 
considering  phenomena  as  they  can  be  stated  in 
terms  of  coexistence  and  succession  ;  that  is,  in 
terms  of  space  and  time.  His  procedure  is  right 
in  so  far  as  it  keeps  close  to  facts  of  experience  ; 
yet  his  fear  of  metaphysical  entities  might  have 
led  him  to  look  with  suspicion  on  space  and  time. 
Instead,  he  uses  these  concepts  in  such  a  dogmatic 
way  that  he  feels  absolved  from  the  necessity  of 
seeking  for  any  truth  beyond  them ;  and  thus 
they  become  a  screen  to  hide  from  him  the  truths 
that  are  ready  to  disclose  themselves. 

7.  A  dogmatic  agnosticism  which  declares  that 
there  is  an  absolute  being  beyond  the  reach  of 
knowledge  has  been  found  to  be  unjustifiable. 
The  agnosticism  is  also  unjustifiable  which  simply 
renounces  the  right  to  go  beyond  phenomena. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  certain  form  of  agnos- 
ticism may  be  legitimate.  If  we  restrict  our- 
selves to  phenomena,  we  may  find  that,  while 
some  can  be  interpreted,  there  are  others  which 
cannot  be  made  to  yield  a  meaning.  The  sense- 
datum  is  present,  but  what  it  signifies  may  be 
for  the  present  unknowable.  Dogmatism  as  to 
the  knowability  or  unknowability  of  the  universe 


THE  LIMITS  OF  KNOWLEDGE  269 

is  out  of  place.  The  universe  presents  itself 
primarily  as  a  universe  of  concrete  phenomena; 
whether  any  one  of  these  admits  of  interpre- 
tation, is  to  be  determined  by  experience. 

We  are  thus  brought  to  the  practical  question, 
whether  experience  justifies  the  idea  that  the 
world  may  be  known.  Are  there  practical  diffi- 
culties in  the  way  of  this  knowledge  ?  A  long 
series  of  such  presents  itself. 

8.  The  first  to  be  noted  is  the  consideration 
that  any  part  of  a  whole  is  not,  when  taken  by 
itself,  the  same  as  it  is  when  regarded  in  view 
of  the  whole.  A  letter  taken  by  itself  has  one 
appearance;  it  changes  its  looks  when  seen  as  part 
of  a  word  ;  a  word  seems  to  change  when  it  be- 
comes part  of  a  sentence.  This  earth,  so  big  and 
important,  becomes,  from  another  point  of  view,  a 
very  small  star  in  the  multitude  of  the  heavenly 
host.  It  may  even  be,  some  think,  that  evil, 
when  seen  in  the  light  of  the  whole,  will  seem 
part  of  a  greater  good  ;  the  discords  will  seem  to 
contribute  to  a  finer  music.  Therefore,  if  the 
mind  should  think  to  enter  into  any  experience 
by  the  exercise  of  sympathetic  imitation,  and  thus 
to  know  it,  it  would  find  that  it  had  been  taking 
a  part  out  of  its  relation  to  the  whole  :  for  an  in- 
telligence capable  of  taking  into  its  grasp  a  mul- 


2/0  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

titude  of  other  facts,  that  original  part  would 
have  a  different  character  ;  and  thus  what 
seemed  to  be  knowledge  would,  because  of  the 
finitude  of  the  percipient,  prove  to  be  illusory. 

There  is  a  certain  amount  of  truth  in  such  state- 
ments. If  two  things  are  brought  near  each  other, 
they  suffer  change.  If  the  mind  is  occupied  with 
one  experience,  and  other  ideas  come  in,  there  re- 
sults a  complex  mental  state  in  which  all  the  parts 
are  modified  ;  and,  if  the  first  conscious  state  is  an 
act  of  cognition,  the  coming  in  of  other  ideas  will 
modify  the  cognition.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
is  to  be  remembered  that  the  object  to  be  known 
does  not  of  necessity  change  :  it  exists  as  a  definite 
fact,  and  it  is  to  be  known  as  it  actually  is.  And 
this  fact  must  be  regarded  as  knowable  in  the  sense 
that  it  can  be  reproduced.  Theoretically  speaking, 
a  man  can  know  his  neighbour's  experience.  Now, 
should  he,  while  he  is  reproducing  his  neighbour's 
experience,  allow  other  ideas  to  enter  his  mind,  such 
as  thoughts  of  his  neighbour's  relations  to  his 
family  and  his  country,  his  imitation  or  repro- 
duction of  the  experience  may  be  profoundly 
modified.  But  it  would  not  thereby  be  brought 
nearer  truth :  the  modification  would  make  for 
falsehood.  An  infinite  intuition,  we  may  suppose, 
would  realize  the  man's  experience  just  as  it  ia 


THE  LIMITS  OF  KNOWLEDGE  271 

realized  by  the  man  himself,  and  that  realization 
would  not  be  changed  by  the  presence  of  other 
conscious  experiences.  While,  therefore,  the  man's 
experience  is  influenced  by  everything  in  the  uni- 
verse, it  is  a  concrete  existence  to  be  known  in 
itself  ;  and  there  is  a  sense  in  which  that  know- 
ledge in  the  finite  knower's  mind  is  not  improved, 
but  spoiled,  by  the  introduction  of  other  ideas. 

9.  But  further  doubts  must  arise  as  to  the  possi- 
bility of  reproducing  in  the  consciousness  of  one 
individual  the  concrete  experience  of  another. 
How  is  it  possible  for  a  man  to  know  another  in- 
dividual, since  in  the  contemplation  of  that  other 
he  gets  only  his  own  experiences  ?  If  he  has  sensa- 
tions of  sight  and  sound  and  touch  which  render 
him  aware,  on  the  ordinary  interpretation  of  them, 
of  the  other's  existence,  he  has  yet  in  these  sensa- 
tions only  his  own  conscious  states.  Moreover,  if 
he  exercises  his  imitative  faculty,  and  enters  into 
sympathy  with  another,  he  has  still,  in  what  seems 
to  be  a  sympathetic  copy  of  the  other's  experience, 
only  his  own  conscious  states.  The  individual 
cannot  step  out  of  himself  ;  and  the  limits  of  his 
individuality  seem  to  render  futile  his  efforts  after 
knowledge.  It  brings  the  difficulty  into  yet  clearer 
light  if  it  is  asked,  whether  the  individual  is  en- 
titled to  say  that  there  are  other  individuals  besides 


2/2  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

himself,  since  for  him  they  are  simply  states  of  his 
own  consciousness. 

The  last  question  may  be  referred  to  first,  yet 
need  not  detain  us.  It  must  be  admitted  that,  so 
soon  as  the  individual  attempts  to  pass  beyond  his 
own  states,  he  is  in  the  realm  of  the  hypothetical. 
He  knows  that  other  individuals  like  himself  exist, 
only  by  a  process  of  association  and  inference  ;  and 
this  process  can  make  no  claim  to  be  infallible. 

It  must  further  be  admitted  that  the  individual's 
cognition  of  another  consists  of  his  own  states. 
But  let  it  not  be  concluded  from  this  that  all  his 
mental  states  are  equally  without  value  as  instru- 
ments of  cognition.  Some  of  them  bear  no  resem- 
blance to  the  experience  which  is  the  object  of 
contemplation,  while  others  are  copies  or  repro- 
ductions of  it.  It  is  a  matter  of  great  moment 
to  gain  this  resemblance,  even  though  the  original 
and  its  copy  remain  distinct  entities. 

10.  But  the  practical  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
knowledge  are  not  yet  finally  disposed  of.  Prelim- 
inary to  sympathetic  imitation  of  an  object  there 
must  be,  as  we  have  seen,  perception  of  its  phe- 
nomenal aspects.  But  to  know  anything  in  its 
phenomenal  aspects  is  a  task  of  unlimited  magni- 
tude. The  knowledge  of  its  constitution  increases 
in  minuteness  of  analysis,  until  there  is  suggested 


THE  LIMITS  OF  KNOWLEDGE  273 

an  illimitable  amount  of  detail,  beyond  all  the 
power  of  the  mind  to  conceive.  Let  the  conscious 
experience  of  an  individual  man  be  the  object  of 
investigation.  We  look  first  on  his  outward  appear- 
ance ;  but  how  deceptive  this  appearance  is,  there 
is  little  need  to  demonstrate.  We  must  penetrate 
beyond  skin  and  nerve-fibre  to  the  cells  of  the 
brain  :  could  we  understand  the  phenomena  of  the 
brain,  and  reach  their  mental  correlates,  we  should 
perceive  what  the  man  is.  But  what  a  task  is  thus 
set !  Even  were  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  see- 
ing the  brain  overcome,  it  seems  impossible  to  em- 
brace in  one  intuition  the  details  to  be  observed. 
The  nerve-cells  are  counted  by  millions  ;  they  enter 
into  endlessly  varied  combinations  ;  many  of  them 
must  cooperate  to  one  result.  But,  further,  the 
cell  is  not  simple  :  it  has  a  complex  molecular  con- 
stitution. And  since  the  quality  of  the  mental 
experience  changes  with  the  condition  of  the  nerve- 
cells,  their  state  of  nutrition,  and  the  extent  and 
source  of  their  agitation,  it  is  necessary  to  have  in 
view  this  molecular  constitution  and  the  changes 
that  it  undergoes  when  exposed  to  various  influ- 
ences. It  can  thus  be  seen  that  the  problem,  even 
in  its  simpler  forms,  is  one  of  infinite  complexity. 
There  is  the  same  difficulty  when  the  individual 
wishes  to  know  his  own  past.  It  is  clear  that,  to 


2/4  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

have  the  same  experience,  he  must  restore  his  brain 
to  the  condition  in  which  it  was  when  he  originally 
had  the  experience.  To  do  this,  he  has  a  task  of 
inconceivable  delicacy.  That  it  is  hard  for  the 
memory  even  to  approximate  to  the  truth,  is  shown 
by  the  illusions  that  beset  it.  The  pictures  of  mem- 
ory, as  Wordsworth  observes,  have  fairer  hues  than 
belonged  to  the  original  experience  ;  the  spectres  it 
hides  become  more  awful.  A  man's  autobiography 
is  Wahrheit;  it  is,  at  the  same  time,  Dichtung. 

It  is  impossible  to  deal  with  this  difficulty  in  a 
completely  satisfactory  way,  since  some  of  the  prob- 
lems involved  must  be  left  indeterminate.  While  it 
is  possible  to  carry  analysis  to  infinity,  it  is  not 
decided  how  this  analysis  bears  upon  the  conscious 
correlate.  It  is  interesting  in  this  connection  to 
notice  the  problem  raised  by  Weber's  law.  It  is 
not,  according  to  this  law,  every  addition  to  the 
stimulus  that  produces  a  perceptible  difference  in 
the  sensation.  This  may  mean  that  there  may  be 
an  addition  to  the  stimulus,  while  yet  the  sensation 
remains  utterly  unchanged  ;  or  it  may  mean  that 
there  actually  is  a  change,  which  yet  is  not  sufficient 
to  call  up  and  associate  with  itself  the  gross  idea  of 
difference.  On  the  former  view  of  its  meaning  the 
task  of  interpreting  the  brain  might  seem  in  a 
measure  simplified  ;  for,  whatever  may  be  decided 


THE  LIMITS  OF  KNOWLEDGE  2/5 

as  to  the  ultimate  correlation  of  the  physical  and 
psychical  series,  it  would  yet  be  maintained  that, 
for  our  human  psychical  experience,  variations 
within  limits  of  considerable  extent  in  the  physical 
series  would  have  no  corresponding  variation  in  the 
psychical  series  ;  on  the  latter  view,  there  would  be 
no  such  simplification;  and,  moreover,  the  task  of 
determining  the  mental  correlate  would  be  one  of 
much  greater  complexity,  inasmuch  as  we  would 
be  unable  to  apply  the  familiar  symbol  of  difference 
to  those  variations  which  really  existed,  but  were 
not  such  as  to  elicit  this  category. 

Yet,  while  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  there 
are  very  great  difficulties  in  the  way  of  applying  the 
method  of  sympathetic  imitation,  it  should  be  ob- 
served that  large  part  of  the  difficulty  must  be  felt 
equally  by  science.  For  large  part  of  the  difficulty 
is  in  determining  the  phenomenal  aspect  of  things. 
Science  claims  that  it  is  dealing  with  facts.  But,  to 
give  facts,  it  must  not  be  content  to  furnish  general 
laws.  It  must  present  the  concrete  facts  in  their 
concrete  details.  If  the  labour  seems  infinite,  it  is 
at  such  cost  that  we  are  to  know  "  facts."  The 
problem,  therefore,  of  becoming  acquainted  with 
the  phenomena  of  a  brain,  in  their  complexity  of 
actual  condition  and  variation,  is  one  which  must 
be  faced  by  the  physiologist. 


276  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

11.  It  must  be  said,  finally,  that  it  is  necessary 
to   distinguish   between   a  method  and   its   perfect 
application.     The  method  of  truth  may  be  known, 
though  perfect  truth  may  not  be  reached.     To  the 
acknowledgment    that    truth   is   still   an   ideal,   all 
advocacy  of  whatever  method  must  probably  come. 
Knowledge   or  truth  may  be  what   Kant   called   a 
regulative   idea.      Yet,  nevertheless,  it  is  essential 
to  know  the  right  method  of  truth-seeking.     And 
we  have  seen  that  on  the  way  of  abstractions  we  are 
going  from  knowledge,  whereas  on  the  way  of  sym- 
pathetic  imitation   we   are   approaching   it.      And, 
moreover,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  we  enjoy  know- 
ledge, even   though   full   fruition   is   not  ours.     If 
knowledge  is  a  copying  of  the  reality,  the  copy  does 
not  altogether  lose  its  value  because  it  is  imperfect. 
And  especially  is  he  who  draws  the  outline  of  the 
object  he  is  set  to  copy  as  it  actually  presents  itself 
to  be  considered  near  the  truth,  rather  than  he  who 
thinks  to  present  it  by  a  series  of  signs,  such  as  the 
arbitrary  symbols  of  algebra.     By  the  one  method 
of  knowledge  we  approach  the  abodes  of  the  living  ; 
and  though  we  may  never  completely  know  them, 
we  are  in  their  presence,  and  feel  the  glow  of  their 
life  ;  by  the  other  we  are  led  away  to  what  is  illu- 
sory and  unreal  —  to  the  realm  of  phantasms. 

12.  We  are  now  in  a  position  to  determine  in  a 


THE  LIMITS  OF  KNOWLEDGE  2/7 

general  way,  how  far  the  method  may  be  applied  to 
the  various  orders  of  being.  A  man  can  sympathize 
most  completely  with  his  fellow-men ;  and,  in  the 
circle  of  humanity,  most  completely  with  those  of 
his  own  household,  and  his  own  age  and  interests. 
The  youth  does  not  sympathize  with  the  old  man ; 
and  the  old  man  has  difficulty  in  sympathizing  with 
the  child.  The  Anglo-Saxon  is  little  able  to  under- 
stand the  Oriental  races.  The  more  diverse  the 
physical  and  mental  character,  the  less  possible  is 
that  common  life  in  which  sympathy  consists. 

This  diversity  is  still  more  evident,  and  the 
barriers  to  sympathy  are  seen  to  be  greater,  when 
we  compare  man  with  the  lower  animals.  It  is 
interesting  to  observe  the  claim  of  Keats  that  the 
poet  is  able  to  overpass  this  barrier.  He  says  that 
the  poet  is  not  only  a  man  "  who  with  a  man  is  an 
equal,"  but  is  also  a  man 

"  Who  with  a  bird, 
Wren  or  eagle,  finds  his  way  to 
All  its  instincts  ;  he  hath  heard 
The  lion's  roaring,  and  can  tell 
What  his  horny  throat  expresseth, 
And  to  him  the  tiger's  yell 
Comes  articulate,  and  presseth 
On  his  ear  like  mother  tongue." 

It  is  evident  that  poetry,  through  one  of  its  most 
poetical  representatives,  claims  to  have,  in  the  case 


278  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

of  the  lower  animals,  that  knowledge  which  has  been 
called  true  knowledge,  and  for  illustration  of  which 
we  have  turned  chiefly  to  the  relations  of  human 
beings.  And  it  is  further  to  be  said  that  there  is 
no  theoretical  impossibility  in  such  an  extension  of 
sympathetic  knowledge  as  that  spoken  of.  The 
animals  are  our  kindred,  and  there  are  many  parts 
of  our  experiences  which  probably  resemble  theirs, 
even  as  the  human  nervous  system  bears  so  striking 
a  resemblance  to  theirs.  It  is,  however,  to  be 
noticed  that  Keats  takes  his  illustrations  from  the 
higher  animals ;  the  bird  and  the  feline  belong  to 
the  vertebrates,  to  which  division  of  the  animal 
kingdom  man  also  belongs.  When  we  descend  to 
animals  whose  organs  of  sense  differ  widely  from 
ours,  we  may  well  feel  that  they  have  sense-expe- 
riences to  which  we  are  strangers.  It  seems  neces- 
sary, before  the  questions  raised  can  be  answered, 
that  there  should  be  an  extension  of  the  sciences  of 
comparative  anatomy  and  comparative  physiology. 
It  is  surely  by  a  comparison  of  the  structure  of  the 
bodies,  and  especially  of  the  nervous  systems,  of 
man  and  the  other  animals,  that  we  shall  come  to 
a  comparison  of  their  conscious  lives. 

13.  Another  problem  that  may  be  referred  to  here 
concerns  our  knowledge  of  our  own  bodies.  The 
greater  part  of  the  body  is,  in  its  absolute  being, 


THE  LIMITS  OF  KNOWLEDGE  279 

utterly  unknown  to  us.  Consciousness  is  associated 
with  a  part  of  the  nervous  system.  If  our  sentience 
constitutes  the  inner  being  of  this  portion  of  the 
nervous  system,  as  some  think,  we  may  be  said  to 
know  it  in  its  truth ;  but  the  rest  of  the  body  re- 
mains strange  to  us.  It  works  for  us,  but  keeps  its 
secret.  It  may  be,  indeed,  that  every  cell  in  the 
body  has  a  sentient  life  of  its  own.  Such  a  hy- 
pothesis is  to  be  tested  by  finding  the  molecular 
constitution  of  the  nerve-cells  which  is  the  correlate 
of  sentience ;  and  while  its  absence  would  not  prove 
conclusively  the  absence  of  consciousness,  its  pres- 
ence in  other  parts  of  the  body  would  be  strong 
evidence  in  support  of  the  view  that  they  are 
sentient.  Were  the  existence  of  such  sentience 
regarded  as  probable,  it  would  remain  to  be  asked, 
how  far  it  could  be  rendered  in  terms  of  our  con- 
scious life ;  that  is,  how  far  it  could  be  known 
by  us. 

14.  The  inorganic  world  seems,  at  first,  a  sealed 
book.  Sun  and  star,  mountain  and  sea,  —  the  mys- 
tery of  their  being  seems  hopelessly  dark.  Yet  the 
theory  that  matter  is  not  dead,  but  sentient,  is  one 
which  has  often  been  held.  It  was  the  view  of 
Leibnitz  that  matter,  while  having  an  independent 
existence,  is  constituted  by  thought,  albeit  thought 
in  a  swoon-like  condition.  Clifford  thought  of  the 


2$0  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

universe  as  made  of  mind-dust.  Professor  Paulsen 1 
writes  thus  :  "  Ultimately  the  same  forces  act  in 
inorganic  as  well  as  in  organic  bodies,  only  in  the 
latter  they  appear  in  extremely  peculiar  and  intri- 
cate combinations.  .  .  .  When  the  excitation  of 
the  auditory  nerve  causes  an  animal  to  start  up,  the 
act  is  as  much  the  mechanical  effect  of  purely 
physical  causes  as  when  a  billiard  ball  in  motion 
sets  another  in  motion  by  impact.  If,  now,  the 
movements  are  accompanied  by  sensations  in  the 
one  case,  no  reason  can  be  seen  why  they  should 
not  be  in  the  other."  Again:2  "The  corporeal 
world  is  phenomenal ;  that  which  appears  in  it  is 
something  akin  to  our  own  inner  life."  Poetry 
also  has  lent  its  sanction  to  this  interpretation 
of  inorganic  nature.  The  lyrics  in  which  nature 
is  called  upon  to  weep  or  to  rejoice  may  only  in 
an  indirect  way  express  this  view  of  nature  ;  but 
there  is  other  poetry  which  is  inspired  by  the  intui- 
tion of  a  spiritual  essence  in  nature.  Wordsworth, 
the  great  nature-poet,  has  made  it  his  song  that :  — 

"  To  every  form  of  being  is  assigned 
An  active  principle  :  —  howe'er  removed 
From  sense  and  observation,  it  subsists 
In  all  things,  in  all  natures,  in  the  stars 

1  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  translated  by  F.  Thilly,  p.  104. 
a  Ibid.,  p.  111. 


THE  LIMITS  OF  KNOWLEDGE  2$ I 

Of  azure  heaven,  the  unendnring  clouds, 
In  flower  and  tree,  in  every  pebbly  stone 
That  paves  the  brooks,  the  stationary  rocks, 
The  moving  waters,  and  the  invisible  air  ... 
Spirit  that  knows  no  insulated  spot, 
No  chasm,  no  solitude ;  from  link  to  link 
It  circulates,  the  Soul  of  all  the  worlds." 

It  must  be  acknowledged  that  all  this  is  stated  in 
language  that  is  of  the  most  general,  or  even  vague, 
kind.  Yet  it  suggests  the  possibility  that  some  day 
the  vague  and  general  may  give  place  to  what  is 
more  definite.  But  much  labour  of  observation  and 
comparison  must  be  accomplished  before  men  can 
read  the  book  of  inorganic  nature. 

15.  We  have  found  that  knowledge  of  other 
things  is  confined  at  present  within  narrow  limits. 
It  may  be  that  it  will  always  be  limited  as  it  is  now. 
Yet  it  is  also  to  be  remembered  that,  if  men  desire 
to  exercise  the  faculty  of  sympathy,  they  will  find 
the  power  to  do  so  increasing.  In  the  evolution  of 
the  individual,  and  in  the  evolution  of  the  race, 
faculties  develop  according  to  the  premium  set  upon 
them.  This  principle  bears  more  or  less  directly  on 
the  development  of  imitation  and  sympathy.  Yet  to 
say  how  far  the  evolution  will  reach,  is  at  present 
impossible. 


CHAPTER  XII 

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 

1.  There  is  now  to  be  considered   the  problem, 
which  has  been  so  long  awaiting  us,  of  the  know- 
ledge  which   the   self    has   of    itself.       The   expo- 
sition   of    the    method    of    knowledge     that    has 
been    advocated  has   had   reference   to    the   know- 
ledge by  an  individual  of  other  individuals.     This 
method  might,  indeed,  be  applied  also  in  the  effort 
which   the  individual  makes  to  gain  knowledge  of 
his   past :    that  past   which  has  become   separated 
from  him  must,  to  be  known,  be  reproduced  as  it 
was  actually  at  first  experienced,  and  may  thus  be 
said    to    be    known    in    a    sympathetic    way.     But 
there    is    a    knowledge    which    the    self    has    of 
itself  in  every  conscious  state,  and   the    nature  of 
this  self-knowledge  must  be  determined. 

2.  It  may  be  said  that  there  is  in  self-conscious- 
ness the  distinction  of  the  self  from   the   not-self, 
and  that  there  is  a  cognition  of  the  self  through 
this   idea   of   it  as    a  particular   entity.       In  view 
of   such   opinions,   it  is   necessary  to   consider  the 

282 


SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS  283 

place  of  this  self-idea  and  its  significance  when  it 
occurs.  An  analysis  of  experience  shows  that  it 
is  not  found  in  all  the  phases  of  the  conscious 
life,  and  that  when  present  it  is  not  in  the  true 
sense  self-knowledge  or  self-consciousness. 

3.  It  is  not  found  in  the  beginning  of  conscious 
experience.      When   the   world    of   the    child    first 
emerges   into    being,    it    consists    of    sensation   or 
feeling,  with  little  or  no  differentiation   in   it.     It 
is  difficult  to   realize   the   infant's  experience  ;  yet 
it  is  safe  to  assert  that  the  infant  does  not   char- 
acterize   its    sensations    as    objects,    and    does    not 
distinguish  itself  as  subject  from   a   world    of   ob- 
jects. 

"  The  baby  new  to  earth  and  sky  .... 
Has  never  thought  that  '  this  is  I.' " 

There  is,  therefore,  one  stage  in  the  conscious  ex- 
perience of  human  beings  at  which  the  distinction 
of  the  self  from  other  things,  and  the  awareness  of 
it  as  such,  do  not  present  themselves. 

4.  Another     stage    in     mental    development    is 
reached    when   the    child   knows   itself   as    distinct 
from    other    things.      The    ground    of    this     dis- 
tinction,   as    we    saw    when     the     genesis    of    the 
category   of    substance   was     under    consideration, 
is    the     recognition     by     the     individual     of    the 
spatial  distinctness  of  his  body.     With  this  spatial 


284  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

width  are  associated  the  feelings  which  are  desig- 
nated the  "somatic  consciousness."  We  thus  get 
the  core  of  the  idea  of  the  self,  alike  in  the  mind 
of  the  child  and  in  the  mind  of  the  more  mature. 

Round  this  central  idea  are  associated  those 
which  pertain  to  the  individual's  activities.  These 
do  not  all,  indeed,  have  reference,  in  the  individual's 
consciousness,  to  the  idea  of  the  self,  but  very 
many  of  them  have.  They  are  thought  of  as 
emanating  from  the  actor,  and  gaining  results  for 
him.  The  self  thus  becomes  the  centre  of  activ- 
ities. The  idea  of  the  self  is  therefore  present 
when  activity  refers  to  personal  well-being ;  it  is 
peculiarly  a  feature  of  the  life  of  utility.  When 
it  is  considered  how  large  a  place  the  utilities 
have  in  conscious  experience,  it  can  be  seen  with 
what  constancy  the  idea  of  the  self  must  appear. 

5.  When,  on  the  other  hand,  the  intellectual 
life  is  considered,  it  is  found  that  the  feeling  or 
idea  of  the  self  is  not  a  necessary  part  of  con- 
sciousness. The  intellect  may,  of  course,  be  directed 
to  subjects  with  which  this  idea  is  naturally  as- 
sociated. But  there  are  many  things  which  have 
no  such  association,  and  in  proportion  as  at- 
tention is  concentrated  on  them,  the  idea  of  the 
self  tends  to  disappear.  Illustrations  of  this  ten- 
dency can  be  found  in  sensorial  activity.  When 


SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS  285 

the  vision  is  absorbed  in  the  colours  of  a  beauti- 
ful sunset,  there  may*  not  be  any  distinct  thought 
of  the  self,  or  any  contrast  of  the  self  with  a 
not-self.  The  lover  of  music  finds  his  existence, 
when  he  is  listening  to  the  orchestra,  to  consist 
in  sounds.  Likewise,  in  the  operations  of  the  ab- 
stract intellect  there  is  the  same  abandonment  of 
the  self  feeling  :  when  the  mathematician,  for  in- 
stance, is  occupied  with  his  problem,  there  may 
be  no  thought  of  the  self  present  to  his  mind. 

In  view  of  all  these  facts  it  can  be  seen  that 
there  is  no  warrant  for  the  supposition  that  there 
is  an  awareness  of  the  self  as  separate  subject  in 
all  the  conscious  activities  of  the  mind.1 

6.  For  the  analysis  of  the  idea  of  the  self 
ghows  us  that  it  is  a  particular  idea  among  other 
particular  ideas.  Even  when  the  original  body- 
consciousness  has  been  enriched  by  the  addition 
of  other  ideas  pertaining  to  the  intellectual  or 
moral  or  religious  life,  the  idea  of  the  self  thus 
gained  still  remains  a  particular  idea.  And  since 
the  number  of  ideas  to  which  attention  can  be 
given  is  limited,  the  entrance  of  one  often  means 

1  It  may  be  here  remarked  that  illusions  as  to  personal  identity 
do  not  arise  from  intellectual  or  sympathetic  absorption  as  such  ; 
they  appear  when  the  self-idea  is  present  and  is  associated  with 
experiences  that  do  not  relate  to  it. 


286  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

the  driving  out  of  another,  and  hence  the  idea  of 
the  self  may  in  its  turn  suffer  exclusion.  It  is 
true,  there  are  some  ideas  which  are  very  per- 
sistent, and  from  the  nature  of  the  idea  of  the 
self  we  may  expect  it  to  show  this  persistency. 
And  there  is  a  sense  in  which  it  is,  save  in  the 
extreme  cases  of  rapt  attention,  seldom  entirely 
absent  from  consciousness.  Often,  however,  it  is 
not  so  much  the  idea  of  the  self  that  is  present 
as  that  body-consciousness  of  which  the  self-idea 
is  the  resultant.  The  body-consciousness,  since 
the  body  is  always  with  us,  is  not  readily  eclipsed. 
And  as  these  body-feelings  are  so  intimately  con- 
nected with  the  self-idea,  there  is  a  sense  in 
which  the  idea  may  be  said  to  have  great  per- 
sistency, even  when  in  its  rounded,  determinate 
form  it  is  not  present. 

7.  But  it  may  be  contended  that  the  idea  of  the 
self  must  be  present,  since  to  it  all  experiences  are 
referred,  and  since,  moreover,  it  is  only  through  this 
reference  that  the  conscious  life  has  its  unity  and 
sense  of  identity.  This  reference  of  conscious  experi- 
ences to  the  self  must  be  admitted  to  take  place  very 
frequently,  in  a  more  or  less  direct  way.  The  idea 
of  the  self  is  the  centre  of  the  conscious  life,  and  it  is 
by  the  association  of  the  various  experiences  with 
this  constant  quantity  that  the  continuity  of  the 


SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS  287 

soul's  life  is  attained;  for,  being  a  part  of  the  mem- 
ory of  the  past,  and  also  a  part  of  the  present  experi- 
ence, it  is  the  bond  which  unifies  past  and  present. 
Yet  while  all  this  is  to  be  recognized,  it  is  to  be 
noticed  that  the  association  may  be  remote  and  in- 
direct; and  also  that,  when  present,  the  self -idea  may 
not  have  its  complete  and  developed  form:  the  asso- 
ciation may  be  with  a  fragment  of  the  idea,  or  with 
something  that  serves  for  the  time  as  a  sign  of  the 
idea.  It  is  only  in  this  qualified  sense  that  the  self- 
idea  is  to  be  taken  as  the  centre  of  reference  for  our 
experiences. 

8.  We  come  now  to  the  question,  whether  a 
knowledge  of  the  self  is  yielded  by  the  self-idea. 
Such  knowledge  cannot  be  given  by  the  idea  when  it 
is  absent.  Nor  is  this  knowledge  given  by  it  when 
it  is  present.  It  presents  itself  as  one  idea  among 
other  ideas,  and  knowledge  of  it  is  not  knowledge  of 
them  any  more  than  knowledge  of  the  pen  which  I 
now  see  is  knowledge  of  the  paper  which  I  also  see. 
The  idea  is  usually  the  product  of  a  fraction  of  ex- 
perience. And  should  it  not  merely  represent  the 
body-consciousness,  but  be  made  to  include  elements 
of  a  different  character,  it  still  has  the  limitations  of 
the  general  concept,  and  fails  to  mirror  the  soul's 
life.  We  cannot  by  it  gain  knowledge  of  the  self, 
when  by  the  self  is  meant  the  actual  experiences  of 


288  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

consciousness.  If  the  self  has  a  knowledge  of  itself 
in  every  conscious  state,  it  is  not  by  this  idea  that 
such  knowledge  is  to  be  attained. 

9.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  do  more  than  refer 
here  to  the  transcendentalist's  view  that  the  self  is 
not  to  be  regarded   as  something   apart   from   the 
soul's  experiences,  but  as  given  in  these  experiences, 
being  the  one  in  the  many.     The  doctrine  is  of  value 
in  so  far  as  it  calls  attention  to  the  concrete,  whether 
we  call  it  "  many  "  or  not.    Its  weakness  is  in  its  doc- 
trine of  the  one.     The  one  is  a  category,  determined 
to  be,  say,  reason;    it  is  then  regarded  as  realized  in 
the  manifold  actual  experiences.    The  illusion  of  the 
one  in  the  many  need  not  be  again  exposed;    nor 
need  it  be  again  demonstrated  that  it  is  not  by  the 
employment  of  such  categories  that  knowledge  of 
the  self  is  to  be  attained. 

10.  Yet  it  may  seem  that  in  knowledge  there  must 
be  the  antithesis  of  object  and  subject,  and  that,  there- 
fore, if  the  self  is  the  concrete  manifold  of  experi- 
ence, it  must  be  copied,  if  not  by  a  general  concept, 
by  a  cognition  which  has  the  manifold  for  its  con- 
tent.    Let  it  be  observed,  however,  that  there  is  not 
in    the   self-cognition    now   being    considered    any 
consciousness  of  such  an  antithesis.      We  do  not  set 
ourselves   over   against    ourselves   in    the   ordinary 
course  of  experience.      We  may  observe  ourselves 


SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS  289 

when  certain  feelings  are  active  in  our  minds ;  but 
such  observation  is  usually  little  entitled  to  the 
name  knowledge ;  besides,  even  it  is  exceptional.  It 
is  not  in  these  rare  glimpses  that  the  continuous 
knowledge  of  the  self  is  to  be  found. 

There  is  a  further  difficulty  in  the  way  of  such 
knowledge.  If  the  objective  experience  is  to  be 
copied,  it  must  be  copied  by  a  similar  experience. 
But  this  means  that  the  same  faculties  are  exercised 
in  precisely  the  same  way,  both  in  the  original 
experience  and  in  its  copy:  that  is,  the  two  collapse 
into  one,  and  the  antithesis  is  rendered  impossible. 

Even  were  this  difficulty  not  insuperable,  there  is 
another  to  be  encountered.  If  there  is  to  be  a 
knowledge  of  each  conscious  state  as  it  is  experi- 
enced, this  knowledge  must  be  known  by  a  new  con- 
scious state,  and  the  new  state  must  be  known  by  yet 
another,  and  so  ad  infinitum.  It  need  not  be  shown 
that  the  method  which  involves  this  infinite  progres- 
sion is  not  the  method  of  the  self-knowledge  which 
we  are  seeking  to  explain. 

11.  Is  it  then  an  unwarrantable  assumption  to 
say,  that  the  self  knows  itself  in  each  conscious 
state?  The  nature  of  this  self-knowledge  and  its 
possibility  are  understood,  if  we  consider  the  nature 
of  any  fact  of  conscious  experience.  A  conscious 
state  is  essentially  knowledge  of  itself.  Its  reality  is 


2QO  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

constituted  by  consciousness,  and  being  a  fact  of  con- 
sciousness, it  is  felt  or  known.  A  sensation  is  in  itself 
an  absolute  fact,  and,  being  a  conscious  experience, 
it  is  in  the  experience  of  it  known  as  it  is;  thus 
it  is  self-knowledge.  Our  feelings  exist  only  as 
feelings ;  and  as  the  feelings  are,  so  are  they  felt ; 
and  as  they  are  felt,  so  they  are.  All  ike  conscious 
states  which  constitute  the  self  are  known  in  their 
reality  in  and  through  the  experience  of  them.  Their 
esse  is  at  once  percipere  and  percipi.  In  them 
"  knowing  and  being  "  are  identical.  Consciousness 
is  self-consciousness. 

12.  The  doctrine  of  sympathetic  imitation  lends 
confirmation  to  this  view  of  self-knowledge.      For 
knowledge  has  shown  itself  to  be  a  function  of  every 
conscious  state.      Each  element  of  the  mind  is  cog- 
nitive in  respect  to  the  experience  of  other  individuals : 
it  is  through  its  sensations,  emotions,  volitions,  that 
the  mind  knows  the  corresponding  elements  in  the 
experience  of  another.      Each  one  of  these  elements 
can   fulfil  this  cognitive    function  because   it  is  by 
its   very  nature  cognitive.     If  through   it   we   can 
know   other  things,  it  is  because,  first,  its  being  is 
knowing. 

13.  It  is,  therefore,  not  alone  in  concepts  of  the 
self  that  knowledge  of  it  consists.     These  have  their 
value :  the  science  of  psychology  has  its  value  and 


SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS  29 1 

utility.  But,  apart  from  the  service  they  render  as 
symbols  of  the  connections  obtaining  among  psychic 
facts,  they  offer  no  special  cognition  of  the  self. 
They  also  are  conscious  facts,  and  therefore  the  self 
is  known  in  them ;  but  they  are  only  a  few  among 
many  such  facts.  Any  sensation,  any  fancy  of  the 
imagination,  is,  as  truly  as  any  category  or  law  of 
psychology,  a  knowledge  of  the  self ;  nay,  the  sensa- 
tion of  the  amoeba  is  as  truly  self-knowledge  as  the 
category  of  the  philosopher. 

Kant  believed  that  knowledge  of  things  in  them- 
selves was  possible,  not  for  an  understanding  that 
used  concepts, but  for  an  "intuitive  understanding." 
Kant,  in  claiming  for  this  understanding  knowledge 
of  things  in  themselves,  failed  to  see  that  every  con- 
scious experience  is  a  thing  in  itself.  It  cannot  be 
disposed  of  as  a  mere  appearance,  for  an  appearance 
cannot  be  only  an  appearance  ;  if  it  is  an  appear- 
ance, it  is  thereby  a  fact  in  itself.  This  series  of 
facts  of  consciousness  is  known  in  the  conscious 
experience  of  them.  That  intuition  by  which  "  the 
existence  of  its  object  is  given"  is  thus  offered  in 
every  conscious  state.  We  found1  that  an  ap- 
proximation to  this  intuition  is  made  in  sympa- 
thetic imitation ;  yet  we  also  found  that  sympathy 
does  not  constitute,  but  only  copies,  the  object.  We 

i  Chapter  X,  §  18. 


292  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

can  now  see  that  the  intuition  which  at  once  con- 
stitutes the  object  and  knows  it  is  given  in  every 
state  of  consciousness  as  such. 

14.  It  is  in  this  self-knowledge,  in  which  being 
and  knowing  are  one,  that  there  is  to  be  found  such 
justification  as  can   be   furnished   of  that   idealism 
which   makes   the    universe    consist   simply   in   the 
states  or  forms  of  the  ego.     They  are  not  objects  to 
the   ego ;  they   are   not  more   its   knowledge   than 
its  life.     It  is  this  self-knowledge  which  constitutes, 
we  may  suppose,   the  knowledge  of  the   absolute 
being,   for  which  there   can    be    no    separation   of 
subject  from  object.     Nevertheless,  it  need  scarcely 
be  recalled,  this  theory  of  knowledge  breaks  down 
when  the  knowledge  of   one  individual  by  another 
is  to  be  explained. 

15.  It  need  not  be  pointed  out  how  absolute  is 
this  self-knowledge.    No  agnostic  objection,  that  we 
know  only  phenomena,  avails  here.     The  conscious 
state  is  a  fact,  and  it  is  known  or  felt  absolutely 
as  it  is.     It  has  no  being  except  as  it  is  felt.     It 
may   seem    different    when    it    is    examined    more 
closely,  but  that  is   because   it  has  itself  changed 
in  the  process  of   analysis.     It  was  felt  absolutely 
as  it  was  in  the  original  experience :  and  the  new 
experience  is  absolutely  as  it  is  felt. 

16.  It  was  seen  earlier  that  there  is  a  sense  in 


SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS  293 

which  all  experience  is  a  knowledge  of  the  self,  for 
it  all  consists  of  the  knower's  conscious  states. 
Earth  and  sky  and  all  they  contain  —  these  are  for 
the  knower,  in  the  first  instance,  his  ideas,  and  thus 
bits  of  himself.  Even  his  most  sympathetic  feelings 
are  yet  his  own  feelings. 

At  the  same  time  we  have  contemplated  the  great 
efforts  made  by  the  mind  to  transcend  this  subjec- 
tivity and  reach  the  world  of  other  things.  And 
we  are  now  in  a  position  to  see  the  relation  of  this 
self-knowledge  to  that  other  knowledge. 

That  the  mental  states  of  the  knower  are  a  copy 
of  the  states  of  the  object,  is  the  conclusion  as  to 
knowledge  which  we  reached.  It  will  be  ob- 
served, however,  that  the  duality  of  subject  and 
object  is  still  to  be  recognized.  Efforts  have  been 
made  to  annul  the  distinction  between  them,  and 
declare  their  identity  to  be  a  fact,  or  regard  it  as 
an  ideal.  The  idealistic  doctrine  which  reaches 
their  identity  by  denying  the  independent  existence 
of  external  objects  is  familiar.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  mystics,  separating  God  from  the  world,  and 
regarding  it  as  their  ideal  to  reach  absolute  unity 
with  Him,  deny,  in  substance  at  least,  the  absolute 
reality  of  things.  But  neither  the  idealistic  nor  the 
mystic  denial  of  the  reality  of  individual  things  or 
persons  must  be  allowed  to  obscure  the  fact  that 


294  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

the  universals  for  which  individuals  are  sacrificed 
are  concepts  or  abstractions  derived  empirically 
from  observation  of  these  very  individuals.  It  is 
the  individual  that  is  real.  Knowledge  is  know- 
ledge by  individuals;  the  problem  of  knowledge, 
as  we  saw  at  the  outset,  concerns  itself  first  with 
the  knowledge  of  individual  human  beings  by  other 
human  beings.  And  when  the  problem  is  thus 
presented  we  can  see  that  one  individual  is  not 
merged  in  another.  If  we  regard  the  brain  as  the 
manifestation  or  sign  of  consciousness,  we  can  see 
that  the  brain  of  the  knower  cannot  take  the  place 
of  the  brain  of  the  person  known.  Even  so,  the 
consciousness  of  the  one  cannot  be  lost  in  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  other.  The  individual  distinctness 
is  preserved.  Knowledge  of  the  experiences  of 
another  is  a  copy  of  them. 

Not  that  there  is  here  being  asserted  any  hard 
metaphysical  dogma  of  the  unity  arid  continuity  of 
the  soul's  life.  We  know  too  little  whence  our 
experience  cometh,  and  whither  it  goeth,  to  assert 
such  principles  even  in  a  symbolic  signification. 
It  is  simply  to  be  noted  that  certain  phenomena  are 
distinct,  and  remain  distinct,  notwithstanding  their 
parallelism. 

Yet,  at  the  same  time,  this  distinctness  is  not  to 
be  characterized  as  isolation.  The  isolation  is  tran- 


SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS  295 

scended  in  sympathy.  The  two  souls  (to  continue 
the  use  of  the  symbolic  language  of  number)  may 
remain  two,  yet  are  they  possessed  of  like  thoughts 
and  feelings.  The  one  who  shows  sympathy  re- 
mains himself,  but  his  self  is  now  a  reproduction 
of  the  life  of  another.  May  it  not  be  said  that  this 
is  the  closest  unity  which  we  can  conceive  as  exist- 
ing between  spirits  ?  It  is  not,  indeed,  annihilation 
of  the  self ;  but  such  annihilation  would  be  the 
negation  of  this  unity.  In  sympathy  the  soul  is 
not  lost,  or  annihilated,  yet  is  it  at  one  with  the 
object. 

The  soul,  therefore,  cannot  lose  its  finitude  or 
individuality.  Yet  it  transcends  this  individuality 
by  sympathy ;  for  while  retaining  the  limits  of 
individuality  it  yet  mirrors  the  world  of  other 
individuals. 

It  may  be  appropriate  at  this  point  to  refer  to 
certain  statements  made  by  Lotze1  regarding  the 
relation  of  knowledge  to  the  object.  He  declares 
that  a  thing  can  never  be  known  as  it  is,  but  only  as 
it  appears  to  the  knower.  Knowledge  is  never  the 
thing  itself,  but  always  consists  of  ideas  about  the 
thing.  And  even,  Lotze  adds,  if  one  should  become 
the  object,  one  would  not  know  the  object :  to 
become  metal  would  not  be  to  know  metal.  We  can 

1  Logik,  §  308. 


296  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

now  see  how  such  statements  are  to  be  corrected. 
The  knowledge  of  the  self  does  not  consist  of  ideas 
about  the  self ;  every  state  of  consciousness  is  known 
absolutely  in  itself.  And  by  imitation  we  gain  a 
knowledge  of  other  things,  not  as  they  appear  to  us, 
but  as  they  are.  We  do  not,  indeed,  become  things, 
but  we  copy  them  in  their  objective  constitution. 
It  may  be  added  that  Lotze's  reference  to  metal  is 
fitted  to  be  misleading.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say 
that  we  are  absolutely  ignorant  of  the  inner  being 
of  metal.  If  we  say  that  metal  is  non-sentient,  it 
has  no  meaning  to  talk  of  a  man's  changing  into  it. 
If  metal  is  sentient,  he  who  becomes  metal  knows 
himself  absolutely  even  in  this  metamorphosed  state. 
17.  It  may  be  pointed  out  that  there  are  two  ten- 
dencies in  the  development  of  the  self.  The  one  is 
toward  individuality.  New  sensations,  new  emo- 
tions, new  ideas  of  all  kinds,  are  welcomed.  All  that 
lies  in  the  potency  of  the  soul  to  think  and  feel  is  to 
be  realized.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  the  ten- 
dency to  sympathy,  to  the  assertion  of  kinship  with 
men  and  things,  to  the  knitting  of  the  world  in  the 
bonds  of  unity.  It  might  not  inappropriately  be 
said  that  there  is  in  the  self  the  centrifugal  and  the 
centripetal  tendency.  Each  of  these  tendencies  or 
functions  must  have  scope  for  itself.  It  is  as  they 
are  both  realized  that  the  fulness  of  knowledge  is 


SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS  297 

reached.  The  life  of  the  self  as  it  is  lived  for  itself 
may  be  called  the  lyric  of  the  soul.  The  perception 
which  it  has  of  the  life  of  others  is  its  epic  or 
drama.  It  is  in  the  combination  or  alternation  of 
these  that  the  true  music  of  the  soul  is  uttered. 

18.  The  complete  definition  of  knowledge  with 
which  we  started  may  now  be  recalled.  Knowledge 
was  said  to  be  the  presence  in  the  mind  immediately, 
or  in  copy,  of  that  which  constitutes  objects.  In 
self-knowledge  the  object  is  immediately  present  in 
the  mind ;  for,  in  the  experiences  of  the  self,  knowing 
and  being  are  one.  In  the  knowledge  of  other  per- 
sons and  things  the  object  is  present  in  copy;  for 
the  individuality  of  the  knower  is  not  lost  in  the 
individuality  of  the  object,  even  as  the  brain  of  the 
man  knowing  remains  distinct  from  that  of  the  man 
who  is  the  object  of  observation. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  PKOBLEM 

1.  What  is  the  bearing  of  the  theory  of  know- 
ledge which  has  been  propounded  upon  the  problem 
of  philosophy  ?     It  is  to  be  remembered,  first  of  all, 
that  epistemology  or   the   science   of  knowledge  is 
a  part  of  philosophy.      It  does,  indeed,  cover  the 
ground  of  psychology,  in  so  far  as  it  considers  the 
origin  and  content  of  the  various  cognitive  factors  ; 
but  probably  all  would  agree  that  it  is  a  peculiarly 
philosophical  problem  to  determine  how  the  cogni- 
tive state  must  be  constituted,  in  order  that  it  may 
represent  its  object.     We  have,  therefore,  been  deal- 
ing directly  with  one  of  the  problems  of  philosophy. 

2.  Further,  epistemology  is  to  be  regarded  as  the 
first  part  or  foundation  of  philosophy.     If  we  wish 
to  know  the  being  of  things,  it  is  essential  that  our 
first  endeavour  should  be  to   decide   the   question, 
what   mental   elements   are  to  enter  into  the  cog- 
nition, and  what  the  method  of  their  employment 
is    to   be.      This    may    seem    like   a    demand    that 
we  should  know  before  we  know  ;   or,  in  Hegel's 
language,  when  he  censures  Kant  for  requiring  a 

298 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  PROBLEM  299 

preliminary  criticism  of  knowledge,  it  is  like  the 
requirement  that  we  should  learn  to  swim  before 
entering  the  water.  But  it  can  be  readily  seen  that 
in  systems  of  knowledge  there  is  presupposed  a 
certain  view  as  to  the  nature  of  knowledge.  There 
are,  for  instance,  certain  assumptions  peculiar  to  the 
unreflecting  period  of  the  mind's  development ;  it  is 
then  generally  assumed  that  sensations,  such  as 
those  of  colour  and  sound,  are  the  truth  of  objects. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  the  period  of  reflection,  there 
has  been,  as  we  have  seen,  an  almost  universal  as- 
sumption that  the  method  of  concepts  is  the  true 
method  of  knowledge  ;  this  was  the  fatal  assump- 
tion of  Hegel.  It  is  true  that  a  correct  theory  of 
knowledge  is  likely  to  be  reached  only  after  many 
attempts  have  been  made  ;  and  in  this  sense  it  is 
true  that  we  must  proceed  with  the  work  of  know- 
ledge, in  order  that  experience  may  eventually  dis- 
close to  us  the  true  content  and  the  true  method 
of  knowledge.  But  it  must,  nevertheless,  be  main- 
tained that  the  true  system  of  knowledge  presup- 
poses the  conscious,  or  unconscious,  use  of  the  right 
method;  and  it  is  surely  possible  to  hasten  that  con- 
summation by  detecting  the  faults  of  the  methods 
that  have  been  employed,  and  by  showing  some  of 
the  new  instruments  which  are  needed  that  the 
desired  result  may  be  attained. 


300  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

The  dependence  of  philosophy  upon  epistemology 
is  likewise  made  evident  by  a  survey  of  the  history 
of  philosophy,  from  which  it  is  seen  how  the  great 
epochs  in  philosophy  have  been  associated  with 
activity  in  the  study  of  epistemological  questions. 
The  belief  of  Socrates,  that  knowledge  consisted  in 
clearly  denned  concepts,  bore  fruit  in  the  idealistic 
philosophies  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  ;  Locke's  theory 
of  knowledge  was  followed  by  the  metaphysical 
theory  of  Berkeley ;  Kant's  reassertion  of  the  value 
of  categories  was  the  natural  preparation  for  the 
great  German  idealistic  systems.  When  it  is  deter- 
mined what  the  elements  are  in  which  knowledge 
consists,  it  is  natural  to  construct  a  system  of  the 
things  which  such  knowledge  can  represent.  The 
conclusions  embodied  in  such  theories  may  not  be 
satisfactory.  But  the  theories  bear  testimony  to 
the  influence  which  a  study  of  the  cognitive  instru- 
ment exercises  upon  philosophy.  It  is,  therefore, 
proper  to  inquire  whether  the  doctrine  of  knowledge 
which  has  been  expounded  helps  in  the  effort  to 
state  and  solve  the  philosophical  problem. 

3.  It  is  the  first  object  of  this  inquiry  to  gain  as 
clear  a  view  as  possible  of  the  function  which  in  the 
course  of  history  has  been  assigned  to  philosophy. 
The  view  adopted  as  to  this  function  will  be  illus- 
trated by  reference  to  the  chief  forms  of  philo- 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  PROBLEM  301 

sophical  doctrine  ;  and  these  forms  of  philosophy 
will  be  criticised  from  the  standpoint  of  the  theory 
of  knowledge. 

4.  Philosophy  is,  literally,  love  of  wisdom.     The 
wise  man  is  he  who  can  understand  his  affairs  so 
correctly  that  he  can  control  them  to  satisfactory 
issues.     It  was  probably  this  practical   knowledge 
which  was  loved  at  first  by  the  Greeks,  as  by  the 
Jews.     But  wisdom  came  to  take  a  wider  range  than 
the  practical.     When  men  began  to  meditate  upon 
the  world,  they  found  delight  in  contemplation  for 
its  own  sake,  and  the  name  "  wise  man  "  was  given 
to    others    besides    those    who    were    distinctively 
moralists. 

Philosophy  or  the  lore  of  wisdom  thus  became 
transformed  into  the  love  of  knowledge.  Know- 
ledge was  sought  wherever  it  could  be  found.  The 
physical  world  was  studied  as  well  as  the  mental. 
The  early  systems  of  philosophy  were  to  a  large 
extent  theories  about  material  things :  the  stars, 
for  instance,  were  a  perpetual  source  of  wonder, 
and  one  thinker  after  another  gave  his  pathetic 
guess  as  to  their  nature. 

5.  As  knowledge  increased,  the  work  of  knowing 
the   world  became   too    great    for   one   individual. 
Division   of  the   labour   was    necessary ;    and    the 
special   sciences   came  to  have  separate  territories. 


302  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

They  seem  now  to  be  independent  of  philosophy,  or 
even  hostile  to  her.  Yet  she  has  not  ceased  to  claim 
their  allegiance  as  their  ancient  mother  and  queen. 
While  each  science  has  its  allotted  sphere,  and 
brings  into  order  the  facts  in  that  sphere,  philosophy 
claims  that  such  a  science  by  itself  is  partial  and 
incomplete,  and  that  the  works  of  the  sciences  must 
be  made  part  of  her  larger  work.  This  claim  on  the 
part  of  philosophy  to  include  science  finds  recogni- 
tion in  the  uses  to  which  the  name  philosophy  is 
put.  In  the  expressions,  "  Philosophical  Faculty," 
and  "Doctor  of  Philosophy,"  the  term  "philoso- 
phy "  refers  to  the  whole  circle  of  the  sciences. 
"  Natural  philosophy  "  is  still  used  to  denote  phys- 
ical science. 

In  view  of  the  claims  which  philosophy  has  made, 
and  the  work  which  it  has  attempted  to  do,  that 
definition  of  it  expresses  most  clearly  the  func- 
tion which  it  has  assumed,  which  represents  it  as 
the  science  of  the  sciences.  Science  is  philosophy 
applied  to  a  particular  problem ;  philosophy  is 
science  made  universal  and  complete.  If  science 
seeks  the  unity  of  law  in  a  particular  sphere,  philos- 
ophy seeks  the  law  of  laws.  It  may  not  be  appar- 
ent how  this  definition  of  philosophy  covers  the 
investigation  of  such  subjects  as  the  existence  of 
matter.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  sig- 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  PROBLEM  303 

nification  of  science  has  not  always  been  the  same. 
Science  means  at  present  chiefly  an  inquiry  into 
laws,  but  it  was  wont  to  mean  an  inquiry  into  the 
nature  of  things  or  substances.  When  this  latter 
point  of  view  is  adopted,  it  is  natural  to  inquire 
what  the  substance  is,  and  even  whether  it  exists  at 
all.  The  problems  of  philosophy  change  as  the  cate- 
gories which  it  uses  change.  Science  is  affected  by 
this  change  equally  with  philosophy.  At  all  stages 
at  which  the  sciences  are  differentiated  from  philoso- 
phy, it  can  be  seen  that  philosophy  claims  to  be  the 
science  of  the  sciences. 

That  this  is  the  true  interpretation  of  philosophi- 
cal claims  and  methods  will  be  still  more  clear  when 
we  consider  the  chief  forms  which  philosophical 
doctrine  has  assumed  in  modern  times. 

6.  One  of  the  great  types  of  modern  philoso- 
phy is  presented  in  materialism.  This  system  of 
thought  is  not,  indeed,  peculiarly  modern :  in  one 
form  or  another  it  is  as  old  as  philosophy.  It  is, 
however,  in  modern  times  that  materialism  has 
gained  its  great  triumphs.  It  has  had  the  advocacy 
of  such  philosophers  as  Hobbes.  It  is  the  creed  of 
many  scientific  men;  and  it  is  probably  correct  to 
say  that  it  is  the  creed  of  many  more,  so  far  as  their 
views  of  the  universe  have  been  systematized, 
though,  at  the  same  time,  they  have  admitted  into 


304  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

their   minds   fragments   of  belief    little    consistent 
with  their  scientific  doctrines. 

7.  This  reign  of  materialism  in  modern  times 
seems  to  be  due  to  the  extension  of  physical  science. 
One  of  the  most  striking  phenomena  in  the  modern 
intellectual  world  is  this  extension  of  science. 
While  metaphysicians  may  seem  open  to  the  charge 
that  they  are  floundering  as  they  have  done  for  two 
thousand  years,  the  labourers  in  physical  science 
have  been  making  sure  and  steady  progress.  They 
have  pushed  farther  and  farther  into  chaos,  and  have 
seldom  been  obliged  to  retrace  their  steps.  The 
soil  they  reclaim  is  thenceforth  fruitful  and  habit- 
able. And  not  only  have  they  accomplished  much; 
they  have  a  wonderfully  clear  conception  of  the 
general  character  of  the  work  that  remains  to  be 
done.  They  have  come  to  think  of  the  world  as 
made  up  of  atoms  and  energy,  or  as  ultimately  ana- 
lyzable,  it  may  prove,  into  mere  forms  of  energy; 
and,  as  the  great  fundamental  doctrines  of  science 
are  the  principles  of  the  conservation  and  trans- 
formation of  energy,  the  task  of  the  sciences  is 
prescribed  to  them.  It  is  to  trace  the  forms  of 
this  energy  and  its  transformations.  The  history  of 
the  physical  world  is  the  history  of  these  trans- 
formations; and  it  is  believed  that,  should  new 
phenomena  disclose  themselves,  they  will  prove  to 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  PROBLEM  305 

be  forms  of  energy  correlated  with,  or  convertible 
into,  the  forms  now  familiar. 

8.  It   is   not   necessary    to    illustrate    at    great 
length  the  meaning  of  this  doctrine   as   it   applies 
to  the  inorganic  world.     It  is   scarcely    too   much 
to  say  that  the  tendency  of   science   is   to   reduce 
all  forms    of   energy   to   mechanical   energy.     The 
attempt  has   been   made   to   divest   gravitation   of 
the  mystery  which    envelops    it,  by    showing,  not 
merely   that   it    is    convertible    into    other    forces, 
but  that  in   itself   it   is   explained  by   the   impact 
of  particles.     The   distinction   between  mechanical 
and  chemical  forces  is  considered  to  be  a  vanish- 
ing one.     Thus  a  remarkable  simplification  of  the 
physical  universe  is  being  reached. 

9.  It   may   seem  that   this   account   of  the   uni- 
verse   finds   the    limits    of    its   applicability    when 
the   phenomena    of    life   present    themselves.     Yet 
the  progress   of   research   has   gone    to    show   the 
continuity  of  such   phenomena   with   those  of  the 
inorganic   world.     The   beginning   of  life    may  be 
in  many  senses  a  mystery  ;   that  is,  the  historical 
conditions    in    which    life    first    arose    have    van- 
ished without  leaving  any  record.     But  of  life,  as 
it  is  known   to  us  now,   a   complete  account  can 
be  given  on   chemical  and   mechanical   principles  : 
there  is  no  process  in  the   body   of  any   plant   or 


306  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

animal  which  cannot  be  so  explained.  Life  is  not, 
on  this  view,  to  be  regarded  as  something  sepa- 
rate from  the  material  elements,  using  and  con- 
trolling them:  it  is  only  a  name  to  indicate  the 
peculiarities  of  this  special  set  of  physical  phe- 
nomena. The  evolution  theory  is  a  purely  mechani- 
cal theory;  the  struggle  for  existence  and  survival 
of  the  fittest  mean  that  the  machine  which  fits  its 
environment  best,  and  responds  best  to  stimuli,  is 
the  one  that  lasts.  It  is  therefore  urged  that 
nothing  in  organized  bodies  can  be  pointed  to 
which  contradicts  this  materialistic  theory  of  the 
universe. 

10.  In  the  case  of  human  consciousness,  ma- 
terialism still  follows  its  own  mode  of  explanation. 
The  physiological  theory  of  the  mind  has  many 
facts  to  support  it.  The  conscious  life  is  found 
to  be  dependent  on  the  brain.  The  kind  of  con- 
sciousness depends  on  the  portion  of  the  brain 
called  into  exercise.  When  the  activity  of  the 
brain  is  suspended,  consciousness  ceases.  Like- 
wise, the  retention  of  experiences  in  the  memory 
is  a  physiological  process ;  the  retention  of  im- 
pressions made  on  the  brain-cells  is  memory  ;  the 
particular  memory-function  known  as  recall  means 
the  renewal  of  the  activity  of  the  cell  which  was 
modified  by  the  original  impression.  From  all 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  PROBLEM  307 

this  it  seems  natural  to  infer  that  thought  is  an 
effect  of  which  the  brain  is  the  cause.  It  may 
therefore  be  said  that  the  brain  secretes  thought 
as  the  liver  secretes  bile  ;  or  the  more  careful  ex- 
pressions of  Buchner  may  be  preferred,  when  he 
teaches  that  thinking  is  a  mode  of  motion  charac- 
teristic of  the  substance  of  the  central  nervous  ele- 
ments, as  the  motion  of  light  is  of  the  universal 
ether. 

When  this  conception  is  gained,  the  appeal  to  man's 
freedom  and  sense  of  responsibility  has  little  weight. 
The  proofs  that  all  human  actions  are  subject  to  law 
are  many  and  strong.  The  materialist  can,  in  regard 
to  this  subject,  claim  the  support  of  very  many  who 
differ  from  him  in  other  articles  of  their  creed. 

11.  Materialism   thus  can   be  seen  to  make  the 
attempt  to  offer  a  science  of  the  sciences.     It  intro- 
duces into  all  the  spheres  of  existence  the  unity  of 
mechanical  conceptions. 

12.  Many  criticisms  suggest  themselves,  but  at- 
tention may  be  restricted  to  those  which  arise  from 
the  special  theory  of  knowledge  that  is  now  before 
us.     In  the  first  place,  this  philosophy  is  made  up 
of  general  concepts.     But  we  have  seen  that  know- 
ledge, to  be  true,  must  be  of   the  concrete.     This 
philosophy,  therefore,  fails  of  the  truth.     Let  any 
one  compare  its  concepts  with  his  actual  experiences, 


308  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

and  he  will  see  how  little  it  is  fitted  to  give  an  ade- 
quate copy  of  the  reality.  Again,  if  knowledge  is 
gained  by  sympathetic  imitation,  we  cannot  know 
matter  at  all,  except  as  it  is  given  in  thought. 
Ideas,  as  Berkeley  said,  can  only  be  like  ideas. 
But,  according  to  the  materialist,  thought  is  a  mode 
of  motion  peculiar  to  the  special  combination  of 
elements  found  in  the  brain.  The  other  modes  of 
motion  and  forms  of  matter  cannot  be  known  by 
this.  If  they  can  be  known,  it  must  be  because  they 
resemble  thought.  But  if  we  adopt  this  point  of 
view,  we  no  longer  regard  matter  as  a  substance, 
independent  of  thought,  which  has  thought  for  one 
of  its  "  accidents  " ;  we  are  forsaking  the  position 
of  the  materialist,  and  are  becoming  idealists. 
Materialism  thus  suffers  from  a  fatal  contradiction  ; 
if  it  postulates  a  matter  which  is  unlike  thought, 
it  is  postulating  something  which,  from  the  condi- 
tions of  knowledge,  is  absolutely  unknowable,  and 
about  which,  therefore,  it  is  impossible  to  make  any 
statements  whatever. 

13.  Dualism  is  another  form  of  philosophical 
doctrine.  It  was  the  doctrine  of  Descartes  and 
Reid ;  in  a  more  or  less  vague  form  it  is  a  very 
widespread  belief.  According  to  it,  there  are  two 
substances,  or  forms  of  being.  Matter  and  mind 
both  exist.  Science  thus  has  two  spheres :  the 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  PROBLEM  309 

science  of  the  sciences  does  not  reach  absolute  unity. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  offer  a  lengthened  criticism  of 
dualism.  In  so  far  as  it  maintains  the  existence 
of  material  substances,  it  is  asserting  the  existence 
of  something  intrinsically  different  from  mind, 
which  yet,  in  being  known  by  mind,  is  found  to 
be  like  mind  ;  it  thus  contains  a  contradiction 
similar  to  that  which  we  found  in  materialism. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  so  far  as  it  deals  with  the 
facts  of  the  spirit,  it  is  akin  to  idealism,  and  may 
be  treated  under  that  head.  It  may  be  added  that, 
while  a  thorough-going  dualism  is  a  possible  doc- 
trine, dualism  is  generally  not  thorough-going. 
Generally  matter  is  referred  for  its  origin  to  a 
supreme  being  that  has  the  properties  of  spirit. 
Thus,  dualism  is  usually  an  implicit  idealism. 

14.  Idealism  is  the  fruit  of  reflection  upon  our 
ideas.  It  examines  the  conception  of  matter,  and 
finds  that  it  is  due  to  the  feelings  of  different  senses, 
which  have  been  elaborated  and  compounded,  and 
also  in  part,  it  may  be  thought,  to  conceptions  born 
within  the  mind.  Material  substance  is  thus,  in  the 
first  instance,  a  cluster  of  mental  states.  The  atom, 
of  which  the  materialist  makes  so  much,  is  a  nest  of 
conscious  feelings  that  have  been  ejected  into  space. 
Likewise,  the  other  categories  of  materialism,  space, 
time,  energy,  are,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  mental 


310  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

facts.  The  idealist  does  not  deny  or  ignore  any  fact 
to  which  science  can  point ;  but  he  yet  finds  that 
in  knowledge  the  knower  does  not  escape  from  the 
circle  of  his  ideas.  If  he  comes  to  recognize  an 
objective  system  independent  of  his  experience,  he 
yet  holds  that  that  system  is  constituted  by  ideas 
like  his  own. 

15.  Idealism  as  a  science  may  take  more  or  less 
developed  forms.     Its  attempt  to  state  the  ultimate 
law  obtaining  in  the  multiplicity  of  mental   facts 
may  consist  merely  in  the  assertion  of  their  common 
character  as  ideal.     The   groupings  of  phenomena 
which  the  sciences  have  effected  may  be  accepted, 
but   no   further   connection   may   be   seen  between 
these  groups   than   the   possession  of  this  common 
quality.     Berkeley  and  some  empiricists  present  an 
idealism  of  this  undeveloped  kind. 

16.  Idealism  may,  however,  advance  to  a  system 
in  which  the  relation  of   the  various   thoughts  or 
ideas  is  presented.     The  philosophy  of  Hegel  offers 
the  completest  form  of  this  more  elaborate  idealism, 
and  may  be  considered  in  illustration  of  it.     Hegel 
regards  the  doctrine  that  the  world  exists  for,  and 
in,  thought,  as  only  the  beginning  of  philosophy; 
the  law  of  thought  must  be  found,  and  the  motions 
of  thought  must  be  traced.     Thought  is  essentially 
knowledge,   and   the   object  of    this   knowledge   is 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  PROBLEM  311 

thought  itself.  The  Absolute  is  subject ;  it  is  a  sub- 
ject which  has  itself  for  its  object,  the  object  being 
given  in  the  thought  of  the  subject ;  in  other  words, 
the  absolute  is  self-consciousness.  But  the  absolute 
does  not  know  itself  immediately;  this  knowledge 
must  be  mediated,  or  given  through  a  process.  The 
significance  of  the  process  is  that  it  is  constituted  by 
a  series  of  attempts  on  the  part  of  the  absolute  to  think 
or  know  or  define  itself.  Each  definition  is  tried,  and, 
as  it  is  found  wanting,  a  truer  definition  takes  its 
place.  These  definitions  do  not  come  at  haphazard ; 
the  process  of  thought  has  a  beginning,  and  it  has 
a  climax.  The  first  definition  is  being  ;  in  knowing 
itself  the  absolute  first  thinks  this  of  itself.  This 
thought  is  the  first,  because  it  is  the  barest  and 
emptiest ;  it  is  "  immediate "  ;  or,  it  is  not  due  to 
any  preceding  activity  on  the  part  of  thought.  But 
this  thought  is  not  an  adequate  representation  of  the 
absolute.  Being  is  too  poor  a  category  to  apply  to 
God.  Whatever  truth  there  is  in  it  will  be  found 
preserved  in  higher  categories ;  it,  in  its  first  crude 
form,  is  discarded,  or  is  retained  only  as  the  medi- 
ator of  something  better.  Other  categories  appear 
to  take  its  place.  The  absolute  thinks  itself  as  a 
world  of  determinate  qualities,  such  as  colours  and 
sounds  ;  again,  it  thinks  itself  as  substance  ;  again, 
as  a  causal  series  ;  finally,  it  reaches  the  true,  ade- 


312  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

quate  idea  of  itself  when  it  knows  itself  as  the  sub- 
ject that  in  its  object  meets  only  with  itself. 

Further,  this  process  from  one  category  to  another 
is  logically  necessary.  Each  imperfect  definition 
contains  in  it  a  contradiction ;  we  must  think  with 
it  something  that  negates  it.  Thus,  to  think  being 
is  also  to  think  nothing.  To  think  determinate 
being  is  to  think  other  determinate  beings  which 
limit  or  negate  it.  In  the  highest  category,  that  of 
spirit,  the  contradiction  is  harmonized,  for  in  self- 
consciousness  the  self  and  its  other,  or  subject  and 
object,  are  identical.  It  is  thus  that  spirit  proves 
itself  the  necessary  climax  of  this  logical  evolu- 
tion. 

It  is  not  to  be  forgotten,  if  we  would  do  full 
justice  to  Hegel,  that  this  system  of  categories  is 
actual  only  in  concrete  human  experience.  Our 
experience  is  the  thought  of  the  absolute.  Our 
observation  of  the  world  is  not  that  of  spectators  of 
the  absolute;  it  is  the  self-cognition  of  the  absolute. 
When  we  think  of  the  world  as  full  of  sights  and 
sounds,  and  pleasures  and  pains,  it  is  the  absolute 
that  is  thinking  so  of  itself.  When  we  think  of  the 
world  as  a  causal  series,  the  absolute  is  denning 
itself  in  our  category.  When  we  reach  the  defi- 
nition of  the  absolute  in  a  true  philosophy,  the 
absolute  has  become  self-conscious. 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  PROBLEM  313 

It  can  be  seen  that  this  system  allows  the  amplest 
room  for  the  particular  sciences.  The  sciences  are 
the  developments  of  the  lower  categories.  If  we 
try,  for  instance,  to  know  the  absolute  through 
the  category  of  causality,  we  may  follow  out  the 
conception  in  an  indefinitely  prolonged  series.  The 
conception  is  a  distorted  medium  through  which  to 
look  upon  the  absolute,  but  if  we  wish  to  remain 
constant  to  this  category,  it  is  in  one  sense  possible 
for  us  to  adhere  to  it.  At  the  same  time,  there  is 
no  final  logical  rest  in  this  category. 

Thus,  this  system  of  idealism  takes  all  our  ideas, 
those  that  are  unreflecting,  and  those  that  are  of  a 
scientific  or  philosophic  character,  and  strives  to 
reduce  them  to  unity  of  principle.  Regarding  spirit 
as  the  highest  conception,  and  joining  with  it  the 
conception  of  evolution,  it  finds  spirit  embodied  in 
each  stage  of  the  logical  development.  In  this  con- 
cept of  concepts  it  reaches  the  absolute  unity. 

It  can  be  seen  with  what  propriety  such  a  philos- 
ophy may  be  designated  the  science  of  the  sciences. 
For  Hegel,  indeed,  science  is  not  restricted,  as  it  is 
for  the  positivist,  to  relations  of  coexistence  and 
succession.  He  recognizes  many  universals,  and 
tries  to  find  the  synthesis  of  them  all.  He  believes 
that  he  offers  the  absolute  science. 

17.    When  we  inquire  what  the  value  of  idealism 


314  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

is,  when  tried  by  the  theory  of  knowledge,  we  find 
that  its  principles  are  in  part  justified.  If  knowledge 
of  things  consists  in  sympathetic  imitation  of  them, 
they,  to  be  knowable,  must  be  of  the  nature  of 
thought.  It  may  be  presumptuous  to  say,  with  the 
idealist,  that  there  are  no  realities  inaccessible  to 
thought ;  but  it  must,  at  least,  be  said  that  by  ideas 
nothing  but  ideas  can  be  known.  Idealism  does  not, 
indeed,  always  allow  that  there  are  objects  inde- 
pendent of  the  knowing  subject,  but,  in  so  far  as  it 
does,  it  is  faithful  to  the  epistemological  principle  in 
proclaiming  their  idealistic  character. 

18.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  idealism  has  sought 
the  constituents  of  knowledge  in  categories.      This 
is  no  necessary  result  of  idealism,  but  it  is  the  result 
which  history  has  brought  forth.      The  inadequacy 
of  this  account  of  knowledge  need  not  again  be  set 
forth. 

19.  It  may  seem  that  the  system  of  Hegel  is  not 
exposed  to  such   censures.      For   Hegel   has  con- 
demned abstractions,  and  has  declared  that  the  real- 
ity is  concrete.    His  universal  is  not  abstracted  from 
other  ideas,  in  comparison  with  which  it  is  bare  and 
poor:  it  is  not  being,  but  spirit. 

The  value  of  this  doctrine,  in  its  recognition  of 
the  fact  of  self-conciousness,  should  be  recognized, 
but  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  for  Hegel  the 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  PROBLEM  315 

instrument  of  cognition  and  the  object  to  be 
known  are  at  once  the  category  or  concept.  His 
logic  is  an  account  of  categories  :  they  constitute 
the  essence  of  God.  Nor  in  the  realms  of  nature 
and  spirit  have  we  escaped  from  categories.  In 
nature  the  idea  has  passed  into  its  "  other " ; 
the  categories  of  the  logic  are  thought  as  other, 
or  viewed  in  another  aspect,  and,  consequently, 
have  a  movement  as  if  they  were  liberated  and  in- 
dependent beings,  and  not,  as  in  the  logic,  mere 
moments  in  the  evolution  of  the  idea.  Neverthe- 
less, they  are  still  categories.  Likewise,  the  spirit 
has  its  being  in  categories ;  its  ideal  is  reached 
in  the  categories  of  an  absolute  philosophy.  Yet 
the  highest  category  is  not  raised  above  the  limita- 
tions of  the  lower.  The  idea  of  spirit  or  reason  is, 
as  we  have  already  found,  a  general  concept,  and  is, 
by  its  generality,  untrue  to  the  concrete  cases  of 
intellectual  experience.  It  is,  also,  as  associated 
with  that  particular  form  of  experience,  the  more 
unfit  to  be  regarded  as  the  truth  of  all  the  facts 
of  the  universe. 

20.  Again,  it  is  necessary,  in  presence  of  He- 
gel's idealism,  to  recall  the  empirical  origin  of  the 
categories.  Hegel  speaks  of  the  system  of  them 
as  a  pantheon  of  godlike  figures.  It  is  not  neces- 
sary to  attempt  to  detract  from  the  celestial  dig- 


3l6  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

nity  accorded  to  them  ;  yet  it  is  found  that  their 
origin  and  function  are  not  those  which  Hegel 
assigned  to  them.  It  follows,  moreover,  from  the 
fact  of  their  empirical  origin,  that  there  is  no 
such  connection  among  the  categories  as  that  in 
which  Hegel  believes  when  he  says  that  each 
category  gives  rise  to  another  by  an  absolute  logi- 
cal necessity.  There  is  this  appearance  of  neces- 
sity only  when  the  new  category  forms  part  of 
the  one  that  is  thought  to  precede  it.  Some  de- 
terminate being  gives  the  thought  of  other  being, 
because  to  think  the  limit  of  the  one  is  to  think 
what  is  beyond  the  limit.  On  the  other  hand, 
substance  does  not  give  rise  to  causality,  unless 
the  substance  is  already  thought  of  as  having 
efficient  agency.  There  is  no  reason  why  mech- 
anism should  give  rise  to  chemism,  or  chemism  to 
teleology.  The  transition  from  one  to  the  other 
is  determined  by  the  contingencies  of  human  ex- 
perience. 

21.  The  Hegelian  system  may  be  taken  to 
present,  as  no  other  system  does,  the  ideal  which 
philosophy  has  been  striving  to  reach.  Philos- 
ophy has  always  been  construed  as  the  science 
of  the  sciences,  but  sometimes  there  has  been 
only  a  vague  apprehension  of  this  signification. 
By  Hegel,  as  by  no  other,  the  requirement  of  a 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  PROBLEM  317 

science  of  the  sciences  has  been  understood  in  all 
its  comprehensiveness.  All  the  more  does  he 
afford  the  most  striking  evidence  that  philosophy 
has  been  moving  in  the  wrong  direction.  It  has 
become  divorced  from  truth,  for  it  has  forsaken 
the  concrete  things  in  which  reality  consists. 

22.  The  results   of   this   criticism  and  the  true 
function  of  philosophy  may   now   be    briefly   indi- 
cated.     First,    philosophy  is  not  a  system   of  the 
universe.     The   demand   for   a   system   is  born    of 
the  belief  that  abstract  principles  or  general  laws 
contain  the  truth.      If  the   facts   of   the   universe 
can  be  resolved  into  a  definite  number  of  general 
laws,  absolute  knowledge   of  the   universe   is   pos- 
sible, and  the  search  for  the  system  of  such  laws, 
and    for    the    ultimate    law    of    laws,   is    justified. 
But  inasmuch  as  this  system  of  laws   is    not    ade- 
quate to   the    revelation   of    the  reality,  it  cannot 
satisfy    the    demands    of    philosophy.     Because    it 
seeks   truth,   philosophy    must    renounce    its   satis- 
faction with  systems  of  the  universe. 

23.  Again,  if  philosophy  is  not  a  system  of  the 
universe,  it  is  still  less  to  be  regarded   as   giving 
an   explanation   of  things.      The   explanation  of  a 
thing  is  its  sufficient  reason.      It  may  refer  to  the 
subjective  necessities  of  the  mind,  as  when  a  geo- 
metrical  construction   is   the   ground  or  reason  of 


318  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

certain  deductions  from  it.  Or  it  may  refer  to 
what  is  objective,  and  then  to  give  an  explanation 
is  to  tell  the  causal  agency.  It  has  been  already 
shown1  that,  both  in  deduction  and  in  empirically 
discovered  relations,  the  idea  of  necessity  is  a  form 
of  the  causal  feeling :  our  association  of  production 
with  the  idea  of  effort  is  so  persistent  that  even 
in  the  conception  of  logical  necessity  we  are  con- 
fronted with  a  form  of  causality.  But  philosophy 
cannot  allow  itself  to  be  mocked  by  the  illusions 
and  spurious  pretensions  of  this  category.  Nor  may 
it  be  said  that  causality  is  a  bond  which  unites  one 
concrete  fact  to  another  concrete  fact,  for  thus  there 
is  involved  the  fallacy  of  explaining  one  thing  by 
another  thing.  It  is  the  thing  in  itself  that  we 
should  know.  The  reference  from  one  thing  to 
another  is  necessary  in  so  far  as  association  is  neces- 
sary to  truth-finding ;  but,  except  as  the  minister  of 
sympathy,  it  leads  away  from  truth. 

In  short,  if  science  is  the  statement  of  general 
relations,  philosophy  must  not  be  called  the  science 
of  the  sciences. 

24.  But  it  must  always  remain  the  function  of 
philosophy  to  present  the  ideal  of  thought.  Logic 
also  fulfils  this  function,  but  it  fulfils  it  because  it 
has  first  learned  of  philosophy.  If  knowledge  con- 

i  Chap.  V,  §  26. 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  PROBLEM  319 

sists  in  sympathetic  imitation,  philosophy  must  pre- 
sent the  ideal  of  such  imitation  in  respect  of  the 
intensity  and  completeness  which  it  exhibits,  and, 
also,  its  ideal  in  respect  of  the  range  of  objects  to 
which  it  is  applied.  It  shows  how  a  perfect  know- 
ledge of  the  individual  is  to  be  coveted,  and  it  seeks 
an  extension  of  that  knowledge  to  the  whole  uni- 
verse. If  the  truth  is  with  God  only,  philosophy  yet 
has  for  its  ideal  to  know  the  truth  as  it  is  known  to 
the  absolute  being  whose  life  it  is.  And  if  this 
knowledge  comes  to  man  part  by  part,  it  is  the 
philosopher's  ideal  that  each  part  shall  be  cleansed 
of  the  alloy  of  falsehood. 

25.  It  is  implied  in  this,  that  philosophy  must 
give  a  doctrine  of  method.  It  must  show  how 
the  knowledge  which  is  desired  is  to  be  attained. 
We  are  thus  brought  back  to  the  principle  laid 
down  at  the  beginning  of  the  chapter  :  the  basis 
of  philosophy  is  epistemology.  Yet,  at  the  same 
time,  epistemology  is  only  the  propaedeutic  to  phi- 
losophy. 

Further,  philosophy  must  use  the  results  of 
science  in  the  doing  of  its  peculiar  work.  It  is 
unnecessary  to  show  again  how  valuable,  in  the 
work  of  knowing,  the  methods  and  attainments  of 
science  must  be  accounted.  For  economy  in  the 
work  of  the  intellect,  we  cannot  afford  to  dispense 


320  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

with  science.  In  epistemology  and  kindred  studies, 
in  attempts  to  define  philosophy,  we  relapse  of 
necessity  into  the  categories  of  science.  But  philos- 
ophy cannot  accept  such  categories  as  other  than 
symbols,  and,  while  it  may  look  with  more  or  less 
satisfaction  on  scientific  systems  of  the  universe,  it 
believes  that  these  are  not  the  truth,  but  are,  at 
most,  only  a  means  to  truth.  Philosophy  attains  its 
end,  not  in  the  formulation  of  general  conceptions,  but 
in  the  realization  of  the  concrete  life  of  the  world. 

It  follows  that  philosophy  must  keep  itself  free 
from  the  prejudice  that  cognition  is  constituted  by 
only  one  set  of  mental  factors.  Philosophy  must 
use  all  the  resources  of  the  mind  that  it  may  find 
that  wherewith  to  copy  the  objects  contained  in  the 
world. 

26.  When  philosophy  has  this  view  of  truth,  we 
can  see  how  idle  are  the  fears  that  truth  may  be 
exhausted.  Such  fears  are  justified  only  if  the 
truth  consists  in  a  system  of  laws.  The  well-known 
paradox  of  Lessing,  who  said  that,  had  he  to  choose 
between  truth  and  the  search  for  truth,  he  would 
unhesitatingly  choose  the  latter,  becomes  an  unmean- 
ing statement  when  the  right  conception  of  truth  is 
attained.  If  truth  is  knowledge  of  the  concrete 
facts  of  the  world,  the  declaration  of  any  one  that 
he  would  not  accept  truth  were  it  offered  him,  is, 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  PROBLEM  321 

in  view  of  the  world's  vastness,  like  a  declaration 
that  one  would  decline  to  be  God.  We  may  not 
fear  an  end  to  knowledge  ;  we  may  rather  fear 
that,  beyond  our  subjective  experiences,  we  shall  fail 
to  make  a  beginning. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

PRACTICAL  APPLICATIONS 

1.  There   are   certain  practical   questions   which 
arise  in  connection  with  the  account  of  knowledge 
which  has  been  offered.     What  is  the  effect  of  this 
view  of  knowledge  on  scientific  work  ?     How  does 
it  help  to  determine  the   function  of  art  ?     What 
course  should  be  given  to  education  in  that  which 
pertains  to  the  intellect,  and,  also,  in  that  which 
pertains  to  the  moral  nature  ? 

2.  The  first  question  has  been  answered  by  the 
discussion  of  the  nature  of  knowledge,  and  need  not 
be  asked  here,  save  that  the  answer  brings  the  prac- 
tical  conclusions  of  the  doctrine  to  a  focus  ;    and, 
also,  recalls  what  must  be  borne  in  mind  in  the  study 
of  the  other  practical  problems.     It  is,  first  of  all, 
to  be  remembered  that  science  has  other  functions 
besides  that    of    truth-seeking.      It  subserves  the 
great  utilitarian  interests  of  life,  and  these  can  be 
secured  equally  well,  or  much  more  expeditiously, 
if  there  is  offered  only  a  symbolic  statement  of  the 
facts.     When  the  sailor  wishes  to  guide   his  ship 


PRACTICAL  APPLICATIONS  323 

aright,  he  studies  the  stars  and  ocean  currents.  He 
does  not  care  for  a  knowledge  of  them  beyond  what 
is  necessary  to  determine  his  course,  and  for  this 
purpose  it  may  be  sufficient  to  have  a  purely  alge- 
braic representation  of  the  facts.  Thus,  science  has 
a  large  work  for  the  doing  of  which  the  subject  of 
sympathetic  imitation  need  not  be  considered. 

3.  But  science  must  proceed  otherwise  in  so  far 
as  it  lays  claim  to  the  high  function  of  truth-seeking. 
In  all  the  sciences,  save  some  forms  of  psychology, 
phenomena,  and  not  things  in  themselves,  are  con- 
sidered ;  and  in  all  the  sciences,  including  psychol- 
ogy, the  search  is  for  laws.  Now,  for  knowledge 
it  is  important  to  study  the  relations  of  coexistence 
and  succession  which  obtain  among  facts.  But  in 
order  to  possess  truth  it  is  necessary  to  combine 
with  the  method  of  science  that  of  art  ;  and  as  the 
art  which  penetrates  most  directly  into  the  inner 
life  of  things  is  poetry,  it  may  be  said  that  there  is 
needed  for  truth  a  poetical  science,  or  a  scientific 
poetry.  One  of  the  great  intellectual  wants  of  the 
world  is  a  poetry  that  is  not  a  mere  opposition  to 
science,  but  that  follows  the  work  of  science,  and 
supplements  it  with  the  results  which  its  own  pecul- 
iar method  yields.  Such  a  poetry  must  keep  to 
facts  even  as  science  does.  It  must  observe  them 
with  the  same  scrupulous  care  ;  it  must,  also,  to 


324  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

expedite  its  interpretations,  find  their  relations  even 
as  science  does ;  over  the  schools  of  such  poets  should 
be  inscribed  the  words,  like  those  which  formed  the 
legend  on  the  portals  of  Plato's  academy,  Let  no  one 
enter  who  is  ignorant  of  mathematics.  At  the  same 
time,  it  must  keep  to  the  concrete,  reproducing  it 
as  it  actually  is,  and  thus  giving  that  imitation  of 
the  reality  which  alone  is  knowledge. 

The  lesson  for  science,  therefore,  is  that  it  must 
not  isolate  itself  or  think  itself  sufficient  by  itself. 
The  abstract  intellect  is  imperfect,  being  alone  ;  it 
needs  the  cooperation  of  the  other  faculties. 

4.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  lesson  to  be 
learned  by  art.  It  is  necessary  that  poetry,  to 
speak  at  present  more  especially  of  it  and  of  the 
prose  epic  or  novel,  should  understand  its  sympa- 
thetic function.  It  should  not  become  philosophic 
or  scientific,  in  the  usual  sense  of  these  terms.  We 
may  need  a  poetical  science  and  philosophy,  but  we 
do  not  need  an  abstract  philosophy  in  rhyme.  Not 
that  poetry  is  to  limit  itself  to  the  so-called  emo- 
tional part  of  our  nature,  —  it  must  mirror  the  other 
processes  of  the  mind  ;  and,  accordingly,  there  are 
poems  and  novels  which  reflect  the  problems  and  the 
reasonings  which  have  occupied  consciousness.  If 
the  hero  represented  has  been  occupied  with  theories 
and  arguments,  it  is  legitimate  to  reproduce  in  the 


PRACTICAL  APPLICATIONS  325 

poem  that  current  of  opinions  and  arguments.  It 
may  well  be  as  worthy  a  theme  as  the  passions  of 
the  knight  engaged  in  the  tournament.  A  poem  or 
a  novel  that  is  philosophical  in  this  sense  is  to  be 
commended  for  its  realism.  Let  it  be  observed, 
however,  that  such  a  work  of  art  does  not  offer 
abstract  formulae  as  if  they  represented  reality. 
The  truth  that  is  given  is  in  the  presentation  of 
the  life  of  the  thinker;  not  in  any  solution  of 
abstract  scientific  or  philosophic  problems.  The 
picture  is  meant  to  be  true  to  the  thinker,  and  not 
to  the  objects  about  which  he  is  thinking. 

5.  A  question  presents  itself  here  which  it 
may  be  well  to  consider.  If  scientific  reflections 
can  thus  be  reproduced  in  poetry,  is  not  the  scien- 
tific treatise,  the  manual  of  mathematics  or  logic, 
a  poem,  inasmuch  as  it  reflects  the  ideas  of 
the  author  ?  Must  it  not,  on  the  above  sup- 
position, be  regarded  as  either  an  epic  or  a 
lyric  ?  It  is  to  be  answered,  that  such  a  treatise 
does  not  disclose  the  author's  mind  as  the  poet 
would  disclose  it.  The  treatise  is  meant  to  dis- 
close a  set  of  objective  facts  or  relations ;  and 
the  reader  has  his  attention  directed,  not  to  the 
writer's  mind,  but  to  this  objective  system.  More- 
over, the  statements  in  the  treatise  are  excerpts 
from  the  writer's  experience,  and  its  calm  pages 


326  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

do  not,  save  to  this  limited  extent,  reflect  his  expe- 
rience. The  fancies  that  came  and  went,  the  hopes 
and  doubts  of  life  that  hung  like  clouds  of  light 
and  darkness  about  the  horizon  of  consciousness  — 
none  of  these  are  reproduced;  and,  since  he  felt 
their  influence  in  all  his  thinking,  his  reader  may 
not  be  in  a  position  to  copy  his  thought.  But 
suppose  the  treatise  could  be  taken  for  a  true 
picture  of  his  thoughts,  and  suppose  the  reader 
should  follow  the  train  of  thought,  —  then  for  such 
a  reader,  so  taking  it,  the  book  is  poetry.  And 
probably  it  is  only  to  the  mind  to  which  thoughts 
of  a  treatise  in  logic  or  mathematics  are  repellent 
that  such  a  statement  seems  strange.  To  the 
mathematican,  the  mathematical  process  is  beauti- 
ful and  fascinating.  Apart  from  common  prej- 
udices, it  is  only  a  mind  alienated  from  the 
mathematical  mode  of  thinking  that  would  deny 
that  a  series  of  mental  events  such  as  this 
might  rightly  be  presented  in  the  epical  or  lyr- 
ical fashion.  Even  if  the  sensuous  form  of  rhyme 
were  wanting,  there  might  yet  be  recognized 
what  is  known  as  a  prose  poem. 

And  let  it  be  added  that,  were  science  and 
philosophy  true,  they  would  be  the  poem  of  the 
objective  universe.  But  they  are  not  true  ;  and 
men  have  sharply  distinguished  them  from  the 


PRACTICAL  APPLICATIONS  327 

poetry  which  has  its  truth  in  the  concrete. 
When  poetry  treats  them  as  facts,  they  are  taken 
merely  as  facts  in  a  thinker's  life. 

6.  But  poetry  has  not  always  been  faithful  to 
its  peculiar  method  of  perception.  Even  the 
poems  of  great  poets  sometimes  degenerate  into 
rhyming  philosophies.  Poetry  cannot  altogether 
withstand  the  influences  of  the  times.  Science 
and  philosophy  have  often  turned  it  aside  from 
its  proper  path.  It  is  the  more  easily  diverted 
when  it  has  not  clearly  formulated  to  itself  its 
destiny.  When  poetry  thus  identifies  itself  with 
the  modes  of  thought  that  are  in  vogue  in  sci- 
ence, the  blunder  is  fatal.  One  of  the  most  con- 
spicuous illustrations  of  this  kind  of  blunder  is 
afforded  by  Wordsworth.  He  is  a  poet  of  the 
finest  aesthetic  feelings,  and  capable  of  the  truest 
sympathy  with  certain  orders  of  human  experi- 
ence. But  in  such  a  poem  as  The  Excursion  he 
devotes  himself  very  largely  to  the  reproduction 
of  the  abstractions  of  a  somewhat  commonplace 
metaphysics.  There  are,  indeed,  human  figures 
moving  in  the  poem  ;  but  it  is  not  the  poet's  in- 
tention that  interest  should  linger  with  them. 
He  has  a  certain  wisdom  to  communicate  to  us, 
and  he  chiefly  wishes  to  express  that  wisdom  in 
the  formulas  of  philosophy.  Many  other  poets 


328  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

might  be  named  who  have,  for  longer  or  shorter 
periods,  relapsed  into  the  scientific  mode  of 
thought.  Doubtless  it  has  seemed  to  such  that 
the  principles  they  present  are  the  true  foun- 
dations of  the  universe,  and  that,  therefore,  in 
calling  attention  to  them,  they  are  making  poetry 
the  minister  of  truth.  All  the  more  is  it  neces- 
sary to  show  that,  when  poetry  neglects  the 
actual  forms  of  concrete  existence,  it  fails  to  ful- 
fil its  true  function. 

7.  It  is  necessary,  therefore,  that  poetry  should 
realize  that  it  depends  upon  the  faculty  of  sympa- 
thetic imitation.     Poetry  should  also   realize   that, 
while  it   is   its  privilege   to    be   free,   and    rejoice 
in  the  world  of  its  own  creation,  it  may  find  not 
less  glory  in  joining  itself  to  science,  and  taking 
up  the  task  of  interpreting  the  actual  facts  of  the 
universe. 

What  has  been  said  of  poetry  applies  to  the  other 
arts.  Poetry,  however,  has  the  preeminence  of  most 
directly  conveying  the  meaning  of  inner  experience. 

8.  While  it  is  necessary  that  art  should  realize 
its  sympathetic  function,  it  must  also  remember  its 
more  sensuous  function.     There  seems,  indeed,  little 
reason  at  present  for  fearing  that  this  will  be  for- 
gotten.     In  painting  and  music  especially,  there  is 
a  demand  for  sensuous  effects.      It  is  important  to 


PRACTICAL  APPLICATIONS  329 

see  the  true  justification  of  the  search  for  such 
effects.  By  all  the  activities  of  the  senses,  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  self  is  enriched,  or  the  self  is  more 
fully  revealed.  It  is  true  that  in  a  sense  the  self 
is  revealed  in  all  its  activities.  Scientific  formulas 
are  activities  or  states  of  the  self.  The  self,  also, 
becomes  conscious  of  itself  in  its  sympathies,  for,  if  it 
mirrors  the  whole  universe,  it  is  thereby  at  the  same 
time  discovering  the  riches  of  its  own  nature.  But 
it  is  yet,  in  a  measure,  true  that  it  is  revealed  most 
directly  in  its  sensuous  activities.  All  other  revela- 
tions follow  upon  these.  It  is  through  them  that 
the  imaginings  are  possible  by  which  the  imitation 
of  the  sense-experiences  of  others  is  achieved.  The 
concepts  of  the  intellect,  so  often  thought  to  be  the 
peculiar  revealers  of  the  self,  are  the  pale  and  faded 
products  of  sense.  It  is,  therefore,  important  that 
this  part  of  man's  nature  should  be  cultivated,  in 
order  that  the  greatest  wealth  of  experience  may  be 
won.  Sensation  should  be  taken  in  its  first  inten- 
tion; it  should  be  realized  in  all  the  fulness  of  its 
own  inner  meaning.  It  is  the  function  of  sensuous 
art  to  find  for  the  eye  the  fairest  and  most  interest- 
ing colours ;  and  for  the  ear  the  sweetest  sounds ; 
and  to  minister  to  each  other  sense  according  to  its 
capacity ;  and,  doing  all  this  in  harmony  with  wis- 
dom, to  give  the  soul  more  abundant  life. 


330  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

9.  The  bearing  of  this  theory  of  knowledge  on 
questions   of   education    must   now  be    considered. 
The  education  of   the  intellect  may  be  most  ade- 
quately understood,  if  it  be  regarded  as  having  in 
view   two    objects,   which,   though    not    ultimately 
separable,  are  yet  relatively  distinct,  and  may  even 
appear  to   come    into    conflict ;    they   are    the   two 
referred  to  above,  utility  and  truth. 

10.  Considerations  of   utility  have  a  very   large 
place  in  human  life.      The  struggle   for   existence 
makes  it  necessary   that  it  should  be  so.     Farms, 
factories,  advertisements,  are,  in   a   large   measure, 
illustrations  of  this  struggle.     Since  man  is  under 
the   law  that  he   shall   seek   what  ministers  to  his 
existence,  or,  in  other  words,  what  is  useful  to  him, 
it  is  one  of  the  first  duties  of  the  educator  to  fit  the 
young  for  the  search.      The  child  must,  therefore, 
be  taught  to   read  and  write  and  cipher;  that  he 
may  be  still  better  equipped,  he  must  learn  foreign 
languages,  and  study  science ;    he   must  also  have 
training  in  his  craft.      In  all  this  education  there  is 
a  certain  end  in  view,  and  other  facts  are  considered 
only  as  they  minister  to  this  end.      It  is  one  refine- 
ment of  this  utilitarian  view  to  claim  that  the  object 
of  education  is  mental  discipline  :    th3  facts  studied 
are  as  the  food  of  the  mind,  valuable  only  when  con- 
verted into  mental  muscle.      It  is  not  necessary  to 


PRACTICAL  APPLICATIONS  331 

enter  further  into  the  details  of  this  utilitarian 
scheme  of  education.  The  importance  of  its  place 
in  human  life  must  be  recognized. 

11.  At  the  same  time,  the  precise  significance  of 
this  place  should  be  understood.  The  ultimate  end 
of  useful  actions  must,  when  consciously  present  to 
the  mind,  be  a  conscious  state.  There  may  be 
reflex  and  instinctive  actions  which  are  useful,  and 
yet  have  not  this  characteristic ;  but  actions  due  to 
man's  device  have  generally  some  form  of  conscious 
well-being  as  their  end,  either  that  of  the  worker 
himself,  or  that  of  some  one  for  whom  he  works. 
The  end  of  such  activities  is  thus  the  enlarging  and 
perfecting  of  self-consciousness.  And,  if  there  are 
actions  planned  by  man  which  have  no  personal 
good  in  view,  but  are  planned  from  the  habit  of 
planning,  they  yet,  as  ideo-motor,  have  it  as  their 
end  that  self-consciousness  be  more  fully  realized. 
We  thus  see  that  the  great  utilities  of  life  minister 
to  that  self-consciousness  which  is  in  a  preeminent 
sense  the  truth.  Utility  and  truth  were  said  to  be 
relatively  distinct :  we  now  see  that,  so  far  at  least 
as  utility  is  a  conscious  scheme,  they  ultimately 
merge  in  one.  We  also  see  how  the  utilities  of  life 
are  related  to  the  fine  arts,  so  far  as  these  are  sensu- 
ous :  both  contribute  directly  to  the  subjective  life. 
It  can  also  be  seen  that  both  require  that  the 


332  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

educator  should  aim  primarily  at  the  cultivation  of 
the  senses.  This  cultivation  is  necessary  for  all 
knowledge ;  what  must  be  pointed  out  here  is  its 
strange  neglect  by  those  who,  while  training  for  the 
life  of  utility,  neglect  the  faculties  by  which  the  re- 
sults of  these  utilities  are  appropriated.  It  should 
be  the  aim  of  the  educator  to  train  the  senses ;  to 
develop  the  activities,  and  thus  gain  the  finer  per- 
ceptions which  accompany  these  activities ;  and 
to  cultivate  those  sense-experiences  which  are 
spoken  of  as  more  internal  and  subjective,  and 
which  go  to  constitute  the  emotional  life.  In  so  far 
as  education  is  the  drawing  out  of  the  self,  it  is  in 
this  way  that  its  function  is  in  part  fulfilled. 

12.  But  not  only  must  the  educator  aim  at  the 
development  of  the  self  in  its  more  subjective  aspect, 
he  must  also  aim  at  the  development  of  conscious- 
ness as  it  is  determined  by  the  movement  of  objects 
independent  of  the  mind.     He  must  teach  facts,  not 
only  as  they  are  in  their  use,  but  also  as  they  are 
in  themselves  apart  from  this  use.     For  the  draw- 
ing out  of  the  soul  means  that   it  is  enriched  in 
sensuous,   subjective  experience,  and,  also,  that  it 
is   enriched    by  sharing    the  experience  of    other 
persons  and  things. 

13.  We  have  seen  that  science  implies  a  certain 
alienation  from  truth.     Emerson  writes  in  his  essay 


PRACTICAL  APPLICATIONS  333 

on  Beauty  : l  "  The  spiral  tendency  of  vegetation 
infects  education  also.  Our  books  approach  very 
slowly  the  things  we  most  wish  to  know.  What  a 
parade  we  make  of  our  science,  and  how  far  off,  and 
at  arm's  length,  it  is  from  its  objects  !  .  .  .  We 
should  go  to  the  ornithologist  with  a  new  feeling 
if  he  could  teach  us  what  the  social  birds  say  when 
they  sit  in  the  autumn  council  talking  together  in 
the  trees.  The  want  of  sympathy  makes  his  record 
a  dull  dictionary.  His  result  is  a  dead  bird.  The 
bird  is  not  in  its  ounces  and  inches,  but  in  its  rela- 
tions to  nature  ;  and  the  skin  or  skeleton  you  show 
me  is  no  more  a  heron  than  a  heap  of  ashes  or  a 
bottle  of  gases,  into  which  his  body  has  been  re- 
duced, is  Dante  or  Washington.  The  naturalist  is 
led  from  the  road  by  the  whole  distance  of  his 
fancied  advance."  Emerson  does  not  hold  steadily 
to  a  precise  idea  of  that  which  is  lacking  in  scien- 
tific education ;  yet  he  indicates  that  one  thing  that 
is  needed  is  sympathy.  The  present  investigation 
has  enabled  us  to  see  how  much  emphasis  should  be 
put  on  this  faculty  when  education  aims  at  truth. 

14.  It  may  in  this  connection  be  of  interest  to 
consider  the  much-discussed  question  of  the  studies 
that  should  be  included  in  a  course  of  education. 
It  used  to  be  commonly  held  that  the  classics  must 

1  The  Conduct  of  Life,  Chap.  VIII. 


334  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

constitute  an  essential  part  of  any  education  which 
had  more  than  the  primary  utilitarian  elements. 
The  natural  sciences,  however,  forced  themselves 
into  prominence,  and  the  claim  was  made  for  them 
that  they  were  as  good  instruments  of  education  as 
the  classics,  or  even  better.  It  is  now  frequently 
said  that  all  subjects  are  of  equal  educational  value. 
If,  in  the  comparison  of  these  studies,  attention  is 
given  simply  to  a  restricted  view  of  their  disciplinary 
value,  it  lies  outside  of  our  present  purpose  to  dis- 
cuss their  merits  ;  it  may  be  that  the  study  of  chem- 
istry is  neither  more  nor  less  disciplinary  than  the 
study  of  the  Latin  grammar.  But  when  we  con- 
sider the  different  studies  with  respect  to  the  direct- 
ness with  which  they  conduct  to  truth,  we  must 
hesitate  to  put  them  all  on  the  same  plane.  We 
have  seen  that  poetry  and  science  are  each  imperfect 
being  alone.  Therefore,  education  must  join  the 
studies  which  by  their  combination  give  truth. 
Moreover,  we  cannot  even  say  that  all  studies  are 
of  equal  disciplinary  value,  when  a  broader  view 
is  taken  of  mental  discipline.  If  the  discipline  is 
to  result  in  a  mental  aptitude  for  truth,  that  apti- 
tude must  surely  fail  to  be  secured  when  there  is 
no  exercise  in  one  kind  of  perception  that  is  essen- 
tial to  truth-getting.  A  training  in  literature  with- 
out science  is  defective  ;  an  education  that  consists 


PRACTICAL  APPLICATIONS  335 

merely  in  scientific  training  is  still  more  gravely  at 
fault. 

15.  It  is  also  to  be  noticed  that  the  objects  of 
which  the   truth  can  be  most  surely  attained  are 
human  beings.     It  is,  therefore,  to  the  studies  which 
deal  with  these  objects  that  we  must  turn  for  the  most 
complete   truth.     That   is,  the  humanities  must  be 
regarded  as  yielding,  in  combination  with  the  scien- 
tific study  of  man,  the  clearest  perception  of  truth. 
It  must,  indeed,  be  remembered  that  the  same  prob- 
lems arise  when  other  objects  in  the  organic  and 
inorganic  world  are   considered.     But   the  fact  re- 
mains that  we  do  not  know  these  so  easily;  other 
things,  or  other  souls,  are  not  known  at  present  as 
the  human  soul  is ;  the  farther  we  go  from  man,  the 
more  impenetrable  is  the  mystery  of  things.     We 
may  hope  some  day  to  know  other  things  as  we  are 
known,  but  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  this  ideal 
is  still  far  off. 

16.  It  is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind  a  qualification 
of   this   statement  regarding  the  excellence   of   the 
humanities.     It  is  possible   to  study  the  literature 
of  the  world  in  a  purely  scientific  way.     The  study 
of  poetry  often  becomes  a  research   into  grammar 
and   philology   and  history.      Of  such   research   it 
may  justly  be  said  that  its  claims  to  superiority  over 
chemical  or  biological   research   are,  at  least,  very 


336  METHODS    OF  KNOWLEDGE 

doubtful.  But  it  is  when  poetry  is  understood  in 
its  true  nature,  and  is  regarded  as  being  in  some 
of  its  forms  an  interpretation  of  objective  existence, 
that  its  value  in  education  is  recognized. 

17.  It    need    scarcely    be  pointed    out    that   at 
present  such   a  scheme   of   education   provides   in- 
struction in  the  method  of  truth  rather  than  truth 
itself ;  for  a  literature  or  a  science  that  is  truthful, 
in  the  absolute  sense,  is  still  in  large  measure  to 
seek. 

18.  It    is  further   necessary   for   the   perception 
of  truth  that  the  faculty  of  sympathetic   imitation 
should    be    carefully    cultivated    from    childhood. 
It  shows  itself  early,  but  as  a   rule   it   soon   loses 
its  first  vigour.     It  is  laughed   at   by   a    thought- 
less   world,   and    shrinks    from    observation.     The 
need  of  struggling   for   existence,  and   of   clearing 
away    everything    which    does    not    help    in    that 
struggle,     is    fatal    to    its    finer    activities.     The 
shades  of  the  prison-house  begin  to  close  upon  it. 
But    were    this    faculty    valued    according    to    its 
worth,    the   loss  of   it   would  be   deplored   as   the 
loss    of    sight    or    hearing.     No    pains    would    be 
spared  to  preserve  and  refine  it  in  those  in  whom 
it  shows  itself,  and  to  rouse  it   into   life   in   those 
in  whom  it  seems  dormant.     Something   has   been 
done,  as  in  certain  forms  of  kindergarten  iustruc- 


PRACTICAL  APPLICATIONS  337 

tion,  to  develop  this  form  of  perception,  but  such 
efforts  have  been  unsystematic  and  incomplete.  An 
education  is  needed  which  shall  make  the  power  of 
sympathetic  imitation  one  of  its  grand  objects. 

19.  There  is  a  further  lesson  to  be  learned, 
which  has  reference  to  the  cultivation  of  the 
moral  life.  We  have  already  seen  that  love  is 
the  fulfilment  of  social  duty,  and  that  the  centre 
and  heart  of  love  is  sympathy :  we  have  also 
seen  that  by  true  knowledge  intellectual  selfish- 
ness is  in  large  measure  excluded.  It  may  now 
be  pointed  out  that  it  is  by  sympathy  that  men 
receive  the  strongest  impulses  to  virtue.  It  is 
customary  to  teach  morals  by  abstract  precepts ; 
and  these  are  useful,  or  even,  in  a  sense,  indispen- 
sable. They  are,  however,  of  the  nature  of  scien- 
tific generalizations,  even  when  they  wear  the  form 
of  the  categorical  imperative.  They  are  able  to 
move  men  to  moral  action,  for  general  principles 
have  the  power  of  determining  action ;  but  they 
are  not  the  great  inspirers  to  morality.  Men  are 
moved  by  examples.  When  Dante  is  describing 
the  sanctification  of  the  penitents  in  purgatory, 
he  is  careful  to  tell  what  is  done  to  inculcate 
the  virtues  that  are  to  be  acquired.  It  is  inter- 
esting to  notice  that  almost  invariably  this  is 
done  by  means  of  examples.  The  penitents  are 


338  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

not  told  to  be  humble :  David,  the  king  of 
Israel,  is  seen  dancing  before  the  ark.  To  pass 
to  the  highest  illustration  of  the  influence  of 
sympathy  in  the  ethical  life,  how  many  from 
whom  moral  exhortations  have  glanced  ineffective 
have  had  their  religious  enthusiasm  kindled  to 
flame  when  they  have  "seen  Jesus."  Nor  are 
we  to  say  that  this  is  owing  to  the  weakness  of 
men,  and  that  it  were  better  could  they  obey  the 
dictates  of  pure  reason.  It  is  in  accordance  with 
the  true  nature  of  morality,  which  has  its  being 
in  the  fellowship  of  human  souls,  and  draws  its 
deepest  inspiration  from  such  fellowship.  Moral 
precepts,  while  of  great  utility,  are  only  means 
to  ends,  and  to  rest  contented  with  them  is  to  suf- 
fer a  desiccation  of  spirit.  Let  the  moral  train- 
ing, therefore,  of  young  and  old  be  conducted  in 
view  of  the  principles  of  human  nature.  Let 
them  be  compassed  about  with  a  cloud  of  those 
in  all  ages  who  have  lived  the  good  life.  Let 
them  be  the  familiar  friends  of  the  world's  saints 
and  heroes,  in  whose  fashion  their  spirits  may 
thus  be  formed.  Or  let  them  be  placed  in  the 
society  of  living  men  and  women  who  are  aiming 
at  perfection,  and  still  more  quickly  they  will 
know,  through  imitation,  what  goodness  is,  and 
let  it  find  a  place  in  their  lives. 


PRACTICAL  APPLICATIONS  339 

20.  An  ethical  question  of  another  kind  may  be 
raised:  Is  knowledge  desirable?     Is  it  good  for  men 
to  enter  into  the  thoughts  of  the  wicked,  and  live 
over  their  injustice  and  uncleanness  ?    It  can  be  seen 
that  men  must  choose,  as  far  as  possible,  what  they 
wish  to  know.     There  may  be  many  things  which  it 
is  not  well  for  them  to  know,  except  in  a  symbolic 
way.      It  is  for  each  one  to  decide  how  far,  for  the 
sake  of  his  spiritual  well-being,  he  must  restrict  his 
sympathies ;   for   to    one  that    may  be  life-giving 
which  to  his  neighbour  brings  death. 

21.  A  deeper  ethical  question  still  remains.     Is 
knowledge  of  other  things,  after  all,  an  end  in  itself  ? 
Conduct  is  often  said  to  be  the  supreme  end  of  life ; 
and,  if  it  is,  knowledge  must  be  ultimately  a  means 
to  that  end.      The  question,  therefore,  how  truth  is 
to  be  attained,  must  seem  a  relatively  unimportant 
one ;  for  if  truth  is  subordinate  to  something  else, 
a  set  of  symbols,  or  anything  by  which  we  can  be 
guided  to  the  supreme  end,  must  seem  sufficient  for 
us.      A   full   justification    of   the   assumption   that 
knowledge   is    an    end    in    itself    cannot    be    here 
attempted.      However,  the  whole  discussion  in  this 
work  has,  in  a  measure,  provided  this  justification ; 
we  have  also  seen  that  to  a  large  extent  the  antithe- 
sis of  knowledge   and    conduct   is   false.      It    may 
further  be  suggested  that  that  life  is  most  divine 


340  METHODS  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

which  most  feels  the  world  as  it  is  felt  by  the 
absolute  being;  and  that  it  is  by  such  feeling  or 
knowledge  that  man  can  reach  that  religious  exal- 
tation when  it  may  in  truth  be  said  to  him,  "  All 
things  are  yours." 


The  Meaning  of  Education 

WITH    OTHER    ESSAYS   AND   ADDRESSES 

BY 

NICHOLAS  MURRAY  BUTLER 

Columbia  University 

Cloth.         i2mo.        $1.00 

HAMILTON   W.   MABIE 

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questions  which  has  seemed  to  me  so  adequate  in  knowl- 
edge and  so  full  of  genuine  insight.  I  like  the  frankness, 
the  honesty,  and  the  courage  of  the  papers  immensely." 

State  Supt.  CHARLES  R.   SKINNER,  Albany,  N.  Y. 

"  A  volume  which  will  be  eagerly  sought  and  thoroughly 
enjoyed.  It  is  clear,  strong,  and  wholesome." 

REVIEW  OF  REVIEWS 

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cation, no  writer  more  readily  commands  assent  than  Dr. 
Butler." 

DETROIT  FREE  PRESS 

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inspiring." 

THE  SENTINEL  (Milwaukee) 

"  Professor  Butler's  book  is  rife  with  ideas  and  suggestions 
which  will  render  it  valuable  to  all  thoughtful  people,  and 
these  are  lucidly  presented  and  urged  in  a  most  persuasive 
way."  

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Attending  Physician  to  the  Children's  Department  of 
Aft.  Sinai  Hospital  Dispensary 


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Journal  of  Education 

"This  is  an  exceedingly  helpful  book.  It  is  a  book  with 
a  mission  for  mankind.  The  author  has  a  great  purpose, 
and  his  treatment  is  both  scholarly  and  original." 

Child  Study  Monthly 

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